

ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Trevor C. Salmon



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Issues in International Relations

International Relations is an exciting and popular discipline, but why is it an important area of study and what can it tell us about the contemporary world?

Issues in International Relations is a clear and simple, but stimulating, introduction to some of the many key conceptual issues and contemporary global problems of today. Written by experienced teachers in a jargon-free way, it assumes no prior knowledge of the subject, and allows students approaching International Relations for the first time to gain confidence in what is an often complicated and confusing discipline.

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- reviews developments in areas of particular contemporary interest such as: Russia and the 'Near Abroad'; the Middle East; and Europe
- provides students with boxed 'revision-style' notes throughout the text and a guide to further reading at the end of each chapter.

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Preface

International Relations is an exciting subject. It deals with issues of life and death, affecting the future of the planet, and affecting the everyday lives of individuals. Very often this excitement and the basic questions that International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline are concerned with are lost sight of in esoteric language, and, on occasion, a concern with form over substance.

This book attempts to rectify this and to provide the basic building blocks that those new to the discipline need both to understand the basic issues and concepts and to have the confidence to go further in the discipline. It is hopefully written in a style that is easy to read, assumes no previous knowledge and is fully self-contained in language and explanation.

It is aimed to provide the reader with a basis upon which to build and delve deeper. It is the beginning of a journey.

Trevor C. Salmon
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1

States and sovereignty

Alan James

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International relations? Now what sort of relations are they? My aunt and her family who emigrated to Australia back in the 1950s? Indisputably they are my relations; and no less indisputably they live, from a non-Australian perspective, abroad. But their tale is hardly one which someone picking up this book expects to read. What, therefore, about the fortunes, on the international football field, of Wales or Scotland? It is fervently hoped (by the Welsh author of this chapter) that no one will deny nationhood to the entities in question; and manifestly they engage, from time to time, in footballing contests (or relations) with other nations. But again, it would be surprising if this book were opened with the thought that it provides some kind of commentary on the World Cup. Could it be, then, that it will be turned to for information about such bodies—which may or may not, but could, exist—as the International Association of Train-Spotters, or the World Scout Jamboree? Unlikely, I imagine.

The previous paragraph is designed to draw attention to three fundamental points about international relations (sometimes capitalised, usually when reference is being made to the university subject of that name; sometimes not, usually when reference is being made to actual international relations):

- 1 That, like many terms and phrases used in politics (such as ‘freedom’ or ‘constitutional democracy’), ‘international relations’ does not, as a matter of fact, have a single, settled meaning, so that it can be correctly used in only one way. Nor, as a matter of opinion, should it have. It would be enormously difficult, and gratuitously controversial, to secure the kind of legislation which that form of semantic correctness would entail. The consequence of this linguistic flexibility is that it is often essential, for effective communication, to define one’s terms or, where there are two (or more) established usages, to identify the particular one which is being employed. This leads to the second point:
- 2 That in this book (so the writer supposes), and certainly in the chapter which he has written, international relations is used in the fairly common sense of inter-state relations (such as those between the United States and Russia, or Britain and France). It is also assumed that the subject, International Relations, includes not just direct inter-state relations but the (non-state) factors and elements which influence them. Such international relations are an aspect of the real world. Things are actually going on, ‘out there’, between states. Accordingly, the object of studying them is to learn about this aspect of reality, to understand the inter-state dimension of our political

environment.

These remarks call for some elaboration, in the shape of the third point:

3 That, while international relations are indeed real, their reality is not the sort which can readily be seen. Now, if you think about it, you will realise that this is true of all human relations. You can see two individuals, but their mere physical propinquity does not tell you anything conclusive about how they really get on. There may be some additional evidence from which you may make a deduction, such as that the entwining of arms is indicative of a loving relationship, or the exchange of harsh words a sign of hostility. But such evidence may be quite insufficient as a basis for a sound conclusion: a quarrel has to be placed against the wider context of the relationship; an apparently warm gesture may represent nothing more than convention, or may even have been made mainly for the benefit of the neighbours. To understand relationships, one has to use not just, or not even, the physical eye; instead, it is the eye of the mind which must be brought to bear.

BOX 1.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- no settled meaning
- usually inter-state relations and the factors affecting them
- analysis of the international aspect of human society

So the study of international relations involves much more than straightforward description. It calls for subtle analysis, for careful generalising. At bottom, it involves learning about an aspect—the international aspect—of the life of human society. And like almost all human relations, those which exist internationally can be very complex. So why bother?

THE GROUNDS FOR STUDY

Any set of answers to this question must include a personal element. So let the writer declare immediately that he has, over almost half a century of study, found International Relations of abiding interest. Naturally, the subject is not everyone's cup of tea. And a good thing, too. Here, as in a related area, there is something called overkill! But for those of a certain mindset and disposition, the study of inter-state relations undoubtedly holds great fascination. The fact that you, the presumably beginning student, have embarked upon it is a most encouraging sign, for it is hardly ever the case that one is obliged to study the subject as a sort of side dish to something else. It is a subject chosen purely out of interest. There is no better reason for studying anything. Unless, therefore, you discover that you have made a mistake (even the best people make them occasionally), or you have the unusual misfortune of finding your particular course or teachers uncongenial, you have an exciting time ahead of you. Unexpected international vistas and teasing conundrums will be opened up for your inspection and enquiry. Good luck!

BOX 1.2 WHY STUDY IT?

- international relationships exist
- they are important
- it raises intellectually challenging questions
- to seek generalisations about the relations

Additionally, there are three relatively objective reasons for studying international relations (or international politics as they are called in some quarters):

- 1 Like Mount Everest, they are there. Politically speaking, the world is divided into sovereign states which interact with each other intensely and on a huge variety of matters. It is a type of arrangement which, arguably (there is some controversy about its starting point), has been in continuous existence for half a millennium. Today, moreover, the attachment to sovereign statehood as an organising political device is at least as intense as ever. It is a natural consequence that some people want to know more about this phenomenon.
- 2 By almost any standard the relations of states are important. The economic well-being of a state's people can substantially or even primarily depend on how their state gets on in its relations with other states. So, sometimes, can their physical safety—and, of course, the technological developments of the twentieth century have made it possible for some states to do catastrophic harm to others. Thus, the subject matter of International Relations resolves itself into issues which have a significant and maybe a crucial bearing on people's lives. It is not going too far to say that the student of International Relations often focuses on matters which are of huge importance for the entire population of the earth.
- 3 It is possible to study International Relations in an intellectually disciplined way. When a class of human things is the object of study, such as families or political parties (rather than specific things, such as a historical episode or a work of literature), it is because the constituents of the class have important elements in common that students can get to grips with. (Such subjects, in universities, are described as social sciences.) The commonality of the class permits generalisations about them. So it is with states.

There are not many sovereign states in the world—190 or so—and in some respects they differ enormously. But they all exist, and co-exist, in the same political environment—which most notably is marked by the absence of government. Hence, in one vitally important respect, all states share the same predicament: they find themselves in an often unfriendly world, in which they must chiefly rely on their own efforts to survive and prosper. Consequently, students can generalise about this form of human encounter, and use such knowledge to illuminate individual sets of relations. Furthermore, the focus of study can vary considerably. It can, for example, concentrate on a specific geographical level of relations (global, regional or bilateral), one or more of the multilateral fora in which they take place (organisations such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation), or the factors which permit any sort of relations at all (international law and diplomacy).

Basic to all such enquiries, however, are the constituent units of international relations. It is to them that attention must now be turned.

STATES

States are generally regarded as having three components:

- 1 Territory. This is, as it were, where a state starts, territory being the element on which its other elements exist. Each of the world's states represents a demarcated physical sector of the land mass of the globe, and at the international level represents it exclusively (the same piece of territory never being the responsibility of more than one state). Thus, apart from Antarctica (where various competing claims have in effect been put on one side), the world's land mass may be imagined as wholly divided into states by frontiers rather as a farm is divided into fields by hedges, fences and walls.
- 2 People. Furthermore, all these frontiers enclose not just territory but people. Their number may and does vary hugely from one state to another, from a few thousand here to hundreds of millions there. But every territorial entity which participates in international relations supports human life. This points to the third characteristic of a state.
- 3 Government. By one process or another, some of the people of a state are designated as its official representatives, constituting its government. A state, like a university, a church, a company or a club, is not a person in the sense that you and I are. It does not walk, think and talk as an individual human being does. No one has ever seen a state (as distinct from the territory of a state). But, like universities, churches and so on, a state is deemed to act like a person—to take decisions, to communicate, to undertake responsibilities, to act.

In other words, a state is a notional person. It must therefore have a way of determining who is entitled to speak and act in its name, and this applies as much to its internal affairs as to the conduct of its foreign relations. Such people are those who comprise its government, and those who are employed by the government. Through these human agencies, the state lives, moves and has its being. Thus, when we say that 'Britain decided to do such and such', what has happened is that the person (e.g. the foreign minister) or the group of persons (the cabinet) with the relevant responsibility has decided, on behalf of Britain, to do it. Or, when I say that 'the state has treated me very badly', what may have happened is that an official in, say, the Department of Social Security, has reached what I conceive to be a bad decision.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF STATES

A state is therefore made up of territory, people and a government. This is often as far as the matter is taken, and for some purposes it is sufficient. But it is insufficient if one

wishes to discover what it is which enables some states to play a full and active role in international relations. For there are many states (i.e. governed territorial entities) which do not participate in international relations, not just because they do not wish to do so but—more importantly—because they lack the relevant capacity.

BOX 1.3 STATES

territory+people+government+sovereignty

For example, the territory of Gibraltar, while only a couple of square miles in extent, has a population which is somewhat greater than one or two states which participate in international relations, and is more prosperous than a number of others. It undoubtedly satisfies the characteristics of statehood which have been mentioned above, yet it has no international part. But, you may say, it is not usually called a state. True—which is why I called it a territory. However, that is inconsequential, there being several terms which are used to refer to governed territorial entities—‘province’, for example, is another. Let us, though, look at a federal state, such as the United States, where the constituent members of the federation do happen to be called states. (In this case there are no less than fifty of them.) Each of these states making up the United States has a defined territory, people, and a government (each government being subdivided into an executive, a legislature and a judiciary). Moreover, a number of them have bigger populations and most of them are a lot wealthier than many of the states which appear, as a matter of course, on the international stage. Yet (like Gibraltar) none of the states making up the United States is a regular participant in international relations.

The reason for this is to be found in one of the most important distinctions—arguably the most important—which can be drawn between states. It is the distinction between states which have an international capacity and those which do not. Gibraltar and similar territories, and the constituent members of federations (which may be called states, provinces or something else), fall in the latter category. They lack what is required for participation in international relations. On the other hand, getting on for 200 states do enjoy this capacity—and hence are the ones which attract the attention of the student of International Relations. They possess, in relation to Gibraltar and the states of the United States, an extra characteristic, an extra qualification.

What is this extra qualification? For better or ill, the states concerned call it sovereignty.

TYPES OF SOVEREIGNTY

Immediately, we run into a problem. The term sovereignty is used, and has for a long time been used, in a multiplicity of ways and for a multiplicity of purposes. It has, for example, emotive connotations, which results in it being employed in political rhetoric. Thus, if a politician does not like a particular policy, the policy may well be condemned

as threatening the sovereignty of the state concerned. On the other hand, those who favour the policy may represent it as an instance of the wise and far-seeing exercise of sovereignty. Then, too, complications arise because sovereignty is used both in the context of a state's internal affairs and in respect of its international situation. Internally, for example, a question is often asked about who really is sovereign. Is it the government, the parliament or the people? Or could it be the press or the wealthy or what has come to be called the establishment? Internationally, the sort of question which may be (and frequently is) asked is whether any state short of a superpower is really sovereign.

Here, therefore, is a splendid illustration of the importance of defining one's terms, and of underlining the distinctions between the various ways in which a term is used. In the rest of this chapter, it must be emphasised, the focus is on the use of the term sovereignty to describe aspects of statehood which directly bear upon or are related to the international position of the state. Within that sphere, note must be taken of the three main—and very different—ways in which the term sovereignty is used: to mean (a) jurisdictional independence, (b) political independence and (c) constitutional independence.

BOX 1.4 SOVEREIGNTY (i)

Jurisdictional	Political	Constitutional
(a) internal supremacy/makes own rules	(b) successfully looks after self?	essential precondition of (a) and (b) essential credential

JURISDICTIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Every territorial authority has certain matters under its jurisdiction, on which it is therefore entitled to make rules. This is as true of a university and a borough or county council as it is of a state. But there is a big difference between the two types of authority. There are tight legal limits on what a university or a local council can do, and those entitlements can at any time be altered by the legislative body which has granted them. A sovereign state, on the other hand, appears to have a free hand with regard to its internal law-making (as well as to the development of its legal relations with other states). Seemingly, it can, in principle, do what it likes, for it is not subject to any superior authority. It can tell other states and international bodies to keep their noses out of its affairs. This is the condition which is frequently regarded as justifying the use of the term 'sovereignty' to describe the regular territorial actors on the international stage. The usage is meant to reflect the fact that they enjoy jurisdictional independence. Within its boundaries, each such state is, in jurisdictional terms, judged to be supreme.

In practice, however, it has never been the case that a sovereign state, by virtue of its sovereignty, has a wholly free jurisdictional hand within its frontiers. States have always recognised that they are legally obliged to exempt foreign diplomats from the exercise of

their jurisdiction; and have frequently accepted international legal obligations whereby foreign traders or foreign states have been granted certain privileges or opportunities in their domestic markets. Furthermore, in the latter part of the twentieth century relatively large legal inroads have been made into other aspects of what were hitherto the private jurisdictions of states. To this sort of extent, therefore, the sovereignty (meaning jurisdictional independence) of any particular state is not total.

These instances exemplify the two main ways in which international law is made: by the development of customary rules and through the making of treaties. States, collectively, are in control of the former, and each state is in individual control of its own treaty obligations. This is why, notwithstanding the fact that their independence in this respect is less than complete, it carries both semantic and empirical conviction to say that states are (jurisdictionally) sovereign. They can determine, directly or indirectly, the limitations which are placed on the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction—whereas you and I are subject to the law-making activity of the groups to which we belong, not least of the state itself. Limited-membership legislative bodies, such as parliament, can and do say what rules are to apply to us. We have to lump it—or get out of the organisation in question by resigning or emigrating. States in international relations, by contrast, make their own rules. Most of these rules relate to what a state does beyond the area of its jurisdiction—in the external sphere. But, as has been noted, some international rules place limits on the exercise within a state's borders of its jurisdiction. At the end of the twentieth century these internal limitations are more extensive than a generation or so ago. And some groups of states, notably those making up the European Union, have accepted far-reaching limitations on their jurisdictional independence.

It follows that this concept of sovereignty is not an absolute one. It is not something which a state has, immutably, or has not at all. Rather, sovereignty in the jurisdictional sense is relative in nature, a matter of degree. It is like a bundle of separate rights. The bundle remains in existence in spite of the fact that it gets smaller through the renunciation of some of the individual items of which it is composed. (It also remains in existence even if the state concerned is in some political disarray.) Thus the states which participate in international relations may be said in some measure or another to be sovereign, in the sense of enjoying jurisdictional rights over those areas of their internal affairs which have not been made subject to the obligations of international law. Even in the case of the states of the European Union, those areas are both considerable and important; in the case of other states, they continue to be vast. Thus the sovereignty (in the jurisdictional sense) of every (sovereign) state in the world is a very meaningful condition.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

An alternative use of the term 'sovereignty' presents it as essentially political, as being constituted by political independence. The suggestion is that sovereignty should be conceived not in jurisdictional (and therefore legal) terms, but in ones which are more down to earth, which are used by the man of the world. Accordingly, a state is said to enjoy sovereignty to the extent to which it can successfully look after itself, can chart and

follow its own independent course on the turbulent waters of international life. A state which is effectively in command of its internal and external destiny and desires, which can assert a high measure of political independence, will be substantially sovereign. It may not always be able to get its way, and so will not be 100 per cent sovereign. But it will achieve a high score. A state which is less successful in this regard will, correspondingly, be less sovereign.

This approach has much appeal, in that it fits in very smoothly with widespread preconceptions about what sovereignty *really* means. In the fields of both religion and domestic politics, the adjective 'sovereign' is most readily associated with the idea of supremacy. Thus in traditional British parlance, God and the King (the latter now being replaced by Parliament) are spoken of as sovereign when, in one way or another, the intention is to convey the idea that the person or entity concerned is all-powerful. Transferring this concept to the international scene is none too difficult. The biggest states are often referred to as 'the powers', and the ascription of power usually carries with it the idea that the state in question is in a good position to achieve its international goals and prevent other states from influencing its domestic affairs. Thus these states—the 'great powers', as they are also called—are seen as largely sovereign; the medium powers as much less so; and the small powers hardly so at all.

It is a neat picture—but, unfortunately, too neat by half. In the first place, the so-called great are far from being able always to get their way, for the very good reason that their adversaries are often drawn from the ranks of their fellow great powers. Nor is it the case that the great can easily get what they want out of lesser powers, or that the medium powers are usually successful *vis-à-vis* the small. Much depends on the issue and the context, making international relations a considerably more complex affair than might be supposed from a mere ranking of states on the basis of their assumed power. Finally, and consequently, huge difficulty attaches to the effort to calculate the extent to which any particular state enjoys political independence. It might be possible to do this in respect of one particular controversy; but combining all the assessments made in respect of matters within one sector of a state's international life—such as its safety or its economic prospects—would surely confound even the most skilled mathematician of power; as, even more so, would the combination of the results in all the sectors. And then, tomorrow, one might have to start again, as other states redefine their priorities as regards the first state, and decide to take a tougher or a softer line towards it on certain key issues.

RESERVATIONS

In short, the effort to assess the degree of a state's political independence is something of a mug's game. This approach to sovereignty is at first sight an attractive one, but it proves enormously hard to apply to the ongoing hurly-burly of international life. But there is another, more profound, reason for not spending too much time on the attempt—a reason which is equally applicable to efforts to establish how much jurisdictional sovereignty is enjoyed by a particular state.

What each of these concepts of sovereignty does is to focus on an aspect of the condition of those states which participate in international relations. But because they do

so participate, they must already be sovereign in that sense of the term which refers to a governed entity's fitness for participation. And there is no possibility of their degree of jurisdictional or political independence having got them there, for these aspects of their condition are not exclusive to states on the international stage. All governed entities have some measure of jurisdictional and political independence. Just as a state will decide how to exercise its jurisdictional independence, and try to maximise its political independence, so might the local golf club determine its in-house rules, and consider how to best to respond to a planning application which would adversely affect its interests. Thus the concepts of jurisdictional and political sovereignty do not in themselves tell us anything which is distinctive about the entities which, among other things, enjoy an international capacity.

Accordingly, these concepts cannot point to what it is which fits some governed entities—and not others—for participation in international relations. There must be a third concept of sovereignty, a more fundamental one, which establishes what is requisite for that purpose. For, as has been noted, all the states on the international stage assert that it is their sovereignty which accounts for their being there. By definition, such a concept of sovereignty will reflect something which is entirely distinctive about the limited number of governed entities to which it applies. It will indicate what has to be acquired if an entity is to be seen as eligible to join those who already participate in international relations. It will, as it were, establish the credentials which must be carried by those who wish to move through the narrow gate which is the sole entry point to the international fraternity.

THE THIRD CONCEPT

The word 'fraternity' was not used casually. For, notwithstanding their competing interests and aims, the limited number of states on the international stage are in one respect rather like a band of brothers. They share something important, which others do not: the status of being sovereign in the sense which makes them eligible for international life. Putting it a little differently, and more in keeping with a term which has in this regard become traditional, such states are not just in society with each other but, collectively, make up a society: the international society. And, as with almost all societies, admission is restricted to those who satisfy a certain test, who are in the right condition. The requirement is the relevant form of sovereignty. Unquestionably (in the writer's firm opinion) it is the term's most fundamental international usage.

But what is the content of this usage? What characteristic(s), in other words, must an entity display to be eligible for admission to the international society? Before answering this question, one point must be made absolutely clear. All too often writers appear, in discussing sovereignty, to use whatever concept of sovereignty happens to appeal to them. In effect, they cite their own personal criterion, implicitly asserting it to be the correct usage. In doing so, they cannot be accused of not defining their terms. For although it is rare for such usages to be spelled out, they can usually be deduced without difficulty from what is said. What such an approach may well attract, however, is the accusation of poor scholarship.

Of course, if the writer in question is avowedly presenting a work of political theory, he or she is entitled to make a personal suggestion about the most appropriate content for the term 'sovereignty'. It can then be considered by others on the basis of what they deem to be its merits. But if a writer purports to be explaining what happens internationally in this or that respect, personal preferences should be firmly excluded. The scholarly obligation on the writer is simply to elucidate the relevant international procedures or events. Nothing more; nothing less. What follows, therefore, is this writer's best effort to ascertain and present the practice of states with regard to that concept of sovereignty which is used, by states, to control admission to the society which they, collectively, comprise.

It happens that individual states seem never to have spelled out, in so many words, what they mean by this usage. And as the international society is simply the collectivity of states, with absolutely nothing by way of organisational structure or written procedures, no guidance is to be derived from that quarter. But there is no problem in determining what this concept of sovereignty entails, for the relevant events and the associated practices of states are crystal clear. It can therefore confidently be stated that sovereignty, in this most fundamental sense, amounts to constitutional independence.

CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE

A sovereign state may have all sorts of links with other such states and with international bodies. But the one sort of link which it cannot have (for thereby it would lose its international status) is a constitutional one. For sovereignty in the sense now being discussed consists of being constitutionally apart, of not being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme. A territorial entity which is so contained is not sovereign and hence is not eligible to participate on a regular basis in international relations. Once any such connection is severed, the territory concerned has become sovereign and thus ready, if it and others wish it, to join in the usual kind of international activity.

BOX 1.5 SOVEREIGNTY (ii)

‘consists of being constitutionally apart’
—constitutionally independent

The constitution of a state, like that of any human enterprise, consists of the body of principles and basic rules in the light of which it is to be governed. It indicates how, in general terms, the state is to be organised and administered, saying what institutions are to be set up, how they are to be manned, the way in which they are to proceed, what they may and may not do, and how they are to relate to each other. It does not need to be written, but except in the case of a country with a long and relatively untroubled internal history (Britain is the only extant case), it is difficult to imagine how a modern state could work effectively without a written constitution. It may well be that, in common with all normative (as distinct from scientific) rules, the constitution will not always be observed. There may, for example, be a change of government through a military coup rather than through the procedures set out in the constitution. But in that event the state concerned will need to get back to its constitution, to amend it or to equip itself with a new one, for the attempt to govern without any kind of constitutional basis is likely to lead to disorder and perhaps chaos.

‘To govern’: that is the key phrase. A constitution indicates that government is under way. It does not necessarily mean that the type of government is democratic (and one must be aware that constitutional independence is not the same as what is sometimes called ‘constitutionalism’, meaning government in accord with democratic principles). A constitution can provide the entity to which it is attached with any kind of political complexion, establishing authoritarian as well as democratic government, and also everything in between. Nor need a constitution provide for government on a rigidly centralised basis. In fact, some powers are likely to be delegated to regional bodies. And if a state is particularly large, or socially complex (in that it contains two or more well-defined and significantly-sized ethnic groups), or geographically extensive (an ‘empire’), it is very probable that the degree of delegation will be such that the subordinate entities will be equipped with their own constitutions.

But the essential point, in this connection, about those entities is their subordination. They are not constitutionally independent—a fact which will undoubtedly be made clear both in their constitutions and in the practice of their relationships with the central government. Some powers (or ‘competencies’ as they may be called), perhaps no more than the conduct of the territories’ defence and foreign relations, will be reserved to the central, or metropolitan, government. In consequence such territories are not sovereign, in the sense which is required to participate in international relations on a regular basis. For the international society admits only those governed entities which are sovereign in the sense of being constitutionally independent.

HOW SOVEREIGN STATES EMERGE

In 1945 the number of constitutionally independent states was about seventy-five. In 1998 it is in the region of 190. In international terms, this is veritably an explosion. The relatively sudden emergence of so many states was an entirely new and totally unexpected phenomenon. (And there is hardly a case during this period of a state disappearing from the political map.) Sovereignty, in the constitutional sense, has clearly been much sought after, and secured. How did it all happen? It is not hard to deduce that the new states must have come from within the territory of once-larger and now-diminished states. And on the basis of what has already been said in this chapter, it will also be clear that a crucial event for each of these territories was a change in their constitutional situation.

No less than almost 100 of the 115 or so new entrants were former colonies—territories lying overseas from the metropolitan centre of the colonial state concerned. Many of them were parts of the British empire (which at the start of the twentieth century encompassed about a quarter of the land mass of the globe and about a quarter of the world's people). At one moment a colony would have been part of the British constitutional set-up. It may well have had a measure of self-government, perhaps a considerable measure. But ultimate authority over the colony lay with the British Crown, and was exercised by the Crown on the advice of the British government of the day. In this way it was open to Britain to make herself felt—to a degree and in a manner which would have been specified in the colony's constitution—in the colony's internal affairs. And certainly it was Britain who spoke for the colony in international relations. Thus the final governing authority lay outside the colony's physical limits.

Then, however, as the outcome of a political process which may or may not have been stressful (or even violent), Britain decided that she would cut her constitutional links with the colony. In accordance with Britain's constitution, decisions to that effect would have been taken by the British Parliament and Government, respectively expressed through Acts of Parliament and Orders in (the Privy) Council. In consequence the constitutional position of the territory underwent a massive change. At a specified time on a specified day its constitutional links with Britain would have been ended, and hence-forth ultimate governmental authority lay within the territory. At the very least a provisional government and constitution would have been provided for in advance, and they would have taken over from the previous set of governmental arrangements. Symbolising the change, the Union Jack (Britain's flag) flying at the centre of the colony's capital would usually have been run down the flagpole at the exact moment of the transfer of power, with the flag of the new sovereign state being run up in its place.

From now on, it is up to the new state to reach its own decisions about all of its internal affairs. It may take advice and assistance from abroad, and may make promises to other states or international organisations about how, in certain respects, it will proceed. But there is no question of another state taking decisions for the territory, and certainly no possibility of an external power disallowing an internal decision on the basis of that power's superior constitutional position. Likewise in international relations, it is now up to the new state to decide for itself what to do. That is not to say that it has complete legal

freedom to do what it likes. It will have obligations under customary international law, and rights too, and may add to both by treaty. But decisions regarding its international situation are now its alone.

BOX 1.6 NEW STATES

From 75 in 1945 to 190 in 1998:95–100 former colonies

15–20 former parts of metropolitan Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia

This was the scenario in respect of roughly one hundred of the states which have gained admission to the international society since 1945. The remaining new states—about twenty—represent territories which were once part of the metropolitan territory of a larger state: chiefly the former Soviet Union, but also the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. So far as these territories were concerned, the process of acquiring sovereignty (in the sense of constitutional independence) was usually much messier. But essentially it was the same. Prior to their emergence as sovereign states the territories were constitutionally subordinate to the state of which they formed a part. Their breakaway was marked by the adoption of independent constitutions, which thereby fitted them for entry into the usual run of international life.

ELABORATION

Before moving on, we will take a closer look at sovereignty (and from now on the qualifying phrase ‘in the sense of constitutional independence’ will usually be dropped when reference is being made to this concept of sovereignty). Many find the concept a rather elusive one. What, therefore, are its key features? The answer is that they are threefold. Sovereignty is a legal, absolute and unitary condition.

BOX 1.7 SOVEREIGNTY (iii)

‘Sovereignty is a legal, absolute and unitary condition.’

1 Legal

This is not meant to imply that to be sovereign is lawful, whereas a different condition might be unlawful. Instead, what is meant is that sovereignty is founded on law, inasmuch as a constitution is a set of arrangements which has the force of law. Thus, the observation that a state is sovereign is one about the standing of the state in the eyes of its own constitutional law. It indicates the possession by the state of a set of legal arrangements of a certain kind—those which equip it with an independent constitution.

This point is worth the sentences which have just been expended on it. For although it is quite widely assumed that sovereignty has something to do with law, it is almost as widely assumed that the relevant law is international. This is a mistake. It is indeed the case that international law applies to sovereign states and regulates their mutual relations. But it is not a provision of international law which has to be satisfied for a state to be ascribed sovereign status. It is a certain kind of constitutional law which is requisite. So far as international law is concerned, the position is that it applies to entities which have already become sovereign. In other words, international law presupposes sovereignty. It makes sense only on the assumption that there are sovereign states to which it can be applied. And those sovereign states are sovereign because they are independent in terms of their own constitutions.

2 Absolute

The second main feature of sovereignty is that it is an absolute condition. Absolute, not in the sense of possessing unlimited power—which was the way in which the word was used by Lord Acton in his famous dictum that ‘power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Rather, absolute in the sense of not being relative, of an attribute being either present or absent, with no intermediate possibilities.

This, too, is a particularly important point to make because, as shown earlier in this chapter, there are other conceptions of sovereignty which are relative. Jurisdictional independence and political independence are relative conditions. They refer to situations which exist in degree, in terms of more or less. Thus when one is talking about either of those usages of the term ‘sovereignty’, it would be natural to say that X was more sovereign than Y, or (if one was feeling bold) that Z’s sovereignty was in the order of 70 per cent.

But when sovereignty is used to mean constitutional independence, one is referring to a different type of phenomenon. It is not one which can exist in degree, in terms of more or less. Rather, it is either possessed or not. The relevant entity is sovereign (and therefore 100 per cent sovereign) or lacks sovereignty—lacks it totally. A statement of this sort is entirely appropriate—indeed, it is called for—when one is speaking of the formal standing, position or status which a person (real or notional) has attained. When someone is, for example, appointed as headteacher of a school or vice-chancellor of a university, that person holds the office absolutely. There is no question of being a 70 per cent headteacher. The individual in question is a headteacher, and the man or woman who lives next door is not. It may be that critical comments are made about the headteacher’s efficiency or industry, so that he or she may be adjudged deserving of a grade of, say, no more than 50 per cent. But that in no way detracts from the fact that the appointee is fully a head-teacher. And he or she will be no less or more of a headteacher than someone else holding a similar position, whatever the relative sizes, levels or reputations of their schools.

The same line of argument is exactly applicable to states when one is talking about whether or not they enjoy constitutional independence—and hence sovereignty. Whether or not a governed territorial entity is constitutionally independent is a matter of fact which in principle can only be answered negatively or positively. No matter how closely

a territory approaches constitutional independence, if it does not reach it the territory has to be adjudged as without it, completely without it. This means that it cannot be sovereign, in the sense which is requisite for normal participation in international relations. Thus (tiny) Monaco, (developing) Mexico and (much-troubled) Mozambique are all sovereign, and hence absolutely so; whereas New South Wales, Nova Scotia and Nebraska (all being constituent parts of federal states—of, respectively, Australia, Canada and the United States) are not. Sovereignty, in this usage, is an absolute condition.

3 Unitary

The third and final main feature of sovereignty is that it is unitary. It may, and does, have different implications in different contexts, leading some to speak of internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. But that is a dangerous terminology, for it can all too easily be taken to mean that sovereignty can, as it were, be split down the middle, enabling one of its halves to exist without the other.

In fact, a sovereign state is all of a piece. Constitutional independence means that no other entity is customarily in the position of being formally able to take decisions regarding either the internal or the external affairs of the territory in question.

Of course, it is always open to a sovereign state to pass over to another state or an international body the legal right to take decisions which are binding on the state concerned in respect of certain specific internal matters. Equally, a sovereign state may wish to listen very carefully to what a powerful and important state has to say on certain aspects of its foreign policy. But the point is that the decision to grant such rights or adjust its policy is the decision of the sovereign state. Were it not sovereign, there would be another entity which, because of its own constitutional dispositions, would be regularly entitled to have a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal and external affairs of the territory concerned.

In sum, the control of both internal and external policy flows from the same source, so that each is inextricably bound up with the other. Just as a vice-chancellor or headteacher will have certain powers within his or her institution and also, by virtue of the same office, represent the university or school externally, so will a sovereign state have both an internal and an external role. Both are a consequence of its condition as a constitutionally independent, or sovereign, entity.

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

On a number of occasions in this chapter, when referring to the difference which sovereignty makes to a territorial entity, such words as ‘capacity’, ‘fitted’ and ‘eligibility’ have (designedly) been used. The point has had to do with the participation of sovereign entities in day-to-day international affairs. Its elucidation is now called for.

When a territorial entity becomes constitutionally independent, and so becomes sovereign, it does not thereby acquire an entitlement to participate in international relations. It has no right to force its company on any of its sovereign fellows. What is has

acquired, rather, is the capacity to do the sorts of things which are commonly done, internationally, by sovereign states: to 'talk' to other states (through diplomatic representatives), to make agreements with them, to apply to join international organisations, to campaign for certain goals, to press other states to do, or not to do, something, and so on. To do any and all of these things, sovereignty is necessary. But it is not sufficient. Additionally, and preconditionally, other states must first, and individually, agree to have dealings with the emergent state.

This process is something like securing membership in an exclusive club. You have to have the relevant credentials, such as the appropriate expertise and affiliation, and the money to pay the fees. But they are not enough, as membership also depends on the existing members being willing to admit you. Internationally, the equivalent procedure involves two preliminary steps: recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations; and a third step of establishing diplomatic missions. This last step will be taken if it is anticipated or hoped that relations between the two states concerned will be particularly close.

BOX 1.8 DIPLOMATIC PARTICIPATION REQUIRES

diplomatic recognition+diplomatic relations+diplomatic missions

1 Recognition

This is a formal device which is unilaterally exercised by the state bestowing recognition. It is in the nature of notice to the other that, in the view of the recognising state, the other state has met the requirements for normal international activity, that it possesses the characteristics of sovereign statehood. The recognising state is announcing that it judges the other state to have, as it were, 'arrived' on the international scene. That clears the way for the two states to have normal dealings with each other. But there is no necessity for them to do so. In principle, nothing at all need follow recognition. In practice, however, it is probably unusual for a state to recognise a new state without also going on to establish diplomatic relations with it. Indeed, it seems that the two steps are now often combined—to the extent of recognition being implicitly bestowed through the establishment of diplomatic relations. In turn, this could suggest that recognition is becoming anomalous. But against that, it should be noted that recognition can still have important consequences for cases in the domestic courts of the recognising state.

2 Diplomatic relations

Logically, this follows recognition and, unlike that device, is a bilateral act. The two states concerned must agree on the establishment of diplomatic relations, which is usually done by way of a specific agreement to that effect. Once a pair of states has established diplomatic relations, they may engage directly in any kind of official contact, relating to each other freely. It is the normal bilateral relationship between sovereign states. It is also

peculiar to them.

Difficulties in a relationship may ensue if a pair of states is not in diplomatic relations (and unlike recognition, diplomatic relations may be broken, either party having the unilateral right to take such a step). In those circumstances, when their diplomats encounter each other in third states or at international organisations, they are entitled (and may be expected) to 'cold shoulder' each other. If one such state wishes to communicate with the other it may first need to make a special check (perhaps through a third party) about the acceptability of such a contact, and make a special arrangement for its execution. In practice, things are not usually as difficult as this in the absence of diplomatic relations, devices being employed to get over some of the problems which would otherwise arise—such as those which have been mentioned. But there is no requirement to use such devices. States not in diplomatic relations are entitled to ignore each other totally. And even if they do make arrangements to get in touch with each other as and when they need to, it is very likely that they will find the situation markedly less convenient than being in diplomatic relations.

3 Diplomatic missions

The establishment of diplomatic relations simply clears the way for whatever sorts of contact two states may wish to have. Contrary to what is sometimes thought, being in diplomatic relations is certainly not synonymous with the setting up of residential diplomatic missions in the capitals of the two states. In fact, two states in diplomatic relations may have very little to do with each other.

But if one or both think that their interests justify it, embassies (or, as between members of the British Commonwealth, High Commissions) will be established in the foreign capital(s) concerned. This greatly facilitates contact between the two states, and so makes it more likely that the 'sending' state will be able to influence the 'receiving' state in the direction it would like. (The sending state is the one sending the embassy; the receiving state the one in which the embassy is established.) A residential diplomatic mission also has a number of other advantages, such as giving the sending state a good listening post in the receiving state, and enabling the former to assist such of its nationals who are anxious to do business in the receiving state.

The diplomatic system thus enables states to have contacts with other states, and so to advance and protect their interests at the international level. It is an arrangement which is exclusive to sovereign states. Accordingly, the fact that a state is active in this way is an irrefutable sign that it enjoys sovereignty. But it must be remembered that sovereignty is not bestowed through getting involved in the diplomatic system. Rather, it is a precondition of involvement that one is sovereign.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Sovereignty is also a precondition of involvement in those international organisations which are made up of states, such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. There are about 250 such organisations, ranging widely in

size and focus. Unquestionably, the international scene has been changed by their emergence during the twentieth century, in that much important business which once might out of necessity have been done on an ad hoc basis is now carried out in these permanent multilateral fora. Unquestionably, too, states have sometimes deemed it prudent to make certain adjustments to their foreign policies in consequence of the diplomatic pressures which have been generated by such bodies. But what is much more questionable is whether, as sometimes seems to be supposed, the sovereignty of states is threatened by these organisational devices.

On the basis of the penultimate sentence of the last paragraph, it could be argued that the political independence (and hence, in one sense of the word, the sovereignty) of states has been diminished by organisational activity. But against that it must be noted that states have also secured benefits from the same source: some of their political goals have been additionally advanced through the successful use of organisations as bandwagons; and some organisations have been valuable providers of economic aid. The one development is probably more or less balanced out by the other. So far as jurisdictional independence is concerned, the position is more one-sided, in that organisational initiatives have sometimes resulted in states accepting certain restrictions on the exercise of their jurisdiction, without any corresponding enhancements. (But it must not be forgotten that such restrictions have been widely thought to be in the general interest, so that they represent political success for the policies of many states.)

BOX 1.9 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
‘are created by states and remain their creatures’

What the preceding paragraph reflects is that international organisations are created by states and remain their creatures. Organisations do not have independent lives of their own; they do not have independent sources of finance; they do not have independent armed forces. All they have comes from or is loaned to them by states. Consequently, organisations are unable, as it were, to devour their creators, and therefore present no threat at all to states’ constitutional independence, and hence their sovereignty (and I make no apology for emphasising once again my conviction that this is far and away the most important concept of sovereignty). Indeed, as was indicated earlier, international organisations presuppose sovereign states.

However, one theoretical qualification must be made to the argument of the last paragraph. There is no reason in principle why a group of states should not set up an organisation and, either initially or subsequently, transfer to it such far-reaching powers that it is, or becomes, not a treaty-based international organisation but a constitution-based sovereign state. In that case the states setting it up would lose their sovereignty and in consequence would have to withdraw from international activity. They would have become subordinate entities within a wider constitutional and governing structure, and it would be that single structure which would now speak and act internationally for all the territory which it contained. The number of sovereign states in the world would decrease, for a number of sovereign entities would be renouncing their individual sovereignties to

create a bigger sovereign state. (Thus this process would be a reverse instance of the one outlined earlier in the chapter, when the creation of new states out of an existing sovereign entity was discussed.)

This, of course, is what may—and some hope will—happen in respect of the European Union. But although, over the last forty years, this grouping has grown in strength and resources, and is not the usual type of international organisation, it is not anywhere near becoming a single state. Most of its members presently display a keen desire to maintain their sovereign individuality. They do not wish to become units within a federal state. For as long as those desires remain, Western Europe will continue to be represented on the political maps, and in international activity, by fifteen states rather than one.

INTERDEPENDENCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Some, however, envisage that sovereign states will disappear, and are even now disappearing, by a different route. It is suggested that their sovereignty is becoming, or will become, eroded and indistinct through its increasing irrelevance. This is seen as due in part to the heightened profile of non-state actors—throwing sovereign states, as it were, into the shadows. Additionally, or alternatively, the suggestion is that states are becoming so involved with each other, so entwined by both co-operative ventures and technology, that their frontiers are losing significance and their individual features are becoming blurred. Either way, sovereignty in the sense of constitutional independence is seen as a concept which soon will be, if it is not already, of interest only to historians.

Non-state actors are a heterogeneous group, including such varied bodies as terrorist groups, multinational corporations and international non-governmental organisations. Without doubt, such bodies occasionally have some impact on the behaviour of states. Terrorists can force themselves on to a state's agenda. If a wealthy multinational corporation operates in a relatively poor state, the latter is naturally going to pay some heed to what the officers of the corporation suggest about the way in which the state's economy is developing. A non-governmental organisation may be thought to have some pull with a certain state's electorate, automatically disposing the state's government at least to listen—and to be seen listening—to what the organisation has to say.

But things also work the other way. Non-governmental bodies will wish to secure the support of states. Multinational corporations are well aware that even in a very poor state the government controls economic and legislative levers which can do them much harm. Terrorists can be routed, and are unlikely to receive much personal consideration in the process. Moreover, states generally find much more on their plates than the need to deal with non-state entities. It follows that there is virtually no reason to think that sovereign states are being put out of business by such bodies.

The other side of the charge outlined at the start of this section emphasises the growing involvement of states with each other. There can be little doubt that such interdependence is now a fact. States have more dealings with each other in regard to more issues of mutual concern than ever before. Almost everything, it seems, comes on to the international agenda: the traffic in drugs, the status of women, the environment, bacteriological weapons, outer space, population issues, economic development, cultural

interchange, and so on. Elaborate and extensive co-operation occurs in a multitude of fields. This is the background to the powerful impression that the world has shrunk dramatically in the last half-century. The headlong speed and mind-boggling complexity of developments in the technological field does nothing, of course, to undermine this impression.

But it by no means follows from this that sovereign states have become outmoded. Indeed, as in the consideration of non-state actors, the evidence can be interpreted to the opposite effect. Up-to-the-minute technologies are being used by states to bolster their strength and extend their control over their domains. International co-operation is the co-operation of states, and to the extent to which it finds expression in agreed programmes of action, that action has to be co-ordinated or conducted by states. Co-operative activity, in short, does not necessarily imply that the co-operating actors somehow fade into the background; in practice it does not have this effect and it is hard to see how it could possibly do so. The world remains politically organised, as it has done for 500 years, on the basis of the sovereign state. The idea that this type of arrangement is somehow becoming insignificant seems, to this observer, totally unrealistic. International behaviour patterns have changed, and are changing, certainly. But the basis on which the world is politically structured—a basis which finds expression in the idea of sovereignty—remains unchanged.

BOX 1.10 INTERDEPENDENCE LEADING TO STATES OUTMODED?

NO!

- states can use modern technology to bolster their own strength
- states can use modern technology to extend their control
- sovereignty still much sought after
- statehood and sovereignty have much affinity with 'national self determination'

THE APPEAL OF SOVEREIGNTY

It is indeed an oddity that so many observers have asserted that the day of the sovereign state is coming to an end. On a charitable interpretation, one assumes that they are using the term sovereignty in a way which happens to support their perception. Which only serves as a reminder about the importance of openly defining one's terms.

But if one relies on what is surely the most basic usage of sovereignty—one which states employ all the time, although admittedly not to the exclusion of others—it could (almost) be argued that the day of the sovereign state has only just begun! For governed groups have during the last half-century been falling over themselves in their zeal to claim and grasp the constitutional condition which is expressed by the term 'sovereignty'. The outcome, as was noted, has been a huge increase in the number of sovereign states.

Many other groups are still trying to achieve the same goal. Basques, Kurds, Quebeckers, Sikhs, Tamils, East Timoreans and a host more assert that it is only sovereignty which will enable them to escape oppression and/or enable them fully to express their national cultures. Meanwhile, those long in possession of sovereignty show no disposition at all to give it up, not even in what are at first sight such favourable contexts as Scandinavia or Western Europe.

The reason for this attachment to the idea of sovereignty is not hard to find. It seems that when people have come to feel affinities of the kind which are summed up in the word 'national' they also feel that the only proper form of government for them is one which is in the hands of their fellow nationals. Of course, this response is likely to be particularly keen if the group concerned has suffered sharp persecution or discrimination at the hands of the governing, and different, nationality. But it does not seem to be dependent on such treatment. Even those who have been governed relatively well by another national group are not slow to claim the presumed benefits of 'national self-determination'—one of the most potent ideas ever experienced in political affairs.

Accordingly, while there is nothing inherently sacrosanct about the concept of sovereignty, it seems likely that the world will remain politically organised on its basis for a long time to come. And, if the writer may finally express a personal view, why not? It used often to be thought that a system of sovereign states was one thereby condemned to frequent wars. There is no reason why that should necessarily be so, and the positive experience of the last fifty years underlines that point, for war between the older sovereign states has been noticeable by its absence. The negative experiences of that period have often taken the form of civil or colonial conflicts, many of which can at least in part be attributed to the rejection of claims to sovereign statehood. Perhaps, therefore, the application of the idea of sovereignty has a contribution of its own to make to peace. After all, if people are on the whole satisfied with their boundaries, that at least removes one ground for conflict.

I would love to know whether, another half-millennium on, the world will still be made up of sovereign states. Hardly worth offering a bet on it. But stranger things have happened.

FURTHER READING

F.H.Hinsley, *Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edition, 1986)

An intellectual history of the idea of sovereignty, from its origins in antiquity to its contemporary usage. Until the last part of the book, however, the emphasis is on the use of the term in domestic politics.

Robert H.Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

An examination of the birth and survival of Third World states. They are called quasi-states because they are seen as existing, and continuing to exist, more through the lack of any external threats than through any positive efforts of their own.

Robert H.Jackson and Alan James (eds), *States in a Changing World. A Contemporary Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)

In the core of this book a variety of experts survey the experience of sovereign states since 1945 in each of the world's eleven geopolitical regions. Additionally, there are essays on the contemporary character of sovereign statehood, looking at its enduring geographical and psychological bases and how it has been affected by economic interdependence and ethnicity.

Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986)

An elaboration of the argument presented in this chapter.

C.A.W.Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (London: Bell, 1962; reissued London: Macmillan, 1975)

An unusual book, written in a style which some will find difficult—full of striking analogies, similes, images and parallels. But those who can cope with it will find it immensely stimulating—not least its tantalisingly brief discussion of sovereignty (which has shaped the present writer's understanding of the subject).

J.B.D.Miller, *The World of States* (London: Croom Helm, 1981)

A series of essays on inter-state relations which are very readable and illuminating.

2

Living in a global world

Globalisation and the future of politics

Roland Axtmann and Robert Grant

BOX 2.1 CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

‘a quarrel in a far away country...of whom we know little.’
Neville Chamberlain, 1938, in response to Nazi Germany’s
expansionist policy towards Czechoslovakia

‘Iraq invades Kuwait—bus fares in Coventry set to rise.’
Headline in a Coventry newspaper when Iraq entered Kuwait

in August 1990, thus causing a steep rise in oil prices.

‘The world is getting smaller—smell better!’

Advertisement for aftershave (Hugo Boss), 1996

INTRODUCTION

Sixty years ago, a leading British politician could publicly proclaim—and presumably expect to find acceptance for such a claim—that another European country was ‘unknown territory’ as far as its history, its domestic politics and its foreign policy were concerned. Its fate was considered to be of little relevance to British interests in the world. Soon after, Hitler unleashed the Second World War and proved the British political class wrong. In 1990, the headline-writer for a Coventry newspaper knew better. The expansionist design of one ‘faraway country’, Iraq, on another, Kuwait, was perceived to be of interest to its readers—not least because it was likely to affect their pockets. Whereas in 1938 one could pretend that the fate of one country would have no effect on the fate of another, it was clear in 1990 that we were living in an interdependent world of shared fate. We know, as does the copy-writer, that the world is getting smaller and we’d better face up to this fact and act upon it—although arguably more than a splash of aftershave may be necessary to survive or get on in this smaller world.

We live in an era of ever-increasing interconnectedness of people, places, capital, goods and services. We are witnessing an increase and an intensification of political, economic and cultural interactions across territorial borders. As a result, all states and societies have become entangled in a complex system of mutual dependencies. It is this reality of worldwide interdependence, its emergence and its dynamics, that the word 'globalisation' aims to sum up. If there were a competition for the word of the new millennium, globalisation would be a strong contender. Like no other word, it is *the* buzzword of public debate. Journalists, politicians, business executives and academics use it to proclaim that something profound is happening and that new world economic, political and cultural orders are emerging. A consensus appears to be forming that we are living in an age of transition in which we have to bid farewell to the world we have known and boldly go where no one has gone before. In this chapter, we wish to present some of the topics that globalisation raises for our understanding of international relations and global politics.

Globalization is a multifaceted process that manifests itself in such forms as global tourism, mass migration and the global reach of nuclear, environmental and health risks. Reduction in travel costs and time, as well as safer travel to many parts of the world, has opened up the globe for discovery by the relatively affluent traveller. We have also witnessed in recent years dramatic population movements. There has been a distinctive increase in transborder migration. It has been estimated that there were about 100 million transborder migrants in the early 1990s, of which about 25 million were refugees, but the majority were people looking for work and employment abroad. In recent years, conflicts in places like Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi caused mass migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Africa alone there were about 35 million transborder migrants in the mid-1990s. While only about one-tenth of the world's population lives in Africa, about one-third of all transborder migration takes place there. Yet, it needs emphasising that we are witnessing a worldwide migration movement which is unlikely to abate in the near future.

The nuclear disaster in Chernobyl demonstrated—if demonstration were needed—that environmental risks easily transgress state borders. We know of the transboundary, global movement of hazardous wastes, and scientific research has made us aware of the pollution of the global atmosphere and the greenhouse effect, as well as the depletion of ocean fisheries—to name but a few of many global environmental problems. We have come to accept that the earth is a fragile planet and that, as cohabitants on this planet, we are members of a global community of fate. The awareness has grown—not least because of environmental destruction and risks—that humanity has a common future.

BOX 2.2 GLOBALISATION

- interconnectedness of people, places, capital, goods and services
- intensification of political, economic and cultural interactions
- complex system of mutual dependencies
- formation of an integrated global economy

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

While these developments are important aspects of globalisation, arguably it has been economic changes and technological innovations in transport and information systems and their worldwide diffusion that have conjured up visions of a 'global' world. For many observers of the contemporary world, globalisation refers to the formation of an integrated world economy. There have indeed occurred great changes over the last couple of decades in the economy. The value of world trade in 1993 was about US\$3.7 billion. In addition, there was a trade in commercial services of US\$1 billion. Compared to 1986, this amounts to an increase in the value of world trade of about 70 per cent. By 1995 the value of world trade had reached US\$4.7 billion and had thus more than doubled since 1986. However, about one-third of world trade was conducted as trade within multinational corporations (that is, a corporation which, while headquartered in one state, operates in a number of countries and becomes increasingly autonomous in terms of its loyalty to its 'home' state.) This was well up compared to the early 1970s when this internal trade amounted to just one-fifth of world trade. Multinational corporations are thus important actors in the global economy. This situation is underlined if we consider the fact that about 37,000 multinational corporations control about 150 million jobs worldwide. Nike, the US producer of sports goods, for example, employs about 9,000 people in the USA, but 75,000 employees through subcontracting around the world.

BOX 2.3 GLOBAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS

Value of world trade	1986	US\$2.2 billion
	1993	US\$3.7 billion
	1995	US\$4.7 billion
Nike (US company)	employs 9,000 in USA	
	75,000 worldwide in subcontracting	
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)		

1976–80 per	US\$40,000
year	million
1981–85 per	US\$43,000
year	million
1986–90 per	US\$162,000
year	million
1990s per year	US\$200,000
	million

The changes in the global economy have been particularly noticeable in the financial sector. A few selected figures may provide an indication of these transformations. Investment of capital abroad, that is, 'foreign direct investment' (FDI), amounted to about US\$40,000 million a year between 1976 and 1980. There was an increase to US\$43,000 million between 1981 and 1985, only for this sum to be dwarfed between 1986 and 1990 when on average US\$162,000 million was invested each year. In the mid-1990s, more than US\$200,000 million was invested abroad annually. In 1993, of all capital investments abroad, 76 per cent was invested in the Western industrial countries. And within the countries of the West, about 90 per cent of the investments were in the triad consisting of Western Europe, North America and Japan. If we ask from which countries these capital investments abroad are being undertaken, we find that 77 per cent of all investments worldwide have emanated from five countries: the USA, Great Britain, Japan, Germany and France, which are also the five leading countries in world trade. These figures quite clearly demonstrate the importance of the industrialised, capitalist West for the formation of a global economy.

What about the 'developing' countries? In 1993, 23 per cent of all capital investment abroad went to these countries. It is true that between 1990 and 1994 the share of the developing countries in capital investment abroad per year rose from about 15 per cent to 40 per cent. But foreign capital investment in developing countries is concentrated on a relatively small number of countries. In 1993, about four-fifths of FDI to the developing countries went to ten countries: China, Singapore, Argentina, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Nigeria.

It is open for debate whether we are already witnessing the emergence of a truly global economy, institutionalised through global capital markets and globally integrated financial systems as well as through global trade and global production networks and in which employment would be determined via a global labour market. Yet there is a clear trend towards an interpenetration of the advanced capitalist countries, and, in particular, the intensification of transfers among three economic macro-regions: North America, Europe and the Asian Pacific. Around each macro-region an economic hinterland has been created that is being gradually incorporated into the global economy through its links with the dominant region. North America serves this integrative function for Latin America; the European Union for Eastern Europe, much of Russia and the South Mediterranean; Japan and the Asian Pacific for the rest of Asia, Australia and New Zealand. In due course, the Russian Pacific, Eastern Siberia and Kazakhstan may also be incorporated into the global economy through their linkages with Japan and the Asian

Pacific. And China's economic incorporation is likely to be much aided through its regained political authority over Hong Kong and the economic engagement of the Overseas Chinese scattered throughout the region and the world.

BOX 2.4 AN EMERGENT GLOBAL ECONOMY?

global capital markets+globally integrated financial systems +global trade+global production networks+global labour markets +interpenetration of advanced capitalist countries+intensification of transfers ⇒ global economy?

When painting the picture of an ever more integrated world economy, we should not forget that, for example, much of Black Africa remains marginalised within the global economy, despite historical links to the advanced capitalist countries as their former colonies. This attests to the fact that entire regions and countries around the world are irrelevant in the new pattern of international division of labour; a fate shared, for example, by some rural regions of China, India and Latin America, as well as large segments of the population everywhere—as high levels of unemployment even in the Western countries demonstrate. Arguably, this marginalisation, or rather, the fact of an uneven economic globalisation, may also have to be seen in the context of changes in the geopolitical order after the end of the Cold War and the European schisms and the diminution of the strategic significance of certain regions for the advanced capitalist countries.

This spatial dimension of economic globalisation is reinforced by political attempts to institutionalise regional economic co-operation around the world. Examples of such economic regionalisation abound. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico, and the European Union (EU) are prominent examples. One could also mention, for example, the Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), founded in 1989, which brings together China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Papua New Guinea, as well as the member states of NAFTA and those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei (but not Vietnam). Among these regions and regional associations, Europe has developed a particularly high degree of regional cohesiveness with a complex structure of formal organisations and institutions. We shall say more about the EU and APEC later in this chapter.

THE 'SHRINKING' GLOBE

The emergence of such a global economy was premised on the development of a technological infrastructure regarding transportation, and the generation and circulation of information. The internationalisation of production and the establishment of production networks have been dependent upon faster and more cost-effective rail, sea

and air transportation and on more extensive interconnections between them. The global economy more generally has become infrastructurally dependent upon the spread of global communications networks and the systematic use of radio, television, telephone, telex, fax, computer and satellite facilities for the generation and dissemination of information. These technological innovations and their systematic applications in economic transactions have resulted in the 'shrinking' of distances with faster and improved connection between places.

BOX 2.5 EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL ECONOMY

DEPENDENT ON:

TECHNOLOGICAL		INFRASTRUCTURE=
TRANSPORTATION+GENERATION	AND	CIRCULATION OF
INFORMATION		

Whether states can avail themselves of the advantages and benefits of these global communications and information networks depends upon their respective access to these technologies. As in the global economy, it is the technologically advanced capitalist countries of the West (including Japan) that dominate the development and deployment of these technologies and that control the access of other countries to them. The structure of inequality and dependence of the global economic system are thus buttressed by the control over the communication media, and in particular the satellite systems on which they rely for speed and global reach, by the economically powerful states and capitalist institutions. Since many of these technologies were initially associated with military surveillance and have become an ever more integral part of the global military order, they also buttress (as well as manifest) the geopolitical dominance of the West.

By meeting the communications and information requirements of both global capitalism and modern warfare, these technologies have created the conditions for a global system of symbolic interaction and exchange. These new communication media allow the generation and dissemination of economically valuable data; but they make also possible the transfer of mental images, exposing the recipients of these images to similar, 'standardised' ways of thinking and acting. In other words, these media and the images they transport have arguably an impact on the culture and identity of the societies exposed to them. A cultural manifestation of globalisation could thus be seen to consist of the spread of English as the dominant world language (*lingua franca*), the screening of Hollywood films and American TV series around the world and around the clock, as well as the global availability, and consumption, of Big Macs and Coca-Cola, for example. There is no denying the fact that 'global culture' remains centred in and bound to the 'West' (and Japan). It relies on Western technology, the concentration of capital in the West, the concentration of advanced labour in the Western societies, and the stories and imagery of Western societies. It is, however, open to debate whether cultural globalisation will result in global cultural homogeneity and whether localisms and traditions of variance will inevitably be swept away by the forces of Western cultural

‘imperialism’.

If we draw together the main points made so far, we could state that a reference to ‘globalisation’ contains the hypothesis that there has occurred an increase in the density of contacts between locations worldwide and that, as social life has become embedded in global networks, local events are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. Furthermore, as a result of innovations in communication technology, many of these connections between locations worldwide have become almost instantaneous so that we experience a temporal immediacy to social events and cultural expressions far away. The ‘globalisation hypothesis’ thus implies that the constraints of space on social and cultural arrangements are receding and that we can witness the ‘temporal’ shrinking of the world.

Now that we have attempted a first approximation at the concept of ‘globalisation’, we wish to discuss the future of politics in such a global(ised) world. As we remarked at the beginning, many observers of the contemporary world assert that we are living in an age of transition. We may therefore be entitled to ask what we the transients (are meant to) leave behind. In the context of the discussion in this chapter, the answer would be: we leave behind ‘politics rooted in the territorial state’. What does this mean?

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

It was only as a result of the rise of the modern state that politics became ‘territorialized’. While there is a long and protracted academic debate on the timing of the emergence of the modern state and the causes behind its rise, for the purpose of this discussion we place its formation in the context of religious turmoil caused by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in sixteenth century. These religious conflicts also contributed to military conflict between the major European powers which resulted in the Thirty Years War between 1618 and 1648. It was during these two centuries that attempts gathered pace that aimed to institute the state as the supreme power across a territory with clearly demarcated boundaries that were sanctioned by international law.

In ‘pre-modern’ Europe, political authority and sovereignty were shared between a wide variety of secular and religious institutions and individuals—between kings, princes and the nobility, bishops, abbots and the papacy, guilds and cities, agrarian landlords and ‘bourgeois’ merchants and artisans. The modern state project aimed at replacing these overlapping and often contentious jurisdictions through the institutions of a centralised state. This endeavour was legitimised by the theory of state sovereignty. This theory claimed the supremacy of the government of any state over the people, resources and, ultimately, all other authorities within the territory it controlled. ‘State sovereignty’ meant that final authority within the political community lay with the state whose will legally, and rightfully, commanded without being commanded by others, and whose will was thus ‘absolute’ because it was not accountable to any but itself (Anderson 1996).

Historically, this state sovereignty was achieved through agreements between states in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years War. Then, governments finally recognised under international law each other’s autonomy from external interference in the most important matter of the time, religious belief. No longer, so

governments pledged, would they support foreign co-religionists in conflict with their states. This international agreement changed the balance of power between territorial authority and confessional groups in favour of the state. It created the pre-condition for the build-up of an effective system of control and supervision by the state over the population. 'Sovereignty' within was thus premised on non-interference from without.

A 'sovereign' right to ultimate authority and control does not imply an ability to exercise it. And the history of state formation can be analysed as the protracted efforts of rulers and their staff to translate 'juridical' sovereignty into 'empirical' sovereignty. 'Governing' took on the form of the artful combination of space, people and resources in territorialised containments, and the policing, monitoring and disciplining of the population within these spaces became the foundation, and the manifestation, of state sovereignty. The sovereignty of the state presupposed the eradication of internal contenders for supremacy. It was also predicated on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state from outside. This amounted to the acceptance of the norm that the territorial integrity of every state was inviolate. State sovereignty as 'external' sovereignty thus needs the recognition by other, 'outside' political authorities.

BOX 2.6 SOVEREIGNTY

- absolute supremacy of government
- autonomy from interference
- not equal to ability to exercise it
- ability to establish boundaries and impose order within
- internal and external dimensions
- sovereign equality with other states

Sovereignty can therefore be defined internally and externally as the power to draw boundaries and to impose 'order' in the sovereign territorial space thus created. As a result of historical developments spanning several centuries, the modern territorial state came into existence as a differentiated ensemble of governmental institutions, offices and personnel that exercises the power of authoritative political rule-making within a continuous territory that has a clear, internationally recognised boundary. It thus possesses 'internal' sovereignty that is typically backed up by organized forces of violence and that grounds the state's 'external' sovereignty *vis-à-vis* other states and its demands for non-interference in internal matters.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

In the process of democratisation since the late eighteenth century, this 'sovereignty' of the state over its population has been appropriated and transformed by the people into 'popular' sovereignty. Sovereignty has been transferred from the (monarchical) ruler to the people, and the people have been defined as the sum of the legally equal citizens.

Democratic rule in the modern state is exercised in the sovereign, territorially consolidated nation-state. In a bounded territory, people's sovereignty is the basis upon which democratic decision-making takes place; and 'the people' are the addressees, or the constituents, of the political decisions. The territorially consolidated democratic polity, which is clearly demarcated from other political communities, is seen as rightly governing itself and determining its own future through the interplay between forces operating within its boundaries. Only in a sovereign state can the people's will command without being commanded by others.

THE TRADITIONAL STATES SYSTEM

Domestically, the modern state became the source of authority and order. Externally, it became the building block of the international or, more precisely, inter-state system as it developed after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This system was conceived to consist of 'sovereign' states which recognised each other's equal entitlement to autonomy and respect within their own borders. This principle of the sovereign equality of all states was believed to lead to the inevitable absence of any supreme arbiter at the international level who would possess a recognised monopoly of the legitimate use of force with the aid of which generally binding moral norms could be decreed and behavioural compliance could be enforced. As a result, the system of states was seen as inescapably anarchic in character with each state pursuing power politics in order to attain its respective national interests. Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher of the seventeenth century, whose political writings reflect upon the revolutionary upheavals in England of his time and who argued in favour of a strong, absolute 'sovereign' power within a state, described the system of states as being in a continuous 'posture of war':

[I]n all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are all in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours.

(Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. R.Tuck: 90)

He envisaged thus a constant state of insecurity and potential war, since each state is at liberty to pursue its interests through resort to coercion or violence unimpeded by any higher moral or religious authority:

[I]n states, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth (not every man) has an absolute Libertie to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.

(Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. R.Tuck: 149)

Even if states do not pursue a policy of territorial aggrandisement or other forms of external aggression, they contribute to a situation of mutual threat and insecurity through

the creation of structures and organisations for military self-defence. This ‘security dilemma’ must be seen as a key element of the inter-state system.

BOX 2.7 SECURITY DILEMMA (i)

‘the increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent.’

Lord Grey, former British Foreign Secretary

THE CONTEMPORARY STATES SYSTEM

Let us now consider the state’s place in international politics in the era of globalisation. Will the Westphalian model that we sketched above wilt away? Will the state remain the main building block of global politics? To answer these questions, we need to take a closer look at the emerging order of global politics. As we have noticed, the ‘security dilemma’ induces states to build up a capability of military self-defence. But it may also lead to a state’s interest in a system of international law and mechanisms of rule-governed co-operation. Among such mechanisms are international organisations.

BOX 2.8 SECURITY DILEMMA (ii)

build up own military capability and/or interest in system of international law and mechanisms of rule-governed co-operation, i.e., international organisations

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a particularly good example of such an international organisation as it is clearly closely connected with the aforementioned ‘security dilemma’. NATO was founded as the military alliance of the Western, liberal-democratic (and capitalist) states during the heightening of tensions with the Eastern bloc which was led by the Soviet Union, in 1949. The founding members not only agreed on military co-operation, but political, social, economic and cultural collaboration in order to protect the Western way of life—which was considered to include parliamentary democracy, capitalism, the rule of law and the upholding of international law. NATO was mirrored on the Eastern side by the Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955 as a response to

Germany's membership of NATO in the same year. The Warsaw Pact, too, was more than a mere military alliance and aimed to improve political co-operation and control by the Soviet Union.

While both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were founded as international organisations with a clear regional reach, the United Nations Organisation was created as an international organisation with a global reach. The foundation of the UN, too, must be placed within the context of the perennial 'security dilemma'. It was founded at the end of the Second World War with the prime objective of securing in the future world peace and international security through continuous multilateral and worldwide co-operation between states. It was the attempt to co-ordinate and pacify the co-existence of states and peoples through a universal international organisation. The member states commit themselves to abstain from any threat or use of violence in pursuit of their national interests and agree that they only have the right of individual or collective self-defence in case of armed attack. They further commit themselves to develop 'friendly' relationships between the states on the basis of the sovereign equality of all members of the UN. They agree to enhance international co-operation in order to solve international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and to promote the basic rights and liberties of all human beings without any discrimination on the bases of race, gender, language or religion. The close connection of the UN with the 'security dilemma' is amply demonstrated by the pivotal role of the Security Council. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council is the most important institution within the UN for maintaining world peace and international security. It consists of fifteen member states, of which five are permanent members who possess a power of veto for any decision proposed. These countries are the People's Republic of China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States of America. The other ten states are elected by the General Assembly every two years.

The 'security dilemma', then, may lead, and has led, to the creation of international organisations that serve as arenas within which governments bargain and negotiate with each other over issues of mutual interest or concern. International organisations constitute an attempt to overcome international anarchy through multilateral co-operation. Not all international organisations can be linked so closely to the 'security dilemma'. Three of the currently most important and powerful international organisations deal with issues arising from international economic interdependence: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (i.e., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

These organisations were established in order to create an international economic regime that would prevent the recurrence of protectionism and political hostility which were seen as precipitating the Second World War. The formation of a 'trio' of institutions was suggested at a meeting held in Bretton Woods, USA, in 1944. This is commonly known as the 'Bretton Woods' system, in which emphasis is placed on stability in national economies and on fixed exchange rates from which no member economy could deviate.

The system operated successfully until its collapse in 1973. The three pillars of the Bretton Woods system were the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The GATT was established in 1947 with twenty-three founding members covering a trade value of US\$10 billion. By 1973 the membership had increased to ninety-nine with a corresponding trade value of US\$155 billion. In 1993 the number of members had reached 117. The GATT has not been an international organisation as such, but rather a 'conglomerate of principles, standards and regulations'. All GATT members have been expected to participate in conferences in which tariff reductions are negotiated. Since its establishment, there have been eight such 'rounds'. The 'Final Act' of the 'Uruguay Round' in December 1993 included an agreement for establishing a World Trade Organization (WTO). This came into existence on 1 January 1995 and has a wider remit than the GATT. It deals primarily with international trade law and aims at 'universalisation' through the bringing together of the achievements of the UN Commission on International Trade Law, the Organization for Economic Trade and Development, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and entities such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. In addition, the WTO includes the provisions of the several international conventions concluded in the fields of transport, labour, documents of credit, property rights, companies and so on. In short, while the WTO continues the work of the GATT towards increasing trade liberalisation, it also represents an acceleration of the movement towards a truly transnational law.

BOX 2.9 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ORGANISATIONS

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 1947–94
WTO (World Trade Organisation) 1995–

- permanent structure to oversee international trading procedure and law
- forum for multilateral trade negotiations and liberalisation
- administration of trade disputes settlement procedures
- incorporation of several international conventions, e.g. transport and labour

IMF (International Monetary Fund)

- maintain stability of exchange rates to help international trade
- encourage expansion and balanced growth of international trade
- give confidence to member states by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments

IBRD (World Bank: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)

- initially: rebuilding of post-war economies
- now: assisting economic development by making loans where private capital not available

A second 'pillar' of the Bretton Woods system was the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As with the GATT, the IMF was established in order to prevent a recurrence of the disruptions that had plagued the 1930s. It was established to maintain stability in exchange rates across the world. Exchange-rate stability was seen as a prerequisite for the expansion of international trade and for a prosperous international economy. In order to achieve this stability in exchange rates, the IMF made its funds available—through lending—to states which suffered deficits on their trade accounts. In a post-war environment of increased trade liberalisation, the IMF survived well, but with major changes in the international economy through the 1970s, its role changed. The focus of IMF lending moved away from the developed countries to the developing countries, and during the 1970s saw the use of its funds increase from US\$1 billion in 1973 to over US\$10 billion in 1979. The long-term nature of these loans is indicated by the fact that as many as twenty-four countries received credits from the IMF for more than ten consecutive years, and since 1982 developing countries have found it increasingly difficult to keep up with their repayments. Through the 1990s, the pretence of ideological neutrality has been dropped and access to the IMF's resources has become conditional on the borrower's adherence to market principles.

The World Bank, otherwise known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), aimed at the rebuilding of its members' economies in the aftermath of the Second World War. Initially its job was to make large-scale investments in basic infrastructure such as power generation and transportation. However, while this led to economic growth, its social effects were 'skewed' to the extent that many of the poorest people in the developing countries tended to benefit least. In an attempt to alleviate these weaknesses, the World Bank has added conditions to its loans, with clauses in which the borrowing country had to prove that its project was to alleviate poverty. Nevertheless, the extent to which these conditions were effectively invoked is questionable. Furthermore, like the IMF, the World Bank has become more politicised in recent years and this has contributed to its relaxation of these conditions.

THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The international organisations which we have mentioned so far are associations of states on the basis of a multilateral treaty in accordance with international law. With executive bodies and competencies of their own, they pursue the objective of a co-operation of at least two states in the areas of politics and/or economics, culture and the military. Such organisations are called in the academic literature 'international governmental organisations' (IGOs). According to the Union of International Associations (UIA), their number has increased substantially since the nineteenth century when the first IGO was founded. In 1909 there were 37 IGOs; by 1951 this figure had risen to 123. By 1977 there

were 252 and in 1986 the number was 369. Perhaps surprisingly, the figures show a steady *decrease* since then, with 260 being cited at the last count in 1996. This trend may be indicative of a decline in the inclination of states to co-operate in tackling global problems.

**BOX 2.10 INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
AND (I) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
(‘international’ is not always used for the latter)**

International organisation: ‘a formal continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership’ (Archer 1983:35)

IGOs

1909:37 1951:123 1977:252 1986:369 1996:260

(I)NGOs

1977:2,502 1981:4,265 1986:4,649 1991:4,620 1996:5,472

We should take note, then, that states are not the only actors on the international stage. IGOs play a substantial role, too. But global politics is populated by even more actors. During the last two decades or so, the threats to the survival of the human race posed by nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and by dangers of an ecocatastrophe, concern with sustainable development as well as with political and social injustice worldwide, be it with political prisoners or discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have led to the formation of movements that do not limit their activities to any single territory. For activists in the environmental and peace movements or in Amnesty International, the ‘one world’ has become the point of reference for their concerns. The participants in these movements act on the basis of a global consciousness. ‘Think globally, act locally’ as much as ‘think locally, act globally’ is the core of their ethos. Arguably, through their global orientation, these activists are participating in the creation of a ‘global civil society’. Many of these activists are members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Gordenker and Weiss (1995:357) report that there are well over 15,000 recognisable NGOs that operate in three or more countries and draw their finances in more than one country. Indeed, regardless of how one defines NGOs, the figures show substantial growth in NGOs. The UIA, for example, defines NGOs as having a participating membership of at least three countries, and having substantial financial contributions from at least three countries. The number of NGOs cited by the UIA in 1996 is 5,472 for 1996 in contrast to 4,620 for 1991, 4,649 for 1986, 4,265 for 1981 and 2,502 for 1977.

In recent years an increasingly dense network structure that connects NGOs globally has been established:

New communication technologies are helping to foster the kinds of interaction

and relationships that were once unthinkable except through expensive air travel. Scaling certain kinds of trans-national efforts from neighbourhoods and regions to the global level and scaling down to involve grassroots organisations are no longer logistic possibilities, but may be treated as institutional imperatives.

(Gordenker and Weiss 1995:365)

There are transnational federations of NGOs such as Save the Children, Amnesty International, Oxfam, *Médicins sans Frontières* and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, all of which operate on a global scale and whose chapters in individual countries have a high degree of autonomy. And there are formal coalitions of NGOs that bring together organisations with different objectives, such as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva, which was originally designed as an organisational structure for European NGOs, but now comprises primarily those of the Third World; or a network such as EarthAction, which is one of the largest global NGO networks with over 700 member associations in about 125 countries. As a result, the number of 'international' non-governmental organisations has increased. Examples of such INGOs are the Socialist International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Olympic Committee.

NGOs and INGOs have also established global information-sharing networks which serve both the purpose of information exchange and campaign co-ordination. The Association for Progressive Communication (APC) was the world's first computer network committed to peace, human rights and environmental protection. It is believed that this association comprises more than 20,000 subscribers in ninety countries. Organizations like Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam and Greenpeace and various other organisations, such as labour unions, are members. The Clearing House on Development Communication (PC) that operates worldwide and provides information for professionals in developing countries in areas such as agriculture, health, environment and community development may serve as another example of such information networks, as does the HealthNet Information Service (HIS), which is a communication and information service that links medical centres in the developing world with each other and with their counterparts in the developed world.

NGOs and INGOs have considerably increased their presence in the global arena as a result of their participation at a 'world conference' organised by the UN in the 1990s. For example, the UN Conference on Ecology and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was attended by 15,000 delegates from 178 states and 115 heads of state and government. In addition, there were representatives of more than 1,400 NGOs who lobbied for their constituencies. At the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, 3,000 representatives of 813 NGOs took part. Parallel to this conference—and in the same building—the first 'Global Forum' was convened at which about 2,000 NGOs were represented to discuss human rights. Almost 4,000 representatives of NGOs attended the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994. The conference on social development in Copenhagen in 1995 attracted about 2,600 representatives of NGOs and about 3,000 NGOs took part in the 'forum' that ran parallel to the official conference. And despite Chinese efforts to stifle meetings and public

debates at the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, 20,000 participants of NGOs in hundreds of workshops at the NGO-Forum discussed the position of women around the world.

TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

Particularly interesting examples of transnational movements and their policy of creating organisational structures are aboriginal peoples. In Australia and Canada, in particular, global networking has resulted in their respective cases being brought to the United Nations, the European Parliament and even the British Parliament. Aboriginal groups have therefore attempted to pursue their interests outside the official channels of inter-state diplomacy. The declaration of 1993 as 'Year of Indigenous Peoples' by the UN signalled the extent to which aboriginal politics has become 'globalised'. This process began as early as the 1940s but only achieved results in the 1970s when contacts between indigenous peoples became truly transnational. This process was initiated by Canadian aboriginal organisations, in particular the National Indian Brotherhood, which saw opportunities arising from the constitutional debates which were taking place in Canada at that time. The result was a conference of indigenous peoples in British Columbia, Canada, in 1975. Out of this, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples was formed.

The World Council has facilitated the activities of indigenous organisations around the world and promotes the development of standards for the treatment of indigenous peoples in such organisations as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN. By the end of the 1980s, the World Council had become one of many NGOs representing aboriginal peoples and having consultative status within the UN. As a response to the emergence of transnational aboriginal demands, the 1980s saw a gradual recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to self-government by the ILO. In particular aboriginal groups focused their demands on the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples which had been established in 1982. In its 1991 meeting, the Working Group drafted a declaration in which indigenous peoples were considered to have the 'right to self-determination in accordance with international law by virtue of which they may freely determine their political status and institutions and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. Such is the degree of this increasing recognition within the UN that the legal position of indigenous groups is now superior in terms of their collective rights to that of other minorities and social groups.

An important development in terms of transnational links between indigenous peoples has been the conference organised by Canadian aboriginal groups entitled 'Strengthening the Spirit: Beyond 500 Years' held in Ottawa in 1991. Although the scope of the conference was not global, it nevertheless drew several hundred delegates from North, South and Central America. One outcome was the proposal that a new international organisation should be established which would push for demands for self-determination and human rights, and which would no longer be dependent on national governments or even on the UN, which many delegates believed had failed indigenous peoples. To this extent the new organisation would ensure that indigenous peoples would not play a

subordinate role in the UN *vis-à-vis* their 'national' governments.

A considerable degree of globalisation is thus under way in relation to aboriginal politics. This is further underlined by the fact that transnational activity can be considered as a strategy to involve international organisations such as the UN in the internal affairs of a given country. For example, in 1980 the National Indian Brotherhood had—albeit unsuccessfully—opened an office in London in an effort to lobby British MPs to block patriation of the Canadian constitution until aboriginal rights had been satisfied. Nine years later, however, the Canadian aborigines were successful in lobbying the European Parliament to pass a resolution on the subject of seal hunting despite powerful cross-pressures from the animal-rights lobby.

The increasing importance of the rights of indigenous peoples placed on the agenda of global organisations such as the UN and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) shows that they are gaining more confidence, and recognition of their legal personalities as distinct societies with special collective rights and a distinct role in national and international decision-making. They have been instrumental in establishing working groups within the UN on the expansion of aboriginal rights, and this process has intensified. The Working Group completed its Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993 and at the Earth Summit in Rio indigenous rights to environmental security were recognised.

A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY?

We have surveyed some of the actors in global politics that are neither states nor international governmental organisations but 'non-governmental' actors. It is now often being argued that these 'non-governmental' actors are in the process of forming a 'global' civil society. Politics in the modern democratic state is not just the business of the government, the civil service or other agencies of the state, but is shaped by political parties, interest groups, voluntary associations, such as churches, and socio-political movements, such as the environmental movement, the women's movement or trade unions. It is this multiplicity of actors and forces within a country that provides individuals with opportunities to associate with each other and to live lives of civil interdependence without total subjugation to an overpowering state. In short, a vibrant society provides the arena for freedom and liberty. It is with this analogy in mind that many observers do not only declare that a global civil society is emerging, but plead that such a civil society on a global level ought to be created.

Whether a global civil society will form at some point in the future is open to debate. We must not forget that the movements and movement organisations we have mentioned above are formed mostly within national civil societies and, to a great extent, depend for their success, and even their survival, on other institutions such as political parties, trade unions, churches and the media. A global civil society that is built around the global linkages of these nationally 'embedded' movements is thus inherently fragile and premised upon a national environment congenial to movement politics. We further know from analyses of national politics that economic interests tend to be politically more powerful than others. It is often not asked in debates about global civil society what the

role of economic interests, and in particular of multinational corporations, will be in such a global society. Will they dominate global civil society to the same extent that they dominate national civil society?

BOX 2.11 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

- individuals associating with each other and living life of civil interdependence without total subjugation to an overpowering state
- global?
- most movements still within national civil societies
- could it sideline states?

Finally, even if a global civil society did form—be it around the non-profit-making non-governmental organisations or around the multinational corporations—would it be in a position to sideline the states as global actors? Who or what would impose some degree of order in a global world populated by a multiplicity of actors and confronted with existential global problems ranging from ecological disasters, mass migration and streams of refugees to famines, wars and human-rights violations?

As we have seen in our discussion on sovereignty, in the past in Europe at least it was the state that was considered to be the ‘ultimate power’ that could impose, and enforce, order over and within a territory. There is no denying the fact that there is no world government, and it is very unlikely that there will be a world state in the future. The creation of such a state would presuppose that nation-states would relinquish the power they still have—in particular as military actors—and install the world state as the global monopolist of the legitimate use of violence to whom everyone would have to submit. Who or what could prevent such a world state from establishing itself as a global dictatorship? Who or what could exercise some sort of democratic control over such a political organisation?

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Yet the fact that there is no highest political authority at the global level and that, indeed, we observe a disaggregation of authority as a result of the increase in the number of global political actors does not mean that of necessity there are no effective political mechanisms by which orderly and reliable responses could be made to global issues. These mechanisms are discussed in the discipline of International Relations and in political debate under the name of ‘global governance’. A ‘Commission on Global Governance’, which was composed of a number of ‘eminent persons’—(former) politicians, economic leaders, academics—and which consulted individuals and representatives of governments, IGOs and NGOs, published a widely discussed report in 1995 under the title of *Our Global Neighbourhood*. In it they advanced the definition of ‘global governance’ cited in Box 2.12.

BOX 2.12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE DEFINED

[Governance] is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken... At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.

It is obvious that for the authors of this report global governance does not mean global government. Rather than opt for a hierarchical model that puts one agency—such as the state—at the apex of the political authority structure, the Commission envisages a political model in which a multiplicity of actors pursue collaborative solutions to common problems in the spirit of collective responsibility. 'Global governance' is meant to emphasise the need, and the desirability, of the collaboration of public and private actors starting from the local level and running right through to the global level. Hence, instead of arguing in favour of establishing a sovereign, centralised institution at the global level that could authoritatively impose order—if need be through coercive means—supporters of the idea of 'global governance' start from the empirical observation of a multiplicity of actors at the global stage and the alleged incapacity of states as the traditional international actors to solve global problems from which they deduce the necessity of setting up decentralised and plural mechanisms of political co-operation and regulation.

BOX 2.13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

- not equal to global government
- rather a multiplicity of actors pursue collaborative solutions to common problems in a spirit of collective responsibility

We may gain a better understanding of ‘global governance’ if we look at one specific issue area. It is often maintained that the global economy cannot be politically regulated, or ‘governed’. However, this is by no means the case. We have already mentioned above the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the GATT/World Trade Organization as major regulatory international governmental organisations. They have been instrumental in removing political control over economic processes and institutions through a policy of ‘liberalisation’ and are now engaged in ensuring the continuation of this ‘neo-liberal’ policy. There are other institutions that are involved in economic governance. For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has a leading role in the supervision of international financial institutions; the Basle Committee’s Capital Accord of 1988 was the most significant international agreement to date in the field of bank supervision, setting rules for measuring capital adequacy and fixing minimum standards of business conduct for banks involved with international activities; and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is pivotal in the area of security-market supervision.

BOX 2.14 GLOBAL REGULATION?

global economy ‘governed’ (?) by

- intergovernmental regulatory organisations, e.g. IMF, World Bank, WTO, BIS, Basle Committee and IOSCO
- private regulatory systems, e.g. debt rating and international commercial arbitration

There is also a host of other private regulatory systems. There are debt-security or rating agencies, which are private entities, that organise information for suppliers and borrowers of capital. The agencies have a vital function for the global economy in which there is a constant flow of capital in search of profitable investment. These agencies rank or rate the creditworthiness of debtors, assessing their liquidity and solvency and hence the risks a lender takes when investing in bonds or securities of issuers. This activity frequently involves the assessment of the creditworthiness of public issuers—for example, national or municipal governments—whose policies may well be influenced by the likely approval or disapproval of the rating agencies. Another private regulatory mechanism is international commercial arbitration. The global economy, as much as national

economics, operates legally through contractual arrangements for the sale of goods, joint ventures, construction projects, distributorships and the like. The settlement of disputes over contracts has increasingly become the task of international commercial arbitration bodies. Rather than submit to the courts of the other party—which in a dispute over an international contract would involve litigation in a possibly ‘alien’ legal system—parties agree on conflict resolution through private bodies. There were 127 arbitration centres by 1993. More recently established centres include those of Bahrain, Singapore, Sydney and Vietnam. Among the most important international institutions involved in commercial arbitration are: the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, with members from some hundred countries and national committees in sixty; the American Arbitration Association; and the London Court of International Commercial Arbitration. But there are other, increasingly important, centres, such as the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission. Two sets of figures may attest to the increasing importance of these agencies. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) received its first 3,000 requests for arbitration between 1923, when it was founded, and July 1976. The next 3,000 requests came in the next eleven years. In 1991, the ICC dealt with 333 cases; in 1992 with 337; and in 1993 with 352. The number of arbitrators has also risen dramatically—and this within a very brief period of time: there were about a thousand arbitrators by 1990, yet by 1992 this number had doubled. Much of this arbitration is done by big multinational legal firms and, with Anglo-American law dominant in international transactions, arbitration tends to privilege Anglo-American law firms and thus contributes to the globalisation of Anglo-American law (Sassen 1996).

When talking about economic governance, we should be aware of the fact that the policy of economic regionalisation which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is itself a manifestation of governance. This can be illustrated with reference to the European Union and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).

BOX 2.15 EU and APEC

EU	15 members; 19 per cent of world trade; 370 million population; significant central institutions+political agenda
APEC	18 states; 40 per cent of world trade; 2,000 million population; no formal institutional structure+no immediate political overtones

But both are regional trading blocs within which trading barriers have been brought down.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

To understand the policies of European integration since the mid-1980s we may see them, among other things, as a response to the structural changes of the international

political and economic system of the post-war world. Relative American decline and Japanese ascent and the concomitant shifts in technological, industrial and economic or financial capabilities have forced the European political and economic elites to rethink their economic and political goals and interests as well as the means appropriate for achieving them. Undoubtedly, one force behind the relaunch of 'Project Europe' was the business interest of some large European firms. They came to realise in the early 1980s that the role of protected national markets in the era of global competition was decreasing. Sectors such as telecommunications, electronics or automobiles were no longer economically viable, even in the larger European countries. A 'single-market' Europe would allow for economies of scale by easing economic transactions and by creating a large, 'harmonized' consumer market. It would allow the development of Europe-wide delivery systems, corporate alliances, production networks and electronic marketplaces. There was an acceptance among many large European firms that such a European orientation was inevitable given the increased size of production runs and investments required for world-market competitiveness. Politicians expected this European 'turn' to solve the problem of economic crisis management at the national level.

It would be wrong to analyse the policy of European integration since the mid-1980s only in terms of economic governance. There are other factors which nevertheless place European integration firmly within a 'global' context. Concern with developing a common foreign and defence policy, or at least with co-ordinating the respective national policies, gained momentum when the United States hinted in the mid-1980s at a reduction in its military presence in Europe. It became urgent when the United States did indeed withdraw troops with the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Irrespective of this, as the negotiations of the then superpowers at the Washington summit of 1987 had already demonstrated, without some common position on security issues, decisions about Western Europe's security would be taken over the heads of its leaders and peoples. The repercussions of the collapse of state socialism in 1989 initiated a further reconsideration of a common foreign and defence policy. First, the post-socialist states of Eastern and Central Europe were looking to the European Community for political and security agreements. Second, the war in Yugoslavia required some kind of joint geostrategic position. Finally, and perhaps of the greatest importance, the inevitable effects of the unification of Germany on the structure, dynamics and balance of power of the European Community had to be parried. How best to bind the united Germany even more firmly into the European order became a decisive diplomatic concern. The solution was believed to lie in the linkage between German unification and deeper political integration in Europe.

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Another example of economic regionalisation and its connection with economic governance is APEC. In economic terms the membership of APEC presents a formidable amalgam of states: eighteen states with a share in world trade of 40 per cent and a total population of more than 2,000 million. APEC was founded in 1989 as a regional forum

equipped to deal—if necessary—with the possible failure of negotiation centred on the GATT. It is a very different form of co-operation from the EU in the sense that it has no formal institutional structures and no immediate political overtones. It also had a minimal set of objectives limited in the first instance to free trade. In this sense one similarity which APEC has with the EU is the fact that it forms a regional trading bloc within which barriers to trade have been gradually brought down.

APEC development has been related to the development of other areas of co-operation such as security. The changing global dynamics of the post-Cold War period has ensured an increasing role for co-operation in the field of security and provides a further opportunity for linkages between governments which are no longer dictated by the contingencies of superpower rivalries. Yet continued US involvement in APEC creates some friction. Although the USA is a member of APEC, it is not a member of ASEAN, which is more clearly defined by its security role. This is therefore seen as an area in which the USA might conceivably wish to become involved over the coming years.

While not a security organisation, APEC's loose intergovernmental structure provides an important network of contacts which has security implications; take, for example, the possible benefits which may arise from increased diplomatic contact between the USA, China and Japan. APEC's priority is similar to its global equivalent, the GATT, in that it is concerned to break trade barriers between countries *not just in its own region* but beyond. It would therefore open its accords to other countries willing to accept their obligations. The emphasis (partly driven by the USA) in APEC, then, is not only trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific Rim region, but globally.

GOVERNANCE AND THE STATE

This survey of some of the institutions and mechanisms of 'global governance' should be amended by a consideration of the importance of at least one further agency, that of the state. Which role does the state play in the architecture of governance? To answer this question, we must ask more generally about the effect of globalisation on the state. This is a topic hotly debated among academics and politicians alike. We do not intend to cover the issue comprehensively, but wish to offer some observations.

Does globalisation lead to a loss by the modern state of its monopolistic rule over a territory and its people? The success of the modern state in the last two hundred years or so and its universality and legitimacy were premised on its claim to be able to guarantee the economic well-being, physical security and cultural identity of the people who constitute its citizens. But forces such as global capitalism, global proliferation of nuclear weapons and global media and culture are now undermining this claim and challenge the effectiveness of the political organisational form of the modern state. They are thus weakening the links between the citizens and the state. The citizens demand political representation, physical protection, economic security and cultural certainty. But in a system of global interdependencies, is the modern state (still) capable of accommodating these interests and mediating between its citizens and the rest of the world?

Arguably, in a world of global interconnectedness both people's sovereignty and state sovereignty have been challenged since '[t]he very process of governance can escape the

reach of the nation-state. National communities by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies themselves, and governments by no means determine what is right or appropriate exclusively for their own citizens' (Held 1992:21). For example, the formation of a global economy outreaches the control of any single state; multi- and transnational corporations, stockbrokers and international money and securities dealers make production and investment decisions that affect the economic well-being of states and people without being accountable to them. Global communication and the processes of informationalisation make it difficult for governments to control information and its dissemination. Extra-territorial global forces both invade the political space of the modern state and, because of their extra-territoriality, are operating outside its controlling reach. Both as space invaders and as space evaders do they challenge the democratic polity. They affect the lives of citizens by imposing constraints and limits on democratically constituted political agency without allowing the citizens substantial control over them.

It may be argued that the sovereignty of the territorial state is being gradually undermined by the pressure of 'de-territorialisation'. We may be witnessing the emergence of overlapping and hierarchically ordered loyalties not entirely dissimilar to those which existed in medieval times. Take, for example, the resurgence of religious identities such as Islam, Christianity and Hinduism, among others. In each of these cases collective identities have been built which are non-territorial and therefore de-linked from the territorial boundaries of the state. One can refer here to the power which Islamic 'fundamentalism' had over a considerable number of Muslims living in Britain when Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses* was published and condemned by the religious leaders in Iran. Another example is the extent to which advanced telecommunications allows for the spreading of evangelism not only in the USA, but across the globe.

In addition to this there has been a marked growth in 'diasporic nationalism' which has been unleashed by the opening up of previously closed borders. Increasing flows of people and information have had the effect of strengthening ties between migrant communities and their 'homeland', even if they are living on the other side of the world. Immediately one may point to the example of diasporic communities such as the Jews, the allegiance of some of whom to Zionism has been maintained throughout the course of history. This continued identification with the 'homeland' has been facilitated by the media and through communications networks such as the Internet and fax. In each case, the territorial boundedness of the state has been undermined by the dynamics of globalisation and signals the possible decline in the power of the state by altering or diluting political allegiances, or putting economic or cultural activities outside the control of the state. De-territorialisation therefore signals the possible transformation or the weakening of the state as it has operated since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

States can no longer afford not to be part of the global economy. Internationally mobile capital and volatile international markets as well as the change to flexible methods of production and the concomitant reshaping of the composition of the labour force have affected the level of economic activity and employment within states and their capacity for political regulation of the economy. Yet we should ask whether capitalism has ever been controllable by the state. Has the state ever controlled finance capital? And has

capitalism never in the past set any limits to what the state could do? We may also argue that the actors in the world economy have an interest in a regulated international business environment:

Calculable trade rules, settled and internationally common property rights, and exchange-rate stability are a level of elementary security that companies need to plan ahead and, therefore, a condition of continued investment and growth.... Companies may want free trade and common regimes of trade standards, but they can only have them if states work together to achieve common international regulation.

(Hirst and Thompson 1995:425–6)

This international regulatory ‘function’ of the states, so Hirst and Thompson propose, gives them considerable leverage over economic actors. Furthermore, they point out that not all economic actors operate globally, but benefit from their embeddedness in national business systems:

Companies benefit from being enmeshed in networks of relations with central and local governments, with trade associations, with organized labour, with specifically national systems of skill formation and labour motivation. These networks provide information, they are a means to co-operation and co-ordination between firms to secure common objectives, and they help make the business environment less uncertain and stable—a national economic system provides forms of reassurance to firms against shocks and the risks of the international economy.

(Hirst and Thompson 1995:426–7)

This argument alerts us to the fact that economic globalisation does not necessarily result in a wholesale decline in political opportunities for national economic management. States as social organisations may benefit economic actors in both the national and global environments.

The effects of globalisation on the modern state need extensive empirical analysis. We must not assume without detailed argument that globalisation, of necessity, weakens the modern state and undermines, if not destroys, its policy capacity. There are still certain functions and tasks that will have to be performed even in the global world and which are unlikely to be performed well, or at all, by private agencies.

Economic globalisation affects different sectors and regions within each state differently. ‘Deindustrialisation’, for example, is bound to bring disadvantages to the manufacturing industries and industrial regions of advanced capitalist countries, whereas the internationalisation of financial services is likely to benefit other geographical locations and socio-economic groups within these countries. One of the effects of global capitalism on the advanced capitalist countries has been the occurrence of socio-economic and socio-political crises which used to be seen as unique to less developed countries: for example, rising long-term unemployment, increase in income disparities and in absolute poverty, depopulation of the countryside, decay of urban centres and an increase in organised crime. Neither for the global system as a whole nor for its

constituent units does economic globalisation thus result in homogeneity and overall integration; rather, it is likely to accentuate heterogeneity and fragmentation. Global capitalism is best analysed as a system of structured inequality. There is a need for an agency that integrates society and takes care of the interests individuals share as members of a community. Who else but the state could take care of this task? We have also noted that the very real danger of a global ecocatastrophe is an important aspect of globalisation and the formation of a global consciousness. As we move into the twenty-first century, a new balance has to be found between the economy and ecology. Achieving 'sustainable development', and hence an economic system that is ecologically safe, presupposes an agency that can instigate reform and see through fundamental changes. Who else but the state could take care of this task?

BOX 2.16 GLOBALISATION AND THE STATE

- globalisation=the end of the state?
- state inability unilaterally to meet its citizens' needs
- factors outside its reach or control
- presence of 'de-territorialisation: re-emergence of overlapping and hierarchically ordered loyalties?
- 'diasporic nationalism': e.g. Jews and Zionism
- but companies need international regulatory framework and that gives states leverage
- therefore, not proven verdict—globalisation has a different impact on different sectors
- still some things only state can do?
- handle local/community de-industrialisation
- ecological issues/local regulation
- make and enforce international agreements

We have noted that local (national) decisions may have global effects—for example, policies regarding emission levels for power stations. Likewise, global processes may have a local impact—for example, the global dissemination of Western imagery through satellite-based communications systems and its effect on local/national cultures. There is a need for an agency that considers the possibly global effect of local decisions, but that also protects national communities as best as possible against the local effects of global forces. Who else but the state could take care of this task?

We have further noted that ever more policies and decisions are being taken in the setting of multilateral negotiations and agreements. Who, if not the state, could have the legitimacy to participate in these negotiations, agree to binding policy decisions, and then have the power to guarantee their local implementation?

Finally, we have observed that around the world political projects of regional integration are being pursued as an attempt to promote regional economies and create structures of regional political governance. These projects will put a premium on the co-

operation of states. Who else but states could provide a legal and material infrastructure for such a regional, 'supranational' space and contain the political, economic and social dislocations which will necessarily arise in such an enterprise?

To fulfil these tasks the state may have to share its sovereignty with other actors. But this curtailment in its sovereignty does not mean that in the era of globalisation the state is likely to wither away.

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FURTHER READING

The literature on globalisation is vast and continues to grow. Any selection is therefore highly arbitrary. A good starting point is David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995. Although the focus of the book is the future of democracy in a global world, Held addresses many of the questions and issues that have been raised by scholars in Political Science and International Relations in the debate on globalisation. Changes in world politics are masterfully discussed in James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, Harvester/Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1990. This scholarly text may be usefully read in conjunction with the volume edited by A.G. McGrew and P.G. Lewis, *Global Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, which has been aimed at a student readership. H.-H. Holm and G. Sørensen (eds), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, contain case studies which investigate the effect globalisation has on states and regions around the world. A key issue in the debate on globalisation has been the question of sovereignty, and a very readable discussion of this issue is Saskia Sassen's *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. A theoretically more elaborate treatise is J.A. Camilleri and J. Falk, *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1993. Questions of sovereignty, state, nation and democracy are also addressed by Roland Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into*

the Twenty-first Century: Globalization, Integration and the Nation-state, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996. Roland Axtmann (ed.), *Globalization and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, Pinter/Cassel, London, 1998, contains essays on the question of how the state in Europe has been implicated in, and affected by, globalisation. A brilliant attempt at mapping the new global economy is the book by P.Hirst/G.Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. Not only do the authors query the view that a global economy has already formed, they argue forcefully that the international economy can still be regulated and governed.

Readers who wish to venture outside the debate on globalisation as it is conducted in Politics, International Relations and International Political Economy may start with the volume edited by Mike Featherstone, *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*, Sage, London, 1990, and Roland Robertson's essays, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*, Sage, London, 1992. Both books provide sociological accounts and discussions of 'cultural' globalisation. *Articulating the Global and the Local*, Westview, Boulder, 1997, edited by Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner, contains many stimulating essays on globalisation from the perspective of Cultural Studies. Finally, Manuel Castells's masterful study on *The Rise of the Network Society*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, which will eventually be published in three volumes, is destined to become an instant classic with its skilful combination of theoretical reflection and empirical observations in an analysis of the political, economic and social world as it is developing as we enter the new millennium.

3

The contemporary nature of security

Roger Carey

Security is an elusive concept. It is a strange phenomenon, a subjective ‘feeling’, and therefore relational and relative, rather than an objective ‘thing’ that can be seen and handled. You cannot touch security—you can only *feel* secure.

If security is something that can only be felt, it must be security from something—a threat of one sort or dimension or another. For the state, the most obvious threat is that posed by another state—a threat of invasion or of control by another power leading to a loss of sovereignty. This is manifest in a military threat, or, very importantly, in the *perception* of a threat. This offers an explanation of the fact that in the period of the Cold War Great Britain did not feel threatened by the United States, but did feel threatened by the USSR. Both had a capability to wipe Great Britain off the face of the earth, yet there was a perception in Britain—whether rightly or wrongly is of no consequence—that the USA had no intention of utilising that capability to invade Britain or otherwise pose a threat to the security of the country. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was perceived to harbour hostile intentions. The perception of threat, therefore, is a subtle combination of not only the capability of another power, but the perceived intention of that power to use that capability in a potentially hostile manner. This relationship has been expressed in a quasi-mathematical form by Singer (1967) as

Threat Perception=Capability×Intent

This formula is, however, deceptive. It suggests that there is a scientific manner in which a threat can be determined. Consequently it implies that there is a level of sophistication in weapons systems, a level of armed forces, that can counter such a threat and thereby guarantee security. While it may be possible to measure with some degree of accuracy the capability of a potential opponent, assessing the willingness and intention to use that capability, and the triggers that may spark that use, involves many more unknown factors.

Once upon a time security must have been a simple affair. Even though it was ill-defined—even lacking in definition—everyone knew what it was. ‘Them’, out there, threatened ‘Us’, in here, epitomised by the medieval knight in his castle, or the circle of wagons in a wagon train attacked by Indians in American folklore. In an era when communications were poor, it was, perhaps, acceptable for leaders to make decisions about threats and the need to take actions to counter the threat and so provide security. The population had no access to better knowledge and so accepted more or less meekly—the situation in which they found themselves.

BOX 3.1 SECURITY

- subjective feeling
- relational and relative
- security 'from' something
- perceptual
- 'us' versus 'them'

For the state, the most widespread unit of organisation in the international system, the Government determines the external threats. The Government develops a security policy to counter these perceived threats through the mechanism of Foreign Office and Defence Ministry or their functional equivalents. (Internal threats have almost always been seen as being different and have been handled through a Ministry of the Interior or a Home Office which have always had separate forces, though sometimes they have been very similar in structure, training and equipment to those designated for external security.) The means that one state developed to counter the perceived threat from a neighbouring state often became itself a perceived threat by the neighbour—who in turn redoubled his forces, and so on. This is the classic security dilemma and can be illustrated by overt arms races over long periods of time—e.g. the late nineteenth-century naval arms race between Britain and Germany and the missile race between the USA and USSR in the 1970s. Only recently have defence analysts suggested building and deploying weapons systems that have an essentially defensive capability in order to break this vicious cycle. Even in such developments and deployments, however, there are considerable dangers in creating instability. During the deployment phase of any such system a potential opponent—i.e. the state posing the threat—might well be aware of the defensive nature of the deployment. True, it will not be seen as a direct threat, but it will reduce opportunities to pose future threats or even to inflict damage and destruction. There is, therefore, a final 'window of opportunity' for the would-be aggressor during the deployment phase of the defensive system. At this time the state posing the perceived threat will have one, final chance to impose its will by military means. This is a very unstable period during which threat perception is likely to be very high and feelings of security, in consequence, to be very low. An interesting contemporary example is the Greek Cypriot decision to deploy ground-to-air missiles in the face of a perceived threat from Turkish Cypriot air capability.

SECURITY AND THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Security, and the study of what constitutes security and how it might be either achieved or overthrown, is academically linked to the 'realist' view of the world. This is an academic tradition going back at least as far as the Greek city states and the writings of Thucydides. This view sees conflict between men—and, therefore, states—as being endemic. To a greater or lesser degree, therefore, the international political system can be

seen as anarchic. Power, and the struggle for power and the control of resources, is central to this manner of thinking. In this environment states will only be constrained by agreements—alliances, treaties, even tenets of international law—that they see as being in their own interests. Security in this context concentrates in the military—upon military values, strategies and capabilities—and is concerned with the survival of the state.

If security is focused on the survival of the state, if this is the paramount value, then logically security has first call on the resources of the state. It is very noticeable that the first act of newly independent states is to create an armed force and that even in the poorest of states the military are well equipped (or relatively so) and enjoy a high status in society. (Ironically, of course, the organisational skills, the virtual monopoly on the right to use arms, the level of equipment enable the military to pose a domestic threat if their privileged position is questioned in any way.) In this situation to have a problem or issue labelled a 'security issue' ensures that there is a flow of resources to solve or ameliorate the perceived threat or problem. Astute politicians, therefore, begin to promote essentially non-security issues as being matters of high security significance. Some 'threats' thereby become more imaginary than real—or they are generated by skilful publicists! A problem then develops in defining what constitutes a 'threat'—is it 'real' or the product of a fertile imagination?

The responsibility of the state to provide security—for itself and its citizens—allows the state to impose all manner of draconian measures on society—e.g. conscription, Official Secrets Acts, and so on. In defending the state, the state itself assumes major powers for itself, including the possibility of reorganising the social and economic fabric of society, as happened in both the First and Second World Wars. In time of overt conflict the whole of domestic society and politics are dominated by the single issue of security—sometimes to the point of paranoia in which, for example, long-established residents find it necessary to change their names for fear of being branded as spies for the enemy—e.g. the British royal family in the First World War.

Some sectors of society, most notably the military and the executive, are in the unique position of both defining the threat—i.e. of determining what constitutes a security issue—and being responsible for countering the threat that they have defined. This ability to define the problem and the solution has the result that funding for security projects has almost invariably taken precedence over funding for other activities. Defence budgets, though not impervious to cuts, have historically been sustained more consistently than, for example, health and education. One consequence of this orientation has been that security thinking tended to become state-centric, seeking solutions only within the state boundary, and has become ethnocentric. Global solutions to identified security problems were either not considered at all or were given a low priority. Regional solutions were usually judged solely in terms of national self-interest, and thus several regional agreements foundered shortly after being established—ANZUSC, the tripartite security treaty of 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and United States being but a single example.

SECURITY AND THE COLD WAR**BOX 3.2 TRADITIONAL VIEW**

- realist
- anarchic world
- struggle for power and struggle of power vs power
- Cold War: purpose of security—to defend integrity and sovereignty of the state (including citizens)

During the period of the Cold War security was firmly enshrined in the military. The purpose of security was to defend the integrity and sovereignty of the state and presumably—though rarely articulated—was concerned for the security of the individual citizens. The ending of the Cold War allowed a questioning to take place of these tenets of the idea of security. The focus of the idea of security could now move away from the state and on to other groupings, often within the state. This led to the classical distinction between internal and external security becoming blurred (it probably has always been blurred to some extent, but analysts have chosen not to recognise this fact). There was also an argument made by some people to extend the idea of security to encompass the environment and other potentially threatening areas of activity, over which the state might have little or no control. The threat was now seen to change and other areas of activity came into focus: classically the environment, but some scholars began to fuse on micro-security issues—e.g. in a developing society the availability of a clean water supply was far more of a security concern to many of the citizens of the state than any number of military threats from other states. This change in focus also implied a move from focusing international relations on the state—the state-as-actor approach—to the individual on the one hand and the global agency on the other.

The major intellectual challenge to the accepted view of security came well before the formal end of the Cold War. Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (1993) was a clear intellectual challenge but more subtly it exposed the limits of the traditional view of security and the need to extend the debate about the nature of security. Indeed, even establishing the need for a debate about a matter that had largely been taken for granted by the bulk of scholars and citizens alike was a major achievement.

Another factor that contributed to this change of focus was the communications revolution. This revolution included jumbo jets and their capacity to carry people from one side of the world to the other; computing power and the development of databases and data handling in a manner that would have seemed unthinkable at the time of the formation of NATO; and the extension of the telephone system in both quantity and quality. This revolution in communications has enabled non-state actors to begin to play a role in international relations, and as communications have improved and become cheaper, so the number of non-state actors has increased dramatically, so that it now includes not only multinational corporations, but universities and local authorities. This

process has been given an added momentum by the ending of the Cold War and the popular expectation that there would be a 'peace dividend'. The advent of the Internet, it is argued by some, has totally altered the framework in which security is set, as it is now possible to communicate and move ideas around the world almost instantaneously. To this ability has been added the discussion of major issues in global fora such as the UN and the impact of an ever increasing global economic independence. This process of globalisation poses, perhaps, the greatest challenge to traditional thinking about security.

SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

At the forefront of this challenge are the environmentalists. The threat is not seen by this group as being posed by weapons systems and other military instruments by one state against another, but by a range of environmental problems—most popularly global warming—that are threats to everyone and the responsibility of everyone. As with more traditional thinking, however, the environmental threat is perceived differently by different people in different parts of the world. Individuals, societies and states see themselves as being less rather than more affected; later rather than sooner. This perception is complicated by a debate over the nature of the threat against which security should be sought—scientists argue endlessly about ecosystems, energy shortages, population growth and food reserves, and the position of these factors on the 'threat league table'. The position of the environmentalists is further complicated by the fact that the environmental pressure groups—e.g. Greenpeace—do not always command the respect or the high level of credibility necessary to convince either decision-makers or large numbers of the global population of the nature of the threat.

There is a further set of arguments that question whether the major environmental threat is from natural activity—e.g. volcanic explosions—or from man-made problems such as greenhouse gases. As little can be done about the former, activity tends to concentrate on the latter. This threat from the environment is seen to be a result of the exploitation and manipulation of nature by man on such a scale that it has now become self-defeating. The two major factors that are perceived to have caused this problem are the massive growth in world population and the vast growth in economic activity, which between them are thought to be likely to overwhelm mankind as a whole.

The major problem faced by those who would have us take environmental threats to security seriously is the simple fact that the world is not organised and does not function as a unit. It is, instead, organised into sovereign states, each of whom has a different perception both of the problem—if it agrees that there is one—and the solution. Even if the problem is recognised, the degree of urgency in identifying and implementing a solution will vary. For example, the USA has clearly indicated that it will not take domestically difficult political decisions about industrial activity and curbs on the use of the motor car in order to prevent a small rise in sea levels. Yet even a small rise in sea level could lead to a state such as Bangladesh literally disappearing under the sea. This example highlights the huge discrepancy in ability to affect the outcome of any environmental threat. Bangladesh, where the threat might be felt most acutely, has little capacity to affect the outcome. The USA, which has the most ability to affect the

outcome, has the least to fear and, in any case, has the resources to 'cope' with the problem if it emerges, and may, therefore, see the threat as being of a very low order of significance (which is tough if you are Bangladeshi!).

There are two reactions to what some claim is a threat, both of which are characterised by an imperfect knowledge of the position. One argument is that we—the West, chiefly—should do nothing. This will enable us to conserve expenditure on what may, in any case, be the wrong issues. We will leave to a future generation—which will, presumably, be wiser, more knowledgeable and wealthier than we are—the task of defining the threat and resolving it. The other argument is that these issues must be addressed *now*. Tomorrow—and certainly future generations—will be too late. The former argument is popular in the developed world—Europe, the USA and Japan—while the latter finds much favour in the less developed world. Yet the less developed world is in a quandary of its own as it also aspires to develop and generate developed world levels of wealth and affluence, thereby contributing to the very problem that it wishes to address. This crevasse can be bridged only with great care and diplomatic finesse. Maybe the writings of the geo-politicians, Mackinder and Hartmann, with their theories of the Heartland and the Rimland, were correct after all. Mackinder, for example, argued that the geographical framework within which political power is exercised is of critical importance, and that the confrontation between land- and sea-power was one of the basic patterns of international politics, as was the relationship between the 'heartland' of Eurasia and those areas on its periphery.

SECURITY—THE FURTHER BOUNDARIES

BOX 3.3 CHANGE?

- end of Cold War
- blurring of internal/external distinctions in policy
- all potentially threatening activities?
- environment
- micro-security: clean water
- less focus on state and more on individual
- globalisation as a challenge to thinking
- feminist perspective
- growth in role and influence of non-state actors
- new emphasis on co-operative rather than conflictual approach

The precedents for collective action to counter a perceived threat are not encouraging. The collective security system of the League of Nations was not a notable success and most conflicts that have occurred and been resolved since 1945 have been concluded outwith the United Nations system. The failure of collective security is summed up by the politician who, when chided that his country did not support sanctions against Germany

after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, responded that Czechoslovakia was 'a faraway country of which we know little'. The same attitude could be observed at the Rio Earth Summit and it is notable that little has been done to implement the ground-breaking ideas that were outlined in the Brandt Report, *North South: A Programme for Survival*, published as long ago as 1980 and which began to address non-traditional ways of looking at security.

Perhaps one of the problems found by those who would widen the focus of security is where to draw any new boundary. Once the traditional boundary of security is removed then what is not a security issue? Some feminists, for example, have argued that the traditional framework was fatally flawed because it reflected the way in which the male-dominated elites of society imposed particular views of what constituted 'security' upon society as a whole, but neglected the concerns of small groups within it. This was unjust and unfair economically and politically.

A further problem faced by those who would diversify the debate about security is that non-state actors begin to become significant and they are much more difficult to constrain than states—e.g. multinational corporations, or even small enterprises, that pollute water sources that cross international boundaries. Likewise, supporters of responses to perceived environmental threats can come from anywhere and this may reflect the fact that there are certain environmental issues that are common to almost all societies—e.g. the problem of urbanisation leading to a concentration of economic activity and the resultant pollution.

The proponents of environmental security would have us believe that what is at stake is not just the popular, immediate issues of a depleted ozone layer and the like, but the maintenance of civilisation. This view sees a forthcoming environmental disaster as a sort of 'apocalypse now' in which mankind will reach a self-destructing pinnacle of achievement. The grand question asked by these thinkers is whether mankind is capable of producing a solution to the security problem that it has itself created. Can civilisation rescue itself? The difficulty faced in answering this question is that the effect of any environmental crisis will not be evenly distributed and the ability to prevent or reverse a problem is also unevenly distributed. Those who have to pay the price of prevention are not the same as those who will have to pay the price of failure.

SECURITY—GLOBAL OR REGIONAL?

If these issues cannot be addressed successfully on a global scale it is suggested that most environmental issues can, in fact, be dealt with at a regional level. At this point the regional solution begins to look suspiciously like a traditional alliance with a perceived threat; a linking of the capabilities of two or more states to counter the threat; the cohesion of the alliance depending for a great part on the severity of the perceived threat; alliance cohesion diminishing with the passing of the threat. There is even room, in this scenario, for the classic security dilemma to reassert itself between two or more alliance groupings.

There are those who wish to extend the security debate who would argue that the conflict that lies at the heart of the political process must be removed and replaced by co-

operation. But even in a co-operative environment there will still be adversarial relationships and it is how to manage these conflicts of interest that underlies both traditional ideas of security and other visions. International politics is not a wholly Hobbesian 'state of nature'—there is co-operation and agreement on some issues, in some areas, and for some of the time (and, some would argue, for most of the time). Agreements are made, and, for the most part, they are kept. There is a recognition, however covert, that there is a situation of interdependence even though it does not go as far as the Palme Commission recommendation that 'nations must begin to organise their security policies in co-operation with one another' (Palme 1982).

NATO AS A SECURITY ORGANISATION

It is against this background of an international system in which some co-operation does take place that it is worthwhile to look at NATO. In many respects NATO reflects the changing nature of security—indeed, this ability to change is a mark of its success. In consequence it is the longest-lasting military alliance in the history of international relations.

At its foundation in 1949 NATO was in the tradition of military alliances going back hundreds, if not thousands, of years. At the end of the Second World War the Hobbesian 'state of nature' model of international relations was not questioned. The alliance was formed for reasons of expediency that would have been familiar to Sun Tsu and Thucydides. Yet even at its creation the North Atlantic Alliance had characteristics that differentiated it from everything that had gone before. The alliance was a formal affair—created by the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949—it placed military obligations on its member states by which each would go to the assistance of any other member that was attacked. There was, of course, a let-out clause, in that the provider of the assistance determined what assistance was appropriate, but the North Atlantic Treaty clearly created an obligation. The driving force for the creation of this military-based collective defence arrangement was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union—at that time busy gaining control and influence over Central and Eastern Europe in a manner that was perceived by the North Atlantic states to be threatening their security, epitomised most clearly by the Berlin crisis of 1948. In recognition of one of the weaknesses of previous collective defence or security arrangements, the North Atlantic Treaty clearly laid down a geographical area within which the alliance would operate—paving the way for later debates about 'out of area' activity by the alliance. These key provisions—for mutual support and for a limited geographical area—were bold attempts to give the alliance military credibility and to provide a genuine military security for its members.

There was, of course, a political perspective to this treaty as to any other. The Cold War was projected in ideological terms. The USA wanted a 'free' Europe, while Western Europe, economically still badly damaged from the Second World War, needed US aid and assistance. The political 'bargain' was that the USA would assist Europe so long as Europe helped itself, both economically and militarily. There then developed a situation whereby the USA contributed more to the security of Western Europe than did the Western Europeans themselves.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the allies were fearful of an invasion of Western Europe—the Korean War was seen as a diverting side-show—and the chiefs-of-staff talks that discussed deployment and so on were replaced by an organisation—the North Atlantic Council. This ensured political control, military planning, an operational military HQ—SHAPE—and a supreme commander—SACEUR—whose first occupant was General Eisenhower. The fact that SACEUR has continued to be an American is a political reflection of the US contribution to NATO—as it then became known. This permanent military and political structure marked NATO as unique in history.

SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE

A second unique factor was the domination of the international political system by two great powers—the USA and the USSR—both of whom possessed nuclear weapons. The advent of nuclear weapons and their ability to destroy societies totally meant that it became imperative for the two major powers to avoid war between themselves. Avoidance of conflict—i.e. a political aim—became dominant over the military aim of defeating an opponent in battle. Security came, thereby, to rely on deterrence—on the posing of a threat rather than its execution. The leader of NATO, the USA, let it be known to its allies that the conflict with the USSR was to be a political rather than a military conflict. Deterrence, an old idea, took on a new and heightened significance.

Security at this time was clearly thought of as military security, designed to make a border impermeable and to protect the national sovereignty of the member states, first by means of deterrence and second by means of force of arms if deterrence failed to deter. The initial NATO strategy was one of massive retaliation—the threat of a huge nuclear response against Soviet cities for any incursion into NATO territory, however small. This strategy lacked credibility even when the USA was immune to any response and in the period when the USA itself enjoyed a monopoly of long-range nuclear delivery systems. By the late 1950s, when the USSR had developed a delivery capability against the USA, the credibility slumped still further. By the mid-1960s, therefore, NATO strategy had evolved to become one of flexible response—a lesser threat was posed, with an outcome that was likely to be well short of mutual nuclear suicide. This alliance response, with a much higher probability of implementation, thereby made the strategy more credible, and thus more effective at providing security.

The strategy did, however, cause great tensions within the alliance. For deterrence to be effective there had to be a high probability of a response by NATO—just what the Europeans and those most likely to be attacked needed for their territorial security. But if deterrence failed to deter and an attack took place, the implications were that these territories would become the (possibly nuclear) battleground—and this was not considered a good idea at all by those concerned. Forward defence in Europe was a splendid idea if you lived in the USA, but not particularly relished by the West Germans. However, to the citizens of West Germany, the potential of a rapid escalation to an ICBM conflict from great power homeland to great power homeland was more appealing—the missiles would fly over Germany. Naturally, to the citizens of the USA, at the receiving

end of the missiles, this was an idea that held few attractions. Even at the basic level of the alliance—the military security of the member states—there was, therefore, a fundamental problem.

SECURITY AND INTERNAL ALLIANCE CONFLICTS

There were other conflicts within the alliance too. With the great issue of war and peace firmly in the hands of the alliance leader, the secondary members depended for their security upon the actions of that leader. This created tensions within the alliance that in previous generations would have led to its break-up. But in the second half of the twentieth century technology did not allow this solution to tensions. Even though Great Britain and France developed and sustained a nuclear capability they could not challenge the USA in nuclear decision-making.

There was, however, a dreadful irony about the British and French nuclear capabilities. The existence of nuclear systems other than that possessed by the USA could be argued to be a very public proclamation that Britain and France did not have confidence in the USA to act in the interests of the European members of the alliance—that, in the last analysis, they believed that the USA would act in its own interests. On the other hand, it was argued, the existence of British and French forces contributed to the uncertainty felt by the USSR and her allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and this was a strong factor in the deterrence calculation. The European nuclear forces also added to the likelihood of a US response, for fear of a maverick British or French response to any attack on Europe.

BOX 3.4 NATO

- Very traditional rationale
- Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,

individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...'

- NAT: North Atlantic Treaty (or Washington Treaty or Atlantic Pact/Alliance) 4 April 1949
 - NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the organisation and military structure created to fulfil the requirements of NAT, located principally in Brussels
 - NAC: North Atlantic Council, the supreme policy-making body in NATO
 - SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe
 - SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located in Mons
- Unique features:
 - permanent military and political structures
 - domination by a hegemon
 - nuclear weapons: more important to deter war than to *fight and win a war*
- Principal strategies:
 - massive retaliation
 - flexible response
 - new strategic concept
- Tensions:
 - strategies+relations between leader and followers+resources and resource distribution

SECURITY AND RESOURCES

Whatever the argument concerning the utility of the British and French independent nuclear capabilities, it was unquestioned that these forces consumed considerable proportions of the limited resources available in Britain and France for military security. And if 'best value for money' was being sought *for the alliance as a whole* these two forces were very wasteful as they only duplicated an effort made elsewhere in the alliance. Such an economic argument was not, of course, confined to nuclear weapons systems, though the nuclear systems were perhaps the most obvious examples. In the conventional weapons area the best interests of the alliance as a whole might have suggested that all high-technology weapons systems be purchased from the USA by all alliance members. But for a variety of reasons, often unconnected with military security, the European members of the alliance wished to retain and develop independent research, design and production facilities. When procurement decisions were made by NATO,

therefore, it was not unusual to find competition existing between the European members and the USA. And for reasons that were totally unrelated to military security, the final decisions were often not the most efficient in alliance terms. An excellent example of this process was the 'sale of the century' to supply NATO with fighter/bomber aircraft in the 1960s that resulted in the purchase of the American F16 (Dorfer 1983).

SECURITY, CONFLICTS, INTEROPERABILITY AND OTHER INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The consideration of non-security factors led to the scaling down of very ambitious ideas of commonality of weapons systems throughout the alliance to the more realistic, and achievable, goal of the interoperability of weapons systems. This seemingly simple goal was highlighted by the need for multiple adaptors for US aircraft to refuel at German airfields; for German trucks to refuel in Belgium; and the apocryphal but illustrative example of the reconnaissance vehicles of all nations having only the air in their tyres as common components. But even in the 'simple' and 'obvious' cases there was much contention and bickering about whose standard would be adopted, such that progress was invariably painfully slow.

In more contentious matters—such as alliance strategy—the room for disagreement was much greater and the challenges were consequently more serious. The French, especially, made several challenges to US supremacy within the alliance, arguing that American and European security interests were not identical. This argument reached a head in 1965–6 when France formally withdrew from the integrated military structure of the alliance. Ironically, however, France did not thereby reduce her own security, because the great power relationship remained, along with the determination of both alliance leaders to challenge the other only politically rather than militarily. The only price that France paid (and any other challenger would have paid) was political. This reflected the fact that the great powers had been very successful in ensuring that there was a high degree of confidence that war would not break out in Europe. Indeed, if France had thought that its security would have been imperilled it would not have behaved in this way.

As security in Europe came to be 'taken for granted', so instability and conflict elsewhere in the world became a focus of NATO squabbling. American involvement in South-East Asia became a particular matter of concern and debate when the USA sought at least the diplomatic support of its European allies. The quality of American leadership under President Jimmy Carter was seriously questioned by the Europeans, and the scepticism reduced only slightly during Ronald Reagan's presidency. The Americans, in turn, publicly questioned why they should pay so heavily for European security, especially as Europe—thanks largely to American generosity and political encouragement—had reorganised itself economically and could easily have 'afforded' to make a greater contribution to the common security.

SECURITY AND BIPOLARITY

These internal conflicts were made permissible by the stability in the international system given by bipolarity, which made life relatively simple. There was only a single focus of tension in international politics: between the USA and its allies and the USSR and its allies. All other conflicts were subordinated to this relationship. Because of their extensive ranges of influence the great powers were able to control—or attempt to control—with varying degrees of success—even the conflicts in which they were not directly involved. The clearest examples of this ‘proxy control’ were the Middle East conflicts of 1967 and 1973, which the great powers could not prevent but which they successfully controlled and limited.

The ‘spheres of influence’ of the two major powers became very well developed. Indeed, so well demarcated did these become that it was possible for the USSR to quell revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia without provoking anything other than diplomatic protests from the NATO states. Europe thus became a very stable area, even if political and economic change was virtually ruled out—security came at the price of political and economic ossification. For almost fifty years the bipolar nature of the international system enabled NATO to concentrate on a single potential opponent—a luxury denied to any previous alliance. The presence of an organisation gave the opportunity to build a bureaucratic machine to ensure political control as well as military command. If the alliance was driven initially by a military-security imperative, it quickly added a bureaucratic imperative to develop and sustain it.

SECURITY AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

In 1989–91 this cosy international system collapsed with the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the break-up of the Soviet Union. In Paris in November 1990 NATO and the Warsaw Pact formally declared that neither threatened the other and effectively brought the Cold War to an end. This was quickly followed in 1991 by the dissolution of the military structure of the Warsaw Pact in March and then by the organisation itself in July. This was followed in December 1991 by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. The end of the Cold War marked the end of bipolarity. The USSR determined that Eastern Europe was no longer part of its security perimeter and that it was no longer necessary to dominate those states that were once part of the WTO. This opened the way for political and economic change in those states previously under Soviet domination, and it also, significantly for NATO, opened up the possibility of change in their international alignments.

NATO thereby ceased to have any obvious opponent. But despite this the alliance has continued in existence and even plans to expand its membership. Partly this is by continuing to offer the member states traditional military security, but, more significantly perhaps as far as the states of what used to be termed Eastern Europe are concerned, membership of the alliance offers political acceptability—entry to NATO is seen as a ‘reward’ for enduring the hardships of the transformation from a command economy to a

market economy and for the political transition to liberal democracy. The non-military aspects of NATO have been emphasised as never before. Although economic and environmental aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty have existed since its inception, they have received only varied attention, usually when the 'cement' of military security appeared to be either weakened or threatened.

Security has, therefore, changed in real terms as well as in perception. The USA no longer faces a real threat to its geographical security and nor does Western Europe—indeed the idea of *Western Europe* is one that is rapidly fading.

The disintegration of the WTO was not, therefore, an unmitigated blessing for NATO. A new role was needed. The London Declaration of the North Atlantic Council (the political body controlling NATO) in July 1990 reaffirmed, 'that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension and we intend to enhance the political component of our alliance' (NAC 1990). There followed a review of NATO's strategy and tactics to equip it better for the new, post-Cold War environment. Dissolution of NATO was never considered. What constituted 'security' in this new world, where the physical threat to state boundaries has receded? The emphasis moved from military preparedness to an emphasis on dialogue and co-operation, the ideas of collective defence and the management of crises, and the prevention of overt conflict.

Concomitant with these changes of emphasis on the political side was a response on the military side to produce the much-vaunted 'peace dividend'—a move to smaller standing forces that were designed to be both more mobile and more versatile. This, in turn, required a military strategy that was no longer based on 'forward defence' as the size of the forces available and the degree of readiness would not permit such a strategy. Besides, if WTO and the USSR no longer existed, there was no longer a defined threat against which forward defence and flexible response could be directed. By November 1991, at its Rome meeting, the North Atlantic Council was able to declare that there was a New Strategic Concept that laid emphasis on 'risks' rather than 'threats'; that saw European security as being indivisible and was able to invite Russia to develop a relationship with NATO.

SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

This was the outcome of a formidable bureaucratic organisation not only rewriting its mission but redefining security for the alliance. This redefinition of security allowed NATO thinking to begin to converge with that of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—a much broader-based body concerned with crisis management. NATO was now also actively thinking about actions 'out of area' as in the tumultuous post-Cold War world the threats and risks to European security were now seen to emanate from non-NATO Europe, and especially the Balkans. NATO also extended its thinking by actively seeking to collaborate with the United Nations and in December 1992 agreed to consider support of 'out of area' activities on a case-by-case basis. The following year NATO supported several UN peacekeeping efforts—e.g. NATO naval forces supported the UN embargo on shipping in the Adriatic; NATO aircraft gave close air support to UNPROFOR operating in Bosnia, and enforced the 'no-fly' zone. The

NATO Council also authorised air strikes to relieve Sarajevo. The policy of giving support to the United Nations eventually went much further and led the alliance to support the Dayton Agreements in November 1995 which led to the first ever NATO land operation when over 60,000 troops, contributed by all the members of NATO, formed the core of the Implementation Force (IFOR). Amazingly, only five years after the end of the Cold War, the IFOR included Russians.

BOX 3.5 NATO IN THE 1990s—SIGNIFICANT MEETINGS/ DECLARATIONS

- 1 London Declaration, July 1990—greater emphasis on political aspects of security
- 2 Rome summit, November 1991—New Strategic Concept and Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation
- 3 December 1991—inaugural meeting of North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)
- 4 Brussels summit, January 1994—NATO leaders launch Partnership for Peace (PfP)
- 5 Madrid, July 1997—invite Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join and launch Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to replace NACC and broaden Atlantic co-operation

BOX 3.6 NATO IN THE 1990s—PRACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS

- Review of strategy and tactics
 - forces to be smaller, more multinational, mobile and versatile
 - scaling back of readiness and reduction in size of nuclear deterrent
 - move away from flexible response and forward defence (i.e. from defence at the edge of the eastern border)
 - move from language of ‘threats’ to ‘risks’
 - new emphasis upon dialogue, co-operation and management of crises and conflict prevention
 - but unaltered central purpose: territorial defence of member states
- Relations with former adversaries
 - NACC invitation—consultations on a wide range of issues relating to openness and democratic control of forces
 - PfP—‘real partnership’ and practical co-operation and operational relations: joint exercises, etc.

- enlargement issue: resulting in invitations to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
- Move into 'peace-keeping and 'out of area'
 - NAT limited activity to territory of member states but agreed in 1992 that would support CSCE and UN Security Council on a 'case by case' basis
 - this led to series of decisions in support of UN peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia, including air strikes to relieve Sarajevo
 - after Dayton Agreements of 21 November 1995, NATO operated first ever land operation and organised 60,000-strong force from its members and PfP states to supervise the implementation of the agreement

SECURITY AND NATO EXPANSION

Not content with this physical manifestation of the redefinition of what constituted European security, NATO also set out on a process of enlargement. In December 1994 the North Atlantic Council, meeting at foreign minister level, determined to establish a principle of enlargement. This resulted in the NATO Enlargement Study which was completed in the short time period of nine months. The study, presented in September 1995, was favourable to the idea of enlargement, but was insistent that the process took place only as part of a wider process of pan-European security development, with the goal of improving the security for all European states, whether NATO members or not. This, of course, included Russia, but the study was clear that, although Russian interests would be taken into consideration, there was no way in which Russia would exert a veto on the expansion process or, indeed, on any other aspect of NATO activity.

By 1996 there existed a forum in which a pan-European security debate could take place. The North Atlantic Co-operation Council, which held its first meeting in late 1991 as a result of initiatives taken by the North Atlantic Council, had by 1994 also developed the 'Partnership for Peace', and by 1996 had some twenty-seven members determined to expand their political and military co-operation, and to strengthen their relationship through practical cooperation. As an illustration of their seriousness of purpose, the nonNATO members of the Partnership for Peace quickly established permanent liaison officers at NATO HQ in Brussels. When the decision to expand NATO was formally announced there were many would-be members drawn from the Partnership for Peace. From a large number of applicants only three were selected, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid in July 1997, to form the 'first wave' of new members—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. They joined the alliance in 1999. The Madrid summit also transformed the North Atlantic Co-operation Council into the new European Atlantic Partnership Council, a clear attempt to move the transatlantic relationship into more political and economic fields.

Expansion is not without its critics. If this expansion is part of a political process then it runs the danger of offending, even alienating, those states rejected from membership

until the second, or even third, wave. If the expansion is for security reasons it may well endanger the security of the existing members without necessarily contributing to the military security of Europe as a whole. By extending the security periphery of NATO to the borders of Belarus and the Ukraine, tensions might actually be increased rather than ameliorated. The expansion of the NATO decision-making process by the addition of three new members will, almost by definition, make decisionmaking even more difficult, and thereby impede the effectiveness of NATO.

The issue of effectiveness is further highlighted by the need to integrate three ex-Warsaw Pact states into the operating procedures and structure of the alliance. The cost of this integration is clearly unknown and has been variously estimated at anything from US\$3 to 30 billion. To expend this sort of resource to create no obvious improvement in security for the alliance—and maybe to create new areas of ‘risk’—has attracted much criticism. This is especially so at a time when the resources for security are being severely reduced—by anything up to 25 per cent in real terms since the end of the Cold War—as member states seek the promised ‘peace dividend’.

Perhaps the most serious criticism of this process, however, is that it has ignored the process of expansion in the European Union. If NATO expansion is more about signalling political acceptability than military need or military logic, then to ignore the process of EU expansion is to suggest that NATO has little concern for the overall well-being of Europe.

There are, of course, arguments deployed in favour of expansion, but they are couched in political rather than military terms. During the period of the Cold War there was a great deal of political rhetoric that has created at least a moral and political obligation to expand NATO—not to do so would be to renege on moral obligations. It is also suggested that membership of NATO is in itself a part of that process of democratisation—membership of an organisation that attempts to be transparent and democratic will, it is argued, reinforce the process of democracy in those states so recently released from the thrall of a socialist system (the earlier admission of Spain to the alliance is a much-quoted precedent). ‘Why not?’ is also seen as a powerful argument.

BOX 3.7 PLUSES AND MINUSES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

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- political and moral obligation arising out of Cold War rhetoric
- why refuse democratic states entry?
- entry will reinforce democracy in Eastern and Central Europe
- membership will enlarge zone of stability in Europe
- transforms NATO from Cold War alliance into suitable security organisation for next century

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- at time when defence budgets being cut not time to take on new

responsibilities

- costs to new members and to NATO
- are these states all stable and what will they contribute?
- how to avoid offending those initially refused?
- how to avoid offending Russia?
- creation of a new dividing line in Europe?
- will enlargement undermine effectiveness of NATO and its decision-making?

SECURITY AND THE NEW MILLENNIUM

If the arguments in favour of expansion are political—and they appear to be—then the lack of convergence with the EU becomes more clearly a matter of criticism and concern. If the definition of ‘security’ is now written more broadly—and we have seen earlier how the concept of security has been widened from purely military security to encompass other elements—the idea of NATO expansion only has validity in the context of this broader framework, and must clearly be linked to the issue of EU expansion. There are five aspiring members of the EU, including the three states that recently joined NATO. Linking the economic and military expansion of Europe and its institutions would reinforce the broader definition of security, and the rigorous economic obligations required to join the EU would ensure that the new member states had the economic capacity to meet defence obligations. Such a linking would also ensure that the Partnership for Peace was seen as the most appropriate forum for the non-NATO members to discuss security and develop modes of co-operation.

NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW SECURITY?

There has been a major change in perceptions of security within the last decade. This has been accompanied by a broader academic debate about the nature and boundaries of security. Despite the quality and persuasiveness of some of the academic argument and the changes that have taken place in the empirical world, the international political system nonetheless remains organised into sovereign states. Although the notion of what constitutes security has undoubtedly been debated more widely than ever before, and the definition may indeed have been broadened, the military instrument is still the one that is/will be used in the final analysis in defence of the sovereign state. The dominance of the military in perceptions of security remains. It is recognised that there are other problems—some of them very serious, and some that pose major potential threats to civilisation—but they do not pose *security* threats. These problems, especially perhaps environmental ones, may lend themselves to resolution through novel forms of collaboration and co-operation, but the sovereign state, which itself remains the dominant form of international organisation, still chooses to resolve security issues through traditional military means. Security will thus remain for the foreseeable future a concern

of the state, and its study will tend to continue to be ethnocentric. This does not imply, however, that it has to be thought of as confrontational or exclusively militaristic. NATO provides an interesting example of flexibility with its increasing interest in environmental matters and with a willingness to expand its membership in a manner that might be thought to be contrary to a classical security reasoning. But flexibility does not mean the abandonment of traditional security.

Those wishing to witness a new era of international politics, with a new definition of security with the advent of the new millennium, are destined to be disappointed. Thucydides can rest in peace.

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4

On the causes of war

A foundation for a future study

Hidemi Suganami

What causes war? This question has interested many kinds of people. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that International Relations (IR), as an academic subject, was created to investigate it. Even though IR has come to encompass a broad range of issues, ‘what causes war’ remains one of the central preoccupations of many scholars in this field.

One of the reasons why *you* wish to study IR may perhaps be that you expect to find the answer to that question. If so, you may be disappointed to learn that the question has not been given any definitive answer despite considerable effort on the part of very many specialists. But you ought not to be too disturbed by this fact. For if the question has remained unanswered, there may be something wrong with the question itself. What I intend to do in this chapter is to suggest some more sensible alternatives, and to deal with them one by one.

But why, you may ask, should I suggest that ‘What causes war?’ is not a very helpful question? My reason is that it is not entirely clear what, as it stands, the question is asking. There are two sources of uncertainty in the formulation.

First, we need to know what the word ‘war’ means. Unless we know this, of course, we have no hope of discovering what causes war. However, it is difficult to state what ‘war’ *really* means because there are different ways in which the term can be defined. I think that it is impossible to determine that any particular definition is *the true one* at the exclusion of plausible others.

I therefore wish to state that, in this chapter, I focus on war between states, without, of course, implying that there are no other types of war. Civil wars are touched on later, but they are peripheral to my main concern. Nor will I deal with war between non-state entities, such as tribal or gang wars. Moreover, the Cold War, military crises and mere legal states of war (not involving actual fighting) are excluded from the discussion. The well-known Correlates of War Project definition of interstate war—conflict involving at least one member of an interstate system on each side of the war, resulting in a total of 1,000 or more battle deaths—is roughly what I have in mind as a guideline in the following discussion.¹

BOX 4.1 WAR

- interstate core
- correlates of War Project definition: 1,000+deaths
- different definitions but uncontroversial core

You may feel that this is to focus too narrowly on one type of war at the expense of certain others. This is a fair point. But there are three reasons for my decision to focus on one type of war. First, whatever other forms of war there may be, the sort dealt with here is still the uncontroversial core of what we normally mean by 'war'. Second, a reasonably discrete body of literature on the causes of war in the narrow sense has emerged in recent decades, and it is convenient to focus on it. Third, examining all sorts of claims about what causes war in the narrow sense is difficult enough. A more extensive study ought to be attempted later.

I remarked earlier that there are two sources of uncertainty in the question 'What causes war?' The first source was 'war'; the second is the word 'cause'. 'What causes war?' may mean 'What are the conditions which must be present for wars to be able to occur at all?' Notice that, when reformulated in this way, the question is not about the actual occurrence of any particular war, but about the very possibility of war itself. Second, however, someone who says 'What causes war?' may be asking 'What, generally speaking, leads to the outbreaks of war?' This is quite a natural thing to ask. But this question, in turn, is slightly ambiguous in its present formulation. Someone who asks this may be interested in finding out the sorts of circumstances which are statistically highly likely to be followed by war. There are many specialists, mainly in the United States, who are trying to answer this version of the question. These statisticians look into a large number of cases all at once without seeking to establish the causes of each. It is also possible, however, that someone who says, 'What, generally speaking, leads to the outbreaks of war?' does so as an afterthought, having already answered several questions of the following form: 'What caused this particular war?' This is different from the statisticians' way in that it examines a number of cases one by one, trying to establish the causes of each.

However, questions of this last form—'What caused this particular war?'—may also be asked without any expectation that they will lead to a general conclusion. Indeed, historians of international relations often say that such an expectation is quite futile. But there are some historians, as well as social scientists, who are interested in generalising about international relations, and about the phenomenon of war in particular, after studying some specific cases.

All this may sound terribly complicated, which it is in a sense. Even some very famous writers on the causes of war have failed at times to separate these questions clearly, and this has often caused them to reach unwarranted conclusions about the subject. Let me therefore summarise the above remarks by stating that at least three kinds of question arise under the title of 'the causes of war': a first relates to the very *possibility* of war, a

second to a high *probability* of war and a third to the actual *occurrence* of war.

BOX 4.2 WHAT CAUSES WAR?

The three kinds of question are:

- (a) 'What are the conditions which must be present for wars to occur?';
- (b) 'Under what sorts of circumstance have wars occurred more frequently?'; and
- (c) 'What caused this particular war?'

To put it in the language which some specialists use, these questions are asking for 'necessary conditions, or prerequisites, of war', 'statistical correlates of war', and 'origins of particular wars', respectively. In this chapter I shall deal with the above three questions in turn, under the three corresponding headings: 'prerequisites', 'correlates' and 'origins'.

I ought to state at this stage that the following discussion is not primarily a literature survey of who said what about which question, although a few examples are introduced to illustrate my argument at various points. Nor is what follows a list of what caused which war, or of more general causes of war, although, again, some examples are mentioned as we proceed. The discussion below is designed largely to help new students *think* about the causes of war. The emphasis is prominently on thinking. This is somewhat unusual. Most introductory works on the theme of the causes of war, and, more broadly, international relations in general, are not written in this way. This, in my view, is a mistake. We need to attend, at all stages, to the issue of how to think about whatever subject interests us. The earlier this is noticed, the better.

PREREQUISITES

Prerequisites of war are those conditions in the absence of any one of which war would be impossible. It is easy to see why this is an important question to ask. If we identify them, and if we can remove any one of them, we can eliminate all future wars—perhaps in much the same way as we have eliminated smallpox by getting rid of the virus.

International anarchy

One answer which has been suggested very commonly in this connection is 'international anarchy'. Unlike, for example, the United States of America, the world as a whole has no central government. The absence of a central government from the international sphere is called 'international anarchy'. It is often said that this makes war possible, although it is usually added that this does not cause any particular war.

Now it may be quite obvious that the absence of a government above states makes it possible for them to fight wars. Much less obviously, however, war can occur even in the presence of government. To see this point, imagine that a world government has been created. Who is to say that *this* government will never be challenged? Just as the United States of America had to go through a civil war (1861–5), it is easy to imagine the United States of the World going through a global civil war. In substance, such a war would be similar to a world war between two or more coalitions of states.

In short, if international anarchy makes war possible, then a world government does not rule it out either. Against this, you may be tempted to say that the former enables war *more* than the latter. But this is not a very good step to take if you want to make your argument with precision. ‘Enabling’ is the same as ‘making possible’, and this in turn is the same as ‘making not impossible’: there is no halfway house between ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’. Since war is ‘not impossible’ either under international anarchy or under a world government, you cannot say that the former enables war *more* than the latter.

This kind of argument may seem like ‘playing with words’, which it is, but you cannot escape it. Some play it well, others less so, and it is among those who play it less well that confusions arise. It is one of the purposes of any academic study to reduce confusions, and to do so we must use our words precisely.

BOX 4.3 PREREQUISITES

- international anarchy: but no reason to believe war is more probable under international anarchy than world government
- problem may lie with world’s inhabitants:
 - the ability of human beings to form a multiplicity of cohesive societies: this will continue though form of societies may change
 - the prevalence of states’ belief that they may resort to arms: territorial gains becoming less acceptable; some areas of world have eliminated war; but in at least some cases war will continue to be regarded as appropriate

In saying that international anarchy enables war more than a world government, then, you may have meant that war is more *probable* under the former than the latter. Note that ‘probability’, unlike ‘possibility’, varies in degree: it could be expressed in percentages.

But, I am bound to ask, how do you know that the probability of war is higher under international anarchy than under a world government? You are, I think, saying this only because you imagine a world government to be an effective one. But is your imagination realistic? For me, it is difficult to imagine a single government ruling the whole world very effectively, when, in fact, many governments have failed to rule societies on much more manageable scales—that is, within separate states. Think of the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and many other examples of ‘failed states’.

Furthermore, even though all states live under international anarchy, most states live in peace most of the time. Indeed, among some states, constituting what some specialists

call 'a security community', war has become practically unthinkable, in much the same way as genocide has become practically inconceivable as a means of governance within many states.

We have no good reason, then, to believe that war is more probable under international anarchy than under a world government. To sum up: war is possible under international anarchy *or* under a world government; whether war is more probable under the former than the latter cannot be answered in the abstract. Since war is possible whether or not the world is anarchical, the common assertion that international anarchy is a prerequisite of war must be rejected.

From the world to its inhabitants

If war is possible whatever way the world as a whole is organised, the problem may lie with its inhabitants. Moving our attention away from the world to its inhabitants is called shifting the level of analysis, from that of the system to that of the units. But what are the units, or inhabitants, of the world considered as a system? It is customary to point to human beings and states. I say 'customary' to draw your attention to the fact that it is possible to think otherwise. The world can be seen as inhabited by things other than individual human beings or states: for example, international organisations, multinational companies, terrorist groups, social classes, and so on. But this is to deviate from the main topic of this chapter. For convenience, I shall here follow the custom, and attempt to identify prerequisites of war at the levels of human beings and states. The question now is: 'What are the features of human beings and states such that without them war would be impossible?'

To this question, a couple of answers may be suggested here: (a) the ability of human beings to form a multiplicity of cohesive societies; and (b) sufficient prevalence of the belief among states that it is their function, under some circumstances, to resort to arms, and, in so doing, to demand the co-operation of their citizens. It is easy to see why the two items are among the prerequisites of war.

I have already discussed the ambiguity of the term 'war'. It encompasses a wide range of conflict. But it is normally understood to exclude fighting between individuals. According to this usage, a 'war of every man against every man', if there were such a thing at all, would be 'chaos', not 'war'. War, even in its very broad sense, not confined to interstate conflict, requires that there be at least two *organised social groups*. Clearly, then, war cannot occur among those species of animal which do not form groups in the first place, like slugs, snakes or spiders. War is possible among humans partly because they are social animals capable of forming cohesive societies. Hence (a) above.

This, however, may sound somewhat paradoxical. We tend to associate war with antisocial traits rather than sociability. Indeed, there is no denying the fact that war would be impossible in an imaginary world in which all human beings were, for example, entirely unselfish. But, at the same time, war would be equally impossible in an imaginary world in which all human beings were entirely selfish. War presupposes at least two cohesive societies within each of which antisocial tendencies, such as selfishness, are controlled, disciplined and punished, to a considerable degree.

Moving on to (b), we should note that war is possible not between *any* cohesive social

groups, but only between those entities which are generally deemed to be a war-fighting sort; in particular, states. The point here, it should be clear, is not that conflicts between entities other than states are, by definition, not wars. It is rather that war does not happen, for example, between county cricket clubs, because nobody thinks of them, however cohesive, as war-fighting entities. For the same reason, counties do not normally engage in war either. They are not equipped to do so precisely because no one really thinks that counties are that sort of thing any more than are county cricket clubs.

Of course, a county or province may come to engage in war (for example, to secede from the state of which it is a part). But in such circumstances we will have to say that the community began to see itself as a war-fighting entity. In any case, for there to be a war of secession, the overarching state must try to prevent it. This, in turn, is made possible by the well-established conception that there are circumstances under which it is the function of states to resort to arms. Preventing secession is often taken to be one such circumstance, and therefore bloodless secession is relatively rare.

The fact that war is made possible by a particular belief human beings have about the proper functions of their societies is especially noteworthy. This is one of the reasons why I would not think of a 'battle between armies of ants' as constituting 'war', for I do not believe that ants are capable of having ideas. I seriously doubt whether even chimpanzees, known to engage in inter-group violence, can be said to 'fight a war'. War is not a natural phenomenon, but a social institution, involving an awareness on the part of those who engage in it that it is an *appropriate* response in the circumstances.

ELIMINATING WARS

Now that we have identified a couple of prerequisites of war, we should discuss whether either of them could be removed. It seems clear to me that there is little point in discussing this question with respect to (a) above. Human beings cannot cease to live in societies. What could happen, in my view, is a gradual shift in the meaning the human race attach to the fact that they form different societies, and, in particular, belong to different states. To put it in another way, this is a shift in the prevailing conception of what international relations are about.

As we noted in connection with (b) above, counties no longer conceive of themselves as war-fighting entities, but states currently do. It may be too idealistic to imagine that, in a parallel fashion, states may one day entirely cease to think of themselves as war-fighting entities.

But the range of circumstances in which states consider it appropriate to resort to war has shifted historically, and has in fact narrowed considerably in the latter part of the twentieth century. For example, war for territorial gains is no longer seen to be acceptable, rarely happens in fact, and usually fails (as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has recently shown). It is also the case that between some states war has become practically inconceivable: for example, among countries of particular regions, such as Scandinavia, constituting 'security communities'; rich industrialised nations of the world; or, perhaps more broadly, liberal democratic countries.

It is not unrealistic, then, to imagine that war will become less acceptable among more

states. Such a development will not rule out the possibility of war, but that would be to ask too much. Expanding the realm in which war is practically unthinkable is enough to aim at, and that is not an unrealistic goal.

In the relationship between any two countries, war may, on the one hand, continue to be considered as an appropriate mode of interaction under certain circumstances. On the other hand, war may become practically unthinkable in their relationship. Whether their relationship follows the first path or the second would depend crucially on the degree of alienation between the two peoples concerned. If war ceases to be an option, it will be because by and large the two peoples consider themselves as forming a special kind of community.

This does not mean that the two peoples cease to have separate identities, or that the territorial boundaries disappear between them. What will have changed is the meaning the two peoples attach to having separate identities or living on opposite sides of the borders. They will treat each other not as an obstacle to manipulate or remove, but a partner in a dialogue, a collaborator in joint decisions. How such a transformation has taken place and what, if anything, can be done now to encourage it are among the most intriguing and important questions of International Relations.

CORRELATES

Those who support the line of argument advanced in the above few paragraphs see the history of international relations as evolutionary, or potentially so. There are, however, those who see them as cyclical or repetitious.

Some of them think that this is largely inescapable: in the world of anarchy and competition, in their view, there can be no real progress. By contrast, others believe that past regularities in the field of International Relations, when properly identified, can be used by governments to avoid repeating some of their past mistakes. Those who seek to identify statistical correlates of war are of this type. Enabling the governments to predict and control international affairs so as to reduce the frequency and intensity of war is their chief objective.

Very many books and articles have been published along this path. The further reading section at the end of this chapter should help you identify some useful summaries of such works. Here I wish to examine just one example, reporting an exceptionally strong correlation, in order to illustrate the problems and prospects of this line of approach.

Arms races and escalation

In a much-debated article, published in 1979, Michael Wallace maintains that a runaway arms race is strongly associated with the escalation of military confrontations into war.² The data Wallace uses covers the period between 1816 and 1965, collected by the Correlates of War Project. In the data, Wallace identifies ninety-nine cases of 'serious disputes' between 'great powers', and finds that they resulted in the 'outbreak of full-scale war' only in twenty-six cases. Of the twenty-six cases, however, as many as twenty-three were accompanied by a 'runaway arms race'. By contrast, according to Wallace, of

the seventy-three cases in which 'serious disputes' did not end in 'full-scale war', as many as sixty-eight were not accompanied by such an arms race. This is summarised in Box 4.4.

BOX 4.4 CORRELATES: WALLACE'S 1979 FINDINGS

	<i>Escalation into war</i>	<i>No escalation into war</i>	<i>Total</i>
Runaway arms race	23	5	28
No runaway arms race	3	68	71
Total	26	73	99

On the basis of this result, Wallace claims that rapid competitive military growth constitutes at least a valuable early warning indicator of the escalation of military confrontations into war. But can the governments of the great powers reduce wars between them in the future by acting on Wallace's prediction? To examine this, I wish to raise the following three questions:

- Is the correlation Wallace found accurate with respect to the period 1816–1965?
- If so, is it right to expect a similar statistical association to continue in the future?
- If so, does a runaway arms race constitute a valuable early warning indicator of war?

The problem of accuracy

Despite decades of concerted effort, statistical studies of war have for the most part produced negative findings and incommensurate conclusions. Where, exceptionally, a very strong correlation is identified, it is usually challenged by those who present contrary findings or try to undermine the significance of the correlation reported. This, in itself, is intellectually healthy, though in all honesty it must be disappointing to those who would want useful results from statistical studies. In Wallace's case, his markedly positive findings have been scrutinised and contradicted by a number of fellow researchers, including Paul Diehl.³ Diehl, like Wallace, used the Correlates of War data, but found that there was no strong association between 'mutual military build-up' and 'escalation of serious dispute into war'. Of the 86 cases of 'serious dispute' he identified, only 13 resulted in 'war', and of these 13, only 3 were preceded by 'mutual military build-up'; further, of the 12 cases where a 'mutual military build-up' preceded a 'serious dispute', as many as 9 did not end in 'war'. These findings are summarised in Box 4.5.

BOX 4.5 DIEHL'S 1983 FINDINGS

	<i>Escalation into war</i>	<i>No escalation into war</i>	<i>Total</i>
Mutual arms build-up	3	9	12
No mutual arms build-up	10	64	74
Total	13	73	86

There are a number of reasons why the two sets of findings diverge so much. Rather disturbingly perhaps, the most important source of discrepancy between them turns out to be quite elementary: how to count things.

According to Wallace's method, where States A and B are engaged in a serious dispute or war against States C and D, there is deemed to be not just one serious dispute or war, but as many as four: A versus C; A versus D; B versus C; and B versus D. By contrast, according to Diehl's method, such a case constitutes just one serious dispute or war: (A and B) versus (C and D).

In Wallace's view, there were, as we noted, twenty-three cases of serious dispute, accompanied by a runaway arms race, which escalated into war. Of these cases, however, nine were integral to the First World War, which is usually considered as one war, and ten to the Second World War, which may be seen as two wars, one in Europe and one in Asia-Pacific. It is not surprising, then, that Diehl's new counting method has resulted in the collapse of ten cases, which, in Wallace's study, fit the 'arms race-escalation' sequence, into three *integrated* ones. Diehl has added a few other adjustments, all tending to deflate the strong correlation asserted by Wallace.

Even though, at first sight, Diehl's critique of Wallace is quite persuasive, it appears on reflection that Diehl's counting procedures cannot necessarily claim to be the more accurate. What Diehl has successfully demonstrated, nevertheless, is that Wallace's findings (as well as Diehl's own) are inevitably a function of his counting method.

But let us not pursue the question of accuracy further since there is no space here to delve into the relative merits of Wallace's and Diehl's counting procedures.⁴ Besides, it would be unfair to criticise Wallace for not having achieved what is in principle unachievable—to present an accurate statistical description of the world which is independent of any counting methods: indeed, it is well worth noticing that there is no such thing as a *pure* portrayal, statistical or otherwise, so transparent that, through it, the real world process is made directly accessible to our senses. Still, a new problem arises, which has to do with prediction, or more technically, 'extrapolation'.

The problem of prediction

There is no doubt that in some future cases a runaway arms race, combined with a serious

dispute, may result in war. But the probability of such an eventuality between great powers cannot be inferred mechanically from Wallace's findings, even if we are to accept them at face value.

The length of Wallace's sample period (1816–1965) may seem reassuring. Still, we may not *unconditionally* extrapolate and predict that a runaway arms race between great powers involved in a serious dispute is highly likely to end in war. To do this, we must presume that relevant conditions of the sample period will remain largely unaffected in the future period that interests us.

The possession of nuclear weapons by great powers since the middle of the twentieth century is but one of the features which would make such a presumption somewhat unsafe: nuclear weapons are a factor which tends to make their possessors behave more cautiously in their mutual dealings. A change in the prevailing perception, which has taken place in the course of the twentieth century, regarding the utility of great power war is another such feature.

If we concentrate on the issue of nuclear weapons, we see in Wallace's study that there was only one case between 1945 (the beginning of the nuclear age) and 1965 (the end of Wallace's sample period) which satisfies his definition of a 'serious dispute between great powers engaged in a runaway arms race'. This was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which, as is well known, did not escalate into war.

It is, of course, dangerous to make inferences from just one example. But this case does suggest that making inferences from a largely pre-nuclear experience may not be the best guide to the nuclear present and future. If we add to this the prevailing perception that war is too costly to be usable between great powers, we will begin to wonder whether Wallace's findings are a reliable guide to the future, either at his time of writing or subsequently.

The problem of utility

But suppose that this doubt, too, should be rejected in favour of Wallace's apparently sensible warning that a runaway arms race is dangerous. Is this warning *useful*, though? Even if I were to accept Wallace's findings more or less at face value, and to believe that his findings supplied a reliable basis on which to predict the future, I would doubt that his warning itself could be very useful in preventing great power wars.

The main problem has to do with the way the two key terms, 'serious dispute' and 'war', are defined. 'Serious dispute', in Wallace's definition, includes: the act of blockade, declaration of war, seizure or occupation of territory, the use of military forces, the mobilisation of armed forces and the seizure of foreign personnel or *material*.

'Serious dispute', therefore, is already a military conflict. Between the countries concerned, the tensions are no doubt already quite high and mutual suspicion paramount. Under these circumstances, how useful might it be to hear of Wallace's warning that the situation, according to the past record, was highly likely to lead to a full-scale war?

BOX 4.6 QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APPROACH

Problems of: accuracy+prediction+utility

Already, armed forces may have been mobilised, war may have been declared, and enemy territory may have been occupied. This comes to qualify as 'war', according to the Correlates of War Project definition Wallace uses, if it involves at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities. How can the two countries involved be expected to prevent just a few more moves—a few more bomb blasts even—that would be sufficient to turn the situation into a full-scale war? The answer must be 'with enormous difficulty', even if both parties were serious in their desire to avoid such an eventuality. This is because neither side can, at this late stage, trust the other to be peaceful in its intent. In short, Wallace's 'early warning' comes too late to be useful.

Uses of the knowledge of the past

It was not my intention to suggest that Wallace's work was pointless, or that, more generally, statistical study of war cannot be of any use. What I wanted to show was how difficult it is to identify correlates of war, which will enable the governments to predict, and thereby also control, international relations of the future. As the discussion above shows, it is not enough to identify a correlate of past wars; to be useful, a correlate has to be of the sort that can enable the governments to predict the future reliably, and to control effectively the development of events in which they are themselves involved. It appears difficult enough even to identify a correlate of war, let alone a useful one.

Still, some investigators are adamant that, however difficult, this is what we ought to aim for, if, as social scientists in the field of International Relations, we are interested in preventing wars. Others are not so convinced. Some of them take a diluted view: that, in this field, all that we can hope for is a general picture of the world, too imprecise to be expressed in mathematical terms, but useful enough to take into account in conducting international relations.

This line of thinking motivates some historians to study past wars comparatively to draw lessons from them. Others believe, however, that, since every war is unique, it is not possible to draw any useful general conclusions about the causes of *war*; there are only causes of particular *wars*. Indeed, many historians openly say that the only justification for investigating the causes of past wars is to satisfy their own, and their readers', curiosity.

There are, then, three commonly held views about the uses of the knowledge of the past. The first group is convinced that prediction and control on the basis of statistical knowledge is what we should aim for. The second group considers that this is unrealisable, but thinks that it is possible still to extract some lessons of history to guide our future. The third group believes that since every case is unique there are no useful generalisations to be made about the past, and that the main function of historical enquiry is intellectual satisfaction.

My own hunch is that the first group is unlikely to deliver what some of its leading members believe they can in the field of international relations, and, more specifically, with respect to war.

BOX 4.7 USES OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST

- prediction and control on the basis of statistical knowledge of the past
- possible to extract some lessons from the past
- every case unique, therefore, no useful generalisations
- not only differences, but some similarities

However, I am not persuaded by the diluted view held by the second group, either. My own reading of the literature suggests that historical generalisations concerning the causes of war are arrived at only because the investigators select and represent several cases in a particular way, disregarding thereby the possibility of contending interpretations. When a general conclusion is drawn with respect to a number of cases, it is not because *these cases* tell similar stories: *the investigators* do, and they do so from their chosen perspectives. The lessons of history are already there in the minds of the investigators, although they present their lessons as though they were drawn from history *as it actually was*.

This does not mean that I accept the view of the third group entirely. In particular, I do not think that the stories of the origins of wars are so diverse that there are only differences, not similarities. Nor do I think that satisfying intellectual curiosity is the only, or the most important, function that writing history fulfils. These points will become clearer in the next section.

ORIGENS

At the beginning of this chapter, I stated that three kinds of question arise with respect to the causes of war. We now come to the third kind: ‘What caused this particular war?’

The answer to this would obviously depend on what ‘this particular war’ was. ‘What caused the Falklands War?’ and ‘What caused the Gulf War?’ are two different questions, to which different answers are expected—only one of them refers to Saddam Hussein, for example. You may therefore feel that there is no point in dealing with the question ‘What caused this particular war?’ in the abstract; what we should do now is to investigate causes of particular wars, one by one.

Not only do I have no space to do that here, but I think that considering the question in the abstract is an important, much neglected exercise. We ought to make clear what the question is asking when, with respect to any particular war, it says, ‘What *caused* it?’ We ought also to consider what sort of answer is normally treated as a plausible or acceptable one. Not only is it necessary to know what the question is asking before we attempt to answer it, but it is interesting to know what shape standard answers take in response to

questions of this sort. For this reveals that even though the answers given to the questions of this sort are diverse, there are nevertheless some similarities among them. My own view is that the range of answers is in fact quite limited in outline. A neglected question is not what caused this or that particular war, but what effect it will have to keep on asking this sort of question, and continue to answer in a way that I believe is standardised to an extent.

All this, I admit, is too condensed, and probably rather unexpected. Let me therefore reconstruct my moves step by step, beginning with a brief analysis of a causal explanation, for, surely, this is where we ought to begin.

Causal explanations

Some people believe, very firmly, that a causal explanation of a particular outcome, such as an outbreak of war, consists of a combination of two kinds of statement: (a) a statement of a law, asserting that whenever a particular type of situation exists, it is always followed by an outbreak of war; and (b) a statement of the fact that the particular type of situation existed before the outbreak of the war in question.

But those people are mistaken. When (a) and (b) are combined, all that follows from them is a statement that a war broke out. This is quite unhelpful because we already knew that a war had broken out. Indeed, it was because we knew that a war broke out, and because we felt puzzled about this, that we came to demand a causal explanation. No amount of reassurance that a war broke out will do anything to solve any of our puzzles about its outbreak.

Besides, it is just as well that the combination of (a) and (b) does not constitute an answer we are seeking. There are no known laws concerning the outbreak of war, which would have meant that a causal explanation was impossible, had it been the case that (a) and (b) were both needed to present a causal account. Trivially, of course, there may be a law to the effect that whenever there is a declaration of war, war breaks out. But, it is easy to see, this and the statement of the fact that there was indeed a declaration of war do nothing to solve our puzzles about the occurrence of war.

So what is involved in giving a causal explanation of an outbreak of war? It is pertinent to consider what sort of people will ask such a question.

By experience I know that my three-year-old son will not. Even though he has learned to ask questions (and that has taken many months since he uttered his first words), the range of questions he asks is very limited indeed. This is so because his knowledge of the world is still exceedingly limited. He does not know—fortunately—that there is such a thing as war. He does know, I think, that many things will not remain the same: his goldfish died. But he does not know, I am sure, that countries which are at peace at one time may be at war at another. He does not yet know that there are countries.

It will be many years from now when he realises that Britain and Japan were enemies at one time (1941–5) even though they are at peace now. He will also learn that the two countries were allies between 1902 and 1921. And it is only when he learns of these facts that he is in principle capable of becoming curious about how the transition took place, why the war occurred. In reaching this degree of intellectual maturity, he will have acquired an enormous amount of knowledge about the world—what names things have,

which things exist and which do not, how things change, what happened in the past, what is possible and impossible, how the world works, and more.

His intellectual grasp, or understanding, of the world will more or less cohere with that of those others with whom he lives and communicates. And he will have learned to believe or disbelieve new pieces of information on the basis of their coherence with his overall understanding of the world. At various points, however, he will, perhaps reluctantly, accept what he initially disbelieves, and make gradual adjustments to his overall grasp of the world.

What this half-imagined story illustrates is this: it is only when people already have a vast amount of general knowledge and particular pieces of information that they come to have some specific puzzles about some item, such as the war between Britain and Japan. It is a function of a causal explanation to try to solve some of these puzzles. It is not a function of such an explanation to clarify everything to someone who knows or understands nothing, but to add some more information to what they already know, or to add new information which undermines what they thought they knew.

Now, there is some difference between me trying to answer my son's specific questions about the war between Britain and Japan and me writing a book on the causes of that war.

In the former case, I can engage in a dialogue, and try to answer my son's questions as he raises them. My answers will be shaped by my son's idiosyncratic interests—what he finds particularly puzzling, where he lacks knowledge, and so on. My answers, if put together afterwards, would require much editing to yield a coherent whole.

By contrast, in the latter case, my act will be a public one, where the audience is expected to follow my explanation from the beginning to the end, without interrupting me with their questions. I will assume a certain common level of knowledge/ignorance on the part of my audience, have a reasonably clear view of what needs explaining and what does not, and will try to give a coherent account in one go, so to speak.

To give a causal explanation of the outbreak of a particular war—or to give an account of its origins—is, I assume, typified by the latter kind of activity. According to the conventional way, this involves narrating from the beginning, wherever that might be, through the middle, whichever route that might take, to the very end, where the war in question broke out, and to do so in such a way that, by following the narrative, the outcome is rendered more intelligible than before the explanation was given.

In short, when, with respect to some particular war, we ask, 'What caused it?', what we are demanding primarily is a narrative account of its origins. We may, of course, want slightly more than this, namely 'what caused it' in the sense of 'what *the main cause* of it was'. But this is to demand *the point* of the narrative, a summary account, compressed to its essence. Either way, we cannot do without a narrative account.

Before I embarked on the discussion of 'causal explanation', I remarked that it will be interesting to know *what shape standard answers take* when dealing with questions of the form, 'What caused this particular war?' This can now be interpreted to mean *what shape narrative accounts of war origins take*. I want to move on to this issue. This is a necessary step towards revealing that, even though the answers given to the questions of this sort are diverse, there are nevertheless some similarities among them. The main sources of such similarities will be clarified in the course of the discussion below.

Narratives of war origins

How, then, is a narrative account of war origins structured? The answer is twofold: narratives of war origins are constructed, conventionally, with certain key ingredients, and they make a point, the sort of point which (no doubt conventionally) is considered as an appropriate one to make, given the kind of thing which war (conventionally) is deemed to be.

To be brief, there are four key ingredients, which are: depiction of the background; reference to significant chance coincidences, if any; elucidation of mechanistic processes, where required; and identification of the key moves made by the governments involved. These ingredients are put together to produce a coherent narrative, which argues a case, makes a point. Generally speaking, the point made in the type of narrative concerned is about who, or what, was responsible for the outbreak of the war in question.

I believe that the above contentions stand to reason. First, it is impossible to start a historical narrative without saying, however briefly, something about the background. Second, the other three ingredients are instances of the three, and the only three, kinds of item regularly invoked in explaining any social event. They belong to the three distinct spheres respectively: the world of chance, the realm of determinism, and the arena of human volition. Third, given that war is normally taken to be undesirable nowadays, it stands to reason that those who enquire into the origins of a war do so with the view to identifying who or what was to blame for its outbreak.

Of course, there may be some exceptions to this general picture. Still, my reading of many historical works on the origins of particular wars confirms that they follow the pattern identified here. I should perhaps add that my assertion relates to works written in the twentieth century by Western male historians regarding the origins of particular outbreaks of war. I exclude from my purview works concerning the *recurrence* of war, attempting, for example, to explain what caused the United States to engage in a *series* of wars during the Cold War. It is works on the origins of particular wars that interest us here, not those identifying what caused there to be a number of (perhaps similar) wars in a given period.

As a next move, I wish to say more about the four key ingredients of the war-origins narratives. My aim is to show that there are some resemblances among such narratives, and that the main source of such resemblances has to do with the final ingredient. But first a few remarks are in order with respect to the first three.

BOX 4.8 INGREDIENTS OF NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS

- depiction of background
- significant chance coincidences
- elucidation of mechanistic processes
- identification of key moves of governments' involved

Backgrounds, chance coincidences and mechanisms

A first key ingredient of war-origins narratives is 'the background'. Many items can form part of this: geographical and demographical features of the countries involved; the distribution of power or alliance configurations in the international system; the governmental structures of the relevant countries and characteristics of their foreign policy-making; the political, social, economic and military conditions of the powers concerned; national self-images, ideological motivations of the leaders and the peoples, and prevailing assumptions about the nature of international politics, diplomacy and war; and the intensity of the existing international rivalry and grievances.

Some of these characteristics, whether individually or in combination, may turn out to constitute 'correlates of war'. When giving a narrative account of the origins of a particular war, however, we do not mention background features, such as the ones listed above, because these are, if at all, known statistically to make war likely. We do so to make our stories easier to follow. We determine what to include in the background sections of our narratives in the light of our storylines, and the level of knowledge we assume in our audiences. However, our storylines are in turn shaped to some extent by what we see as important background conditions pertaining to the case in hand, and these may be selected on the basis of more or less well-confirmed impressions about the sorts of circumstances from which war is a likely, as well as an intelligible, consequence.

A second ingredient is reference to significant chance coincidences. By a 'chance coincidence' is meant a simultaneous occurrence of two or more events which are causally unrelated to one another. Since many simultaneous occurrences are not causally interrelated, there are many chance coincidences—mostly unnoticed. Under some exceptional circumstances, they play a pivotal role in affecting the subsequent course of events; and some writers—often professional historians concerned to stress what was unique to the case in hand—place a great deal of emphasis on the role of chance. For example, according to some historians of the First World War, an element of chance explains how an assassin succeeded in killing Archduke Ferdinand; and without this assassination, the war would not have happened in the way it did; therefore, chance is an indispensable element in the story of the First World War.⁵

A third ingredient is reference to war-conducive mechanisms. A 'mechanistic process' is said to be in operation where we are induced to behave in a certain way because of the workings of our mind or body, or because the social environment influences us to think and act in a particular manner; or where, through the workings of the system in which our

actions take place, they lead to unintended consequences.

Historians at times take such processes for granted, but social scientists are often keen to draw attention to them as indispensable linkages between various key situations, events and actions. Examples include: strong influence of the military upon the government, forcing it to adopt a 'worst-case' analysis; stress during a crisis which leads to war-producing misperceptions and a loss of flexibility; and a bureaucratic organisation following standard operating procedures, even where the outcome is not optimal.

Of the three ingredients so far discussed, the background conditions and mechanistic processes contribute to some extent to making the narratives of war origins resemble one another: similar background conditions and similar mechanisms are referred to from time to time, here and there—for example, a shift from a complex system of alliance to a simple two-bloc system, stress during crisis producing less than optimal outcomes, and so on. But the most important source of resemblance lies with the fourth factor, to which I now turn.

Government actions

There is no denying the fact that governments engage in all sorts of behaviour, but the main kinds of move they are said to make in the processes leading to outbreaks of war are limited in variety. Obviously, for war to occur there must be, first, acts with belligerent intent and, second, resistance. The former category includes any act motivated by a clear intent, immediately or at some later stage, to force upon the opponent a choice between surrender and war. The latter is a refusal, when confronted, to surrender immediately. Since resistance is an entirely normal reaction, it tends to be assumed, rather than explicitly stated, in the narrative of war origins. By contrast, a detailed explanation is usually offered with respect to belligerent intent. This, as defined above, is a broad category, and includes a variety of preparatory measures, undertaken with a clear intent to start a war at a later stage, as well as an actual use of force at the start of a war. When such acts, of a preparatory nature, were committed long before the actual outbreak of war, we say that the war was 'premeditated'; but, in many cases, it is difficult to supply evidence for premeditation.

BOX 4.9 BELLIGERENT INTENT

- may be premeditated: Hitler's policy pre-World War Two?
- may be against a perceived unreasonable enemy or punitive: coalition action against Iraq in January 1991?
- may be because of sense of no alternative: Israel's pre-emptive actions in 1967?

There are three other important points to notice with respect to 'acts with belligerent intent'. First, they need not be of an aggressive, unreasonable kind. They can be committed, for example, to embark on a punitive war against an unreasonable enemy, as

is usually said to have been done against Iraq in 1991 by the United States and its allies. Second, 'acts with belligerent intent' may be undertaken in relative freedom, or in desperation with a strong sense that there was no alternative. A standard case to illustrate the latter is Japan's decision to attack the United States in 1941 at Pearl Harbor. Third, no matter how reluctant both parties are to enter into a war, there would be no war without one party committing an act with belligerent intent. The implication of this is that there is no such thing as an accidental war. Of course, there may be accidents that lead to wars, but the wars resulting from them are not themselves accidents. It must, however, be acknowledged that most wars are largely unintended, if by 'wars' we mean not just their outbreaks but their costs and outcomes.

Now, to reach the stage where one state confronts another with a choice between an immediate surrender and war, a number of other moves will normally have been made by their (and perhaps some other) governments. Conventionally, these moves are characterised in terms of the four criteria in Box 4.10.

BOX 4.10 CRITERIA OF ORIGINS OF WAR

- contributory negligence
- insensitivity
- thoughtlessness
- recklessness

An act or policy is judged to be contributorily negligent if it is seen to constitute a failure to resort to standard countermeasures against an adversary's offensive policy, thereby unduly encouraging the adversary to take even more offensive steps, receiving harm as a result. The appeasement of Hitler is often judged in this way. Another potential case, from the more recent period, is Britain's failure, in early March 1982, to take a precautionary naval action against Argentina's possible attack on the Falkland Islands.⁶

The remaining three types can be explained as follows. Suppose that state *A* is about to undertake what amounts to an offensive act against its adversary *B*, and that the act's offensiveness is noticeable to a reasonably attentive mind. If, in such circumstances, *A* performs the act, unaware even that *B* will, with good reason, consider the act as offensive, then *A* can be said to act 'insensitively'. If, however, *A* performs the act, having noticed its offensive character, but failing to give any serious consideration to the resultant risk of war, obvious to a reasonably attentive mind, then *A* can be said to act 'thoughtlessly'.

Finally, in deliberating whether or not to perform the offensive act, *A* may calculate as follows: the probability of war resulting from the act, and/or the cost of such a war, would be quite considerable; but, still, that probability and/or the cost would be tolerably low when judged in the overall context of what *A* could probably gain by resorting to the act, in contrast to not doing so at that time. If, on the basis of such a calculation, *A* carries out the offensive act, even though a reasonably prudent leader would not take such a risk, then *A* can be said to act 'recklessly'.

This last category also covers cases of controlled risk-taking—where A resorts to the offensive act, along with some softening measures to reduce the risk of escalation into war, and/or the cost of such an eventuality, speculating that the risk and/or the cost has thereby become tolerable in the overall calculation.

'Insensitivity' seems to be illustrated well by Tsarist Russia's actions towards Japan, leading to the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5). Argentina's decision to invade the Falkland Islands, apparently with the intention of forcing the British government into serious negotiations on a transfer of sovereignty, may be an example of 'thoughtlessness'. 'Recklessness' is a quality often attributed to the German leaders, both in 1914, leading to the First World War, and 1939, leading to the Second World War.

I should stress here that the particular characterisations I attributed above to certain governments' actions or policies are meant to be tentative. There are, of course, other interpretations: for example, the appeasement of Hitler is thought by some not to constitute 'contributory negligence', and Hitler is thought by some not to have acted 'recklessly'. But such other interpretations will not do away with the set of criteria, listed above, by which to judge the quality of government actions—or so I propose here for a further study.

WHY ASK WHY THE WAR?

The apparent fact that in narratives of war origins government actions are characterised in terms of a very small set of criteria reveals the main reason why such stories show resemblances. Similar acts are committed from time to time, here and there in the different narratives. Further, the fact that the criteria used to characterise relevant actions of the governments are quite transparently legalistic shows the extent to which these stories resemble legal arguments. They are concerned chiefly to indicate who, or what, was to blame for the outbreak of war under consideration. Moreover, the fact that people may differ in their judgements, for example, as to whether a particular act constituted 'contributory negligence', and, if so, whether that was more significant than the 'recklessness' of the adversary's act, shows why histories of war origins tend to take on a quality similar to legal disputes. Finally, however, it should be noted that, unlike legal disputes, historical controversies are open-ended: there are no well-articulated laws in this area (only some contending notions about what is reasonable behaviour in international relations), and there are no final decisions which cannot be overturned. Given that no answer to the type of question under consideration is likely to be final, you may perhaps wonder what is served by asking such questions.

One way to deal with this question is to ask whether it would be better to stop asking such questions. The answer must be categorically in the negative. It is impossible for people living in states in the modern world *not* to have histories about themselves and their relationships, and these include histories of the origins of their wars. To stop asking questions about them because there were no final answers would be to sanctify whatever happened to be the dominant versions as the only true ones. We ought not to abandon the freedom to challenge whatever the orthodox historical views happen to say, for to do so would probably be to abandon our freedom to think critically about our own societies.

It also seems to me that the overall effect of continuing to raise the type of question under consideration is to keep alive the notion that war is something for which the governments, and the citizens, are responsible. It is what governments deliberately do that brings about actual outbreaks of war. Of course, this does not mean that governments always wilfully bring about wars. The truth is that their actions are constrained by the international and domestic frameworks in which they operate and the circumstances in which they make choices. But to acknowledge this is to imply that the environment in which governments work ought to be improved. What this means and how this can be achieved are important questions for International Relations.

TOWARDS A FUTURE STUDY

In the above discussion, I commented extensively on three kinds of question which arise under the rubric of the causes of war: 'What are the conditions which must be present for wars to occur?'; 'Under what sorts of circumstance have wars occurred more frequently?'; and 'What caused this particular war?'

In relation to the first question, the most noteworthy point was that war is made possible by a particular belief human beings have about the proper functions of their societies. This made it possible to suggest how the world could become more peaceful. In brief, people will have to learn to treat each other not as an obstacle to manipulate or remove, but a partner in a dialogue, a collaborator in joint decisions. How such a transformation has taken place and what, if anything, can be done now to encourage it were said to be among the most intriguing and important questions of International Relations.

In connection with the third question, it was argued that one of the main functions of historical enquiry into the origins of particular wars is to keep alive the notion that governments, and peoples, are responsible for the occurrence of particular wars. In this connection it was observed that the domestic and international environment in which governments operate may have to be improved. What this means and how this can be achieved were said to be important questions for International Relations.

These are two similar conclusions, pointing to the importance of investigating how relationships between different peoples and between their governments could improve. You will not be surprised to hear—given my discussion of the second question—that, in my view, it is probably more fruitful to investigate this than to try to identify useful early warning indicators of war.

However, to the extent that investigating how the world could now become more peaceful involves enquiring how the world did become more peaceful in the past, problems associated with this question will have to be addressed again. In particular, we will need to face the question of whether any specific interpretation of the past is more acceptable than its alternatives; we need to consider whether extrapolation from the past to the present is warranted in the case in hand; and we need to ask whether the knowledge derived from the past can effectively be used in the present or to shape the future.

NOTES

This chapter benefits from the Oxford University Press's permission to let me use parts of my book, *On the Causes of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). In the process of writing a shorter piece for a new audience, however, I made some modifications to my earlier views. I am grateful to Andrew Linklater and Debbie Lisle for their very helpful comments on the first draft.

1 J.D.Singer and M.Small, *The Wages of War* (New York: Wiley, 1972), p. 381.

Singer and Small are the leading figures in the Correlates of War Project.

2 See M.D.Wallace, 'Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23 (1979), pp. 3–16. My exposition of Wallace's argument here is based on my reading of this article.

3 P.F.Diehl, 'Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 20 (1983), pp. 205–12. My exposition of Diehl's argument here is based on my reading of this article.

4 See, for more details, H.Suganami, *On the Causes of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 94–9.

5 See, for more details, *ibid.*, pp. 159ff.

6 Lord Franks, *et al.*, *The Franks Report: Falkland Islands Review* (London: Pimlico, 1992), introduction by Alex Danchev, pp. xiii–xiv.

FURTHER READING

On the social nature of human conflict, see A.Rapoport, *Conflict in Man-made Environment* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974). See also J.Groebel and R.H.Hinde (eds), *Aggression and War: Their Biological and Social Bases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially F.A.Huntingford's chapter, 'Animals fight, but do not make war'. E.Luard's *War in International Society* (London: Tauris, 1986) is an extensive study of war as an institution of international society, and contains a pioneering historical investigation into the evolution of the purposes of war, as well as a thoughtful concluding discussion on the utility of war in the contemporary world. On the evolution of warfare more generally, see M.Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

The best summary of contemporary statistical findings relating to war is J.A.Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Other useful works comparing various approaches include: M.Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); J.S.Levy, 'The Causes of War: a Review of Theories and Evidence', in P.E.Tetlock, *et al.* (eds), *Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 209–333; and R.I.Rotberg and T.K.Rabb (eds), *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Comparative case histories of war origins include J.G.Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to*

War, 4th edn (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1985), and Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (London: Hutchinson, 1995). Stoessinger's work borrows from G.Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1988), which is a highly readable critical introduction to some standard arguments about the causes of war. The best-known work on the causal theories of war is still K.N.Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). H.Suganami, *On the Causes of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) contains the first serious attempt to transcend Waltz's contribution to the study of the causes of war.

K.L.Nelson and S.C.Olin, Jr., *Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979) is a convenient guide to writings on the origins of the First and Second World Wars, and develops an interesting argument about how history is written. Historical works on the origins of particular wars are innumerable. The Longman series on *Origins of Modern Wars*, edited by Harry Hearder, contains some excellent works. Among them, J.Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1992) is a masterpiece; and P.M.H.Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe* (London: Longman, 1986) is very useful to students. In studying history, it is important to read works which challenge orthodox views. A classic and controversial example is A.J.P.Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964). A work, which should be read in conjunction is W.H.Dray, *Perspectives on History* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), ch. 4 'A Controversy over Causes: A.J.P.Taylor and the Origins of the Second World War'. See also David Campbell, *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), esp. chs 1–4.

On the gradual expansion of more peaceful international relations, see M.Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, Nos 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983), pp. 205–35, 323–53; R.Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and J.Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). A.Linklater's *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundation of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997) is profoundly inspiring on the theme of the transformation of international society.

Finally, on 'failed states' and civil wars, which was beyond the scope of this chapter, see K.J.Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

5

Military intervention and international law*

Steven Haines

It is something of a truism to say that ‘military intervention’ is a current issue in international politics—throughout history military forces have been used as an instrument of state policy. Nevertheless, it has in recent years been especially topical because multinationally endorsed military operations have been regarded by many to have assumed a new significance and utility. The end of the Cold War, the regeneration of interest in the United Nations as a major actor in international security terms, and a marked increase in the number of UN Security Council-endorsed military operations, including successful ventures like Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf in 1990–1 and UNTAC, the UN operation in Cambodia, have all combined to suggest that the international utility of military forces has increased. Nevertheless, in contrast, the difficulties experienced in brokering an appropriate military response to crises, such as those in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and unfortunate experiences, such as those faced by UNOSOM in Somalia, have also led to a questioning of the value and efficacy of military involvement. Both the Yugoslavia and Kosovo issue and the longer-running debate about the utility of military forces as multinationally endorsed agents of good provide more than adequate justification for a chapter of this book to be devoted to ‘military intervention’—whatever we mean by that.

BOX 5.1 NEW EMPHASIS ON MULTINATIONALLY ENDORSED MILITARY OPERATIONS

- end of Cold War
- renewed interest in UN
- UN Security Council legitimisation
- but still number of difficulties

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of Steven Haines and should not be interpreted as the official position of the Royal Navy, the Ministry of Defence or any other department of HM Government.

AN ETHICAL DIMENSION TO FOREIGN POLICY?

Arguably, ethical, moral and legal questions are increasingly displacing purely realist considerations in the process of decision-making in international politics. In the United Kingdom, for example, the new Labour Government announced, shortly after its victory in the 1997 general election, its intention to conduct its foreign policy within an ethical framework. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO's) mission statement, launched by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook on 12 May 1997, articulates in particular its commitment to human rights and its determination to 'use the status of the UK at the UN to secure more effective international action to keep the peace of the world'. Mr Cook went on to state that the 'fourth goal of our foreign policy is to secure the respect of other nations...our foreign policy must have an *ethical* dimension'. Implicit in what this mission statement says is an intention both to take due notice of the internal human rights records of states when deciding on the nature of the UK's relationship with them and to contribute to attempts to resolve international disputes.

BOX 5.2 AN ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY?

- increasingly possible, if less direct threat
- FCO Mission Statement, May 1997
- growing importance of values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy?
- growing importance of acceptable behaviour by others?

The proof of the pudding is in the eating and the sceptics will undoubtedly remark that such words will not necessarily drive actions when fundamental questions of national interest are at stake. However, in the UK's recent Strategic Defence Review one of the features of the new security situation that was acknowledged was that the most fundamental of core interests for the UK—territorial integrity and political independence—are not under any current direct threat. As a consequence, the UK, along with most other states of Western Europe, has a substantial degree of choice when it comes to actions related to international relations and security. One obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that decisions about military involvement in the wider world can be less driven by the imperatives of raw national interest and more influenced by moral and ethical considerations.

With that possibility very much in mind it will be useful and timely to discuss the use of military forces from a legal perspective. International law has important things to say about the use of the military instrument in the conduct of contemporary international relations and is itself a guide to what is—and what is not—considered, generally, to be acceptable international behaviour. Admittedly, it is but one of the valid perspectives and should not be regarded as the only way of approaching the issues raised by it. Indeed, it is also important to stress that an examination of the law will not necessarily reveal the

moral and ethical issues. All that this chapter aims to do, therefore, is offer some key markers on the legal framework for the use of armed forces. It is by no means setting out the universally definitive statement on 'military intervention', but will hopefully help its readers to shape their own views on the issues it discusses.

DEFINING 'MILITARY INTERVENTION'

A comprehensive definition of 'military intervention' that reflected all the principal analytical perspectives (political, military, legal, etc.) would be impossible to produce for the simple reason that the phrase means something different to different groups of analysts. In the consciousness of the reasonably informed, broadsheet newspaper-reading general public it is a phrase that can range very wide indeed. Its definition in that context would probably include unilateral, bilateral and multilateral coalition military operations (land, sea and/or air), conducted either with or without the consent of the state or states in which they are taking place, and either with or without endorsement by a competent regional authority or the United Nations Security Council. Their purposes would range from the use of military forces in the benign role of humanitarian assistance provided in response to natural disaster or famine, such as in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s and in Central America in late 1998, to the mounting of substantial combat operations to counter aggression, such as the UN-endorsed coalition operations against Iraq in 1990–1. Last, but by no means least, it would need to encompass both those military operations intended to influence the *internal* affairs of a state and a distinctly different form of military involvement, the objective of which is to stabilise or resolve in some way an *international* dispute between two or more states. In short, it would include just about any use of the armed forces that involved their deployment within the territory or airspace of another state.

BOX 5.3 GENERAL RANGE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION ISSUES

- Is it unilateral or by bilateral or multilateral coalition?
- Is it with or without the consent of the state concerned and with or without the consent of the United Nations?
- It can range from humanitarian help to combat.
- It may involve the internal or international resolution of a dispute.
- Is military 'advice' or the sending of 'military advisers' intervention?

One should always beware definitions that are too wide-ranging, of course. If too inclusive they become virtually worthless, except as fascinating academic exercises in linguistic dexterity. Some may well serve to confuse rather than enlighten. We instinctively know what something means until, that is, we set out to define it, when we have our initial assumptions challenged.

In recent years, under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative, military personnel engaged in 'defence diplomacy' have been giving advice to former Soviet republics on a wide range of military issues. Would such very basic advice fall within the definition of 'military intervention'? The instinctive and, it must be said, obvious answer is an emphatic 'No'. In stark contrast, the US involvement in Vietnam is clearly regarded by the bulk of International Relations analysts as one of the more profound examples of 'military intervention' in the twentieth century. But it is worth asking when the US 'intervention' actually began. Did it start with the deployment of the first US combat forces into South Vietnam during the Kennedy administration or had it already started some years earlier with the deployment of military advisers in the 1950s? If some military advisers can be involved in a form of 'military intervention', at what point does mere advice become 'intervention'? Perhaps 'military intervention' is directly related to combat/security operations and not simply routine military training or the provision of low-level advice about military organisation and force structures. That was presumably the US Government's view in relation to Vietnam in the late 1950s and very early 1960s.

This question of military intervention was, of course, raised again by the US involvement in Central America during the Reagan administration. The legal issue at stake was the legality of the provision of US support to guerrilla forces (the 'Contras') opposed to the left-wing Sandanista Government in Nicaragua. A case was taken to the International Court of Justice by Nicaragua, but the USA refused to accept the court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the ICJ declared that it did have jurisdiction and went on to find against the USA on a number of counts.

In coming to their own conclusions about how to define 'military intervention' and the legality or otherwise of it, students of international politics are able to consult a growing range of articles and books that deal with the subject; they do not have to look far for inspiration. The bulk of the literature written from an international relations perspective looks, quite understandably, at questions of policy. It provides a great deal of information on *why* interventions have taken place, *how* they have been conducted and the *policy lessons* learned in the process. However, in an age of internationalism, in which the rights and wrongs of political actions are subject to global scrutiny, be they domestic or international in their orientation, one cannot afford to gloss over general normative or legal considerations.

BOX 5.4 A LEGAL DEFINITION OF INTERVENTION

'the forcible or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state'

(Jennings and Watts 1996:430)

This chapter is concerned with intervention *in international law*. One useful legal definition runs as follows: 'the forcible or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other

state' (Jennings and Watts 1996:430) Students of international politics may find this a somewhat narrow definition, strictly related as it is to interference in the internal affairs of another state. There is no doubt, as already discussed, that in more general usage 'military intervention' encompasses a very much wider range of military operations than its legal definition implies. Nevertheless, it is especially important to appreciate that there is a difference between, on the one hand, military operations aimed at influencing the internal affairs of a state and, on the other, operations whose purpose is to influence the outcome of an international dispute between two or more state parties.

It is also important to acknowledge that, in a great many cases, international disputes will have internal domestic dimensions and that the internal affairs of one state may be the root cause of international disagreement or, indeed, constitute a threat to international peace and security. There are no easy lines of demarcation; no straightforward categories that will invariably apply. Nevertheless, for clarity of legal understanding it is most appropriate to consider the two forms of military operation separately. Even when military activity serves both 'internal' and 'international' security purposes, with apparently very little scope for distinguishing between the two, the legal distinction may still have relevance to the particular circumstances of each case and may also, for example, have an influence on the way that individual soldiers conduct themselves. Given that perhaps the most instinctive understanding among non-legal observers of international politics is that 'military intervention' includes the use of military forces to intervene in international disputes, we will deal briefly with this form of intervention first, before moving on to the currently more contentious issue of military operations focused on a state's internal circumstances.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

An examination of military operations that have taken place since the Second World War seems to point to the emergence of three different categories of intervention for the purpose of influencing an international dispute. There is what might be described as 'partial intervention', when military forces are deployed in support of one side or another in a dispute. Second, there is 'impartial intervention' when military forces are deployed between disputing states and attempt to act as honest brokers to aid dispute resolution. Finally, there are 'enforcement actions' that involve the application of UN-endorsed military sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Partial intervention

Partial intervention is nothing new, including, as it does, any instance in history in which one state has provided military assistance to another to resolve an international dispute. It follows that any state that has conducted military combat operations within any sort of military alliance framework has been involved in a form of partial intervention. Military alliances have been formed throughout history for either offensive or defensive purposes. However, during the course of the twentieth century international law dealing with the

utility of military power in international relations has undergone fundamental change. Following the First World War there were two significant attempts both to limit resort to military force in the resolution of international disputes and to outlaw war: the creation of the League of Nations in a flawed attempt to build a universal collective security system, and the oft-quoted but largely ineffective Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. However, with the successful adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, and its general acceptance as the defining legal regime for the maintenance of international security, states can no longer legitimately resort to war to resolve their disputes with others.

The UN Charter outlaws war as a means of resolving disputes (notwithstanding the possibility of the Just War doctrine being used in relation to humanitarian intervention, to be discussed below). However, in doing so, it does not deprive states of their inherent right to defend themselves. Article 51 allows for individual or collective self-defence. This means that if a state is subject to an armed attack from another state it is not only able to take measures to defend itself but is able to call upon, and accept, the assistance of others in that endeavour. It is no coincidence that the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, for example, should incorporate that principle as the defining article of the collective defence arrangement at the heart of the NATO Alliance. It is worth quoting Article 5 of the treaty:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the UN...[will take]...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to secure and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This article is entirely consistent with the UN Charter and goes on to say that any armed attack against NATO members will be reported to the Security Council along with details of those measures taken in response.

Although Article 5 is included in the North Atlantic Treaty, it is by no means necessary for a similar provision to be included in all formal alliance arrangements. As long as an alliance or coalition of states acts in accordance with the principle enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter it will be acting legitimately. It is also the case that collective self-defence may be activated by individual states going to the aid of another state in an ad hoc manner and without any formal defensive arrangement being in place beforehand.

The right of self-defence exists regardless of the UN's ability to respond adequately to threats to international security. Although the coalition response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was supported by appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, the actions taken to recover territory would have been legitimate in customary law even if the UN Security Council had remained deadlocked over the issues at stake. The same is also true of the unilateral British response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982.

With war as a means of dispute resolution outlawed by the UN Charter, the right to contribute to collective self-defence represents the only legitimate reason for partial military intervention (quite obviously, it would not be legitimate for a state to intervene to assist an aggressor). In theory, once an act of aggression has been reported to the UN Security Council, the Council has determined that the aggression poses a threat to

international peace and security, and a UNSC resolution has been passed calling on the aggressor to withdraw and imposing Chapter VII military sanctions if it does not any subsequent military action will cease to be 'partial' and will assume the status of 'enforcement action', of which more below. But this can be a lengthy process and a UNSC resolution that falls short of a clear mandate to take enforcement action does not take away a state's right to continue its own or collective action in accordance with Article 51. This point was made forcefully by Britain following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine representative to the UN had argued that the fact that the Security Council was seized by the matter meant that any unilateral military action by the UK would be contrary to international law. As Sir Anthony Parsons, Britain's permanent representative at the UN in New York, stated on 22 May 1982, the UK's inherent right of self-defence was unimpaired by actions taken within the UN for the simple reason that those actions had, until then, proved ineffective.

However, what is also true is that while defensive action is legitimate, a UNSC endorsement of the action taken helps establish legitimacy in the broader consciousness. It is arguably the case that the British action in 1982, for example, would have proved diplomatically far more difficult to manage if Sir Anthony Parsons had failed to get Security Council backing for his country's position. Although Britain's military forces acted alone in the South Atlantic in 1982, foreign assistance of other kinds was forthcoming. The brokering of any coalition operation in the future is likely to be rendered considerably easier with a UN stamp of approval.

Impartial intervention

Although impartial intervention is not entirely a post-Second World War phenomenon, there is no doubt that it was the deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to Egypt in 1956 that provided the baseline for future operations under the 'peace-keeping' banner. UNEF I was deployed following the cessation of Anglo-French military operations to secure the Suez Canal. It was established as an impartial force to provide a face-saving reason for British and French withdrawal and to create a stable zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces. The then UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, outlined a broad philosophy for such 'preventive diplomacy' and established a set of principles that were intended to guide future peacekeeping operations.

In general terms, peace-keeping forces, as envisaged by Hammarskjöld, would deploy after a cease-fire between two warring states. They would patrol an area between the opposing belligerent forces and act as intermediaries to avoid any friction taking place between the parties to the dispute, thereby creating a degree of stability in which full cease-fire negotiations leading to dispute resolution could take place. The forces so deployed would be lightly armed, consistent with their own self-defence, would be as impartial as possible and, importantly, would be present with the consent of both parties to the dispute.

It is the final point that is especially important from a legal point of view. Pure peace-keeping actions conducted under UN auspices do not require Chapter VII enforcement measures to be approved through UN Security Council resolution. The basic legality of these impartial interventions is determined by the consent to their presence provided by

the parties to the dispute. Without that initial consent, pure peace-keeping forces would not be deployed under UN auspices in the first place. If forces intervened without the consent of the parties, in order for them to be effective the mandate under which they would be operating would need to be provided through a binding UN Security Council resolution imposing some obligation on the part of the state, or states, in whose territory the forces were to be deployed. Ultimately, the Security Council may resort to a fully-fledged enforcement action under a Chapter VII mandate. This would allow the deployed forces to use armed force if necessary to achieve their mission. Such a mandate would transform the military operation from a purely impartial intervention, in which consent legitimises the deployment of forces, into a full enforcement action, the legitimacy of which is determined by UN Security Council resolution.

This sounds fairly straightforward. Unfortunately, nothing is that simple. Since 1956, the ways in which forces have been deployed under UN auspices have been subjected to a range of influences. The difficulties associated with the requirement for consent in cases of impartial intervention were highlighted in 1967 when the Egyptian leader Nasser withdrew consent from UNEF I, the UN Secretary-General U Thant ordered the UN force's withdrawal, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War followed shortly thereafter. Additional problems as to the precise mandate of peace-keeping forces had already been highlighted through the actions of ONUC in the Congo between 1960–4. In that instance, a UN force found itself embroiled in a complex internal situation in a state that was disintegrating in civil war, with political factions employing low-intensity military operations against each other. Although deployed under the Chapter VI 'Peaceful Settlement' provisions of the UN Charter, and in theory restricted to the use of force in self-defence, ONUC had to employ a broad definition of 'self-defence' that resulted in it appearing itself to be one of the warring factions. The reputation of UN forces in peace-keeping roles during the Cold War probably reached its low point when those military units contributing to the UN operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) simply stood by and watched as Turkish forces invaded the island in 1974. Of course, they had no option but to do what they did. For UNFICYP to have resisted the Turkish invasion would have required a Chapter VII enforcement mandate which it did not possess. Nevertheless, the UN's inability to act did nothing at all to enhance its reputation.

Despite these previous setbacks, once the Cold War was over and consensus became more easily achieved among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the temptation to use military forces under UN auspices to intervene in various crisis areas around the world became irresistible. There was a sharp increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the number of operations, the number of states providing forces to them and in the variety of operations being mounted. It has been the last factor—the variety of operations—that has generated complexity in terms of the legal basis for what these operations are trying to achieve. The most difficult problem has become one of distinguishing between impartial intervention and enforcement action.

BOX 5.5 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

Partial:

- intervention for one side or another, legally, with consent;
- UN Charter Article 51—collective and individual self-defence;
- UN Security Council role—Chapter VII of Charter and North Atlantic Treaty Article V

Impartial:

- deployment between disputing side;
- UNEF I 1956—‘peace-keeping with consent’;
- if not, UN Charter Chapter VII—Security Council role

Enforcement:

- application of UN-endorsed sanctions—diplomatic, economic and military—UN Charter Chapters VI and VII

Enforcement action

According to the process established in the UN Charter, once the Security Council has determined that there is a threat to international peace and security it can, if appropriate, impose a range of sanctions on states that it judges to be transgressing acceptable norms of behaviour and contributing to instability. There are three forms of sanction: diplomatic, economic and military. If military sanctions are considered necessary, the Security Council can, under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provide a mandate for military forces operating under UN auspices. Those forces would apply military sanctions but would do so only within the terms of a mandate provided in a Security Council resolution.

It is the UNSC resolution that legitimises action taken to apply mandated sanctions. If forces deployed for that purpose step outside the terms of their mandate their actions may be deemed to run counter to UN law. They would, of course, regardless of the terms of the mandate, retain the inherent right of self-defence. Legal considerations will usually be conveyed to the soldier on the ground by way of command and control mechanisms known as Rules of Engagement (ROE). If ROE are divided into those actions permitted in self-defence and those other actions permitted in pursuit of mission objectives, it should be possible to relate specific actions taken by individual soldiers and their commanders, via separate legal audit trails, to either Article 51 of the UN Charter (for self-defence) or to both Article 42 and the words in the mandate agreed by the UN Security Council and contained in its resolution (for mission accomplishment).

Enforcement actions do not have to be conducted by forces under direct UN command and control. When the UN Charter was drafted it had been envisaged that the UN would

itself have forces under command, together with an appropriate military staff at its headquarters in New York. However, neither the full military staff nor the forces needed to conduct enforcement operations ever materialised. The first major military operation conducted under UN auspices was that mounted by a coalition (including the UK) under US leadership in Korea in the early 1950s (the residues of which are still in place today on the southern boundary of the Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea). Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990–1 is the very obvious recent example of a military operation mounted under similar arrangements. A coalition of forces was put together under US leadership, initially to defend the territory of other states in the Gulf region (principally Saudi Arabia), but subsequently to recover the territory of Kuwait and eject the Iraqi forces occupying it. Those coalition forces were operating under the terms of UNSC resolutions and to a mandate that limited their responsibility to the recovery of Kuwaiti territory.

This is a point worth dwelling on, bearing in mind the comment made above about the need for forces engaged on enforcement action not to overstep their mandates. The decision that was made, in the later stages of Operation Desert Storm, not to press home the military advantage and to halt the advance once it had achieved its mandated objective, was consistent with the need to maintain legitimacy. Whatever the political ramifications, it would certainly have been beyond the mandate for coalition forces to have pressed on for Baghdad, overthrowing Saddam Hussein in the process. It would also have gone beyond the measures necessary to give effect to the inherent right of collective self-defence that similarly legitimised the coalition action. The need to comply with the principle of proportionality in defending the territory of Kuwait must not be forgotten and, indeed, would also have been in the minds of those drafting the mandate authorising the use of force in Security Council Resolution 678.

Some may have wished that more had been done to undermine Saddam Hussein's hold on power in Iraq. With subsequent Iraqi actions against minorities within its own population, both north (Kurds) and south (Marsh Arabs), and the recent ongoing disputes over the activities of UN weapons inspectors, it would arguably have been politically very convenient if Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. However, one has to consider the possible consequences of the coalition going well beyond its mandate. The legitimacy of its actions would have been seriously questioned and it may have had a negative longer-term effect on the ability of the UN Security Council to provide firm directives for similar purposes in the future. That there will be a need for firm action in the future is something about which there can be no doubt. With the NATO action in 1999 in Kosovo, without a specific UN Security Council mandate, this need hardly be stated although, of course, by virtue of the lack of a UN mandate, this action cannot be regarded as falling under the general heading of 'Enforcement Action'.

MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR 'INTERNAL' EFFECT

The second category of military involvement to be examined is that which is intended to have an impact on the internal affairs of the 'host' state. A further sub-categorisation is also necessary, to distinguish between operations that take place with the consent of the host state and those that do not.

BOX 5.6 MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR 'INTERNAL' EFFECT

- at request of or with agreement of host state
- at request of previous colonial possessions, e.g. UK interventions in Muscat and Malaysia and French in Chad and Zaire
- non-consensual military intervention, e.g. Soviet Union in Hungary and United States in Grenada?
- humanitarian, e.g. Liberia and Somalia

Military operations mounted at the request of the host state

There has long been a customary law prohibition on military operations that are conducted without the request or consent of the state in which they are taking place. This prohibition is derived from the principle of state sovereignty and its twin pillars of territorial integrity and political independence. Put simply, if there is no request or consent, a military deployment into another state's territory is usually illegal and may even be regarded as an act of aggression. The corollary of this is that if a state does request (or consents to) another state, or group of states, sending military forces into its territory, for whatever reason, their *presence* is legitimate (even if what they subsequently get up to may not be).

There is a long list of military deployments in the years since the Second World War that have been conducted at the request of, or with the agreement of, the host state. This list obviously includes every deployment or reinforcement of British forces in British colonial possessions or dependencies and UN mandate territories (examples being Palestine, East Africa and Aden). None of these is, strictly speaking, the concern of this discussion because they were essentially domestic business; colonial possessions are within the domestic jurisdiction of the colonial power. That would have been the case even with military deployments into self-governing territories. If, for example, the British Government headed by Harold Wilson in the 1960s had decided to deploy armed forces against the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, post-UDI, the presence of those forces on Rhodesian soil would have been entirely legitimate because the legal sovereign authority was still the British Crown.

Notwithstanding such examples of domestic colonial business, Britain has also deployed forces at the request of other states, some of which had previously been colonial

possessions of the British Crown. Examples included deployments to Muscat and Oman in 1957, Jordan in 1958, to the independent former East African territories of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in 1964, during confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in 1963–5, and to Zambia in 1965. There are, of course, plenty of non-British examples as well, including French deployments to their own former colonial territories in Africa (for example Chad in 1968, 1969 and 1983, and Zaire in 1978), the Indian deployments to Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Maldives in 1988 and, of course, the US deployment of advisers followed by combat troops to South Vietnam.

The key question in all such cases is concerned with the extent to which the deployment of military forces is conducted at the request or with the consent of the host state. If a deployment takes place at the request of a host state but the forces deployed subsequently overstep their mandate, their activities may become illegal. The US presence in South Vietnam has already been quoted as an example of a legitimate deployment of military forces. However, it arguably may have ceased to be legitimate when agents of the US Government became involved in the coup to depose President Diem in 1963. Diem was deposed and murdered by officers of the South Vietnamese Air Force. However, the CIA and the US ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, were certainly aware of what was going on and President Kennedy did nothing to stop the coup. It is fair to conclude that the Diem-led government, while requesting US involvement, would certainly not have wished agents of the US Government to become involved in South Vietnamese internal political affairs to quite that extent.

Regardless of subsequent events creating legal confusion, even initial requests for military deployment, or the existence of some degree of consent, can be subject to interpretation and even fabrication. A number of cases in which that has been the case, including that of the US operation in Grenada, will be mentioned in more detail below. However, what is not in doubt is that if there is a clear, unambiguous and obviously freely expressed desire on the part of a government to have foreign military forces deployed within its territory, then that deployment is legitimate.

Non-consensual military intervention to influence the internal affairs of a state

As is clear from the legal definition of intervention quoted above, in international law the word 'intervention' implies a lack of consent by a government or, at best, its unwilling acquiescence in the face of a military force being deployed into its territory. This precise legal definition of intervention reflects the International Law Commission's Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, by Article 3 of which 'every State has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other State'. Nor, of course, must one forget Article 2(7) of the UN Charter itself, which establishes non-intervention in domestic matters as a fundamental principle of the UN system.

There has developed over time a political doctrine of non-intervention that has had a profound influence on the development of international law. In liberal philosophy the non-interventionist position has been justified on two related grounds. The first, Kantian, perspective is concerned with the rights of citizens to determine their own way of life in their own state, unhindered by external interference, whatever form that way of life might

assume. Intervention undermines that right and is therefore to be discouraged. For J.S.Mill, the justification for non-intervention was that it would be irresponsible to intervene in the internal affairs of a state in order to impose a liberal form of government. If the people had not by themselves developed the political sophistication to decide on, or the ability to create, a liberal form of government, they would not be able to sustain it without suppressing opposition, thereby undermining the very liberal principles that were being introduced. A minority liberal government would either fall or have to be continually reinforced by outside forces.

The principle of non-intervention for a combination of philosophical and practical reasons was espoused by Britain in relation to internal political upheavals in other European states during the nineteenth century. The revolutionary tide spreading through Europe produced two arguments for intervention from different ends of the political spectrum. The monarchies of the Eastern European states wanted to intervene to reinforce fragile monarchies threatened by revolution. More liberal elements wanted to intervene to give support to revolutionary forces that were attempting to create more liberal forms of government. Britain preferred to remain aloof. By one interpretation, British statesmen preferred not to become embroiled for reasons of pure national interest. Whatever the actual reason, a tradition of non-intervention developed. This was greatly tested during the Russian Civil War of 1918–20 when Britain did intervene with others in an attempt to counter revolutionary Bolshevik forces. By that unfortunate experience the British tendency to non-intervention was reinforced. In contrast, the strongly idealistic form of pro-democratic liberalism that developed in the USA, from its founding onwards, provided the basis for an interventionist approach once isolationism had given way to globalism post-1945, although since Vietnam the desire to intervene has been curtailed by an equally strong desire not to become embroiled at great cost in American lives.

Liberals have, therefore, long argued about the wisdom and propriety of intervention. The debate between those in favour and those opposed has produced a sort of balance. This has had an influence on contemporary international law. While the basic principle of non-intervention remains the starting point, it is now qualified by interpretations that do not invariably exclude it but allow for it in certain exceptional circumstances.

BOX 5.7 NON-CONSENSUAL INTERVENTION

‘the forcible or dictatorial interference of a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state’

(Jennings and Watts 1996:430)

International declarations

- International Law Commission: Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States
- UN Charter Article 2(vii)
- UN General Assembly: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention

- Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
- Helsinki Final Act of CSCE
- Kantian and Mill perspectives

Of course, by no means all states in the world regard this essentially liberal debate as the defining feature in international legal terms. The idealistic fervour of the extreme liberal democratic view in favour of pro-liberal intervention generated a reaction from those states that felt threatened by what they saw as Western liberal imperialism. In 1965, for example, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention. This declared that no state has any right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason at all, and condemned any form of armed intervention or threat against another state. This position was again reinforced by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

In stark contrast to these attempts to ban intervention, the socialist view that culminated in the Brezhnev Doctrine came out in full support of intervention to support socialist movements under threat from reactionary elements. Nevertheless, it did not prevent the Soviet Union and its satellites signing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975, a document that again came out against non-consensual intervention. Perhaps the most important recent restatement of the law relating to this issue is contained in the 1986 judgement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case (Merits). The court found against the USA and, among other things, stated that US support provided to the Contras represented an illegal interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs, that the USA had used force against Nicaragua and that it had violated Nicaragua's sovereignty.

The fact that consent has become the accepted means of legitimising military deployments is borne out by the number of occasions on which military operations have taken place in controversial circumstances but been justified by claims that they were mounted at the request of the state in which they were taking place. There are several well-known cases, each providing international legal analysts with some difficulties. Those that are well worth examining are the Soviet deployment of military forces or reinforcements into Hungary in 1956, into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, and the US military operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.

Critics of each of these deployments often refer to them as invasions, implying that they were mounted against the wishes of the sovereign power within the state. In international law they would, on that basis, be correctly described as 'interventions'. In each of the cases of Soviet deployment some attempt was made to convey the appearance of consent. With Czechoslovakia, for example, the Soviet deployment, aside from being justified by reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine, was also 'supported' by statements from the Czech leader, Alexander Dubček, who very conveniently appeared to remain in office for a short period afterwards.

BOX 5.8 BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, November 1968

‘When internal and external forces hostile to Socialism attempt to turn the development of any Socialist country in the direction of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of Socialism in that country, a threat to the Socialist commonwealth as a whole, it already becomes not only a problem for the people of that country but also a general problem, the concern of all Socialist countries.’

There is no doubt that Dubček’s position was a sham to create an appearance. His consent was obtained under extreme duress and his subsequent treatment at the hands of the communist successor administration provides clear prima facie evidence to support this view. In the case of Afghanistan, the deployment of Soviet forces was claimed by Moscow to be in response to a request from Afghanistani President Amin who was executed/assassinated immediately Soviet troops gained control of Kabul.

The US operation in Grenada is a particularly complex situation from a legal point of view. It was by no means clear who or what constituted the Government of Grenada at the time the military operation was mounted in the early morning of 25 October 1983. There had been a military coup between 12 and 14 October and the previous prime minister, Maurice Bishop, had been executed/assassinated on 19 October. The leader of the coup, Hudson Austin, had declared an interim administration and established a shoot-on-sight curfew to suppress opposition. However, Grenada, while an independent state, was a former British possession and had retained the British monarch as its head of state. The Queen was represented in the country by the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon. According to the Prime Minister of Barbados, Sir Paul had requested help from him. As a result, Barbados, Jamaica and five member states of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States supported the US-led military operation. Subsequent elections placed a moderate leader in power and Grenada was stabilised. The US-led force left the island on 15 December.

BOX 5.9 SOME CONTROVERSIAL CASES

Czechoslovakia 1968

Afghanistan 1979

Grenada 1983

Panama 1989

The UN General Assembly deplored the ‘invasion’ but there was no possibility of the Security Council doing so in the face of a likely US veto. The whole episode apparently angered Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister at the time, but only, one supposes, because it was mounted without her prior knowledge. In constitutional terms Mrs Thatcher had no relevance to the legal issues at stake. The British Prime Minister

was not in a position to advise the Queen on matters relating to Grenada; that was the prerogative of the Grenadian Government through the Governor-General. One should therefore ask: was the deployment of US troops an illegal non-consensual intervention or was it a perfectly legitimate deployment of forces in response to a request from the Governor-General exercising his constitutional powers delegated to him by Grenada's head of state, the Queen? Readers are invited to make up their own minds and will doubtless be influenced in doing so by the extent to which a 'fudge' is assumed to have taken place. There is certainly a possibility of post de facto legitimisation.

Six years later, in 1989, the landing of US forces in Panama was partially justified by the claim that the constitutionally elected government had consented to the deployment. General Noriega, the effective leader of the country, had set aside the results of an election and it was from the winner of that election, Guillermo Endara, that the US Government obtained consent. Endara was sworn in as President hours after US forces landed.

Such controversial examples of military operations, justified by reference to a claimed request from the 'host' state, are at least evidence of the extent to which only military operations by consent are clearly legitimate. That is not to say there is no longer a debate. Far from it. The legal debate is now more about which circumstances will allow non-consensual military deployments and which will not, rather than between those who invariably rule it out and those who wish to intervene whenever liberal political forces or vital liberal democratic principles, such as those relating to human rights, are under threat. The basic rule remains opposed to military deployments without consent but this is increasingly being modified by acknowledgement that there will be exceptional circumstances in which it will be appropriate to depart from it.

MILITARY ACTION TO PROTECT ONE'S OWN NATIONALS

The argument of the inherent right of self-defence—a right enshrined in the UN Charter—has been deployed on many occasions to justify responsive attacks. Three very recent incidents involving US attacks on other states merit examination by any student wishing to delve further into the legal issues. The first of these is the air raid on Libya, in 1986, in response to perceived Libyan involvement in terrorist bomb attacks, in particular one on a Berlin nightclub that resulted in the death of an American serviceman and injuries sustained by fifty others. The second would be the 1993 missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, in response to an apparent Iraqi plot to assassinate President Bush. The most recent example would be the 1998 cruise-missile attacks on sites in Afghanistan and Sudan following the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. All of these attacks were justified by reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Arguably, such claims represent extremely flexible interpretations of the idea of 'self-defence', especially if their assessment as such is compared with Webster's classic definition of self-defence following the British seizure and destruction of the US vessel *Caroline* in 1837. For Webster, an action taken in self-defence had to 'show a necessity..., instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'.

Over 160 years on, this wording is at the core of any informed debate on the issue of self-defence. It is especially so in relation to the protection of nationals abroad, for which military intervention appears to have assumed a degree of legitimacy in international law, despite a lack of consent. Clearly, if a state descends into a condition of civil disorder or civil war to the point at which its authorities can no longer provide adequate protection for foreign nationals resident in, or visiting, its territory, it raises the question about the rights of other states to intervene on behalf of their own citizens.

In modern military terminology, operations whose aim is the evacuation of foreign nationals from a state's territory are known as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Typically, NEOs are mounted when civil disorder breaks out in a state and other governments become concerned about the safety of their nationals who are trapped in-country and at risk of injury or death as a consequence. If consent can be obtained, such an operation will clearly be perfectly legitimate. However, it may be necessary to retain an element of surprise to achieve a safe evacuation of, say, embassy personnel in a deteriorating security situation. That may make it militarily advisable not to seek approval. Alternatively, it may be difficult to identify a competent authority if the security situation is especially bad. In the worst of all cases, the competent authorities of the state may be either totally helpless to act or even conniving with others to threaten foreign nationals. Perhaps the two most infamous recent examples of foreign nationals being placed under threat to their lives with the assent or assistance of the local authorities were the support provided to aircraft hijackers at Entebbe by the Amin regime in Uganda in 1976 and the holding hostage of US diplomats in Tehran following the Iranian revolution. Each of these incidents provoked military responses, one successful (by the Israelis at Entebbe) and the other a failure (President Carter's mission to rescue the American hostages).

Are such operations acceptable in international law? The answer is perhaps best revealed in an examination of state practice. It is certainly the case that operations of this type have been justified by reference to a state's right to protect its own nationals. Arguably, the inherent right of self-defence included in Article 51 of the UN Charter extends to individual citizens of the state and not just to its territory. Indeed, it would be somewhat absurd if self-defence could be applied in the case of an invasion of an uninhabited island but not in the case of a threat posed to citizens of the state. If that is the case, states must have a legal right to protect their nationals when other states fail to meet their own obligations to provide them with adequate protection. The legal issues were debated in the UN Security Council at the time of the Entebbe rescue, with the Israeli and US representatives in particular arguing forcefully in favour of the type of intervention mounted by Israeli special forces (see D.J.Harris 1998:909–12). The arguments were again rehearsed in the context of the US Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case (dealing with the issues surrounding the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran), although the ICJ did not rule on the legality of President Carter's aborted rescue mission. Two incidents with a maritime flavour are also relevant: the Corfu Channel Case dating back to an incident in 1946 involving the Royal Navy in Albanian territorial waters; and the *Mayaguez* incident involving a US action to recover a captured US merchant ship from Cambodian waters. In the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ ruled against the UK on the grounds that, while innocent passage through the Corfu Channel was a right, actions

taken by the Royal Navy to ensure safe passage (a mine-countermeasures operation) violated Albanian sovereignty. In connection with the *Mayaguez* incident, the USA argued the right of self-defence.

The right of self-defence also, of course, has a collective dimension that would justify a military operation mounted by one state extracting nationals of other states. A good example of a recent operation that did just this was mounted by the Royal Navy in January 1986 in the former British territory of Aden. The country had collapsed into civil war between the government and rival factions. The Royal yacht *Britannia*, accompanied by two escorts and an auxiliary, evacuated a total of 1,379 men, women and children, of over fifty different nationalities, all of whom had been trapped in the besieged capital. The majority were taken out by boat over the beach. Other more recent examples include the operations that involved UK forces evacuating civilians from Liberia in April 1996 and Sierra Leone in May 1997, and that from Albania mounted by the Italians, also in 1997.

BOX 5.10 NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Entebbe 1976	Liberia 1996
Tehran 1981	Sierra Leone 1997
Grenada 1983?	Albania 1997
Aden 1986	

Interestingly, the United States used the protection of its nationals as one of its justifications for intervention in Grenada in 1983. The use of this argument could be seen as a further clouding of the legal issues surrounding the entire military operation in Grenada, already discussed above. Surely, one might argue, if the US forces had been invited in by Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General, why did the USA need to justify its action further by reference to its inherent right to protect its own nationals (principally a group of students who were studying at a college on the island)? To give the USA the benefit of any doubt, the dual approach to justifying a military response in the case of Grenada might simply have been one of 'belt and braces'. But it adds further evidence of state practice in relation to military action to protect nationals. It would seem to be the case that in such instances, whether they be in response to official lack of action bordering on blatant support for terrorism (as at Entebbe airport in 1976) or simply in response to a deteriorating situation in which no competent government authority can be identified, military action without consent is legitimate.

That said, international law does restrict the action that can be taken to that necessary to evacuate nationals and defend them in the process. Clearly, intervention without consent represents a breach of the territorial integrity of the state, albeit a temporary one. In this respect, it is reasonable to conclude that the breach of a state's territorial integrity must not have any long-term effect. It must be for a period of time essential for the successful conduct of the operation and no more. Any action beyond that, amounting to

significant interference in the internal affairs of the state, would run counter to the UN Charter and risk falling into the category of an armed attack on the state concerned. This is quite logical and can be directly related to the standard principle of proportionality to be applied when exercising the right of self-defence. The corollary is, of course, that if a state uses disproportionate force in mounting an NEO it may itself come under legitimate attack from the state in whose territory the operation is being mounted.

MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES

Increasingly, the most common and controversial reason given for departures from the doctrine of non-intervention is related to the need to provide humanitarian relief. Such relief can range from the dropping of food and medical supplies to communities threatened by natural disaster to military action against the forces of a state intent on gross violations of the human rights of inconvenient minorities within its own population.

In many cases, of course, medical and food aid will be provided at the request, or with the consent, of the state in which the aid is required. As has been pointed out already, that would be perfectly legitimate and the presence of military forces engaged on such benign mercy operations would be largely uncontroversial. However, it is not invariably the case that a state will want others to provide food and medical aid. If, for example, the section of the population suffering disease and starvation is a minority or divisive group with which a majority or dominant group has little or no sympathy, the offer of aid may be rejected or its enforced provision may well be opposed. Before India deployed 15,000 troops to Sri Lanka with the consent of the Sri Lankan government in 1986, the Indian Air Force had already flown into Sri Lankan airspace without consent to drop humanitarian relief supplies to Tamil communities in the northern part of the island. The legality of that move was in some doubt. However, the more recent humanitarian action taken to protect minority communities in both northern and southern Iraq has moved the debate on further.

Military action that is taken for apparently humanitarian purposes, or which has an undoubtedly positive humanitarian effect, is not an entirely new phenomenon. In very extreme terms, the unconditional surrender imposed on Germany by the Allies in 1945 had a humanitarian effect in that it destroyed utterly the Nazi state and its policy of genocide towards the Jewish people. As a consequence of the Holocaust, genocide was declared by the UN General Assembly in 1946 to be a crime under international law.

The subsequent 1948 Genocide Convention made provision for contracting parties, under the terms of the UN Charter, to take action to prevent or suppress acts of genocide. Indeed, Article 1 of the Genocide Convention establishes an obligation on its contracting parties to 'prevent and punish' in the event of genocide being committed. However, genocide is rather more willingly described in emotional terms than it is determined by states to have taken place. Not even the thoroughly reprehensible Pol Pot regime in Cambodia attracted international military intervention on grounds of suppressing genocide. More recently we have witnessed the genocide committed by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. This was recognised by a UN Security Council Committee of Experts as genocide in October 1994—the first occasion since 1948 that

the UN has, in any capacity, recognised a particular set of circumstances as constituting an act of genocide (Gourevitch 1998:203). It was apparently the case that the US Government avoided using the word 'genocide' to describe the Rwandan outrage for the simple reason that to acknowledge it as such would have created an obligation to intervene. While this was an obligation that Washington was unwilling to act upon at the time, it has apparently apologised since then for its reluctance to act (ibid: 350). In relation to Bosnia, the ICJ has yet to rule on the nature of acts committed by Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims in a case taken to the court in 1993 by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) (Case Concerning Application of the Genocide Convention; Wippman 1998:273).

In the spring and summer of 1999 genocide was once again in the news with Serbian forces ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian community and with NATO intervening using air power to force Slobodon Milosevic's hand. The legal issues surrounding the NATO intervention are of some importance in relation to the broader question of humanitarian intervention and are by no means clear-cut. However, rather than discuss these now, it will be useful first to establish what the law had to say about humanitarian intervention immediately before the Kosovo intervention. Putting the question of genocide to one side for the moment, what have been the key examples of military deployments without consent that have had humanitarian effect?

Although very much related to fears of an anti-Indian regime taking power in what had been, until then, the eastern part of the geographically divided Pakistani state, the Indian military operation in East Bengal in 1971 was prompted partly by the prospect of upwards of 10 million Hindu refugees flooding into India. There was apparently no attempt by India to justify its actions in international law by reference to a perceived legal right to deploy military forces on humanitarian grounds. Nor was there an attempt to do this in the case of the Tanzanian military deployment into Uganda in 1979. The Ugandan intervention was clearly intended to overthrow one of the bloodiest and most ruthless dictatorships to which the post-war world has had to bear witness. It is impossible to find any argument in print in any reputable publication that does not applaud the deposing of Idi Amin. However, Tanzania did not justify it on the basis of humanitarian necessity; it was, rather, referred to as resort to military force for reasons of self-defence. One could challenge this assertion and maintain that mere self-defence did not require the deposition of the Ugandan government, but that is not the point. It seems there was a belief in Tanzania that the deployment of military forces into Uganda for anything other than reasons of self-defence would be regarded as an illegal intervention, regardless of its clearly positive humanitarian consequences.

Ultimately, of course, there is a real sense in which the acceptance of a rigid doctrine of non-intervention has to include acceptance of the possibility of genocide or extreme human-rights violations by default. Since it is now most unlikely, given the ubiquity of the international broadcast media community, that widespread human suffering within any state will go entirely unnoticed, public opinion within most states will almost certainly come out in favour of some degree of humanitarian response, even if governments are still able to resist such calls.

In most cases, given the scale of modern financial and technical resources, an adequate response will often be physically possible even if actual policy decides against it or takes

some time to come into line with public expectations. It seems that these two related factors—media interest and the physical capacity to respond—are having an effect on the development of international law through emerging state practice. If it is becoming increasingly unacceptable politically for governments to do nothing in the face of massive humanitarian disaster elsewhere in the world, active responses will not only generate evidence of state practice but will, importantly, create in the minds of many a belief in the legal imperative to act. It must not be forgotten that customary law emerges when there is a combination of practice and a belief in the legal obligation to adopt it.

BOX 5.11 EVOLVING LAW ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

- affected by changing practice and a belief in an international obligation
- but compare United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, 'humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country', and United Nations Security Council Resolution 688's creation of 'safe havens' for Kurds in northern Iraq.

So it would seem that from the perspective of customary law the absolute need for consent is increasingly being challenged. Significantly it is also being challenged within the UN. In recent years there have been several instances of humanitarian action being approved through adoption of UN Security Council resolutions. In some cases, like those involving Liberia and Somalia, international action was demanded without consent from the states concerned for the simple reason that the internal situation of those states rendered it difficult or impossible to secure an unambiguous consent from a legitimate and effective government. If a state has descended into a condition of anarchy through civil war then it is surely not reasonable to sit on the sidelines and refuse to deploy forces for humanitarian purposes on the basis that there is nobody in a position either to request or approve it.

As history has demonstrated, such circumstances are not unusual. Examples of states that have in recent years descended into a state of chaos resulting in the loss of effective government include Lebanon, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Albania and Zaïre (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). In such cases, who does one ask for permission to deploy humanitarian assistance? The instinctive answer is probably 'The United Nations.' However, as recently as 1991, the General Assembly, in Resolution 46/182, seemed to rule out the delivery of humanitarian assistance without the consent of the state in which the disaster was unfolding. Fortunately, the Security Council (whose resolutions can be legally binding, unlike those of the General Assembly) has been somewhat bolder in practice and demonstrated, in the case of Somalia in particular, a willingness to utilise Chapter VII of the UN Charter to legitimise humanitarian action where no government is able to provide consent. Chapter VII is, of course, concerned with responses to threats to international peace and security. While disasters that are contained within territorial boundaries might be construed as offering no such threat, there may well be an emerging

tendency for the Security Council to interpret substantial disaster within a state as having the potential to overspill and create an international crisis. For it to do so constitutes a significant development in the legitimisation of humanitarian action without consent. Nevertheless, as recently as 1986, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued a statement in which it stated that: 'the best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal' (D.J.Harris 1998:918).

Since then, the case that has probably done most to move perceptions of the legal position further towards an acceptance of humanitarian action without consent is the creation of safe havens in Iraq. Following Operation Desert Storm in 1990–1, the brutal suppression of the northern Iraqi Kurds and Shiite communities in southern Iraq by the Iraqi army incensed international opinion. There was no doubt that Iraq was violating accepted standards of behaviour and, indeed, failing to comply with international instruments to which it was party (the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). A cynic might comment that if Iraq had not invaded Kuwait in 1990 and had not been so decisively dealt with by Operation Desert Storm, it is extremely unlikely that the international community would have reached agreement at UN Security Council level to condemn such internal repression. There is no doubt that in April 1991 Iraq was in a much weakened position by virtue of the events of the preceding winter. However, the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 688 in that April should not be written off merely as an unusual development at the tail end of the UN-endorsed action against Iraq, or as just a final attempt by the coalition states to humiliate Saddam Hussein.

The resolution was not fully supported within the Security Council and was only narrowly adopted because China abstained rather than applied a veto. Nevertheless, it represented a development of some significance, not so much for what it stated as for what it precipitated. While it did state that the actions against the Kurds threatened international peace and security, it did not authorise military sanctions and did not, therefore, provide an endorsed mandate for military operations. Despite that, a number of states, the UK and USA included, promptly mounted military operations involving both ground and air forces to prevent further suppression. This is significant because, if the resolution did not legitimise military action, the states involved must have reached the conclusion that there was either an inherent right or an international obligation in customary law to mount military operations for humanitarian purposes that did not require a specific UN Security Council resolution to legitimise. The British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, virtually confirmed that this was the UK view in a radio interview in August 1992, following the establishment of a 'no-fly zone' in southern Iraq. It was formally confirmed by an FCO official to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Nevertheless, it is also significant that some eight months after the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182 stating that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states must be fully respected and that 'humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country'. It has to be admitted that, so far, there has not been a UN Security Council resolution specifically legitimising military action for humanitarian purposes in a state that has a government capable of exercising control over its own territory and which is

opposed to the action being taken. The provision of humanitarian aid to states that have no effective government or in which there is a state of civil war and internal political chaos would be, arguably, less legally contentious.

It would appear to be the case, therefore, that there has been a shift in the law on humanitarian intervention in recent years, although the debate is far from satisfactorily resolved. As Christopher Greenwood has pointed out:

it seems that the law on humanitarian intervention has changed, both for the United Nations and for individual states. It is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into anarchy, international law forbids military intervention altogether.

(Greenwood 1993:34)

We can now return to the case of Kosovo and the legality of the NATO intervention. It seems reasonable to assume that the starting point for NATO's case for intervention is the conclusion reached by Greenwood in the quote above. There can be little doubt that, given the evidence provided by the international news media and by NATO's official statements, what Serbian forces were engaged in was a form of genocide. This may be described as 'ethnic cleansing' but, in combining both the driving of ethnic Albanians out of their homes and territory with the systematic murder of significant elements of the Albanian adult male population, Serbian military and police forces conducted genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention. There is considerable evidence that genocide was also being committed well before the NATO air campaign commenced. In the twelve months from the spring of 1998 to March 1999, it has been estimated that two thousand ethnic Albanians had been killed by Serb forces, a quarter of a million had been driven from their homes and five thousand of their homes had been destroyed. NATO may understandably have reached the conclusion that the massacres and the displacement of ethnic Albanians constituted genocide and assumed an obligation to respond, to 'prevent and punish', arising from Article 1 of the Genocide Convention. What was debated, however, was the extent to which NATO's response could be regarded as legitimate without an expressed mandate passed down to it from the UN Security Council. From political pronouncements to date, it would seem that the justification for intervention was based on two levels of argument, one related to the system of UN law and the other making reference to traditional Just War theory.

BOX 5.12 KOSOVO

- intervention: justified by UN law or Just War theory?
- UN: did it require a separate UNSC resolution?
- Just War: *ad bellum*—decision to go to war; *in bello*—conduct of the war

The first of these arguments was that the Yugoslavian Government was blatantly defying the UN Security Council's demands promulgated in UN Security Council Resolution

1199(1998). This demanded that all parties cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo, and that both the Yugoslavian authorities and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take action to avert humanitarian catastrophe. The resolution also stated that the Security Council was acting under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, rendering it unambiguously binding on all states. The NATO argument could be that, having defied this UNSC resolution and gone on to commit genocide, Yugoslavia has placed itself in a position in which the obligations implicit in the Genocide Convention needed to be met by the international community. This argument assumes that a further UN Security Council resolution is not necessary, despite the fact that UNSCR 1199(1998) contained no specific mandate to apply sanctions. A counter-argument would be that, while there is little or no doubt that Serbian forces were committing genocide, the absence of a specific and deliberate UN Security Council resolution, defining the extent and limits of military sanctions, means that intervention is contrary to international law. The NATO argument would have at its heart the assumption that, in certain circumstances (included in which would be those present in Kosovo), there is an obligation to respond that goes beyond the limitations inherent in the mechanisms of UN law. The absence of an appropriately worded UN Security Council resolution does not take away from states those obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention and which are now a part of customary international law. The counter-arguments are positivist in tone and based on an assumed need to apply strictly the mechanisms of UN law and, in the absence of a suitable UNSC resolution, apply rigidly the principles of non-intervention. Students of international politics will need to make up their own minds about the most appropriate line to take. However, it would seem absurd that practical political problems associated with achieving full agreement on military sanctions within the UN Security Council should lead to inaction in the face of the staggering atrocities being meted out to the Kosovan Albanians. The fact that previous similarly unacceptable behaviour (in Cambodia and Rwanda, for example) did not result in intervention does not mean that progress is not possible—the failure by states to meet their obligations in the past does not absolve them of the obligation to act in the present.

The second argument that was frequently deployed to justify intervention, by the British Prime Minister in particular, is not related to the mechanisms of UN law but is to do with traditional Just War theory. It is the case that the *jus ad bellum* elements of Just War doctrine have been regarded by many to have been displaced by the UN Charter, with the latter having the effect of banning recourse to war. Assuming that UN law is not paramount and that Just War doctrine can still be applied, the arguments would be that intervention is entirely appropriate and legitimate.

Under traditional *jus ad bellum*, war must: be waged by a legitimate authority (a state); be fought in a just cause and for an aim that is morally acceptable; be a measure of last resort; be likely to be successful; be proportionate in its consequences (the good achieved outweighing the harm done in waging the war); and be waged in a manner consistent with the principles enshrined in *jus in bello*. NATO is an alliance of states and is, therefore, a collection of legitimate authorities in its own right. Given the evidence of genocide already available in the months up to the spring of 1999, NATO can argue, with some justification, that its attempt to prevent atrocities was a just cause. The air campaign was only launched after intransigence by the Serbs led to the failure of the Rambouillet

talks and was, arguably, a last-resort measure. The eventual good to be achieved by the war would outweigh the harm done by waging it—and harm includes NATO forces' unintended or accidental targeting of civilians, including Kosovo Albanian refugees. NATO certainly maintained that its use of precision munitions met the requirement to wage war in accordance with the laws of war—the *jus in bello*.

The first key question one must ask about the Just War approach is: has the creation of the UN system brought an end to the Just War doctrine or does Just War still apply when the UN fails to act? If one believes that the creation of the UN consigned the Just War doctrine (or at least the *jus ad bellum* element of it) to history, then the NATO intervention, if justified by reference to Just War principles, will be illegal. However, anyone adopting this argument must also be prepared to accept that the inherent imperfections in the UN system may result in the international community being obliged merely to stand by and watch while genocide is committed, notwithstanding the apparently contradictory obligations enshrined in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention.

Assuming that NATO's decision to go to war with Serbia complied with Just War principles in all other respects, is it legitimate, given the need to comply with the requirement that a war is only justly launched if it is likely to be successful? Suffice it to say that those who launched the air campaign assumed it would be successful; those that opposed it on military grounds assumed it would fail. The former can justify the war in Just War terms; the latter would argue that such obvious military folly means that the NATO intervention fails to comply with Just War principles and is, therefore, illegal.

At the moment there are few sound conclusions that can be drawn about Kosovo and the legal issues surrounding it. Undoubtedly, it will have some impact on the ways in which we view the law concerned with humanitarian intervention. That impact might be profound. Indeed, in years to come the NATO campaign may be seen as the pivotal event in the marginalisation of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, of course, it may come to be seen as the most severe example of illegitimate departure from UN legal processes but no more than that. A possible conclusion that one might draw is that the intervention is both *strictly illegal* and *entirely legitimate*. If this sounds oxymoronic, simply pose the question: 'is the law good law if, in applying it, one has to accept profoundly undesirable—even evil—consequences?' In international law, if a particular norm has shortcomings, it is possible for state practice combined with an assumption of a legitimate imperative to act in a particular way to lead to a development in customary law. This leads to a profoundly important question: can the series of norms enshrined in the UN Charter be altered by the traditionally recognised process of developing customary law? There are those who would argue that the UN Charter is a particularly strong form of treaty that cannot be modified in this way—Kosovo's effects in this respect are yet to be identified.

BOX 5.13 ISSUES RELATING TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

- was external military involvement:

- interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state wracked by civil war?; or
- (im)partial interference in a series of international disputes?
- was it with or without consent, and the consent of whom:
 - competent local authorities or UN?
- was the intervention 'peace-keeping' or 'enforcement'?

SUMMARY

In summary, the deployment of military forces into the territory of another state is perfectly legitimate if it is with the consent of the state in whose territory they are deployed. If there is no consent, the presence of military forces on another state's territory is very likely to be contrary to international law unless it is justified by reference to the legitimate right to exercise self-defence (through, for example, the mounting of an NEO) or by compelling evidence of humanitarian necessity.

On the issue of humanitarian intervention, especially when linked to a need to prevent genocide, the legal issues will be profoundly affected by the analysis of NATO's justification for intervention in Kosovo. Prior to that crisis resulting in military intervention in the spring of 1999, there was already some evidence of a shift in international opinion towards humanitarian intervention as customary law, the principal example to support such a shift being the intervention in northern Iraq in the absence of specific UN Security Council mandate. That the NATO intervention in Kosovo is contentious is something of an understatement and it should not be assumed that it will necessarily lead to a general acceptance of a shift back towards the primacy of Just War principles and away from strict UN law. Perhaps the most that one can conclude at present is that the international law dealing with humanitarian intervention is in a state of flux.

The next likely development in the debate is a ruling from the ICJ. At the time of writing Yugoslavia had not taken the case to the court but it was understood that it was about to do so. The court will need initially to rule on its own jurisdiction. Thereafter, if it does accept its jurisdiction, it will then need to deliberate on the issue of genocide. Ironically, if the Yugoslavian submission is accepted as the basis of the case, the court will be considering Yugoslavian claims that NATO action rather than the Serb actions against Kosovo Albanians constituted genocide.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This chapter is not long enough to permit a detailed discussion of all the consequences of the legal requirements surrounding the use of military intervention forces. If it were, there is no doubt that an important case study used to illustrate the legal complexity of almost

all aspects of military intervention (international, including partial, impartial and enforcement action; internal, both consensual and non-consensual) would be the full range of operations that have taken place within the territory of what was, until 25 June 1991 (when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence), the Republic of Yugoslavia. The disintegration of that state, the wars that have been waged as a result, the humanitarian disasters they precipitated, the military interventions that were subsequently authorised and the difficulties experienced by all concerned in attempting to impose some legitimising logic on what needed to happen on the ground have all combined to reinforce the need for students of international relations to take some interest in the subject of military intervention. To have gone into the tangled weeds of the myriad conflicts that have been waged since 1991 within Yugoslavia's old boundaries would probably have served to confuse rather than enlighten the subject of this necessarily general treatment of military intervention and international law. The facts and circumstances having an effect on military operations in that region are accessible elsewhere, the exception being Kosovo, which has been discussed above, albeit very soon after the start of the NATO intervention. All that this chapter has attempted to do is highlight the principal legal considerations with which those wishing to analyse that sort of complex situation need to be armed.

Nevertheless, it might be worth listing, by way of illustration, some of the key questions that should be asked in connection with Yugoslavia, in attempting to make some legal sense of what has happened there. First, has external military involvement in Yugoslavia been interference in the internal affairs of a single state racked by civil war or has it been either partial or impartial interference in a series of international disputes? At what point did Yugoslavia cease being a unified state *de facto* or *de jure*? When intervention took place was it with the consent of the competent authorities within the territories concerned or was it legitimised instead by UNSC resolution? If the latter, were those resolutions based on Chapter VII and, if so, did they contain an effective mission accomplishment mandate for those military personnel attempting to conduct the operations in theatre? Did the forces deployed understand the status of the operations relative to the UN Charter? If a force deployed originally under an impartial peace-keeping or Chapter VI mandate had its function changed to that of enforcement, why and how was that achieved?

Few issues to do with the use of military intervention forces are more complex or more urgent than that to do with their legitimacy, as Yugoslavia has demonstrated more than adequately. It is an issue that involves political leaders at the grand-strategic level, their military advisers at the military-strategic level, commanders at the operational level and, of course, those charged with carrying out their decisions at the tactical level, whether it be on the streets of Sarajevo, in the air above Iraq or on the rivers of Cambodia. While the debate might at first appear to be one about decisions being made at the strategic level, there is a very clear relationship between the aims and objectives—and the mandate—agreed by political leaders and the tactical rules of engagement that individual soldiers, sailors and airmen will be working within. This is something about which the political level should be aware.

Although today there seems to be rather less enthusiasm for intervention than there was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue remains a crucial one in international politics,

as Kosovo demonstrates in large measure. Professional and capable armed forces are available for interventionary actions if their political masters wish to use them in that way. If the ethical dimension to decision-making is acknowledged rhetorically, those forces provide scope for the turning of words into action. Subsequent action, as evidence of developing state practice, will also have an influence on the development of the norms that provide the legitimising framework. Those norms had apparently shifted before Kosovo, in relation to humanitarian intervention in particular; it will be profoundly interesting to follow the legal debate as Kosovo unfolds and as subsequent analysis tracks the logic of any legal arguments deployed at the time. If the ICJ does become involved, as seems likely, those with an interest in the subject of military intervention will do no better than to follow the arguments as they unfold in The Hague.

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6

Resource issues

Paul Rogers

RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In August 1991, Iraq invaded the Gulf state of Kuwait, justifying its action by claiming an historic right to the territory of the country. International reaction was formidable and within a few months a huge military force had been established in the region, led by the United States but including contingents from over twenty countries. By January 1991, Iraq had still refused to withdraw its forces, and the US-led coalition attacked Iraq with a massive series of air strikes, followed by a ground attack into Kuwait and southern Iraq which liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

At the time, Western governments justified their tough action by arguing that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was entirely unjustified in international law and that it therefore demanded the toughest response. Not all commentators accepted this, pointing to many other examples of 'illegal' occupation of territories which had not incited such a strong reaction, and within a year or so, many Western politicians were admitting that the Gulf War was, in reality, a resource war, fought over the control of the immensely rich oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.

The importance of the region for world oil supplies is without question. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait alone had nearly 10 per cent of world oil reserves—a country the size of Wales with oil reserves nearly three times as large as that traditional oil giant the United States. Iraq had even more oil, so that after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait his regime controlled nearly one-fifth of the world's oil reserves. To Western eyes, the situation was even worse than that, because Kuwait might be used as an Iraqi spring-board to move into north-eastern Saudi Arabia. The Saudi oilfields exceed all the other oil fields of the world in sheer size and ease of extraction, and Saudi Arabia controlled a quarter of world oil reserves in 1991.

So, taken together, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia possess close to half of all the world's reserves of oil, the most important single energy resource by far. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Iraq's actions were viewed with alarm and dismay in Western capitals, and a massive force was assembled to counter Saddam Hussein. It was ironic that prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had been regarded in the West as a friendly state, a convenient buffer against revolutionary Iran, even to the extent that Western states were muted in their condemnation of repeated Iraqi use of chemical weapons, both against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and against its own Kurdish people in 1988. Once Iraq had come to threaten Western oil supplies, though, retaliation was inevitable. As one commentator remarked at the time, if Kuwait had grown carrots instead of oil, the reaction would have been very different!

BOX 6.1 RESOURCE CONFLICT

Western Sahara

The old colonial territory of Spanish Sahara, on the west coast of Africa, was regarded as a largely empty desert, the size of Britain but with less than 100,000 people, many of them nomadic. Then, in the early 1970s, huge deposits of rock phosphate, a key constituent of fertilisers, were found at Bukraa in the north of the territory, quite close to the borders with Morocco, itself the world's biggest supplier of phosphates.

Spain gave up its claim to the territory, the inhabitants wanted independence, but in 1976 the country was forcibly divided up by Morocco and Mauritania, with Morocco taking over the rich phosphate mines. This led to a bitter twenty-year war between Morocco and the Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, involving guerrilla warfare across the desert. In their determination to secure the mines, the Moroccans built massive barriers, hundreds of kilometres long, but were never able to secure the whole territory.

By the early 1990s, the war had become a stalemate, and the United Nations moved in to try to organise some kind of referendum which might lead to a compromise between Morocco and Polisario (the Mauritians having given up their claim).

The Western Sahara conflict has complex causes, not least in the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, but one fundamental factor throughout has been the potential wealth of the territory, based on one of the world's less well-known raw materials, rock phosphate.

The Shaba Rebellion and control of the cobalt mines

When the Belgian Congo gained its independence in 1960 there was a protracted and bitter civil war during which the mineral-rich southern province of Katanga tried to break away. Its efforts failed and the province was renamed Shaba and formed part of the independent state of Zaïre, ruled by the autocratic President Mobutu and supported by mining companies engaged in exploiting the copper, diamonds and especially the cobalt of Shaba. Cobalt is widely used in industry, especially for armaments, and half of the world's reserves are found in Shaba Province.

Many of the rebels in the civil war sought refuge across the border in North-East Angola, and in 1977 they tried unsuccessfully to invade and take over Shaba and separate it from Zaïre as an independent resource-rich state. They failed but regrouped and tried again in 1978, this time with considerable initial success, defeating the inefficient Zaïre army units in the region and taking over some of the most important mining towns such as Mutshatsha and Kolwezi. The Shaba rebels were aided by Eastern Bloc states already supporting Angola. The idea of this cobalt-rich territory coming under the

control of a left-leaning group of rebels was unacceptable to Western states. With the ready agreement of the Zaïre government, an airlift of French and Belgian troops was rapidly organised, using NATO logistics, and some 2,500 troops deployed to repel the rebel forces.

This they succeeded in doing, and stayed in Shaba to stabilise the province for the Zaïre government while an Inter-African Force was organised using troops from many French-speaking countries. Eventually, the French and Belgians withdrew and a programme was started to boost the Zaïre army so that it would have the ability to maintain the security of the province for Western mining companies.

Ironically, there is some evidence that Eastern Bloc countries, knowing that an invasion was imminent, had bought up supplies of cobalt on the world markets. As soon as the invasion started, the price of cobalt went up and, by playing the capitalist system, they made some tidy profits.

The Gulf War of 1991 is one of the most notable examples of a resource war of recent years, but it is not the only one (see Box 6.1), and resource issues in international relations usually become noteworthy only when they are a cause of conflict. In reality, though, the production and especially the trade in resources has been a core theme in the relations between states and is likely to be even significant into the future as environmental limitations on human activity lead to tougher competition for supplies of many raw materials.

In particular, the search for raw materials was one of the driving forces of the whole colonisation period that set in place an international trading system which, for the majority of the world's people, survives to this day. Many analysts would argue that this pattern of trade, with Third World states still trapped in the role of providing raw materials for the industrialised world, is one of the core reasons for the North-South divide between rich and poor countries. With the global wealth-poverty gap still growing, this is, in turn, seen as one of the most likely causes of international insecurity in the early years of the twenty-first century.

THE SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER

There are two main classes of resources: renewable and non-renewable. Renewable resources include all the plant and animal products which can, with care, be produced regularly from the land, rivers or sea. They therefore comprise all the world's food supplies, including cereal crops, root crops, fruit and vegetables, together with meat, fish and dairy products. Because water cycles naturally in the biosphere (with rain 'recycling' back into the atmosphere as evaporation from the land, rivers, lakes and the sea), it is also seen as a renewable resource.

Renewable resources can be depleted through overexploitation. Forests can be cut down and not replanted, crop-lands can be overworked so that soil fertility falls and crop yields then decrease, irrigated land in hot countries can be subject to salinisation (excess

salt) and fishing grounds can be over-fished. Even so, careful conservation of renewable resources can ensure a sustainable long-term supply of products.

BOX 6.2 RESOURCES

- Renewable—plant and animal products+water
- Non-renewable—e.g. oil, coal, natural gas, uranium, ferrous metals, phosphate and potash

The second category of resources comprises those that are non-renewable, mostly those that are mined or otherwise obtained from the earth's crust, and do not renew themselves, at least not in human time-scales. Probably the most important of these are energy resources, especially oil, coal, natural gas and uranium, followed by ferrous metals such as iron, cobalt and tungsten, and non-ferrous metals such as copper and aluminium. Also important are resources for construction, including sand, gravel, stone and brick clay, though these are rarely traded between states and are not relevant to the present book. There are also important resources used to support agriculture, particularly fertilisers.

The importance of non-renewable resources in international affairs is hardly ever recognised—indeed most students of the subject are not even aware of the role of many of these resources in human activity. Take fertilisers and agriculture, for example. Almost all the food crops traded between states are grown using compound fertilisers which are made up of three nutrient elements—nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium (nitrate, phosphate and potash)—with phosphate and potash fertilisers obtained mainly by mining.

Although organic farming using compost and manures is a major feature of subsistence farming in the tropics, and is becoming quite popular in some temperate countries, world agriculture depends on compound fertilisers, and without them there would be catastrophic food shortages and famine. Yet many of the supplies of these fertilisers are mined in just a few locations and are traded vigorously throughout the world.

Most of the world's trade in phosphates comes from North Africa and the Middle East and is one of the underlying causes of the twenty-year conflict in Western Sahara (see Box 6.1). In 1973, fertiliser prices escalated alarmingly, and this was one of the causes of the 1974 World Food Crisis which threatened tens of millions of people with starvation (see Boxes 6.3 and 6.4).

Certain other resources are regarded as strategically important, although, apart from oil, the significance of these for international relations is rarely appreciated. Tungsten, for example, is a ferrous metal which can be combined with iron, carbon and other elements to produce ferro-alloys of remarkable hardness, capable of maintaining a cutting edge at high temperatures and therefore essential for scores of processes in industry. Most of the world's tungsten ores are located in China. Similarly, ferro-cobalt alloys retain their shape at very high temperatures and are essential in many industries, not least in the making of rocket motors for missiles. Two-thirds of all the world's cobalt reserves are found in Central Africa, mostly Shaba Province of Zaïre, and have been subject to intense resource conflict in the past (see Box 6.1).

BOX 6.3 THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS—1973–4

After more than a decade of improvements in world food production, due partly to new crop varieties forming part of the 'Green Revolution', there was an unexpected decline in the early 1970s. By early 1974, food prices were soaring, world grain reserves had been halved and 40 million people were estimated to be at risk of famine in twenty-two countries stretching across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The crisis originated from a combination of seven causes, two of them long term and the remainder more immediate. Long-term factors were:

- Third World states concentrating on urban and industrial development to the relative neglect of rural development, especially the

subsistence farming systems which produced around half the world's food, and

- rapid population growth in areas of relative food stress.

Short-term factors were:

- severe climatic conditions affecting many key food-producing regions;
- partial failure of the Green Revolution since many of the new varieties required fertiliser and pesticide inputs which were beyond the reach of poor farmers;
- a world fertiliser shortage and consequent price increases;
- increased food demand in the booming industrialised North; and
- the direct and indirect effects of the 1973–4 oil price increases.

At the peak of the crisis, hard-hit countries needed 11 million tonnes of emergency food aid in addition to the 6+ million already agreed under food-aid schemes, but few had the money to purchase the food. There was also a shortage of around 1.5 million tonnes of compound fertiliser. Even so, at no time did world grain reserves become completely depleted; it was more a case that the poorest countries did not have the money to buy grain.

The UN called a World Food Congress in Rome in November 1974, and this demanded immediate increases in food aid as well as a new world agricultural development fund, an effective famine forecasting system and an emergency food bank. All this was designed to remove the spectre of famine by the mid-1980s.

At the time, the congress seemed to achieve little and was dismissed as a waste of time. Within months, though, there were slight improvements. Canada, Australia and some

European countries increased food aid, and the newly rich oil-producing countries of the Middle East gave considerable financial assistance, especially to some Islamic countries which were among the worst affected. Also, the oil price increases caused a recession in the West and food demands, especially for expensive meat, fell quite rapidly. The worst predictions of famine for 1975 were averted.

Even so, the long-term aims of the Food Congress were hardly met, endemic malnutrition remained the order of the day, and the mid-1980s were marked by severe famines in countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia.

BOX 6.4 THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS REVISITED—1991

The World Food Congress of 1974 had aimed to banish starvation within a decade, but systematic failure to invest in rural and subsistence agricultural development in the Third World was, instead, a feature of the 1980s. This was made worse by the developing debt crisis—many Third World states had borrowed heavily in the late 1970s to counter the effects of the oil price rises, and were now having to pay huge sums to cover the interest on the debts. Some countries were spending as much as a quarter of all their export earnings just covering interest payments, without even beginning to pay off the capital.

By April 1991 there were renewed warnings of severe shortages, with over 25 million people at risk in Africa from food shortages brought on by drought and wars, poor harvests in Russia as the country struggled to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union, and drought-affected harvests in Brazil. A real sense of crisis was obvious at the end of April when an appalling cyclone hit Bangladesh, one of the world's most heavily populated states, killing more than 50,000 people. The cyclone destroyed huge areas of crops in this normally fertile area.

Once again, it was Third World states which were worst affected, and once again it was not a problem of overall world food shortages. Although the levels of grain reserves of the 1960s had not been reached in the following two decades, there still were adequate reserves, just a lack of money to purchase the food.

As in 1974 the international community responded, if all too slowly, and many voluntary agencies did their best to help. The worst excesses of famine were averted, yet there was little increased commitment to tropical agricultural development. As the century drew to a close, with many parts of the industrialised world booming, more than 500 million of the world's people remained malnourished and development specialists warned of more famines to come.

Put simply, energy, food and mineral resources have figured persistently in relations between states, often providing the driving force for many international political

developments. They were primary motives for the European colonisation of much of the world, and underlie much of the current North-South trading relationship.

This chapter will concentrate on analysing the historical significance of resources in international relations, assess their current importance, point to possible sources of conflict and suggest co-operative approaches by which resources may be used in a more sustainable manner while improving the economic prospects of poorer states.

RESOURCES AND COLONISATION

A common feature of past empires has been the transfer of resources from the conquered periphery to the metropolitan centre, providing the raw materials and other resources needed to maintain the imperial power in its accustomed state. An early and classic example was the Roman Empire, with grain from Carthage, timber from Dalmatia, tin from Britain, gold from Iberia and slaves from throughout the empire.

In the early years of European colonial expansion, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, this phenomenon of resource control was developed on a truly intercontinental scale for the first time in world history, initially by the Spanish and Portuguese and then by the British, Dutch, French and other European powers. In the process, numerous high-value commodities were exploited throughout the world, including gold and silver from Latin America, spices and tea from the Far East, fine cloth from South Asia and tobacco and rum from the Caribbean.

The most lucrative trade of all was the so-called triangular slave trade. Slaving ships would sail from ports such as Bristol, carrying goods which would be traded with slavers in West Africa. The slaves would be transported across the Atlantic, sold in the New World at great profit, and cargoes of tobacco and cotton brought back to Britain for further profit.

By the nineteenth century, subtle yet fundamental changes were taking place in the political economy of colonisation, brought about by two factors. The first was that Europe was undergoing progressive industrialisation, leading to economic growth, an expansion of the population and a rapid increase in demand for food and raw materials. In countries such as Britain the early decades of the Industrial Revolution were fuelled almost entirely by indigenous resources, including coal, iron ore, copper, lead and tin all produced by the mining of deposits in many parts of Britain. At one time, Parry's Mountain, in North Wales, was said to be the world's largest copper mine, and the Cornish tin mines and North Yorkshire lead mines were profitable for the land owning families of the time.

BOX 6.5 RESOURCES AND COLONISATION

Transfer of resources:

- imported into Europe—variety of raw materials (primary commodities)
- exported out of Europe—manufactured goods

Colonising powers controlling economies of colonies and ensuring trading relationship profitable

Eventually, though, the demand for resources outstripped supply and intensive searches for new sources of raw materials were undertaken throughout the colonies. This was aided by the second factor—major developments in maritime technology, especially steam-driven cargo ships which could carry heavy cargoes far more economically than the older cumbersome sailing vessels.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, a pattern of trade between Europe and the rest of the world became established. This comprised a huge variety of raw materials, known as primary commodities, coming into Europe from the colonies of Africa and Asia, and the newly independent states of the New World. In return, manufactured goods were exported from the industries of Europe. Early examples of this trade were tin from Bolivia, copper from Peru and Chile, coffee from Brazil, cocoa and palm oil from West Africa and rubber from Malaya.

Resource trade with Europe was dominated until the 1950s by the colonial trading relationship, with colonising powers able to maintain control of the economies of their colonies and ensure that trading relationships were persistently profitable, but even non-colonial relationships were highly asymmetric. As Japan industrialised towards the end of the nineteenth century, its demands for raw materials grew massively, and became one of the factors driving Japanese expansionism in the 1920s and 1930s. This led to the so-called Japanese Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a neocolonial process, and ultimately to the Asia-Pacific components of the Second World War.

The United States industrialised almost entirely on the basis of its own rich natural resources, and even exported large quantities to Europe. Even so, it developed trade relationships with many Southern states which were highly advantageous to it, and could be enforced by military methods if necessary. The role of the US Marine Corps in Latin America was a classic example of this, described memorably by General Smedley E. Butler, who took part in many of the actions. Writing in 1935, he recalled:

I spent thirty-three years and four months in active service as a member of our country's most agile military force—the Marine Corps. I served in all commissioned ranks from a second Lieutenant to Major-General. And during that time I spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism. Thus I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank to collect revenues in... I helped pacify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 1903.

Overall, and over a time period of more than a century, a firm trading pattern was, for the most part, established, with primary resources or commodities flowing to the

industrialised countries and manufactured goods going to the colonies and former colonies. This was to have profound implications for the evolution of a pattern of world trade which survives largely to this day and is a key feature of North-South economic relations.

RESOURCES AND WORLD TRADE AFTER DECOLONISATION

Decolonisation began in the late 1940s with India, Pakistan and Indonesia, and continued across Asia and Africa through to the mid-1960s, with a few colonial anomalies such as Hong Kong surviving many more years. The acquisition of political freedom did not mean that newly independent states had any means of negotiating trade reform—they may not have had to contend with the US Marine Corps but many found themselves in a precarious economic position after independence, stemming from several factors.

Most countries found themselves relying for most of their export earnings on very few resources. For Zambia it was copper, Bangladesh produced jute, Ghana relied on cocoa, the Ivory Coast on palm oil. Coffee and cotton came from Uganda and sisal from Tanzania. Any one country therefore had little room for manoeuvre, and was highly vulnerable to changes in commodity prices, making effective development planning difficult.

A much more serious problem was the persistent stagnation in world commodity markets. After a brief price boom at the time of the Korean War, the following two decades were characterised by stagnant prices for most Third World resources, as many countries competed for limited markets. Industrial products showed persistent price increases so that the terms of trade (ratio of import to export prices) of Third World countries actually deteriorated markedly after independence.

BOX 6.6 POST-COLONIAL PROBLEMS

- Dependency on one or two commodities.
- Stagnant price of commodities.
- Deterioration in terms of trade: ratio of import to export prices.

1950s–1972	32 per cent increase in import prices
	11 per cent increase in export prices
1972 loss of \$10,000 million=20 per cent of aggregate exports;	
\$8,450 million received in official aid	

A small number of oil-producing countries were partly insulated from this trend, and some East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan got huge economic aid from the West because they were considered to be frontline states in the Cold War. These were exceptions—overall, non-oil-producing Third World countries experienced a 32 per cent increase in import prices from the mid-1950s to 1972, compared with just an 11 per cent increase in export prices. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), in 1972 the deterioration in terms of trade for Third World countries over this period was

equivalent to a loss, in 1972, of about \$10,000 million, or rather more than 20 percent of these countries' aggregate exports, and considerably exceeding the total of official development assistance from developed market economy countries to developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America [some \$8,450 million in 1972]. In other words, there was, in effect, a net transfer of real resources, over this period, from developing to developed countries, the flow of aid being more than offset by the adverse terms of trade of the developing countries.

Remember that these are 1972 prices—in current prices the loss of terms of trade would be closer to \$80,000 million each year. Remember, also, that most development assistance is in the form of loans which have to be repaid, or else is 'tied' to the buying of goods and services from the donor country.

In essence, the structure of world trade in resources, between the poor South and the rich North, actually involved the poor systematically subsidising the rich, not the other way round as is usually assumed to be the case.

Given these circumstances, Third World states embarked on a series of measures to counter these damaging trends. One option was to develop home-based industries specifically for import substitution—producing goods which might otherwise be imported. A second approach was to try to process their own resources into much more expensive exports—producing electric cables instead of raw copper, or clothing instead of cotton. Finally, they could try to go for full-scale industrialisation and follow the route of the older industrialised states of the North.

BOX 6.7 POSSIBLE REMEDIES

- Development of home-based industries, but small markets and needed big investment.
- Process resources into more expensive products, but problem of trade barriers of North to protect their own industries.
- Full-scale industrialisation, but lack of educated workforce and investment.
- Unite together—UNCTAD, but few guarantees of markets and reasonable prices.

There were severe obstacles to all three approaches. Import substitution involved small-scale production because home markets were small, and also required heavy investment which was rarely available. Processing home-produced resources was certainly possible, but immediately came up against trade barriers erected by consuming countries in the industrialised North to protect their own processing industries, barriers involving tariffs, quotas and value-added tax all being used by the USA and Western European countries. Finally, full-scale industrialisation was rarely feasible given the need for a well-educated workforce and lack of government investment. While transnational companies would, on occasion, be interested in industrial development, their prime aim was to get a good return on their investment.

An entirely different approach was for Third World states to unite together in order to negotiate a more equitable trading system with the more powerful industrialised states of the North. This was attempted, primarily through the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964, and for more than thirty years UNCTAD has attempted to act as a negotiating forum for this purpose. In doing so, it has taken an interventionist stance, arguing that patterns of world trade established during colonial times have been persistently damaging to the interests of most of the world's people, and UNCTAD has tried repeatedly to propose a more equitable system, most notably in a key report put together right at the start of UNCTAD by its first Secretary-General, the Latin American economist Raul Prebisch (see Box 6.8).

Results have been patchy at best. Repeated attempts to negotiate commodity agreements, in which Third World states would get guaranteed and reasonable prices for their resource exports, have met with very little success, and many different efforts to help countries get access to markets for their processed resources have been similarly unsuccessful. There have been some exceptions, such as the Lome Conventions sponsored by the European

BOX 6.8 THE PREBISCH PLAN FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

The UN Conference on Trade and Development was set up in the early 1960s to provide a bargaining forum between Third World and industrialised states. The pressure for UNCTAD came almost entirely from Third World states who were convinced that their weak position in world trade was the biggest single hindrance to development.

The first Secretary-General of UNCTAD was the Argentinian economist, Raul Prebisch, and he gathered together a group of economists which worked to produce a blueprint for reform. This was published in late 1963 and was formally called 'Towards a New Trade Policy for Development', although immediately termed the Prebisch Report. It had six main elements.

- 1 There should be improved prices for resources exported from Third World states, mainly to be achieved by commodity agreements between producers and consumers.
- 2 A compensatory finance system, financed mainly by rich industrialised countries, should be set up to compensate poor states for sudden losses in production of resources.
- 3 There should be a tariff preference system whereby industrialised countries would give preferential treatment to manufactured and otherwise processed goods coming from Third World states.
- 4 Schemes to encourage regional industrialisation among neighbouring Third World states should be set up, thus achieving economies of scale.
- 5 There should be increased Third World participation in shipping and freight insurance, at that time dominated by Northern interests.
- 6 Development assistance (foreign aid) should be of a much higher quality, with fewer loans and more grants.

The Prebisch Plan involved a strong measure of international economic planning, and was radically different to the free-market ideas which were to become so dominant in the 1970s and 1980s. Even so, UNCTAD believed that their implementation would hugely increase the development potential of the Third World, and it persisted for a decade to put these ideas across, with very little success. Only in 1974, when a world trade crisis made conditions difficult for industrialised countries, was there a narrow window of opportunity for action (see Box 6.9).

Union, which give preferential access to some processed high-value resources into Europe, and some commodity agreements, such as that for natural rubber, have been of use (see Boxes 6.12 and 6.13), but the overall problems for Third World resource producers have persisted over the decades.

Only once, for a very brief period, did circumstances favour the resource producers rather than the rich industrialised countries. In the early 1970s, a boom in oil prices instigated by the oil producers (see Box 6.11) coincided with a sharp increase in prices of food, fibres and metals, and industrialised countries suddenly found themselves in the unusual position of poor terms of trade. There was brief talk of restructuring world trade to produce a so-called New International Economic Order, but little came of it (see Box 6.9).

BOX 6.9 WHAT CHANCE A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER?

Starting in October 1973, world oil markets went wild, as OPEC states succeeded in exerting 'resource power' and pushed the prices up by over 400 per cent in a few months. This coincided with a more general boom in resource powers, fuelled in part by extensive speculation on commodity markets, which had begun to gather pace during 1973. Over the twelve months to the end of 1973, prices of metals shot up by 133 per cent, fibres went up by 59 per cent and world food prices increased by 37 per cent (contributing to the 1973–4 World Food Crisis—see Box 6.3).

As a result of these extraordinary changes, industrialised countries found themselves on the receiving end of poor terms of trade and were, for once, willing to consider trade reform. Normally, such issues would be discussed at one of the four-yearly UNCTAD meetings, but the next one wasn't due until 1976, so the UN called a special session of the General Assembly in New York in April 1974.

Intensive work by UN staff resulted in a blueprint for the comprehensive reform of world trade which would stabilise the wildly fluctuating resource prices, but do it in a manner to the long-term benefit of poorer countries. A rather grandiose Declaration on a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was agreed by the participating countries, which would involve setting up an Integrated Commodities Programme intended to stabilise the prices of eighteen raw materials covering 60 per cent of world trade in resources excluding oil. This would be backed up by an \$11 billion buffer stock system to iron out further fluctuations in supply.

The details of this new plan were to be worked out and developed in time for the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi, two years later, and many Third World economists saw this as a remarkable opportunity to improve their development prospects.

In the event, by the end of 1974, commodity prices started to fall as the industrialised world went into recession, and the motivation of the rich countries to agree to trade reform evaporated. UNCTAD spent years trying to

revive the idea of the NIEO, but without success. In the 1970s and 1980s, free-market ideas became dominant, any notion of planned trade reform to aid Third World states was viewed with grave suspicion and, meanwhile, the global gap between rich and poor grew steadily.

RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT—THE HIDDEN LINK

World trade in resources might seem a highly specialised topic, and it is true that it rarely features in books on international relations. In part, this is because the study of International Relations has been dominated by Western scholars interested primarily in the relations between the world's most powerful states and by the tensions and problems of the East—West divide of the Cold War years. In reality, though, resource trade is a crucial and 'unsung' aspect of the relations between states, especially if we are concerned with all the peoples of the world.

While we have concentrated on the early years of decolonisation, when the structure of the current world trading system was firmly set in place, this analysis of North-South inequality stemming from unfair trade is still highly relevant, since the terms of trade for commodity producers continue to be on a long-term decline with only occasional exceptions. After the slump years of the 1920s and 1930s, resource prices rose in the early years of the Cold War and recorded a second rise in the early 1950s at the time of the Korean War. Then there was a slump until the twin booms of the mid-1970s and early 1980s before a slump by the end of the decade. Overall, only in one year since 1950 have the terms of trade been as favourable as at the time of the First World War.

BOX 6.10 THE HIDDEN LINK

unfair terms of trade \Rightarrow borrowing \Rightarrow debt

The relationship between resources and development goes further. As already mentioned, the one major example of successful resource power was the massive increase in oil prices in 1973–4. This hit industrialised countries badly, although they had enough wealth to cope. For many Third World states it was a near disaster as they suddenly had to cope with a surge in fuel prices with little extra income to support them. As a result, they borrowed heavily on the international financial markets, themselves awash with petrodollars being recycled from the newly oil-rich states of the Middle East.

As a direct result of this, the indebtedness of Third World states increased massively in the late 1970s, followed by a long period of high interest rates. The end result has been the debt crisis, as the majority of all Southern states have had to contend with massive repayments, often doing no more than paying off outstanding interest and not even beginning to repay the capital debts. Taken together, debts and poor terms of trade are the two most significant obstacles in the way of the successful development of the Third

World. Both are directly related to the politics and economics of world resources.

STRATEGIC RESOURCES AND CONFLICT

We have seen that a knowledge of world trade in resources is essential for any understanding of North-South relations, but is this going to be important for the future? Since so many of the resources used by the industrialised world are found in the South, could this give Third World states a latent economic power? Could it also lead to conflict over resources?

As to a latent economic power, the conditions required for exercising resource power are onerous, and there have been few occasions, apart from the spectacular one-time success of OPEC, when anything much has been achieved. Even so, resource power could become significant if circumstances change. A sustained increase in resource demand, coupled with the development of political unity by Third World producers, could make all the difference. There is, though, another important angle on this whole subject which brings together questions of strategic resources and their role in international security. There are a few examples of resources which are both singularly important for modern industry and are located in a restricted number of places. They include certain metals such as cobalt, tungsten and platinum, together with the most important energy resource of all—oil. There have been several examples of specific conflicts which have been fought partly over the control of particular strategic resources (see Boxes 6.1, 6.12 and 6.13 on resource conflict), but these are small compared with the potential for conflict over oil, already seen in the instance of the 1991 Gulf War.

The world's oil industry originated in the United States in the 1880s, spread quickly to the Caucasus and Indonesia and grew to include large oilfields in Canada, Venezuela and the Soviet Union. By the early post-war years, the Middle East and North Africa were becoming significant producer areas,

Table 6.1 World Oil Reserves—Top Ten Countries (billion barrels)

	<i>1 January 1990</i>		<i>1 January 1996</i>
1 Saudi Arabia	255.0	Saudi Arabia	258.7
2 Iraq	100.0	Iraq	102.5
3 Kuwait	94.5	UAE	98.0
4 Iran	92.9	Kuwait	96.0
5 UAE	92.2	Iran	88.2
6 Venezuela	58.5	Venezuela	64.5
7 Former Soviet Union	58.4	Former Soviet Union	57.0
8 Mexico	56.4	Mexico	49.8
9 United States	34.1	China	24.0

with the Persian Gulf coming eventually to be the most important area for oil reserves in the world.

There were two reasons for this. One is that the traditional oil-producing giants, the United States, Canada and Russia, have been rapidly exploiting their best oilfields, with relatively few new fields being discovered. The second reason is that increasingly the most readily available oilfields have been found in and around the Persian Gulf. This was touched on in the introduction, and we have to be careful to distinguish between production and reserves. Table 6.1 shows proven oil reserves, for 1990, the year of the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, and for 1996.

Although countries such as the United States and Russia are still the world's largest producers of oil, well ahead of Saudi Arabia, for example, they are really little more than minnows compared with Gulf states when it comes to reserves—indeed, a small group of Gulf states now controls more than two-thirds of all the world's oil reserves. Moreover, some of the best new oil fields are being discovered in the Persian Gulf region, especially in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which both increased their reserves in the early 1990s. Until around 1970, Western Europe and Japan were dependent on Gulf oil, and by the early 1970s even the United States was progressively importing oil as it could no longer satisfy home demand from its own fields. Now even China is a net oil importer. All the major industrialised and industrialising regions of the world are becoming increasingly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf.

This shift in resource power was recognised by some military planners more than twenty years ago, after OPEC had increased oil prices by over 400 per cent in 1973–4. In the wake of that crisis, a number of studies were done, especially in US military circles, to see whether it would have been possible to intervene in the Middle East if the oil tap, so to speak, had been turned off. The results showed that the United States and its allies did not have the kinds of military forces available to be able to deploy rapidly to the region to secure the oilfields.

BOX 6.11 THE RISE AND FALL OF OPEC

In the late 1950s, the world's oil industry was dominated by seven companies, the 'majors' such as Shell, BP, Exxon and Mobil. Together they controlled 84 per cent of oil production outside of the USA and the Soviet Bloc, and worked closely to manage oil markets for their mutual benefit, while limiting their payments to producer countries like Iraq, Iran, Indonesia and Venezuela.

In 1960, an attempt to make producer countries accept a cut in revenues helped persuade five countries, led by Venezuela, to set up an organisation to work for their own interests, a kind of trade union. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was headquartered in Vienna and aimed to improve the share of oil revenues going to the producer countries.

For more than a decade, OPEC laboured in this aim while apparently making little progress, yet all the time trends in the world oil industry were working it its favour:

- More countries joined OPEC during the 1960s, including Algeria, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates, so that by 1970 OPEC members had over 60 per cent of world oil reserves.
- Although there were many political differences within OPEC, the member states worked together in their common interests when it came to oil policy.
- Most of the new oil reserves discovered in the 1960s were in OPEC countries.
- OPEC states worked steadily to train their own nationals in oil operations.
- French, Italian and smaller North American oil companies began to compete more successfully with the seven majors.
- By the early 1970s, even the United States needed to import oil.

By 1973, OPEC was beginning to exploit its power, encouraged by the Libyan decision to take over foreign oil companies in September of that year. One month later, the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War between the Israelis and Syria and Egypt broke out, and Arab members of OPEC used their new-found 'resource power' to put pressure on Western governments to bring the war to an early end. Within months, action by OPEC and by individual oil producers had pushed oil prices up a staggering 400 per cent. Initially opposing the moves by producer countries, the major oil companies quickly found that they could make exaggerated profits at a time of booming prices, and did little to bring the price spiral under control. As multinationals, they worked in their own interests, not necessarily the same as those of the major industrialised countries, and many of them achieved record profits for 1974.

The new oil prices were sustained for several years, before dipping towards the end of the 1970s, only to shoot up again at the end of the decade, not because of further OPEC action, but due to oil shortages brought about by the Iranian Revolution and the outbreak of the Iran/ Iraq War.

By the early 1980s, OPEC had lost most of its cohesion and was unable to regain the resource power it had used so effectively in 1973–74. Even so, the organisation remained in being and by the late 1990s its members controlled three-quarters of the world's oil reserves, making it eminently possible that OPEC might reassert its power some time in the future.

The 1973–4 oil crisis was a result of internal events among the oil producers, but later in the decade, with East-West tensions rising rapidly, the real concern of the USA and NATO was with Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued Presidential Directive 18, which ordered the Pentagon to identify forces available for rapid deployment. This led to the establishment of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task

Force, known more commonly as the Rapid Deployment Force, which became operational in 1980.

The Rapid Deployment Force was intended to be able to operate anywhere in the world, but its main focus was always on the Middle East, and four years later, in 1984, it was expanded to create a new unitary military command, Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for maintaining US security interests in the Middle East and South-West Asia, with specific emphasis on the Persian Gulf.

By the end of the 1980s, CENTCOM could call on 300,000 troops from the army, air force, navy and marine corps, and comprised the Third Army, the Ninth Air Force, three aircraft-carrier battle groups and a marine amphibious force together with elements of Strategic Air Command and substantial intelligence, reconnaissance and special forces units. A key concept was rapid deployment, including the availability of a complete army brigade of over 4,000 troops with comprehensive artillery and air defences, air-mobile and ready to move at twenty hours' notice.

The Pentagon also put in place an elaborate system of forward-based supplies, ready to support emergency military operations in the Gulf. The British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean had been leased to the USA in the late 1960s and was now built up into a huge base, with supply ships permanently stationed there to move fuel, ammunition, food and other supplies to any area of operations. During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia did not allow foreign troops to be based on its territory, but, in co-operation with the United States, a series of air bases was built which were far larger than needed by the Saudi air force, and were readily available for US and allied forces in the event of any threat to the kingdom.

All of this planning revolved around the need to secure Gulf oil supplies for the West. The prime intention might have been to forestall any Soviet moves during an East-West crisis, but when Saddam Hussein's Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in August 1990, these same forces formed the core of the coalition which went to war with Iraq six months later.

Since the Gulf War, it has become established practice to base troops and aircraft in both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the United States has gone on to build up its permanent naval presence in the Gulf by re-establishing the Fifth Fleet.

All the current trends indicate that the industrialised world will become progressively more dependent on oil supplies from the Gulf, so much so that any threat to these supplies will be viewed with fundamental concern by the United States and its allies. If there is one region of the world where instability could lead to a resource war, it is the Persian Gulf.

BOX 6.12 RESOURCE POWER (1): WHY IT RARELY WORKS

For several decades until 1973, seven major oil companies effectively controlled the world's oil industry, but their ability to do this was curbed for a time by OPEC, which was the first grouping of Third World states to succeed in developing 'resource power'. Their success was short-lived, not least because Third World resource power needs several factors working in its favour. Among the most important factors are:

- that Third World states producing a particular resource must have a high degree of unity of action;
- that they control a large proportion of world trade in that resource, preferably at least half;
- that if the resource is non-renewable, they control most of the reserves;
- that large stockpiles are not held by consuming countries; • that the substitution of the particular resource by other commodities or synthetic substitutes isn't feasible, at least in the short term; and
- that the countries seeking to exploit resource power should be sufficiently strong to resist any pressures which may be put on them by consuming countries.

OPEC in the early 1970s fitted these requirements remarkably well. The member states were united, were responsible for the majority of the world's oil exports and reserves, stocks in industrialised countries were rarely more than 100 days of supply, for most of its uses there were no immediate substitutes for oil, and the countries already had reasonable financial power. Moreover, the oil companies quickly found that rising ('bull') markets were good for their profits, too.

OPEC's position was, and is, rare. Many resources come largely from Third World states, including aluminium, cobalt, copper, nickel, tin, tungsten, platinum, many fibres, natural rubber, coffee, tea and sugar, and there have been a number of attempts at resource power. So far, none has been as successful as the brief rise of OPEC (see Boxes 6.11 and 6.13).

BOX 6.13 RESOURCE POWER (2): MANY ATTEMPTS—FEW SUCCESSES

OPEC's spectacular success in the 1970s led many other countries to try to emulate it, with a number of mini-OPECs quickly established. In most cases, though, conditions were not right and the successes were few and far between. Two examples of resource power which have worked, at least

intermittently, are rock phosphates and natural rubbers.

Phosphate is essential for modern agriculture as one of the three constituents of fertilisers, and most supplies come from North Africa, especially Morocco which has about half the world's resources. In the early 1970s, after two decades of stagnant prices, a shortage of phosphate fertilisers developed on the world market. Morocco doubled its export prices on 1 January 1974 and put prices up by another 50 per cent six months later. Other producing countries followed suit, and the prices held for more than a year before falling steadily in the late 1970s (see also Box 6.1).

Although natural rubber competes with synthetic rubber, it is in many ways of a higher quality and is particularly important for some purposes (including contraceptives). Most of the world's natural rubber comes from just three countries—Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand—and they, together with smaller producers, constitute a mini-OPEC: the Association of Natural Rubber-Producing Countries. There have been a number of occasions when they have worked well together, ensuring the stability of an international natural rubber agreement helping to ensure buoyant yet stable prices.

While there are a few successful examples, most other attempts to develop resource power have had little effect. Third World copper producers are represented by CIPEC, and bauxite (aluminium-ore) producers by the International Bauxite Association (IBA). Because copper and aluminium are, to some extent, interchangeable in their uses, to get successful producer power would require co-operation among more than a dozen countries, almost all of them relatively poor. There have been a few occasions when either CIPEC or IBA have managed to stabilise prices, but these have been rare—all too often they have been too weak to negotiate successfully with the industrialised North.

Surprisingly, coffee and sugar are two of the most important commodities traded on world markets, and there have been repeated attempts to negotiate commodity agreements between Third World producers and consumers in the North. In the past thirty years, successes have been rare and agreements have been minimal in their effect. On one occasion, though, in the late seventies, a world shortage of coffee, caused by wars in Africa and crop diseases and frosts in South America, sent prices soaring for over a year. When they eventually started to fall, the biggest producer, Brazil, started buying up coffee on the commodity futures market. This caused intensive speculation, curbed the falling prices for some months and even enabled Brazil to profit from its own speculating.

The Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (AIOEC) was set up in 1975, within a year of OPEC's success with oil prices. Its aim was to emulate OPEC but it was, from the start, riven with divisions. Part of the problem was the sheer number of countries involved, with eleven attending the founding

meeting, but the bigger problem was that iron ore is exported from both Third World and industrialised countries. With little in common among its members, AIOEC has never managed to exercise resource power.

RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

So far, this chapter has looked at the main features of international resource use up to the present time. We have seen that the developing pattern of world trade in resources was a key feature of the colonial period and left a trading system which was highly asymmetric—Southern Third World states have been mainly suppliers of resources to Northern industry, and a trading relationship has developed which has been highly advantageous to the North.

Repeated attempts to negotiate trade reform have met with little success, and attempts have also been made to exert resource power. With very few exceptions, most notably the oil producers in the mid-1970s, these have been unsuccessful.

At the same time, the very concentration of resources in Southern states may well give them a latent political and economic power in the future, and some resources are already seen by Western strategists in terms of security. Again, the most notable example is the concentration of oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, with a heavily militarised region already subject to an intense conflict during the Gulf War.

We now need to look at future resource use in global terms and link it in with three other trends, the growth in population, particularly in relation to resource use, the increasing rich-poor divide and the possibility of environmental limits to human activity.

The demographic transition from rural to urban-industrial societies typically includes a phase of rapid population growth followed by a phase of near stagnation, with population densities up to ten times greater than before. Most Northern states commenced this transition during the nineteenth century and have now completed it, and many Southern states are well into the expansion phase. Curbing population growth is rarely just a result of large-scale population control measures but tends to follow educational and economic improvements within a population.

BOX 6.14 FUTURE RESOURCE USE TRENDS

- Demographic transition: urbanisation+population growth+growing rich-poor divide
- Population: 4 billion 1975; 5.4 billion 1991; 6 billion 2000; 8 billion 2020
- Rich-poor
 - 1960: richest 20 per cent-70 per cent of world's wealth; poorest 20 per cent-2.3 per cent of world's wealth
 - 1991: richest 20 per cent-85 per cent of world's wealth; poorest 20 per

cent-1.7 per cent of world's wealth

World population has been growing rapidly since the mid-twentieth century although there are signs that it is now slowing down. Even so, from 4 billion people in 1975, it increased to 5.4 billion in 1991 and will go to over 6 billion by 2000 and around 8 billion by 2020, possibly stabilising at 10–12 billion towards the end of the twenty-first century. Almost all the population growth will be in Southern states.

At the same time, the great majority of the world's resources are used by a minority of the world's people in the rich industrialised North, and the rich-poor divide is actually growing, not diminishing. In 1960, the richest 20 per cent of the world's people had 70 per cent of the wealth; the poorest 20 per cent had 2.3 per cent. Over thirty years later, by 1991, the richest 20 per cent had 85 per cent of the wealth and the poorest 20 per cent had 1.7 per cent. To put it more bluntly, the rich-poor divide had doubled.

There are already specific problems of environmental limitations on human activity, and these are apparent within states, across regions and at a global level. They include increased competition for land, forests, water resources and fisheries.

Apart from pollution problems of rivers such as the Danube and Rhine, there are major areas of potential conflict over water resources. These include competition between Turkey, Syria and Iraq over the Tigris/Euphrates waters, and between India and Bangladesh over the Ganges/Brahmaputra. Most significantly, the demand for water between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the underlying problems preventing a settlement to that protracted conflict.

In many parts of the world, there are increasing problems of deforestation and loss of soil. About 24 billion tonnes of topsoil are lost each year, mainly through erosion and salinisation, equivalent to the loss of the crop-lands of India over the past two decades. There is a net loss of tropical rainforests of over 10 million hectares each year.

At the global level, ozone depletion has been recognised as a major concern for over a decade, and some action has been taken to bring it under control. Much more difficult a problem is that of climate change, caused primarily by the increased production of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, mostly by industrialised states.

There has been a systematic problem of food supply for several decades, with endemic malnutrition in numerous Third World countries which, on occasion, break out into full-scale famine, usually prompted by drought, floods or war. World food problems stem from many causes, most of them relating to poverty rather than an absolute inability to produce food, and there has been some success in enabling food production to keep pace with population increases. At the same time, the fact that some 500 million people experience malnutrition at a time of rapid growth and extraordinary wealth in other parts of the world indicates that consistent policies for improving food security have had little success. On two occasions in the past thirty years there have been major food crises (see Boxes 6.3 and 6.4). In each case intercontinental famine was avoided, but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will remain the case.

There is good evidence to suggest that the human community is beginning to come up against some basic environmental limits to growth, and issues such as climate change and resource conflict are evidence of this. This does not mean that some kind of apocalyptic

collapse is likely—there are many short-term ‘fixes’ which can be used to counter individual problems. The more fundamental difficulty is that the world’s resources are used so unevenly. As a consequence, if there was to be more economic equality across the world, the effects on the global environment would be extreme. This was put very well by the British ecologist Palmer Newbould, writing at the time of the first UN Environment Conference, in Stockholm in 1972:

My own view is that however successful population policies are, the world population is likely to treble before it reaches stability. If the expectation of this increased population were, for example, to emulate the present lifestyle and resource use of the USA, the demand on world resources would be increased approximately 15-fold; pollution and other forms of environmental degradation might increase similarly and global ecological carrying capacity would then be seriously exceeded. There are therefore global constraints on development set by resources and environment and these cannot be avoided. They will require a reduction in the per capita resource use and environmental abuse of the developed nations to accompany the increased resource use of the developing nations, a levelling down as well as up. This conflict cannot be avoided.

(Newbould, 1972)

To put it another way, the ‘cake’ of world wealth is not going to grow for ever, since resource and environmental factors will eventually exercise a whole range of limits. These are likely to include increasing pressures on land, soils, water, fisheries, minerals and energy supplies. But there are few signs that the majority of the world’s people are able to escape from poverty unless they can participate in economic growth, since their share of the world’s wealth shows no sign of increasing. Development is dependent on growth but there seem to be increasing limits to that growth. The alternative is some kind of redistribution, or at least a radical decrease in the human impact on the global environment which results in environmentally sustainable development.

If this does not happen, then we should expect to see issues of environmental conflict becoming far more important in international relations, with every risk of conflict, not least between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. The geographer Edwin Brookes put it succinctly, also at the time of the Stockholm Conference, when people were first starting to talk about limits to growth, saying that we would end up with: ‘a crowded glowering planet of massive inequalities of wealth, buttressed by stark force, yet endlessly threatened by desperate people in the global ghettos of the underprivileged’.

CO-OPERATIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT—CHANGES FOR A NEW CENTURY

Re-ordering North-South relations to promote development and greater equality requires comprehensive trade, debt and aid reform. Trade reform still requires the progressive implementation of commodity agreements, along the lines of the original Prebisch Plan (see Box 6.8), providing for progressively higher and stable resource prices for Southern states. Debt cancellation rather than debt rescheduling is needed to remove a massive economic burden, and high-quality development assistance is required, principally in the form of grants aimed at basic needs.

These necessary changes in North-South development relations are both radical and fundamental, representing a near-total reordering of attitudes. They would, over a period of years, involve a redistribution of wealth from North to South—a reversal of the pattern of many decades. They would also require changes in economic relations and good governance within most Southern states, where wealth distribution is frequently very poor.

Even so, improved co-operation for development does not address the other issue, the response to environmental constraints, which requires different approaches in industrialised and developing societies, with both seeking to achieve sustainable development. The greater responsibility lies with those societies, principally in the North, which have the greatest environmental impact, both in terms of rates of resource use and as sources of pollution.

This chapter is concerned specifically with resources, and in this respect it can be argued that a combination of much higher levels of recycling of non-renewable resources, coupled with fairer prices paid for new supplies from Third World states, would result in an improvement in long-term sustainability of such resources combined with a stimulus to Third World development. Similarly, more careful use of renewable resources, ensuring that crop-lands, forests and fisheries can sustain levels of production in the long term, coupled again with fairer prices, would be a further stimulus to North-South co-operation.

It also follows that if such strategies were to be adopted, then the patterns of development in Third World states would need to be radically different to those previously adopted by the industrialised world, otherwise, as Newbould has remarked, the global ecosystem would not be able to sustain human activity. Such sustainable development will require many forms of assistance, including financial aid, but is necessary and in the interests of the North as much as the South.

The kinds of changes being proposed by environmental economists and specialists in sustainable development are very different to prevailing ideas about international trade and use of resources, but they are beginning to attract a wider following in the face of the seemingly intractable problems of poverty and environmental insecurity. Whether they take root and lead to a transformation in our ideas about international co-operation for common security will be one of the most interesting and important aspects of the early years of the twenty-first century.

FURTHER READING

One of the few detailed studies on resources and conflict is *Global Resources and International Conflict*, edited by Arthur Westing (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986). There are two good books on resource trade and North—South relations: *Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System*, by Nassau A. Adams (Zed Press, London, 1993), analyses the UN role in trade reform; and *The Trade Trap: Poverty and the Global Commodity Markets*, by Belinda Coote (Oxfam Publications, Oxford, 1992), is a readable and perceptive analysis of the links between North-South resource trade and poverty. An early study of the post-colonial trading relationship and resource use was *Future Resources and World Development*, edited by Paul Rogers (Plenum Press, London, 1976), and a more recent book which deals with environmental security, especially oil security, is *A Violent Peace: Global Security after the Cold War*, by Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando (Brassey's, London, 1992). The most readable book about oil is *The Prize*, by Daniel Yergin (Simon and Schuster, London, 1991).

7

From international organisation to international organisations

Alasdair McLean

Perhaps one of the most fundamental issues within International Relations is that of international organisation. In its broadest sense, international organisation refers to the manner in which actors within the international system relate to, and interact with, each other. In this sense, international organisation is, quite simply, the manner in which the international system is organised or arranged. It is thus easy to see why this might be described as the most basic issue in International Relations.

The modern international system of states is generally regarded as dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This agreement not only ended the Thirty Years War in Europe, but swept away the dominance of the Pope, by way of the Holy Roman Empire, and outlined some of the rights and responsibilities of the new, sovereign territorial states which were to arise from it. However, without doubt, the seventeenth century was an altogether much simpler time. States were principally concerned with ensuring their territorial security and status in relation to other states. Over the next 200 years or so, life became rather more complex. The Industrial Revolution meant that commercial life became more important and, gradually, the relations of states with each other came to include, to a much greater extent, trade and commerce. International economic relations grew in importance. In parallel, greatly increased capabilities in terms of transportation and communication developed, which made international activity much easier to undertake. Relations between states also, therefore, increased in complexity and it became necessary to find new ways of organising international society to cope with these increased demands.

Thus new forms of co-operation were established. By the nineteenth century a new form of player on the international stage had emerged—international organisations. And so the changing requirements of international organisation resulted in the emergence of international organisations.

BOX 7.1 DEFINITIONS

‘International *organization* is a process; international organizations are...a phase of that process...based primarily upon...the organizational efforts in which governments participate’

(Claude 1964:4)

- international organisation: manner in which actors in international system interact and literally regularise, order and manage their affairs together
- International Organisation: formally structured entity

Today it is more common in encountering the term international organisation to find it referring to *an* international organisation—a formally structured entity comprising members from more than one state. If you were asked to name an international organisation it is very likely that you could rattle off quite a lengthy list. You might come up with such organisations as the United Nations, the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Alternatively, you might think of organisations such as the International Red Cross, Amnesty International or Greenpeace. It has to be said, there is no shortage of international organisations to choose from.

Clearly, though, just from the few examples given above, not all international organisations are the same. There is obviously a big difference between, for example, the United Nations and Greenpeace. Logically, therefore, we must be able to identify certain different categories of international organisation. Modern international organisations can be classified as intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—sometimes described as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to differentiate them from purely nationally based organisations.

Indeed, one of the most significant changes in international relations in the twentieth century has been the tremendous growth in international organisations. Today, according to the Union of International Associations (UIA), there are some 260 intergovernmental organisations, and no less than 5,732 non-governmental organisations. Yet even this large number is only the tip of the iceberg. This total of over 5,700 organisations includes only ‘conventional’ bodies. If one adds other types, such as internationally oriented national organisations, autonomous conferences and the like, and some 1,300 apparently inactive ones, the overall total in the UIA’s ‘Table of International Organisations listed by type’ comes to a staggering 44,128 (*Yearbook of International Organisations*, 1996–7). It should be stressed, however, that this total is arrived at by including a very wide range of differing forms




Figure 1 Growth of IGOs and NGOs

of bodies. For the purposes of this chapter, we will really only be considering the conventional bodies. Nevertheless, the significance of even this total of 5,732 organisations can clearly be seen if one considers that the figures in 1909 were respectively 37 and 176, and by 1977 had risen to only 252 IGOs and 2,502 NGOs (see Figure 1).

CLASSIFICATION AND NATURE OF IOs

This is one of the most difficult tasks in the study of international organisations. When is an IO an IO? In the limitations of this chapter it is not possible to consider the whole range of forms of international organisations in detail. Accordingly, attention will be focused on the two principal forms—intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).

In conventional terms, there are several criteria which must be met in order for an intergovernmental organisation to exist. It should:

- be based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of states;
- include three or more states as parties to the agreement;
- possess a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks.

These three criteria are those used by the UIA. However, it is possible to come up with a more general range of features which indicate the nature of the IGO. Starting with the three criteria outlined, all IGOs must have some formal instrument of agreement between governments. Most commonly referred to as a convention, charter or constitution, this will set out the institutional arrangements for the organisation and also detail the areas of competency which it has. Considering the second criterion, the minimum of three states involved, this clearly excludes any bilateral agreement or institution. But there are several other points which relate to the states belonging to an IGO. First, the very existence of the

IGO suggests that it is there to address problems which are common to the member states. Thus all the member states will, to varying degrees, be committed to the aims of the organisation. Second, and following on from this, almost certainly, all states within the IGO will be equal. That is to say, they will have equal responsibility within the decision-making process of the organisation for the attainment of the goals of that organisation. Of course, this equality may be rather more theoretical than practical. Contributions of resources towards the running of the organisation will in all probability not be equal, and thus the major contributors may seek to exercise more influence in the actual operation of the organisation, by flexing their political and economic muscle. But the fact remains that virtually all IGOs theoretically espouse the equality of their membership, although the UNSC allows five permanent members a veto (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) and in some organisations, such as the European Union (see Chapter 10), there is weighted voting on some issues: that is, some states have more votes than others.

The third criterion—the secretariat—will also differ considerably from organisation to organisation. In some cases, it may be very small, carrying out a minimal amount of work. In others it may be large and complex, with a range of functions akin to that of a state itself—such as the European Union, for example. In general terms, the size and range of influence of the secretariat will reflect the size and influence of the organisation as a whole. But within some organisations, the role of the secretariat itself raises a number of questions, which will be addressed later in this chapter.

One further point relating to the nature of IGOs is that they will often have an ‘international legal personality’. This means that they have a legal existence which is separate from their member states. In other words, in such a case, the IGO itself can enter into legal agreements. Employees of the organisation, for example, may be employed by the organisation, not by its member states, and the organisation itself can enter into contracts with suppliers. More significantly, in terms of international law, since the IGO has a distinct personality, it can enter into international agreements itself, and can have representatives from states outwith its membership accredited to it.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOs)

International non-governmental organisations are very different creatures from IGOs. Whereas IGOs, to varying degrees, have power—in that they comprise sovereign states—INGOs generally do not, at least directly, have the same power. They are, in a sense, the pressure groups of the international arena. As a consequence of this, their role and function are substantially different from those of IGOs. However, in some ways they are also rather similar. Once again, the single most reliable set of criteria for defining such an organisation is provided by the Union of International Associations, in particular the editors of their *Yearbook of International Organisations*. They have established a set of seven rules designed to identify an international NGO. The criteria they have established cover such areas as aims, membership, the way in which they are run and finance.

BOX 7.2 THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS' CRITERIA FOR NGOS

- Aims: must be genuinely international in character with the intention to cover operations in at least three countries.
- Members: there must be individual or collective participation, with full voting rights, from at least three countries. Membership must be open to any appropriately qualified individual or entity in the organisation's area of operations.
- Structure: must be formal, giving member the right periodically to elect a governing body and officer. There must be permanent headquarters and continuity of operation.
- Officers: if, for a period, are all of the same nationality, there should be rotation at designated intervals of headquarters and officers among the various member countries.
- Finance: Substantial contributions must come from at least three countries. There must be no attempt to make profits for distribution to members.
- Relations with other organisations: Entities formally connected with another organisation are not necessarily excluded but there must be evidence they lead an independent life and elect their own officers.
- Activities: Evidence of current activity must be available.

However, as is so often the case in International Relations, there is no straightforward, simple answer to the question of defining an INGO. While the UIA criteria are generally regarded as an appropriate yardstick, other bodies operate to different definitions. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for example, defined an INGO as 'Any international organisation which is not established by intergovernmental agreements...including such organisations which accept members designated by government authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organisations' (ECOSOC resolution 288(+), 27/2/50 and Resolution 1,296(+Liv), 25/6/68). This is an altogether much broader definition. Indeed, according to the UIA itself, 'a clear and unambiguous theoretically acceptable definition of international NGOs remains to be formulated.' Such definitional differences, while perhaps seeming rather pedantic, may be of importance in considering whether any particular organisation is recognised by other bodies, such as the UN, or indeed by individual states.

ROLE AND FUNCTION OF IOs

The tremendous growth in the number of international organisations is regarded by some as an indication of the decreasing relevance of the state as the primary actor in the international system. From this standpoint, increasing global interdependence, regional integration and the like may be seen as threatening the historic dominance of the state. But there is little evidence to suggest that the primacy of the state is under any real threat. Despite tendencies such as those indicated, the sovereign state remains without doubt the key actor in international relations. States still very jealously guard their sovereignty, autonomy and independence of action in the modern world, and such factors today offer as many constraints and stimuli to the international actions of states as they ever did.

One indication of the growth in interdependence of states is the extent to which they relate, co-operate and interact with each other, and this is reflected in the growth in international organisations. For one other change in the way in which international relations are conducted is that it is through such bodies that many of the interactions between states are carried out. It has to be remembered that international organisations—at least IGOs—do not suddenly emerge from nowhere, like a mythological genie. They are created by, used by and sometimes abused by states. IGOs are themselves by-products of the state system. They are brought into existence and continue to function because, in the main, states find them useful in a number of different ways.

BOX 7.3 WHY IGOs?

- because states find them useful and in their national interest
- means of co-operation in functional areas: e.g. post and telegraphs
- useful method by which states can further co-operative goals by providing:

- framework in which international negotiations can occur
- physical location for such negotiations plus support services
- means by which agreements are enforced
- forum for airing of opinions

As in the earliest days of international organisations, they offer a means of co-operation in a functional area. In the modern world, expectations in some areas transcend national boundaries. For example, if one lives in Britain and posts a letter to a friend in another country, say the USA, one has the expectation that it will be delivered to the correct address. Yet such a simple process requires international co-operation. In addition to the obvious physical co-operation required to transport the letter between countries, payment for this service, in this example, will have been made to the Post Office in Britain, by way of purchasing a postage stamp. Yet the delivery is carried out in the USA by the US

mail, who require payment for their part of the service. Thus, this simple task requires a high degree of international negotiation and agreement. In such a case, this is the role of the Universal Postal Union (one of the first international organisations to be established, as the General Postal Union, in 1868). This body oversees all such international postal agreements, payments for international delivery and so forth.

At a more technical level, but remaining in the communications sphere, considerable international agreement on technical standards must be achieved for international telephone calls to be feasible. Each national telephone service has its own technical standards, and may operate in a slightly different technical manner. Yet for an international telephone call to be successfully completed, the signals transmitted must be intelligible to the domestic telephone system of the receiving party. Imagine the chaos which would ensue if a UK telephone sent electronic signals to a US telephone but, because of technical differences, the US telephone received a series of electronic pulses which it could not interpret as a telephone conversation. Modern international telecommunication as we know and expect it would be impossible. Again, therefore, the international negotiation and co-ordination of the necessary technical compatibility is undertaken by an international organisation—in this case the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which came into existence in 1865 as the International Telegraphic Union.

From these examples, the importance of international organisations in such a functional, co-operative role can easily be seen. Indeed, these forms of organisation, dealing with non-political, functional matters, were among the first international organisations to come into existence in the nineteenth century, known as public international unions. Yet IOs play many other important roles as well.

Perhaps the single most important function of any IO is to provide an effective method by which states can further co-operative goals. This applies in any issue area where such co-operation is to the advantage of a number of states. In serving this specific role, international organisations can carry out a number of different functions. In the first instance, they provide a framework within which international negotiation can occur. They often also offer the physical location in which such talks can take place, along with all the necessary support services to facilitate international negotiation, such as secretarial support, translation and interpreting services and so on. Indeed, INGOs in these respects carry out much the same function, albeit that in their case it is not states who are meeting, but, nevertheless, representatives from a number of different countries.

However, the role of the IGO may be even more substantive. They may not only facilitate international discussion and agreement, but may then offer the means by which such agreements are carried out, or enforced. One example of this role can be seen in the work of the World Health Organisation (WHO). Within the discussion framework of the organisation, states may decide on a collective course of action, say a vaccination programme against a particular disease. In addition to the organisation being an important part of the policy-making process in this regard, the practical work of vaccinating populations, particularly in developing countries, may well be carried out by WHO personnel. Furthermore, the ultimate responsibility for monitoring the success of the operation will also rest with the international organisation.

IGOs in particular also provide a forum within which states can generally air opinions,

float ideas and propose certain courses of action, to gauge the response of the other members. Indeed, this function may also be carried out at the informal level within the organisation, between the individual representatives of states, and thus provide very useful informal feedback on the views or positions of other governments. It has often been said that much of the real success of the UN, for example, stems not from the formal meetings and committees, but rather from the opportunities it affords for informal discussions and conversations in the corridors and restaurants of the UN Headquarters in New York.

Up to this point, we have considered international organisations in broad, rather general terms. The remainder of this chapter seeks to look at some of the issues raised in the context of what might be considered the pre-eminent international organisation of the twentieth century—the United Nations, and, more briefly, its predecessor, the League of Nations.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The horrors of the First World War inspired both individuals and governments around the world to consider how such loss of life might be avoided in the future. Even as the war was being fought, consideration was being given to how to develop a system which would mean that such a conflict could never again occur. Individuals and groups, both private and governmental, in a number of different countries around the world came up with the idea of an international organisation with the principal aim of achieving world peace.

In May 1916 President Woodrow Wilson of the USA addressed the US League to Enforce Peace, and by so doing became the first world leader to give official support to the notion of a League of Nations after the war. In fact, although Wilson is generally credited with being the prime mover behind the League, he did not lead the way in framing the detail of what such a body might look like. In fact, the first official draft of the Covenant of the League came from Britain (Northedge 1976:27–8).

President Wilson was, however, the driving force in so far as he was adept in taking ideas already espoused by others and promoting them most effectively. It was he who insisted that the Covenant of the League of Nations should be incorporated into the peace treaties formally concluding the First World War. And so, just one week after the peace conference was convened in Paris in January 1919, largely at the instigation of the US and British delegations, a resolution was adopted that meant the plans for a League of Nations would be incorporated into the peace treaties. The League of Nations formally came into existence on 10 January 1920 with the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

There were three main institutional aspects to the League of Nations—the Council, the Assembly and the Secretariat. The Council was the effective governing body, representing the great powers of the time. Essentially, the underlying concept was that these states, as the most important of the day, had most at stake in the international system, and thus should have most say on an ongoing basis. The Assembly was the forum for the membership as a whole, a regular talking shop where all League members, on the theoretical basis of equality, could express their views, enter into discussion with the

other members, and arrive at mutually beneficial conclusions. The third element, the Secretariat, was the day-to-day 'civil service', the pragmatic, ongoing bureaucracy which took those policy decisions and acted to implement them.

BOX 7.4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920–46

- Council
 - representatives of principal allied powers and four others (elected from Assembly)
 - each member of Council one vote; decisions needed agreement of all present
 - to deal with any matter within League's sphere of action or affecting world peace
 - to recommend course of action to members
- Assembly
 - representatives of all the members
 - to deal with any matter within League's sphere of action or affecting world peace
 - each state one vote and up to three representatives; decisions needed agreement of all present
- Secretariat
 - permanent and based in Geneva

On the face of it, this seems a reasonable construction for such an international organisation. Yet in some ways it was not new. Although the immediate origins of the League lie in the First World War, it is possible to relate it to the organisation of the international system from earlier years. The congress system which had developed throughout the nineteenth century was a series of ad hoc meetings of the great powers which met as necessary to discuss matters of common interest. One example of such a meeting was the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, which effectively codified the rules of diplomacy. Originally held together by fear of Napoleon, and of revolution, these meetings became more regular, as the states concerned found them a useful way of addressing their mutual concerns. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this had developed into the Concert of Europe. Bearing in mind that the League provided a forum for the leading powers to meet regularly to discuss mutual concerns, it more than slightly resembles the concept of the Concert of Europe.

BOX 7.5 PRECURSORS OF THE LEAGUE

- Not necessarily a direct line of descent but some previous seeds:
- Council: Concert of Europe flowing from the Congress of Vienna; regular series of meetings among the great powers to seek to maintain status quo, peace and order.
- Assembly: The Hague 'International Peace Conferences' of 1899 and 1907—stress on universality and meeting in peacetime to deal with issues of international relations
- Secretariat: The public international unions and administrations created in nineteenth century to facilitate greater interconnectedness.

Another mode of organisation in international society in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the conference system. The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 saw the coming together of the European states to consider a major issue—in this case, disarmament. This can be seen as a conceptual assembly of all the nations—a prototype model for the Assembly of the League. The third feature of international organisation which had emerged in the nineteenth century was the concept of the international public unions. These were international organisations which focused on specific functional areas, such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (1875) or the General Postal Union (1868) but engendered co-operation at the technical, functionary level—the inspiration for the Secretariat of the League.

Thus, from an organisational perspective, there was remarkably little that was new in the establishment of the League of Nations. What was novel was its aspiration to being a global organisation, devoted to the maintenance of peace and, if necessary, backing its purpose with firm action, by way of the concept of collective security, in which all members take joint responsibility for the maintenance of security, whether it directly affects their own security interests or not.

The underlying thinking behind the framing of the League Covenant was based on what the powers thought had been the origins of the First World War, and thus the League specifically set out to counter those factors which it was thought had been to blame. There were three principal factors which were identified: arms races, secret diplomacy in pursuit of national interests and the breakdown of the traditional balance of power system. Thus, in response to this the League aimed for disarmament, open covenants, openly arrived at, and collective security in place of a balance of power.

The League had a few minor successes, managing to resolve a number of international disputes, but in the 1930s it suffered a series of major failures. When the Japanese invaded Chinese Manchuria in 1931, and again when Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935, the League turned out to be effectively powerless to prevent these incidents—the very type of incident it had been established to deal with. By this stage the League was fatally wounded. It could do nothing when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936, followed in 1938 by the German invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and was powerless the

following year when the invasion of Poland sparked World War Two.

This raises an obvious question—why did it fail? In essence it is possible to identify four basic causes of the failure of the League of Nations:

- The failure of the Covenant.
- Weakness of membership.
- Balance of power v. the League system.
- Level of operation.

There were a number of weaknesses in the Covenant itself, which led to a variety of attempts to strengthen it. The French wanted effective means to implement Article 16 (economic sanctions and military action), but on the question of disarmament they were more reluctant. A 1922 draft treaty of mutual guarantee and the 1924 Geneva Protocol, both of which were designed to give military teeth to sanctions, failed. In 1928 came the Kellogg-Briand Pact which bound signatories to renounce war as an instrument of national policy—but how could this be enforced? Thus the deficiencies within the Covenant itself were never corrected.

There were also distinct problems with the membership. The USA, one of the world's most significant powers, never joined. Germany was only in for a short period (1926–33), Japan left in 1933, Russia only joined in 1932 and was thrown out in 1939. Yet the basic principle of collective security demands that membership be as wide as possible. To a large extent the League hinged on Britain and France—who did not always agree with each other, and certainly both, throughout their membership, continued to place considerable faith in secret diplomacy to uphold security.

BOX 7.6 WEAKNESSES OF THE LEAGUE

- Covenant: effective decision-making capability lacking; even if 'resort to war', it was only the duty of the Council 'to recommend' what armed forces should be contributed and what should be done (Covenant Article 16.2; see below).
- Weaknesses of membership: United States—never a member; Intermittent membership of: Germany, 1926–33, Japan, 1920–33, Russia, 1932–39.
- No real collective security: Article 11.1 of Covenant: 'Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.' But Article 16.1: 'Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall, *ipso facto*, be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial,

commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.'

Article 16.2: 'It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League.'

- Level of operation: Article 19: 'The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'

Which leads on to the third factor—the inherent tension between the conflicting desires for the traditional balance of power structure and the League system of collective security. For the League to operate effectively, all members had to consider collective security, and openness as the primary method of ensuring peace. Notwithstanding this, its most important and influential members, Britain and France, still sought security through alliances, sometimes secretly negotiated. This created a fundamental dilemma. It is not possible to carry out open diplomacy—open covenants, openly arrived at—as the League system demanded if, at the same time, you are engaged in secret diplomacy to form independent security alliances.

Finally, the level of operation of the League was also a factor in its downfall. The League tried to deal with the question of international peace and security at the level of the international political system as a whole. But many of the aggressors which it encountered, such as Japan, Italy and Germany, were fundamentally aggrieved with the structure of the international system itself. Japan and Italy felt hard done by with respect to the colonial situation, Germany with the Versailles peace settlement. But the League could not address these types of difficulties in any truly constructive manner—it had no suitable way of revising settlements within the international system. Article 19, which allowed the Assembly to advise reconsideration of treaties that had become inapplicable, simply did not work.

Thus, overall, there was no single factor which led to the demise of the League of Nations. Rather it was a combination of a number of factors. But together they certainly proved fatal to the institution as a whole.

However, despite the disappointing experience of the League, this was not to be the end of such an organisation. Throughout the Second World War, in a number of different countries, individuals, private organisations and governments were considering the way in which such an organisation might be made to work. As the war neared its end, the thoughts of the Allied powers became more focused on the question of the shape of the world after the war. They determined that the only way to prevent future recurrences of such widespread hostilities was to establish a global organisation which would have the

aim of maintaining international peace and security.

Preliminary plans for such an organisation were drawn up at a series of meetings held at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC. The outline which emerged from these conversations was further discussed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at Yalta in 1945 and was, with a few amendments, approved by a special conference in San Francisco in April 1945, with the Charter of the United Nations coming into force in October 1945.

THE UNITED NATIONS—ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The United Nations is an intergovernmental organisation. It is made up of sovereign member states, and thus it is not some form of world government.

The UN comprises six major organs, which are briefly detailed below. In addition, a host of other bodies are members of what is more generally called the UN system.

The six main organs are:

- **The General Assembly.** The main deliberative body of the organisation. All 185 member states are represented in the General Assembly, and each has one vote. Decisions on ordinary matters are reached by a simple majority of votes, while important questions need a two-thirds majority. The Assembly normally meets once a year, with its regular, annual session lasting from mid-September to mid-December. In addition, special or emergency sessions can be held when necessary. Between the normal sessions of the General Assembly, its work is carried out by special committees and other affiliated bodies.

The General Assembly has the power to discuss and make recommendations on all matters which fall within the scope of the UN Charter. It is important to note that while its conclusions, or recommendations, are not binding on any member state—it cannot force states to follow its recommendations—they do represent the weight of world opinion. The Assembly also determines policies and programmes for the organisation, approves the annual UN budget, considers reports from other organs, formally admits new members to the organisation and appoints the Secretary-General.

BOX 7.7 THE UNITED NATIONS

- **General Assembly:** all equal with one vote+two-thirds majority on important questions+the UNGA can, whatever the wording of its resolutions, only make recommendations.
- **Security Council:** five permanent members (China, France, USA, UK and Russia) have a veto;+10 other members, elected by rotation. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and under Chapter VII (Article 42) 'it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.' Article 43.1: 'All Members of the United Nations...undertake to

make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.’ Article 49: ‘the Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.’

- ECOSOC: Chapter X—primary functions are economic growth, technological dissemination and respect for human rights.
- Trusteeship: now redundant as no longer any trusteeship territories.
- International Court of Justice: 15 members; parties, if they accept that case should go to ICJ, agree to accept ICJ decision.
- Secretariat: 9,000 staff from 170 states; to be independent of member states in performance of duties; and Article 99: ‘The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.’

- The Security Council. The organ to which the Charter gives the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Charter obligates states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. They must refrain from the threat or use of force against other states and may bring any dispute to the attention of the Security Council.

The Security Council can be convened at any time, whenever it is required to consider a threat to international peace. It comprises fifteen members. Five of these—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—are permanent members of the Council. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with five being elected each year. In 1997 the ten non-permanent members were Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea and Sweden. Decisions of the Security Council require nine votes out of the fifteen. Except on purely procedural questions, a decision cannot be taken if there is a negative vote by any one of the five permanent members—the so-called veto power of the permanent five. Importantly, however, decisions of the Security Council are compulsory. All member states are obliged to carry out decisions of the Security Council—the only UN body which has this mandatory legal authority. Although, of course, every issue brought to the attention of the Security Council is different, there is a general pattern to what the Council will typically do in considering the matter. When a threat to peace is brought before the Council, it will usually first ask the parties to reach agreement by peaceful means. It has a wide range of tactics which it can employ to try to ensure peace. It may undertake mediation, send observers to monitor the situation or send peace-keeping forces to try to prevent the outbreak of conflict. If fighting does break out, the Council will try to secure a ceasefire. Peace-keeping forces may be deployed, with the consent of the parties involved, in an attempt to reduce tension, perhaps by keeping opposing forces apart. Other methods, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, may also

be utilised, and, in the last resort, the Council has the authority to order collective military action.

The Security Council also makes recommendations to the General Assembly on a candidate for the post of Secretary-General, and on the admission of new members to the UN.

- The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This works under the overall authority of the General Assembly and is responsible for coordinating the economic and social work of the UN itself. It is also responsible for its specialised agencies and institutions. ECOSOC has fifty-four members and holds at least one substantive session each year. This session normally includes a special meeting at the level of government ministers to discuss major international economic and social issues. ECOSOC recommends and directs activities aimed at promoting the economic growth of developing countries and the observance of human rights, and spreading the benefits of science and technology. It also tries to foster international cooperation in such diverse areas as housing, family planning and crime prevention.
- The Trusteeship Council. Established to ensure that governments which were responsible for administering trust territories took adequate steps to prepare these territories for independence or self-government. In one respect this can be seen to have been the most successful of all UN activities in that by 1994 all trust territories had attained independence or self-government, either as separate states or by joining neighbouring independent countries. Thus, the Trusteeship Council no longer has a trusteeship system to oversee. Accordingly, its rules of procedure were amended, and it will now only meet as and when this may be required. Technically, however, it remains one of the six major organs of the UN, although it is now effectively redundant.
- The International Court of Justice (also known as the World Court). The main judicial organ of the UN. It consists of fifteen judges, elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Only countries may be parties in cases brought before the Court. If a country does not wish to participate in a case, it does not have to do so, but if it accepts, it is obliged to comply with the decision of the Court.
- The Secretariat. It works for all the other organs of the UN and carries out their programmes. It is effectively an international civil service, or bureaucracy, totalling some 9,000 staff, from 170 different countries, which carries out the day-to-day work of the UN, both at Headquarters and around the world. The head of the Secretariat is the Secretary-General of the UN—currently Kofi Annan.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN

The primary objective of the United Nations—as it also was with the League of Nations—is to maintain international peace and security. Following very closely behind this primary goal is another—that of promoting international economic and social cooperation. The third main objective is to promote respect for human rights for all peoples. Each of these objectives is stated fairly clearly within the UN Charter, as are, at least to some extent, the means by which they are to be pursued. There is also a further group of rather more vaguely defined goals, including: developing friendly relations among nations; acting as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in attaining the more specific goals; taking appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; practising tolerance and living together in peace as good neighbours; and establishing justice and respect for international law. In the case of this latter group of aims, none is outlined in any detail, nor are the means by which they might be achieved indicated in anything other than the vaguest of terms. Within the constraints of this chapter, therefore, attention will be focused on the principal objectives, and in particular on the primary one—the maintenance of international peace and security.

With respect to this objective, the Charter specifies a number of means by which this may be achieved, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace or acts of aggression. These aspects are dealt with at some length in the Charter, with Chapter VI of the document devoted to a variety of methods for peacefully settling disputes, and Chapter VII outlining a variety of measures which may be taken when the situation has become more serious, involving threats to the peace, actual breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

The main responsibility for ensuring that international peace is maintained is given to the Security Council, although this function is shared, to some extent, with the General Assembly and also the International Court of Justice.

Regarding the second main objective, the major organ tasked with the primary responsibility for promoting international economic and social co-operation is the Economic and Social Council. To this end, however, the General Assembly also has a significant role, as of course, do many of the myriad other organisations and specialised agencies which fall under the overall auspices of the United Nations, within the UN family.

The objective of promoting respect for human rights is also predominantly the remit of the Economic and Social Council, which is empowered to set up commissions in this field and may make recommendations and prepare draft conventions on human rights. The General Assembly also has a major responsibility in this sphere. In addition, the safeguarding of human rights is a fundamental element of the trusteeship system, and thus the Trusteeship Council is the third major organ of the United Nations to have a responsibility for such matters.

BOX 7.8 UNITED NATIONS' OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

- General objectives (Preamble to Charter):

- 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'
- 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights'
- 'to establish conditions under which justice...can be maintained'
- 'to promote social progress'

Therefore to:

- 'practise tolerance'
- 'unite our strength to maintain international peace and security'
- '[promote] the economic and social advancement of all peoples'

- Purposes (Chapter I, Article 1 of Charter):

- 1.1 'To maintain international peace and security';
- 1.2 'To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace';

- 1.3 'To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems';
- 1.4 'To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends'.

- Principles (Chapter I, Article 2 of Charter):

- 2.1 'The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members';
- 2.3 'All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means';
- 2.4 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state';
- 2.7 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; *but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII* (i.e. if the Security Council decides that such a matter is a threat to international peace and security, it can intervene: this is often overlooked and only the first clause of the article is referred to).

There is little doubt that the work of the UN in areas such as economic and social development, human rights and general humanitarian activities is of great importance around the world. A major part of the UN's work is concerned with such matters, with a whole range of programmes which aim to provide a better life for all people of the world. Today, according to UN figures, around three-quarters of the world's people live in developing countries and around 1.3 billion live in abject poverty. The Charter of the UN specifically assigns it the role, as one of its major functions, of promoting higher standards of living, full employment and economic and social progress. More detail of some of the ways in which it attempts to achieve this can be found in Box 7.9. However, to the general public, the work of the UN revolves around its primary function—the maintenance of international peace and security—and to most people that means peace-keeping.

BOX 7.9 THE UN ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The primary UN body working towards social and economic progress is the UN Development Programme (UNDP). This is the largest UN provider of grants for development and the chief co-ordinator of UN development co-operation. It focuses on helping countries eliminate poverty, creating employment, advancing women's status and protecting the environment. Its annual budget of \$1 billion generates some \$9 billion a year in follow-up investment from public and private sources, and it is at work in 175 countries and territories.

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) also spends around \$1 billion annually in assistance programmes in some 144 countries. Much of its work relates to immunisation, primary health care, nutrition and basic education.

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) encourages sound environmental practices and promotes international agreement in relation to the environment. Other UN programmes which also work for development include the World Food Programme, the UN Population Fund, the UN Centre for Human Settlements and the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

Humanitarian aid is given to countries stricken by war, famine or natural disaster. Part of this aid is in the form of direct assistance from UN programmes, such as the World Food Programme or UNICEF. In 1995 the UN raised \$1.5 billion for humanitarian assistance around the world. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and assistance to some 27 million people, while attempting to find long-term solutions to their difficulties. In addition, there are fourteen specialised agencies of the UN which work towards development and international co-operation within their own areas of expertise. These are: International Labour Organisation (ILO); Food and Agriculture Organisation

of the UN (FAO); UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); World Health Organisation (WHO); World Bank; International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO); Universal Postal Union (UPU); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); World Meteorological Organisation (WMO); International Maritime Organisation (IMO); World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO).

MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The first article of the UN Charter sets out the purposes of the United Nations. And the first purpose is defined as

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective means for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

This seems a daunting prospect, so how exactly does the United Nations aim to achieve this purpose? How does the UN maintain international peace and security? The short answer is that it does so by a wide variety of means, ranging between the extremes of quiet diplomacy and direct military action. The quiet diplomacy approach is typified by the ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General—informal and formal meetings the Secretary-General holds in relation to matters of international concern—as an attempt to avoid crises or prevent ongoing disputes escalating. At the other extreme lies full-scale military action taken under the auspices of the UN.

BOX 7.10 MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

- diplomacy and provision of ‘good offices’
- peace-keeping
- mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- investigation
- right to intervene
- use of sanctions, including: complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and any other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations

The area most commonly associated with UN efforts to uphold international peace and security is that of peace-keeping. This is thus often regarded as synonymous with the activities of the UN, particularly those of the Security Council. Under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, while Articles 39 and 40 additionally vest the authority to identify aggressors with it. This in itself is no mean feat in a time of diverse and wide-ranging threats. Peace-keeping, although traditionally linked with the work of the UN, is entirely omitted from the Charter. For the former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, peace-keeping fits in as an ‘unwritten Chapter Six and a Half’ of the Charter. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are the main sections dealing with the practicalities of maintaining international peace and security. Chapter VI relates to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, providing an initial focus for preventive efforts such as mediation, arbitration and negotiation (Article 33). Article 35 gives the Security Council the right to investigate matters, while Article 36 outlines the right of the Security Council to intervene in international disputes. Chapter VII, on the other hand, concentrates upon Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression, and is therefore the logical follow-on from the Chapter VI measures. If the provisions outlined in Chapter VI were to fail, the founding fathers intended that Chapter VII be invoked.

Articles 41 and 42 relate to the use of sanctions, and air, sea and land forces. Furthermore, Article 43 states that members must make their armed forces available to the UN, while importantly, Article 51 highlights the right of members to use force legitimately in self-defence—even if the matter has not yet been considered by the UN or its Security Council.

Peace-keeping is the public face of the UN in relation to international peace and security. The first peace-keeping operation was established in 1948: UNTSO—a small, unarmed observer mission which was tasked with monitoring the truce following the Israeli war of independence. Somewhat ironically, UNTSO also holds the distinction of being the longest-running UN peace-keeping operation, since it remains in existence today. A total of forty-two peace-keeping operations have been run by the UN, with more than 750,000 military personnel involved, from a total of 110 countries (not to mention thousands of civilian personnel), thus indicating that the responsibility for this task is generally spread among virtually all member states. It should also be remembered that the cost of peace-keeping cannot merely be measured in financial terms—since 1945 more than 1,500 individuals have lost their lives in UN peace-keeping operations. Nor is it always the most obvious states which contribute the most. In fact Fiji holds the distinction of having contributed to almost every such operation; an unlikely candidate if ever there was one.

The original, or classic, philosophy of peace-keeping hinges on three basic elements:

- consent of the parties to the conflict;
- impartiality of the peace-keepers;
- the non-use of force, other than in self-defence.

However, although all peace-keeping operations were supposed to be based on these three principles, at times, in particular operations, if they were not breached, they were certainly bent to the limit. This is not a new criticism. Even in the Congo operation

(ONUC) from 1960, conflicting mission demands and a volatile political situation meant that the forces on the ground were constantly at risk of being accused of breaching the guiding principles. When the province of Katanga attempted to secede from the Congo and UN forces were utilised to prevent such an action, they were immediately accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of the country. Originally set up to help with the restoration of law and order, ONUC went far beyond this mandate. In February 1961 they were authorised by a Security Council resolution to use force if necessary to prevent civil war. In sum, the redefined missions handed to ONUC went considerably beyond what could generally be construed as the impartial, non-use of force, with the consent of all parties, principles which were the foundation of classic peace-keeping. Such events, while particularly blatant in the Congo operation, have occurred since. Consequently, over the years, a rather more complex notion of a variety of elements involved in maintaining peace have been developed. Today, peace-keeping is but one element—although, in practice, still the one which is the public face of UN activities in relation to international peace and security. Today the UN is also involved in dimensions such as post-conflict peace-building, peace enforcement and preventive diplomacy (see also Chapter 5 above).

FINANCE

The United Nations is, of course, a fairly complex organisation, and the same can be said of its funding. Basic funding for the running of the organisation comes from compulsory contributions from each of the member states. The amount each has to pay is determined according to a formula adopted by the General Assembly. The UN regular budget, met by these assessed contributions, was \$1.3 billion in 1996. This provides the day-to-day funding for the core functions of the organisation—essentially the Secretariat operations. The UN itself is very quick to point out that this is a remarkably small budget for the running of a global organisation—it is about 4 per cent of the annual budget of New York City, for example.

However, this is only the regular budget, which is effectively the basic ‘housekeeping’ budget for running the organisation. This does not take into account the money required to run the many programmes and agencies within the UN system as a whole. A second category of budget applies to most of the assistance programmes run by the UN. These are funded by special budgets, which rely on voluntary contributions from member states, rather than assessed contributions. Thus the funding pattern, and indeed the proportion of a programme budget paid by any one country, can vary considerably from year to year. In recent years the total operating expenses for the UN system as a whole—including the World Bank, IMF and all the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies—has averaged \$18–20 billion per year.

A third form of budget relates to the activities of the various specialised agencies which are connected to the UN system. These are largely autonomous and each therefore has a considerable degree of independence in determining its own budget. Although technically under the overview of the General Assembly, the central body of the UN can only review and make recommendations regarding the budgets of these agencies. The

General Assembly cannot take budgetary decisions on their behalf.

Fourth, and by far most controversially, are the budgets required to run the various peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. Originally attempts were made to assess contributions for peace-keeping in a similar manner to the assessment of the regular budget. From the outset, however, this did not meet with the approval of all the member states. When the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established, for example, in 1956, the Soviet Bloc countries, and a number of Arab states, refused to pay contributions for this. Similar difficulties arose with other states in relation to other peacekeeping operations, and so alternative ways of financing peace-keeping had to be developed. Accordingly, today, all peace-keeping operations are separately funded, and the finance for these can be obtained in a number of ways, from assessment all the way through to the voluntary contributions of the states who are parties to the dispute which has given rise to the need for the operation in the first place. Essentially, although there is a formula for deriving peace-keeping contributions, each operation is uniquely financed.

The more general question mark which hangs over the whole question of UN finance is how precarious it is. This situation arises due to a number of member states failing to pay their contributions in full. Although in principle a state which is at least two years in arrears may be denied its voting rights in the General Assembly, this has never been invoked—although it nearly was, against the USSR in 1964. The reason for this is simple: if a member state were to be sanctioned in this way, it is far from impossible that the response of that state may be to withdraw from the organisation—as the USSR threatened in 1964. In such an event, the organisation is fully aware that it would not receive the arrears of funding which it was due. But the more important reason is that the political desire to maintain as close to universal membership as possible has always far outweighed the desire to penalise recalcitrant contributors.

If 1964 saw the financial crisis come to a head, it has never truly been resolved since then. Periodic attempts to amend the funding basis of the organisation have been made, but these really represent no more than tinkering at the margins. The underlying problem is simply the task of persuading states to pay what they owe.

This was again brought into sharp focus in the mid-1980s. The US Congress passed a piece of legislation known as the Kassebaum Amendment which meant that the USA would not pay more than 80 per cent of its assessed dues until the United Nations introduced a number of reforms to the budgetary process and its general methods of administration. Since then, Congress has each year raised, or appropriated, less money than it is due to the United Nations and consequently the arrears which the United States owes the United Nations have continued to rise. Indeed, at present, the USA owes the UN something over \$1.6 billion.

BOX 7.11 UN FINANCES

- Income: contributions from member states based on formula relating to state's share of world economy and ability to pay.
- Mid-1997: member states owed UN in all \$2.3 billion; peacekeeping \$1.6 billion; regular budget \$681 million; international tribunals \$8.7 million.
- August 1997: only 78 of 185 member states had paid in full what they owed. US owed in all \$1.4 billion; peace-keeping \$920 million; regular budget \$498 million.
- UN budget 1997–9: \$252 million less than 1995–7.

REFORM

In recent years, the structure of the United Nations has been called into question. A growing number of states have expressed concern over a number of issues. The two most significant areas which have caused concern are the structure of the Security Council and the finances of the organisation as a whole. Both these areas, it is argued, do not reflect the current international system. While they may have been appropriate at the time of the founding of the organisation, more than fifty years ago, they are now out of step with the structure of international society.

In the case of the Security Council, it is argued that its composition reflects the great power structure immediately after the Second World War. Essentially, the permanent members are those who were globally powerful in the 1940s. Today, however, question marks hang over the UK and France in particular, neither any longer a great power on the world stage. Why, it is asked, in today's world should these two countries hold such a significant position within the body which acts as the guarantor of international peace and security? Although both are historically powerful states, it is difficult to dispute that their roles in international society no longer have the global impact which they had fifty years ago. Conversely, it can be asked why economic powers, such as Japan and Germany, today the second and third largest financial contributors to the UN budget respectively, have no such permanent place at the table. Similarly, the permanent membership does not truly reflect the geographical distribution of UN membership today. Within an organisation in which the majority of the member states could be described as developing countries, would it not be reasonable for this group to have at least one permanent seat on the Security Council?

Questions such as these are typical of those which have been raised concerning the structure of the Security Council. And they are important questions. As has already been indicated, the Security Council is unique in that its decisions are obligatory on all member states. In this respect, the decisions of the Security Council are taken in the name of all members of the United Nations. In order to attempt to ensure that Security Council resolutions are observed by all member states, it is important that the Security Council itself is regarded as having the moral authority and political legitimacy of the

membership as a whole. It can only do this if its membership, and especially its permanent membership, is seen as a fair representation of world society and, in particular, the membership of the UN as a whole. Or as Nicholas Hopkinson has put it: 'The world balance of power has changed dramatically in the years since the United Nations was established but the composition of the Security Council has not' (Hopkinson 1993:13).

Over the years, a variety of proposals to amend the structure of the Security Council, to bring it more into line with the realities of the 1990s, has been put forward. These range from simply adding further members, most specifically Germany and Japan, as permanent members (a proposal which was rejected in 1996), adding a new category of 'standing' members—whose seats would be permanent, but without the veto power of the existing permanent five—thus allowing for permanent membership to reflect more closely the economic and regional realities of the modern world, or simply increasing the number of non-permanent members. Other suggestions which have been floated include the notion of rotating members, from defined geographical areas. In other words, the geographical area would effectively have a permanent seat but it would be a different national representative which sat in it.

The issues involved are, at one level, very simple, but at a more politicised level extremely complex. At the simple level it seems obvious that the membership must be changed to reflect current international power relations. At the more political level, however, to achieve this effectively requires those who currently hold power within the Security Council (i.e. the permanent five) to give up some of their power. Rather ironically, perhaps, any change to the membership is a substantive question, which thus requires the consent of each of the permanent members. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, they are not rushing to give up their seats, vetoes or power.

The other key area of difficulty which the UN as an organisation faces is that of its financing. As outlined above, each member state contributes to the regular budget of the UN according to a funding formula. Yet many states have, consistently over the years, failed to meet these obligations. As of February 1997, the UN was owed over \$3 billion in arrears from member states. This would cover the budget of the UN's core functions—the Secretariat operations in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, Vienna and five regional commissions—for almost two and a half years. Successive Secretaries-General have reiterated that unless something is done to reduce this level of arrears, the UN as an organisation will remain in a very precarious financial position, almost on the brink of insolvency.

Over the years, a number of suggestions have been made which would generate income, independently of the assessed contributions of member states, for the UN. Something in the region of 3 per cent of current UN revenue comes from sources such as the sale of publications and stamps, and charges for services. However, to put the organisation on a sound financial basis, through increased independent sources of finance, would require a much greater proportion of revenue to be raised from alternative sources. Some of the suggestions which have emerged as alternative sources of finance for the UN are highlighted in Box 7.12.

BOX 7.12 REFORM: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCE, ADMINISTRATION

- Security Council membership
 - add new permanent members
 - change criteria for permanent members
 - add new category of 'standing members'
 - introduce geographical permanency
- Possible new criteria for membership
 - economic or population or geographical or 'power'?
- Finance
 - a fee for the use of international waterways
 - exploitation of the resources of Antarctica
 - a special surcharge on international mail or on international communications
 - licensing fees or other charges for the use of outer space
 - taxes collected by member states, but earmarked for UN use
 - taxes on international travel, or international passport fees (Bennett 1995:102)
- Administration—1997 proposed reforms
 - new post of Deputy Secretary-General
 - creation of Strategic Planning Unit
 - creation of Senior Management Group
 - no-growth budget+cut 1,000 jobs+cut 33 per cent of administration budget

Paradoxically, as Bennett points out, any of these proposals which would raise considerable revenue for the organisation would face considerable opposition from member states. Any moves which made the UN less dependent on the direct contributions of its member states could fundamentally alter the nature of the organisation. The United Nations is an international organisation composed of independent, sovereign states. As such, given that at present they contribute virtually all the finance of the organisation, they, and in particular the larger states which contribute most to the budget, would view any dilution of their contributions as a loss of control, a distinct threat to their influence within the organisation. Thus, radical reform of the financial base of the UN seems a potentially risky and somewhat remote possibility.

Consequently, the organisation has to contend with its present financial difficulties in ways which are acceptable to its members. In July 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced a new series of administrative and budgetary reforms which fell within his

scope of action. These reforms at the administrative level included the recommendation to the General Assembly that a Deputy Secretary-General be appointed (a wholly new post), the establishment of a Strategic Planning Unit and the formation of a Senior Management Group, to act like a cabinet, leading the process of change. In relation to streamlining the organisation, he proposed a no-growth budget, eliminating 1,000 posts (a 25 per cent cut from a decade ago), and reducing overall administration costs by 33 per cent, with the savings reallocated to development.

Most significantly, in an attempt to avoid the near-bankrupt state which the organisation has faced for a considerable period of time, he proposed the establishment of a Revolving Credit Fund, initially capitalised at up to \$1 billion through voluntary contributions—or indeed any other means which could be suggested by the member states. This would provide the organisation with a financial cushion and thus make it slightly more financially stable.

CONCLUSIONS—THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

As we have seen, the rise in the number of international organisations has continued virtually unabated over the past hundred or so years and there is no reason to suppose that this trend will change in the foreseeable future. The creation of such a plethora of organisations, both IGOs and INGOs, is not accidental. As science and technology collude effectively to shrink the world, in terms of communication, transport, and so on, international transactions, whether private or public, continue to increase. This is both a function of the growth of international organisations and a further reason for their existence, as a means of facilitating such international transactions and also a method of structuring them.

BOX 7.13 STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

‘States form, join and remain in international organisations because they are perceived to serve their national interests’

Notwithstanding this, however, the key principle of international relations remains state sovereignty. This is undiminished since the seventeenth century, and again there is no reason to imagine it will lessen to any significant extent in the twenty-first century. Consequently, the role and function of all international organisations will be both shaped and constrained by this fact. States form, join and remain in international organisations because they are perceived to serve their national interests. They do so in a number of different ways. First, they offer a forum within which the narrow, traditional national interest may be served—another avenue through which the conventional interests of the state may be served. They offer a new and convenient means for diplomacy—it is

cheaper and much more effective particularly for small states to maintain a mission at the United Nations in New York where they can meet with diplomats from 184 other countries than to maintain 184 separate diplomatic missions around the world. They also serve to legitimise both countries themselves and their policies. Over the last fifty years, one of the first aspirations of virtually every new, independent state which has emerged into international society has been to secure UN recognition. Similarly, even the most powerful of states have sought the approval of the UN for their actions, at least some of the time. For although the UN is in no way a form of world government, it does comprise the governments of the world. In this sense, the collective views of the General Assembly or the Security Council represent world opinion. Particularly in the changing international scene following the end of the Cold War, the UN plays an increasing role in defining world opinion, setting the boundaries of what is acceptable international behaviour and what is not. Thus, states who wish to be seen as 'good' international actors wish its, at least tacit, approval of ventures, so as to avoid the risk of international public condemnation.

International organisations also offer the hope of tackling specifically international problems. If we take the environment as one example, again the scientific and technological developments of the last hundred or so years have not only caused some international problems, such as damage to the ozone layer or climate change, but have allowed for far greater understanding of the linkage between the activities of states and consequent environmental degradation—locally, regionally and indeed on a global scale. Some of these types of problems demand international action—they are impossible to resolve at the national level. Thus, a host of international organisations has sprung up to work in such areas, because, for the time being, they offer the best method of encouraging and facilitating international co-operation to tackle truly international problems.

So what of the future? Will we see a continued expansion of international organisations and further broadening of the range of issues with which they are concerned? In short, the answer is probably, but not certainly. The one thing which international organisations prove is the flexibility of humankind in its endeavours to organise society at the international level. They are a means of dealing with changed environments and circumstances which states encountered as a result of societal developments, such as improved communication and transport capabilities. As humankind continues to evolve, so too will the methods by which we organise international society. Thus, although not yet on the horizon, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that we have reached the ultimate in international organisation. Some entirely new form may be just out of sight at the moment, but may emerge in twenty, fifty or a hundred years. Until then, however, international organisations are here to stay.

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8

The Middle East

Arena of competition and conflict

James Wyllie

Since the end of the Cold War the Middle East has experienced some radical political developments. However, neither international security nor, in many cases, domestic security has improved for many states within the region. Indeed, for some governments and societies there is a distinct sense of greater insecurity than there was during the relative certainties of the Cold War era. Paradoxically, the end of that global conflict has exacerbated some of the conditions which make the Middle East the most insecure, inflammable and unpredictable subsystem of the international system. This chapter will identify and explain the salient characteristics which perpetuate these conditions for the region as a whole, and assess the prospects for improvement.

GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The Middle East is a subsystem of acute strategic importance to the rest of the world. For local and external powers there are many immutable interests over which to compete, and such competition is a major contributory factor to the reputation of the Middle East as the world's most volatile and violent region. To appreciate its strategic importance, a clear definition of what constitutes the Middle East is vital but a precise, universally acceptable definition is difficult to achieve. There are a number of historical and contemporary perceptions of the Middle East which do not easily fit together. The term 'Middle East' was first used by the American admiral and strategic thinker Alfred Mahan in 1902 to describe the area between Arabia and India with the Gulf at its centre. In the nineteenth century the British used the term 'Near East' to refer to the Ottoman Empire and the Levant, but applied the term 'Middle East' during the Second World War to British military headquarters in Egypt. With Europe as the historic point of reference, traditional geographers described 'the East' as all regions east of Europe, with the Near East as the area from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, the Middle East as the area from the Gulf to South-East Asia, and the Far East as the regions facing the Pacific Ocean. Nevertheless, *The Times* (London) adopted the Mahan definition soon after the admiral coined it. Popular modern usage often incorporates a vast area from Afghanistan to Morocco, from Yemen to Turkey, and from the Mediterranean down to the Horn of Africa. Matters are further confused by the insistence of the US State Department on using the term 'Near East' to define the region encompassing Egypt, the Levant and the Arabian peninsula.

BOX 8.1 THE MIDDLE EAST

- Mahan 1902: area between Arabia and India with Gulf at its centre
- British nineteenth century: 'Near East'—Ottoman and Levant (eastern part of Mediterranean)
- World War Two: 'Middle East'—British military HQ in Egypt
- traditional geographers: 'the East'—east of Europe; 'Near'—area from Mediterranean to the Gulf; 'Middle'—from Gulf to South Asia Sea; 'Far'—regions facing the Pacific Ocean
- Hiro: 'core'—Iran, Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Jordan and Egypt
 - to west: Arab North Africa
 - to south: Sudan
 - to north: Turkey and Cyprus

In a sensible fashion Dilip Hiro suggests that clarity is best achieved by viewing the Middle East as a core, with peripheries. The core is Iran, the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Jordan and Egypt. To the west is Arab North Africa, to the south Sudan, and to the north Turkey and Cyprus. To include all three peripheries is to give the Middle East its widest definition, which is often the popular application of the term. To view it only as the core is to give it a narrower but still fairly popular definition. The focus of this chapter will be the core as described by Hiro, with frequent reference to states in the peripheries (including some newly independent states from the former Soviet Union) as they affect the core.

For centuries the Middle East has been deemed to be of peculiar strategic importance by the great powers of the day and, of course, by local, regional states. Whoever creates a substantial platform of political, economic and military power in the region, be it in the form of empire, surrogate power or long-range political hegemony, influences not only the Middle East but contiguous areas. In addition to the strategic attraction of wielding wide-ranging power in the region, the cultural magnetism of the Middle East has drawn major, extra-regional powers to the area for centuries. Prestige and status have been associated with extending protection and influence over the 'cradle of civilisation' and the source and meeting place of three of the world's great religions—Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Islam has prevailed across most of the Middle East, but suffers from rival sects. Arabic may be the dominant language, but it has many dialects and Turkish and Persian are rivals in some areas. Bernard Lewis has described the Middle East as 'a museum of religious and linguistic history'. If for no other reason, the Middle East would be a focus of world attention because of its cultural heritage. These cultural features contribute to the instability, tension, internecine rivalry and general insecurity in the region.

Given its geographical position, the Middle East has been a crossroads of historic importance and remains so to this day. Much of the movement of people, goods and

information back and forth between east and west must transit through or above the Middle East. In 1869 the successful construction of the Suez Canal cut thousands of miles and many days off the time taken for trade and military power to travel from Europe to the East. This was of particular importance to the European imperial powers, and Britain and France became major shareholders in the Suez Canal Company. A major reason for the establishment of British hegemony over Egypt in the late nineteenth century, which continued until the middle of the twentieth century, was to safeguard that vital sealine of communication to India. The AngloFrench military expedition against Egypt in 1956 demonstrated the continued perception by West Europeans of the strategic importance of the canal. That anachronistic exercise of military force failed, and the radical Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser took full control of the canal. While the dismantling of the European empires in the East has reduced the military primacy of the canal to West Europe, a vast volume of commercial goods transit the canal. In addition, the canal remains an important route of egress for naval vessels from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and vice versa.

To the south of the Suez Canal, where the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden converge, is the Strait of Bāb al Mandab (Arabic for 'Gate of Lamentation'). At this point Africa and the Arabian peninsula are separated only by twenty-six kilometres of water. This vital sealine of communication is vulnerable to pressures exercised by Yemen or Ethiopia. Most of the estimated 20,000 vessels transiting the Strait of Bāb al Mandab also transit the Suez Canal except for those with Red Sea destinations.

BOX 8.2 STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Suez Canal+Strait of Bāb al Mandab+Strait of Hormuz

Another important maritime location is the Strait of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman meet. Most of the vessels from the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf must seek egress through the Strait of Hormuz. There is no alternative seaborne route out of the Persian Gulf. States such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar do not have a coastline outside the Persian Gulf. Iran's major oil terminals are at the north-eastern end of the Persian Gulf, far distant from the Iranian coastline on the Gulf of Oman. The Strait of Hormuz is between thirty and fifty kilometres wide and is seen to be of great strategic importance primarily because about 20 per cent of the world's oil is transported through it. Over a hundred oil tankers pass through the strait every day, and medium- to long-term interruption to these oil supplies would cause considerable economic disruption for the United States, Western Europe and the industrial states of East Asia.

Western Europe and Japan are more dependent on oil from the Gulf than is the United States. But a major disruption of the oil-based economies of the pro-Western states in the region could have major, unattractive economic consequences for all the industrialised states over and above a dramatic drop in energy for the Western European and Japanese economies. Gulf Arab, pro-Western, oil-producing states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have become fully integrated actors in the world financial and economic system.

Kuwait now earns as much from overseas investments in developed industrial countries as it does from oil exports, and Saudi Arabia earns over 30 per cent of its gross national product from overseas financial assets. The oil-producing states of the Middle East, nearly all of which are in the Gulf region, constitute a large market for the capital, consumer goods and service industries of the industrial democracies. For the European Union, the Middle East comprises as big a market as the United States.

A wide variety of natural resources are to be found in the Middle East: for instance, iron ore in Egypt, phosphate in Jordan, Israel and Syria, chromite in Iran and Oman, and copper in Oman and Saudi Arabia. But rarely does production of such material exceed 2 per cent of global production, and often exploitation of known resources is not deemed commercially viable. Such resources are of little strategic significance to external powers. However, the Middle East has oil in abundance, and oil is of the highest strategic value to nearly every state in the international system, particularly to the advanced economies of the world. Even if there was no oil, the Middle East would still be of considerable geo-strategic importance for many of the reasons just discussed. However, the presence of vast, viable oil reserves makes the region, especially the Gulf, of profound geo-strategic importance. The strategic nature of the oil reserves, and the political impact of oil on the region, deserves separate consideration below, following analysis of the vexed and fundamental problem of political legitimacy in the Middle East.

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Popular doubts over the political legitimacy of many state boundaries and most regimes is the fundamental cause of much Middle East instability. The roots of this modern condition go back eighty years to the territorial and political settlements imposed on the region by the victorious Western powers following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War One.

For 400 years countries we know today as Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Israel and Kuwait were composed of provinces ruled from Istanbul. Parts of modern Saudi Arabia and Yemen were in this empire, as were, until nineteenth-century European imperial advance, Egypt, parts of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. Ottoman rule in the core Middle East prevailed for so long that notions of an Arab nation, or separate secular Arab states, were almost non-existent.

The Ottoman Empire's ill-advised alliance with the Central Powers in World War One led to its complete defeat and disintegration. The protection it had provided in the Middle East for centuries against European domination came to an end. Such a complete cataclysmic collapse allowed Christian, Western European imperial powers to impose their blueprint on the region, largely regardless of local wishes when such wishes could be identified and measured. This is not to suggest that British and French plans were logical and coherent. Such were the different actors, pressures and objectives to be accommodated, within a political vacuum, that even assuming the most altruistic of motives not everyone could be satisfied. Nevertheless, given the political tenor of the times and the normal behaviour of war victors, British and French strategic interests received clear priority.

In the core Middle East, as distinct from North Africa, Britain was the senior partner, reflecting its relatively greater strength after World War One and its deeper strategic interests in the region. British and French plans were shaped by commitments made during the exigencies of fighting the Great War. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915–16 between the Hashemite Arab leader in the Hejaz and the British High Commissioner in Cairo promised Arab independence if there was an Arab revolt against the Turks. In 1916 the Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Arab provinces into zones of permanent British and French influence while accepting the principle of Arab independence. The famous Balfour Declaration of 1917, announced in an effort to bring the Zionist movement behind the Allied war effort, promised a national home for Jews in Palestine without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of other inhabitants.

BOX 8.3 BREAK-UP OF TURKISH EMPIRE POST-FIRST WORLD WAR

- Hussein-McMahon correspondence, 1915–16: promise of Arab independence
- Sykes-Picot agreement, 1916: accepted principle of Arab independence but divided Arab provinces into zones of British and French influence
- Balfour Declaration, 1917: promised national home for Jews in Palestine
- Treaty of Lausanne, 1923: established borders of modern Turkey
- 1919–23: Britain and France largely impose borders

Two countries resisted imperial control with some degree of success. Against all the odds a cohesive Turkish state struggled out of the shambles of the Ottoman collapse. In 1920 the draconian Treaty of Sèvres proposed depriving Turkey of some of its richest provinces, dismembering Anatolia, and leaving the Sultan as a puppet ruler in a shrunken, creaking Turkish state at the mercy of its neighbours, not least Greece. The bitter Greek-Turkish war of 1920–2 saw Greek armies eventually driven from Anatolia and a portion of Turkish territory in eastern Thrace. Mustafa Kemal, later to be called Atatürk, was the Turkish general who turned the tide. The Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, replaced Sèvres, and the boundaries of the modern Turkish state were largely agreed then, with slight modifications later. Distinct losers were the Kurds who, under the Treaty of Sèvres, were promised a state of Kurdistan. Turkish borders, and those of Syria and Iraq, precluded the fulfilment of the Kurdish dream. The repercussions are evident to this day, with the brutal war in south-east Turkey between Marxist Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish army, and in northern Iraq where the Kurdish area requires international protection from the Iraqi army but is subject to internecine strife as well as occasional interventions by Turkish forces.

Persia was another country which managed, because of the emergence of a strong military leader, to retain a large degree of independence from Western imperial control. While neutral during the Great War, its territory was violated by the Russian-Turkish conflict. Persia was important to Britain as the first country to produce oil in the Middle

East. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP) led the way. Soon after the war the weak Persian government came under pressure from London and Moscow to agree to special relationships. In 1921, faced by the prospect of internal collapse, Colonel Reza Khan of the Persian Cossack Brigade launched a successful *coup d'état*. In 1925 he made himself Shah, and in 1935 changed Persia's name to Iran. Backed by an efficient army, he exercised an authoritarian control over the country and embarked on a modernisation programme similar to that of Turkey. By 1930 Persia was producing four times the oil of 1920, and was the world's fourth largest producer after the United States, Russia and Venezuela. In 1933 he managed to extract much-improved commercial terms from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Under the leadership of Reza Khan great power influence was kept at bay. But for the rest of the region Britain and, to a lesser extent, France led sway.

The frontiers of the modern Middle East largely correspond with those imposed by Britain and France in the period 1919–23, or bartered in co-operation with local warlords. Modern Iraq was created by Britain. Iraqi access to the waters of the Gulf was deliberately restricted, and the integrity of Kuwait as a separate political entity was sustained. Iraqi claims to Kuwait on the basis that it was formerly, until the nineteenth century, an integral part of the Ottoman province of Basra, were disregarded by the British. Limited access to the Gulf and the sense of being cheated out of Kuwait are deep-seated resentments which all Iraqi governments have carried to this day. Britain also exercised the guiding hand in formalising the borders of modern Saudi Arabia with Iraq and Kuwait. Ibn Saud was also obliged to yield territory in the far north of his domains when the port of Aqaba and a large portion of hinterland were ceded to the new territory of Transjordan, a separate political entity detached from Palestine by the British.

Following the Ottoman collapse Britain created the entity of Palestine. During the Ottoman rule there was no administrative entity called Palestine, but Britain wanted a territory in the Holy Land to act as a strategic buffer for Egypt and the Suez Canal. British Palestine was an amalgam of the Ottoman district to the south of Jerusalem, a southern portion of the province of Beirut, and the city of Jerusalem and its suburbs. Territory across the Jordan River, known as Transjordan (later Jordan) was hived off from the original Palestine as a separate autonomous emirate in 1923. Britain accepted responsibility for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine, but Transjordan was deemed exempt from that commitment. It became the independent state of Jordan in 1946. France, as agreed under the Sykes-Picot agreement, assumed control of territory known as Greater Syria, which included the area now known as Lebanon. In 1920 France enlarged the emirate of Mount Lebanon with territory from Syria, creating Greater Lebanon. In 1926 this became the Republic of Lebanon. Syria was divided into four administrative areas: Latakia, Jebel Druze, Aleppo and Damascus. The last two became Syria in 1924. Before nominal independence in 1941, the other two were added, but France had transferred the disputed district of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) to Turkey in 1939 to persuade Turkey not to align with Germany. Syria still lays claim to this productive piece of territory, and it remains a point of contention between Damascus and Ankara. Official Syrian maps show the district and city as still part of Syria.

The profound perception of illegitimacy was compounded to a degree difficult to exaggerate by the creation of the state of Israel on Arab soil. The existence and survival

of the Jewish state in the Middle East since 1948 has permeated nearly every feature of Middle East conflict for the past fifty years. In 1922 Jews comprised 11 per cent of the population of Palestine; by 1949 they comprised 30 per cent and had achieved an independent state. Between 1922 and 1948 a succession of British high commissioners failed to reconcile the conflicting national aspirations of the Jewish and Arab populations in the British mandated territory of Palestine. In contrast to its efforts in Iraq and Transjordan Britain did not—or was unable to—prepare the territory for independence. A large military presence was required to maintain civil order between the Jewish and Arab communities. Throughout the interwar period, Britain had to wrestle with its commitment to fulfil the Balfour Declaration, formalised by the League of Nations as part of the mandate, and its promises of self-government for the local Arab population. A surge of over 200,000 Jewish immigrants between 1932 and 1939 led to the Arab uprising of 1936–9, resulting in over 3,000 Arab, 300 Jewish and 130 British deaths. At this stage other Arab states began to take serious interest, and the cause of Palestine became a pan-Arab issue. Paradoxically, the closeness of some of the Arab states which evinced concern over Palestine to the imperial power apparently responsible for the betrayal of the Palestinian Arabs detracted from the legitimacy of the Arab rulers. A similar delegitimising condition was to apply to those conservative Arab states which, during the Cold War, claimed concern over the dispossessed Palestinians yet closely associated with Israel's major patron, the United States.

In 1937 the Peel Commission recommended partition, but this was rejected by Arab opinion. Prior to the Second World War Arab anxieties were calmed by the 1939 White Paper limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years. The war then diverted attention, but as soon as it was over Palestine re-emerged as a major issue and conflict resumed. In the early post-war years Britain found itself fighting both Arabs and Jews. For economic and military reasons it was unable to manage and gave notice that it was to relinquish the mandate in May 1948. In November 1947 the United Nations agreed to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. When, on 14 May 1948, the Palestinian Jews declared the independent state of Israel, surrounding Arab states rejected the UN resolution and declared war. Israel won the war and extended the new state beyond the UN partition lines. This new state did not occupy all of the Palestine mandate. An area around the city of Gaza on the Mediterranean coast fell under the control of Egypt, and a large part of the West Bank of the Jordan River, including half of Jerusalem, was annexed by Abdullah of Transjordan into his kingdom. After two millennia there was again a Jewish state. It was on historic ground, previously occupied by Arabs for centuries. Arab armies, with numbers very much in their favour, failed to defend the new Palestinian state. As Shlaim (1995) points out, Arabs call 1948 '*al-nakba*'—the catastrophe. The shame and humiliation of 1948 and the need to make amends and restore Arab pride have constituted the salient feature of instability in the Middle East since the Arab failure to destroy Israel at birth. That failure further undermined the legitimacy of the regimes put in place by the imperial powers.

BOX 8.4 CREATION OF ISRAEL

- 1922–48 League of Nations ‘mandate’ territories include Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan
- 1937 Peel Commission recommended partition—rejected by Arabs
- UK decision to relinquish mandate in May 1948
- November 1947 UN decision to partition Palestine into two
- 14 May 1948 Palestinian Jews declared independent state of Israel
- Arab states declare war but lose; Israel extends boundaries

BOX 8.5 ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

1948+1956 (Suez)+1967 (Six-Day War)+1973 (Yom Kippur War) +1982 (Israel/Lebanon)

The failure of the Arab states to defeat Israel in the subsequent wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, and to prevent the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the shelling of an Arab capital in 1982 exacerbated among the Arab peoples the distinct sense that their governments could not or would not punish the major crime against the Arab people. An intensely anti-Israeli posture is deemed a major legitimising factor by all radical Arab governments in the Middle East. Two years after the historic Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by members of his own army. His successor, President Mubarak, has always been under pressure from secular and, more recently, Islamist radicals for his support of accommodation with Israel. In 1995 he narrowly escaped assassination. In 1964, with the evident inability of the Arab states to recover Arab land in Palestine, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed from an amalgam of Palestinian groups opposed to Israel. In addition to direct action, the PLO appealed over the heads of Arab governments to ordinary Arabs, especially following the abject failure of Arab armies in the Six-Day War of 1967. Israel’s stunning military victory saw it take control of the Sinai peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights overshadowing the Galilee valley, and the whole of the West Bank, including the half of Jerusalem which Israel had not previously occupied. In many ways the 1967 defeat was as cataclysmic as that in 1948. The Arab governments were prostrate beneath outstanding Israeli military and political success.

Following the 1973 October war, Egypt did recover the Sinai peninsula in the 1979 treaty. Israel had never had territorial ambitions in the Sinai. But until the recent watershed Israeli-Palestinian peace process which began in 1993, Israel ruled over the rest of the territory acquired in 1967. It has annexed Arab East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights to Israeli sovereign territory, and over 100,000 Jews have built settlements on the West Bank. Since 1993 Gaza and most Arab populations in the West Bank have been granted limited Palestinian self-government, but Israel still controls over 70 per cent of

the territory of the West Bank.

The Middle East is the most undemocratic region in the world. Excluding Turkey at present, Israel and arguably Yemen, no Middle East state exercises a democratic system on the Western liberal, pluralist model. Except in Lebanon, no Arab head of state has changed by democratic means for a generation. The average tenure of Arab leaders is over twenty years. Jordan has made limited, tentative steps with elections to the Lower House since 1989, but real executive and legislative power is retained by the King, his appointed cabinet and the appointed Senate. In Egypt, Syria and Tunisia parliaments and some tame opposition parties exist. But governments remain in power by blatant vote-rigging and coercion. In the 1997 Iranian presidential election over 200 candidates were barred from standing, leaving the electorate with the choice between two mullahs. In Kuwait, since the Gulf War, there have been elections to the National Assembly of fifty representatives. Only adult males who can trace their family origins back to the emirate in 1920 may vote. This means an electorate of only 100,000. Political parties are banned, and the government is appointed by the emir. Where parliaments or national assemblies do exist in the Middle East they are normally powerless creatures of the government, and perform largely symbolic functions. The absence of political legitimacy, which so weakened the subsystem in its early years, continues to this day.

OIL

If for no other reason, the Middle East, largely the Gulf, would be of immense strategic importance to the great powers and their allies as a leading source of world oil production. Over the past thirty years oil has brought great wealth to parts of the Middle East, but not to others. Countries bordering the Gulf, and Libya in North Africa, have been the primary beneficiaries, and nearly all of the income has been kept for the benefit of the rulers and sometimes the peoples of the oil-producing states. Declaratory support for pan-Arabism has not extended to the equitable sharing of vast oil revenues among all Arab peoples. This has created deep resentment between the states and among many Arab people who feel themselves dispossessed of Arab wealth. Such perceptions have contributed to a sense of the illegitimacy of the prevailing order.

BOX 8.6 WORLD OIL PRODUCTION, 1996

3,361.6 million tonnes=69.68 million barrels daily	
Middle East	29.2 per cent
Former Soviet Union	10.5 per cent
Latin America	9.3 per cent
Africa	10.7 per cent
Asia and Australasia	10.8 per cent
Total	70.5 per cent
North America	19.7 per cent

Europe	9.8 per cent
Total	29.4 per cent

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1997

The relatively small populations of the developed industrial world consume by far the largest share of world oil. In 1995 North America, Europe (excluding the former Soviet Union), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan consumed 65.7 per cent of world oil. The rest of the world, including the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, consumed 34.3 per cent. Currently the Middle East, in particular the Gulf, is producing just less than one-third of the world's oil. This is less than the combined totals of the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa, and Asia and Australasia. The Middle East is producing about 80 per cent more oil than it did ten years ago, but about 10 per cent less than it did in 1979. Over the past twenty years the oil industry has experienced a period of great turbulence. In 1973–4, dissatisfied with a long regime of low prices, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled oil prices. The Arab countries were the leaders of this world-wide organisation which included members from Latin America, Africa and Asia. The primary motivation for the price hike was economic, and it followed nearly three years of intermittent negotiation with the Western oil companies. A political dimension was added by the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The OPEC price rises allowed the Arab oil states to claim supportive pressure on behalf of the Arab cause. This move took place at a time when demand was surging, and over 60 per cent of the non-communist world's oil supply was provided by OPEC, 80 per cent of it from the Middle East and North Africa.

BOX 8.7 WORLD OIL CONSUMPTION, 1996

Total: 3,312.8 million tonnes

North America	29.8 per cent
Europe	22.3 per cent
Australia	1.3 per cent
Japan	8.1 per cent
South Korea	3.1 per cent
Taiwan	1.1 per cent
Middle East	5.7 per cent
Africa	3.3 per cent
Latin America	6.1 per cent
Rest of Asia	13.2 per cent
Former Soviet Union	6.0 per cent

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1997

In the late 1970s, as the industrial world was emerging from the economic depression provoked by the earlier price rises, demand again surged. But at the same time the Iranian revolution caused a sharp drop in oil production. OPEC took advantage of the situation to double prices. Again there was economic recession in the industrialised world, and energy conservation programmes were initiated. Other oil producers came on to the market, for instance Britain and Norway. Between 1973 and 1979 non-OPEC oil production in the non-communist world increased by 20 per cent, and between 1979 and 1988 by a further 27 per cent. As a consequence OPEC's share of non-communist world oil production fell to 40 per cent in 1985, 60 per cent of which came from the Middle East.

BOX 8.8 OIL

OPEC: 1973–60 per cent of non-communist world's oil supply
from OPEC

1985–40 per cent of non-communist world's oil supply
from OPEC

Prices per barrel: 1981 \$35; 1986<\$10; early 1988 \$16; late 1988
\$13; 1990 \$20; late 1990s<\$20

Saudi Revenues: 1984 \$50 billion; 1987 \$25 billion

Oil prices tumbled from a high of over \$35 a barrel in 1981 to lower than \$10 in 1986, recovering to around \$16 a barrel by early 1988, but then tumbling again in late 1988 to around \$13 a barrel. From their peak of \$287 billion in 1980, OPEC revenues fell to \$232 billion in 1985. Saudi Arabia, the major OPEC producer, saw its oil revenues virtually halved from around \$50 billion in 1984 to \$25 billion in 1987. It was OPEC's effort to recapture its lost share of the world market of 1986 by boosting production that resulted in a large surplus of oil on world markets and the dramatic plummeting of oil prices by 70 per cent in six months. The clear lesson was that undisciplined flooding of the world oil markets would merely cause prices to fall dramatically.

Subsequent efforts by OPEC to introduce production quotas and drive oil prices back up in the late 1980s were not successful. Only in 1990, as a result of the Gulf crisis, did oil break the \$20-a-barrel mark. Indeed, a contributing factor to the Gulf War was Iraq's exasperation at Kuwaiti flouting of the OPEC quotas. Iraq wanted an effective quota system to increase oil prices to a level which would help Iraq to recover from its debilitating eight-year war with Iran between 1980 and 1988. But even if OPEC could have exerted effective production discipline over its members, the world oil-producing community extends beyond OPEC. Non-OPEC countries such as Norway, Britain and Mexico are producing at levels outside any OPEC control. In 1995 Norwegian production was nearly twice that of 1989, and Britain's production was 30 per cent more than in 1989. Mexico's production has been largely stable throughout the 1990s, at a volume greater than that of Norway.

Currently, OPEC cannot control world production. It is economic realism rather than

organisational discipline which is controlling OPEC's contribution to world oil production. World production which allows a target of about \$20 a barrel is the policy. This is seen to provide enough revenue for the oil producers without creating an economic recession among customers. In the mid- to late 1990s prices were hovering just below \$20, occasionally nudging the target. In real terms this means that the cost of oil is less than half of what it was in 1979. There is no shortage of world oil, and producers wish to avoid a glut. Challenges on the horizon to this regime include the return of Iraq to the oil market as a major producer when post-Gulf War economic sanctions are completely removed, and the need to accommodate the likely production increases from Caspian oilfields.

Given that there is plenty of oil, that oil is relatively cheap, and that the Middle East countries of OPEC account for only about 30 per cent of current world oil production, why does oil continue to be such an important strategic feature in any consideration of the Middle East? The answer is to be found in an analysis of world oil reserves and production trends. It is reckoned that at the end of 1996 OPEC accounted for 76.1 per cent of the world's proved oil reserves. The Middle East members of OPEC accounted for nearly 65.2 per cent of the world's proved reserves.

BOX 8.9 YEARS OF PROVED RESERVES AT CURRENT PRODUCTION, 1996, AND PERCENTAGE SHARE OF WORLD TOTAL

	Years	%
Middle East	92.1	65.2
Latin America	36.1	7.6
Africa	25.0	6.4
Asia and Australasia	15.7	4.1
Former Soviet Union	25.5	6.4
North America	18.1	8.3
Europe	8.2	2.0

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1997

A paradox of the world oil market is that cheap oil, while attractive to economic growth, reduces the proved oil reserves, i.e. economically viable oil reserves, of the non-OPEC world because, by and large, non-OPEC oil is more expensive to produce, costing as much as \$12 a barrel to extract in a difficult location such as the North Sea or Alaska. Saudi Arabian crude oil costs about \$3 a barrel to extract from under the desert.

Not only do the Gulf states enjoy possession of the lion's share of proved world oil reserves, but with examination of the years of reserves remaining at current production levels, i.e. reserves/production ratio, the strategic importance of Middle East oil is elevated even higher. Saudi Arabia, which holds over 30 per cent of Middle East oil reserves, and a quarter of world reserves, is a state of peculiar strategic importance to the industrialised world. Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and the UAE each have about 16 to 17 per cent of

Middle East proved oil reserves. If Saddam Hussein's armies had been allowed to remain in Kuwait in 1991 then he would have been in direct control of over 30 per cent of the Middle East's proved reserves, and would have been in a position to intimidate Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states which account for a further 50 per cent of the region's proved reserves.

BOX 8.10 YEARS OF MIDDLE EAST OIL PROVED RESERVES, 1996, AND PERCENTAGE SHARE OF WORLD TOTAL

	Years	%
Saudi Arabia	83.4	25.2
Iraq	100+	10.8
Kuwait	100+	9.3
Iran	69.1	9.0
United Arab Emirates	100+	9.4
Oman	15.8	0.5
Qatar	22.5	0.4
Yemen	30.0	0.4
Syria	11.3	0.2

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1997

Assuming a relatively low oil price, the above picture portrays an alarming future of energy vulnerability for many industrialised countries, not least the United States. Over the past decade American dependence on imported oil has increased. In 1988 it produced about 70 per cent of its oil requirements; ten years later the figure was less than 50 per cent. It looks quite probable that by early next century OPEC could again be the dominant actor in the world oil market, when the increased number of industrialised countries in the West, Asia and South America will be scrambling for a share of the same pool of oil. This raises some very important questions and issues. Would or could the economies of the industrialised world again adapt to a high energy-price environment, while next time avoiding a major recession? Should the governments of the industrialised democracies risk the wrath of electorates which enjoy cheap oil at present by taxing imported oil in order to reduce consumption and encourage exploitation and development of the more expensive home-extracted product? What will Russia, China and potentially India do to gain access to oil for their rapidly developing economies early next century? These are issues of national strategic importance which are going to have to be faced by governments over the next few years. Whatever policies are decided, good working relations with the oil-rich states of the volatile Middle East will be a crucial priority.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

Throughout the Cold War years successive international initiatives were taken to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, but success was rare and limited. Following the spectacular Israeli victory in 1967 President Johnson set out five principles for an Arab-Israeli settlement. These comprised the removal of threats to any nation in the region, justice for refugees, freedom of navigation, an end to the arms race and respect for the independence and territory of all states in the area. UN Resolution 242 of November 1967 reflected the Johnson principles, and formed the basis for all subsequent peace moves. The resolution recognised 'the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats and acts of force'. Acceptance by Egypt and Jordan was an important recognition of Israel's right to exist. That there should be a 'just settlement of the refugee problem' was an Israeli concession to the Palestinians. But, as Fraser (1995) makes clear, the core of the resolution and the matter over which there would be continuing dispute was the future shape of any peace settlement. Such a settlement was to include 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict'. Whether this meant some territories or all territories is argued to this day.

In 1979 President Sadat of Egypt converted *de facto* recognition of Israel into a *de jure* reality. Egypt became the first Arab country to risk formal relations with Israel. The new, right-wing Likud government of Menachem Begin was committed to retaining the West Bank, which Begin saw in biblical terms as 'Judea' and 'Samaria' and as such ordained to become part of Israel. Such dogma, however, did not apply to the Sinai peninsula. Encouraged and sponsored by President Carter, Egypt and Israel reached terms for an agreement in 1979. Sadat had wanted a comprehensive agreement, with Israel returning to 1967 borders and a homeland provided for the Palestinians. Begin aimed for a bilateral agreement with Egypt, the leading Arab state, while giving up nothing of substance on the West Bank or in Gaza. The outcome of very tough bargaining was the March 1979 treaty which delivered to Israel recognition from and peace with Egypt, and gave Egypt back its lost territory in Sinai. The treaty contained commitments to progress towards autonomy for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, but no firm, enforceable plans. Throughout the Arab world Egypt's move was seen as a betrayal, a view loudly echoed by the new radical government of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League until 1989, and Sadat was assassinated by some of his own troops in 1981. The 1979 treaty was the first essential step to any Arab-Israeli détente but it only seemed to deepen Arab rancour and frustration.

In 1981 Israel attacked and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak; later that year the Golan Heights, captured in 1967, were formally declared Israeli sovereign territory; and in June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. Ostensibly the objective of the Lebanon invasion was to clear Palestinian terrorists from up to forty kilometres inside southern Lebanon. The real objective was to destroy the Palestinian strength throughout Lebanon, discredit the PLO in the occupied territories and install a pro-Israeli Christian Arab government in Beirut which would sign a treaty similar to that Israel had concluded with Egypt. The Israeli army actually drove on to Beirut and besieged it, and its forces did not

withdraw from most of Lebanon until 1985. In effect, the Israeli invasion opened a Pandora's box of political and military problems. As a fighting force the PLO was expelled from Lebanon, and politically it did lose much credit on the West Bank. But a peace treaty of May 1983 between Lebanon and Israel was never signed by the Lebanese president and lapsed in May 1984. Lebanon's civil war, under way since 1975, was deeply exacerbated. The poorer Shia population in Lebanon, in the form of Hezbollah—the party of God—vehemently opposed the Israeli presence, and continues to attack the narrow Israeli security corridor extending fifteen kilometres or so inside southern Lebanon to this day. The large Syrian military presence inside Lebanon since 1976 makes sure that no government in Beirut is pro-Israeli, and controls the activities of the Iranian-funded Hezbollah as a bargaining chip for negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights.

By 1989, the picture was not promising for the PLO. Twenty-five years after its foundation it had not recovered any Palestinian territory or forced any meaningful political concessions from Israel. Egypt, the leading Arab state, had recognised Israel and agreed a peace treaty. Cairo appeared willing to tolerate Israeli annexation of Arab territory, Israeli attacks upon Arab states and Israeli blocking of any progress towards meeting the 1979 treaty commitments to address the Palestinian issue. Following expulsion from Beirut in 1982, the PLO headquarters was on the edge of the Arab world in Tunis. The superpowers were focused on winding down the Cold War peacefully, not sorting out the Arab-Israeli problem. The Soviet Union, patron of radical, anti-Israeli states such as Syria, was in steep, terminal decline. Between 1980 and 1988 Iran and Iraq, both PLO allies, had been engaged in a bitter, total war, which left both severely weakened economically and militarily at the end of the decade. The Gulf Arab oil states were struggling to meet domestic social and economic expectations from reduced oil revenues, and were more anxious about threats from militant Islam than about the plight of the PLO. In August 1990, following Saddam Hussein's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, Yasser Arafat and the PLO made a grave strategic mistake by supporting Iraq.

BOX 8.11 KEY DATES IN PEACE PROCESS

- 1967 President Johnson of the US enumerates five principles;
UN Resolution 242
- 1979 Egyptian formal diplomatic recognition of Israel; 'Camp
David' agreement
- 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; PLO expelled from Beirut
- 1991 Madrid talks
- 1992 Change of government in Israel
- 1993 'Oslo Accords'
- 1996 Likud party into government

Reflecting the new world order, for which it was claimed the Gulf War of 1991 was being fought, President Bush promised a serious political effort to address the Arab-Israeli issue. It was obvious to many Arabs that the United States was prepared to take great risks to secure the principle of Kuwaiti independence but not to secure Palestinian independence. To deflect such criticism the United States (officially together with the disintegrating Soviet Union) sponsored the Madrid multilateral talks on security in the Middle East. Israel agreed, under American pressure, to meet with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. It would not meet with the PLO, but accepted that Palestinians from the occupied territories could be part of a Jordanian delegation. UN Resolution 242 was the basis for the conference. Following the Madrid meetings, and outside the Middle East, Israel met bilaterally with the three Arab delegations to discuss a range of matters, including economic and political issues as well as security. Amongst the Arab members there was an understanding that no separate deals would be done, but that a comprehensive settlement was the objective. Between 1991 and 1993 there was little progress. The conservative Likud government of Yitzak Shamir was hostile to any deals, but the general election of June 1992 returned a more flexible Labour government led by former general and prime minister Yitzak Rabin, with Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister. Following initial contacts made through the Madrid process, but outside its remit, secret Israeli-PLO negotiations in 1993 produced the surprise and historic September 1993 agreement reached in Oslo.

The September 1993 agreement was a watershed. The PLO, the official representative of the Palestinian people, accepted the existence of a state of Israel. Israel accepted the concept of Palestinian self-government—though not yet sovereignty—in lands occupied by Israel since 1967, and also accepted the right of the PLO to be considered the representative of the Palestinian people. The 1993 agreement set out enclaves of Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho as a first step, while Israel retained responsibility for security in the rest of the West Bank and around the enclaves. In return the PLO would peacefully coexist with Israel and reject terrorism. Promises were made to remove sections of the Palestinian National Charter which denied Israel's right to exist.

BOX 8.12 THE OSLO ACCORDS

- PLO accepts existence of state of Israel
- Israel accepts concept of Palestinian self-government in 'occupied territories' (i.e. territory gained by Israel in 1967 war)
- Israel accepts PLO as representative of the Palestinian people
- enclaves of Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho
- Israel responsible for security in rest of West Bank and around enclaves
- PLO rejects terrorism and agrees to remove sections of Palestinian National Charter which deny Israel's right to exist
- Delayed implementation
- Final phase—most difficult issues: permanent status of East Jerusalem+West Bank settlements+refugee issue+question of nature of Palestinian entity
- Nothing agreed unless all agreed

Disputes over details, and terrorist incidents by dissidents on both sides, delayed implementation of the first phase until May 1994 when Israeli forces withdrew from Gaza (except for the protection of small settlements) and Jericho. A second interim agreement, lasting five years, was supposed to proceed from the election of a council for the self-governing areas in July 1994. No later than the third year of the interim agreement, July 1997, permanent status negotiations were planned to begin covering such crucial issues as the fate of East Jerusalem, the question of settlements on the West Bank, the rights of refugees and the final nature of the new Palestinian entity. Difficulties of negotiation, further terrorism and an overall lack of political trust all contributed to delays to the timetable. The Taba agreement of 1995 extended Palestinian self-government over most of the population centres of the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem, by March 1996. In January the long-delayed elections to the Palestinian Council were held, and Yasser Arafat's Fatah branch of the PLO won 66 of the 88 seats on a 90 per cent turnout. There was a separate election for president which Arafat won with 88 per cent of the vote. The Israeli military withdrawals from populated areas of the West Bank were delayed by security concerns arising from the terrorism of opponents to the agreements. But, by late 1997, the Palestinian National Authority exercised internal control over all major towns and villages on the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, but Israel remained in control of 70 per cent of the territory.

The terrorism which hindered the implementation of the agreements was largely perpetrated by Hamas, and the smaller Islamic Jihad, both splinter groups from the Muslim Brotherhood. Hoping to create dissent among the Israeli population, suicide bombers waged a campaign against Israeli civilian targets such as buses and cafés. Arafat's unwillingness, or inability, to tackle the terrorists within their own base areas in the autonomous territories created deep misgivings within Israeli society. Some felt Israel had been betrayed by the September agreement, and one of those assassinated Prime

Minister Rabin in November 1995. The deep unease over the security implications of Israel living beside a resentful Palestinian autonomous entity resulted in a surprise election victory for the conservative Likud and allies in the general election of May 1996. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised a much firmer approach to security and a tougher line in negotiations with the PLO. However, this courted the danger of fuelling public Palestinian support for Hamas, and disaffecting those in the PLO who thought a reasonable deal could be struck with Israel. The September 1993 agreement and subsequent arrangements were historic but did not bring peace and stability to Palestinian-Israeli relations. Many Israelis and Palestinians abhor the agreements and view them as deep betrayals. The agreements have raised numerous points of contention which seem very difficult to resolve—for instance, the future of the 120,000 Israeli settlers on the West Bank and the status of East Jerusalem as either capital of a Palestinian entity or part of the Israeli city of Jerusalem.

The September agreement also upset President Assad of Syria. He assumed that no deal would be done with Israel which was not comprehensive, as agreed by the Madrid process. Such a comprehensive deal ought to have included the recovery of the Golan Heights by Syria. The surprise, separate Palestinian-Israeli agreement made no reference to Syria. As a consequence the state which posed the clearest military threat to Israel has been against the agreement since its announcement. Even if, as is unlikely in the short to medium term, the PLO and Israel were to resolve all their disputes amicably, the total opposition of Syria would leave any bargain very vulnerable and would militate against real stability in the region. Since 1994 tentative on-off talks, sponsored by the United States, have taken place between Syria and Israel over the Golan issue. No agreement had been reached by the end of 1998. A *de facto* war over the Golan has been waged in southern Lebanon. Syria controls the flow of Iranian aid to the Hezbollah guerrillas who attack Israel's slim security zone on the far side of its northern border with Lebanon. If Israel withdraws from the Golan, which it annexed in 1981 and where 15,000 Israeli settlers comprise the majority of the population, then Syria can hold out the prospect of stopping the Hezbollah attacks. Between late 1996 and its fall from power in early summer 1999 the Netanyahu government in Israel had insisted on a 'Lebanon first' policy. It also argued that Syria must stop Hezbollah attacks, and then Israel would negotiate on the Golan issue. The fall of the Netanyahu-led Likud government and its replacement by a Labour-led coalition under Prime Minister Ehud Barak changed the atmosphere and the prospects for progress, with concessions seeming possible from all sides.

Nor do all other Arab states give clear support. Egypt and Jordan are two exceptions. President Mubarak sees the September 1993 agreement as the beginning of the fulfilment of pledges regarding the Palestinians contained in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. At difficult times in PLO-Israeli relations since 1993 President Mubarak has made public efforts to bring both sides together and reach a compromise. King Hussain moved very quickly to align Jordan to the new breakthrough of 1993. In October 1994 Israel and Egypt signed a treaty granting Israel recognition and addressing some Israeli-Jordanian territorial, water and economic issues. At difficult times King Hussain also used his good offices to contribute to Palestinian-Israeli détente. Both the Egyptian and the Jordanian governments are committed to and entangled in the new Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

Should it all fail then the future of the regimes in Cairo and Amman must be in doubt. They have every interest in making the process succeed. But some other Arab governments have opposite interests.

Being implacably opposed to Israel has been a legitimising factor for regimes in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Libya, as well as Syria. These states constitute what is commonly known as the Rejectionist Front. Iran, with its militant Islamist political character, is the most voluble and virulent in its propaganda against the 1993 agreement, the existence of Israel and the associated American patronage which it deems makes it all possible and accounts for many other evils in the Middle East. The Rejectionist Front does not have a coherent, centrally planned strategy, and some of these states are rivals. But the common message against Israel gives encouragement to all those who oppose Israel, the PLO's compromise and the dominance of American influence in the region. Many of the more moderate—in Western eyes—Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and Morocco, quietly welcome the Israeli-Palestinian détente but fear that formal alignment could provoke internal dissent and external vilification. The existence of Israel, and its relationship with the Palestinians and most of the Arab world, looks set to contribute to regional insecurity for some time to come.

MILITANT ISLAM

Islamic fundamentalism, as manifested by the bombers of Hamas inside Israel, the belligerence of Hezbollah and the nature of the regime in Iran since the revolution of 1979, has created anxiety and alarm in many parts of the Middle East and in much of the rest of the international system. Through many Western eyes, and for many governments in the Muslim world, the scale and the ferocity of the contemporary Islamist political challenge has now put the threat at the top of the security agenda.

Islamic fundamentalism is the popular but inaccurate term used to describe a contemporary brand of militant, political Islamic behaviour. For many years a conservative brand of Islamic fundamentalism has been present in the Muslim world, but traditionally it has restricted itself to non-political affairs or it has worked in support of the incumbent government. The most complete example of the latter is Saudi Arabia. This is the most fundamentalist state in the Muslim world, where the religious and political systems are inextricably linked and legitimise each other. But Saudi fundamentalism is deeply respectful of the domestic social status quo and has no radical foreign policy objectives towards other Muslim states.

Contemporary political Islamic revivalism is radical, militant, pan-Islamic and non-status quo. Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to conceptualise contemporary political Islam as monolithic, centrally controlled, with a coherent set of universally agreed political objectives. On the contrary, it is diverse in character with a range of differing and sometimes competitive political and religious objectives. The language of prayer and scripture is Arabic, but the majority of Muslims are non-Arabic, from Asia and Africa. Within Islam there is the clear divide between the Sunni and the Shia branches, deeply rooted in events following the Prophet's death over 1,000 years ago. Within the broad Sunni and Shia creeds there are many sects. Most Muslims are Sunni, but the majority in

Iraq and Iran and large sections in Lebanon and Yemen are Shia. There is no centralised, religious hierarchy and no world Islamic leader.

BOX 8.13 BRANDS OF ISLAM

- Conservative—traditional, non-political, domestically status-quo orientated, no radical foreign policy
- Revivalist—radical, pan-Islamic, non-status quo: rejection of Western secular systems and support for Sharia (Islamic law) as basis of state law; but divided: Arab and non-Arab, and Sunni and Shia

While diverse in character, there are two common themes to contemporary, militant, political Islam. One is support for the Sharia—Islamic law—as the basis for state law in Islamic societies. This is the weaker of the two themes as some movements, such as Al-Nahda in Tunisia, insist they support a more liberal interpretation than other movements, such as the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. The dominant common theme through the Middle East and North Africa is that of rejection of Western modes of secular government and economic and social organisation.

Some of the secular governments of those states with Muslim populations, in particular Algeria and Egypt, have come under severe domestic pressure from militant Islam in the 1990s as no state has experienced since the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979. These pressures have arisen from the successive failure of a Westernised mode of government to deliver self-proclaimed objectives such as economic prosperity, fair government, social justice, pan-Arab unity and the defeat of Israel. The increasing dependence of these corrupt, authoritarian regimes on Western economic and military aid in order to defy domestic and external opponents compounds de-legitimisation of the ruling classes in the eyes of the general population. The authoritarian nature of many of these governments has inhibited conventional political opposition and fuelled grass-roots resentment and frustration. These feelings have been channelled into radical, political Islam as the only vehicle of opposition to secular authoritarianism. It is probably more accurate to see Islam as a rallying point for basic political and economic grievances rather than the hard-edged, driving force for conflict. If the social and political system is flexible enough to accommodate active, legitimate political participation by Islamists, then the hard edge of political Islam may be blunted.

But the fear in Egypt and Algeria is that serious attempts to incorporate Islamist political activity in democracy in their countries would lead to a rapid and tough Islamisation of their societies. Indeed, it was the very success of the Algerian FIS in the December 1991 elections that led the Algerian authorities to abandon the 1992 elections when a sweeping FIS victory seemed inevitable. Since then a bloody civil war between the Algerian secular government, with its power base in the army, and the militant Islamists has resulted in over 60,000 deaths.

In 1979 the world was shaken by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the advent of an atavistic, Islamic-revivalist government in Tehran. Iran is the largest and most influential

country in the Middle East ruled on an Islamic model, but Sudan and Afghanistan are other examples. From a Western perspective they appear very unattractive role models. But that is to underestimate the significance attached by the ordinary people of the Middle East, especially in the overcrowded cities, to the achievement of discarding Western, secular domination. The sheer survival of the Iranian political system, and its efforts, against many odds, to project influence beyond its borders, serves as inspiration in the slums and refugee camps of Cairo, Gaza and Lebanon.

While notions of a concerted, global conspiracy are misplaced, militant pressure is clearly, and often brutally, evident in certain countries. Since the early 1990s, militant Islamist behaviour has created distinct Western anxieties about threats to economic and strategic interests, the potential toppling of pro-Western governments, and subsequent mass migration to Western Europe to escape illiberal social systems and inexperienced and incompetent economic management. France has made it clear that an Iranian-style government in Algeria, barely 300 miles from Marseilles, is not welcome, and has insisted that this is a problem for the whole European Union. At the November 1995 Barcelona Conference of twenty-seven countries from the European Union, the Middle East and North Africa, it was agreed that between 1995 and 1999 the EU would grant \$6 billion in economic assistance to a range of North African and Middle Eastern states.

**BOX 8.14 EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE,
BARCELONA, 1995**

- 27 states (15 EU+12 Mediterranean states)
- created Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
- three baskets: political and security+economic issues+social, cultural and humanitarian
- economic basket: moves towards 'Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone' by 2010, economic co-operation and increased financial assistance; aid package of \$6 billion over four years to create 'an area of shared prosperity'?

It is hoped that such generosity, boosted by bilateral arrangements such as economic aid from France to Algeria, will help to dilute the economic grievances which contribute to militant Islam. At the summit Western European countries also expressed hopes that political reform would proceed as an antidote to militant Islam, but no timetables were set. To date, no serious democratic reforms have occurred in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Elections, from which the FIS remained excluded, have been held in Algeria but there has been no change of government. The bloody civil war looks set to continue, with hundreds killed every month. The challenge in Egypt is much less severe, and very strict policing has contained the militant threat to a mere fraction of the Algerian problem. Nevertheless, the government apparatus is often a target and must always remain on alert.

Countries where militant Islamists are in control of government, specifically, Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan, are experiencing very troubled times, and prospects for peace,

stability and prosperity in these societies look very bleak. Yet the very existence of these governments, and the aura of corruption and failure which surrounds the secular governments in the Middle East, will continue to inspire many young Muslims to support contemporary, militant Islamic politics. What the West should do to sustain peace and stability in these societies continues to perplex Western policy-makers. Economic aid to struggling secular governments is one option. Countries such as France and Spain view the Islamist challenge in North Africa as the most serious external threat in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. The United States continues to view Egypt, strategically, as a pivotal country in the Middle East despite the end of the Cold War. Clearly, if Egypt fell to militant Islam then Arab-Israeli relations would be set back decades and international security conditions in the region would be transformed. Egypt, with Israel, continues to top the list of American overseas-aid recipients.

LOCALE OF WAR, GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND UN ACTIVITY

At its core and on its peripheries, the Middle East is the most belligerent region in the world. The primary factors contributing to this condition have been examined throughout this chapter, and most look set to continue for some time. The conflict and tensions of the recent past and the present are such that contiguous regions, and often the rest of the world, cannot remain immune. Between 1948 and 1991 the Middle East experienced five Arab-Israeli wars and two Gulf wars. In addition to the major international conflicts, the region has suffered smaller, sub-regional wars, often within states but with some external intervention. In North Yemen a civil war between royalists and republicans raged from 1962 until 1970. From 1962 until 1967 Egyptian forces assisted the republicans and, from 1963, Saudi forces backed the royalists. Fighting occurred between Egyptian and Saudi forces. Egypt withdrew after its military debacle against Israel in 1967, and Saudi Arabia stopped backing the royalists in 1969. In 1970, after 200,000 deaths and setbacks to both the leftist republicans and royalists, a compromise conservative republican coalition, including some royalists, emerged as the government. A very hostile relationship existed between North Yemen and South Yemen, the Marxist state which succeeded the British colony of Aden. In 1990, with the collapse of Soviet patronage, South Yemen unified with the more populist North Yemen. This hasty union, which brought the political leaders of the North into a dominant relationship over those of the South, led to civil war in 1994. Northern forces were successful, and the political elite in Ṣan'ā rather than Aden dominates the country. Elections, recognised as among the most free in the Arab world, have legitimised this power structure. However, in demographic and political terms, the new Yemen is a challenge to Saudi power in the Arabian peninsula, and relations between the two are very uncomfortable. Historic boundary problems are often the focus of tension and occasional clashes, but the fundamental problems are deeply strategic and political.

BOX 8.15 WARS

Five Arab-Israel+two Gulf Wars (Iran/Iraq 1980–8 and 1991 war against Iraq)+Yemen+Kurds

In another corner of the Middle East the struggle of the Kurds—a nation of 15 million people without a state—is another example of internal conflict with international dimensions. Since the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, denied the Kurds their own state there has been a succession of struggles against Iran, Iraq and Turkey by Kurdish factions or coalitions in an effort to achieve greater autonomy. To date, the record is one of betrayal, pain and disaster. Most recently, in 1991, the Kurds attempted to capitalise on Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War to carve out an independent region in northern Iraq. Saddam Hussein turned his substantial surviving military forces against the Kurdish revolt and crushed it brutally. World opinion was outraged and UN Security Council Resolution 688 authorised US, British and French forces, based in Turkey, to provide protection and famine relief to the Kurdish region in Iraq. Across the border, in south-east Turkey, the government has been fighting a Kurdish insurgency since 1986. The Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK, has been pressing for autonomy. The campaign has been bloody, with over 20,000 deaths. Since 1992 large Turkish forces, often up to 50,000 strong, have intervened into northern Iraq in search-and-destroy operations against PKK personnel and bases. Syrian assistance to the PKK exacerbates poor Turkish-Syrian relations over Euphrates water, old territorial disputes and very close Turkish-Israeli military relations since 1993.

The collapse of the Soviet Union's global struggle with the United States left Washington as the victor of the Cold War. One of the spoils of war was an unprecedented hegemony by an external power in the Middle East. One local consequence was the effort by Saddam Hussein to rearrange the regional internal strategic balance in Iraq's favour before the imminent collapse of Soviet power. He hoped to capitalise on the uncertainties created by the disintegration of the old world order before the United States came to terms with a new world role, not least in the Middle East. This strategic initiative nearly worked. In January 1991, five months after Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, the US Senate narrowly voted 52–47 to authorise the US use of force to liberate Kuwait. Impressive military success in the Gulf War complemented the dominant political position of the United States following the Cold War.

The demise of Soviet power, and the subsequent weakness of Russia, meant there was no great power threat to the United States. Key states in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel and Jordan can only be confident of national security if underwritten by the United States and its Western allies. Presently, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have long, bilateral defence agreements with the United States, Britain and France. Such security arrangements are preferred to any defence alignment with large Arab states. The Damascus Declaration of March 1991 raised the prospect of an Arab collective-defence arrangement incorporating Egypt, Syria and the Gulf Arab monarchies. Underpinning this plan was the notion that economic assistance to Egypt and

Syria would be reciprocated by Egyptian and Syrian military power deployed to protect the vulnerable Gulf states. Agreeing economic details proved difficult, and the Gulf states revealed their true preference by opting for defence links with non-Arab, non-Muslim Western powers.

However, victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War have not translated into harmonious 'pax Americana' in the Middle East. American dominance is challenged by so-called 'rogue' states, unwilling to conform to American regional objectives. From the fall of the Shah of Iran, America's close ally, in 1979, the Islamist regime in Iran has opposed any Muslim accommodation with Israel and the dominant American influence over the Gulf Arab states. Anti-Americanism has been a distinguishing and legitimising feature of the Iranian regime, and it is suspected of responsibilities for a range of terrorist attacks against American personnel in the region. The US State Department list of states which sponsor terrorism includes Iran, Libya, Iraq, Sudan and Syria. Under American law, the US government must veto any request by countries on the list for loans or economic assistance from any international financial body, such as the International Monetary Fund, of which the United States is a member. Washington has difficulties in constructing a coalition against these rogue states, despite anxieties over their links with terrorism and apparent evidence of intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Throughout much of the 1990s the United States imposed an unprecedented campaign of 'dual containment' against Iran and Iraq. Economic sanctions were in place against both states in an effort to induce behaviour less threatening to American and Gulf Arab perceptions of security in the region. However, many Western European states with valuable trade links with Iran preferred a 'critical dialogue' with the Tehran regime rather than tight economic sanctions. This same European attitude applies towards Libya, which is also subject to American economic sanctions. Most Western European states are not supporting these sanctions, which are additional to those imposed by the United Nations over suspected Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie airline terrorist bombing of 1988.

Looking across the Middle East, it is evident that the United States may be the dominant external power, yielding influence as no other great power has done before, but its power is far from complete. Indeed, there are clear signals that the short American period of relative hegemony is under challenge. In the late 1990s Russian attempts to recover influence in the region are under way. New initiatives towards the old Soviet clients—Libya, Syria and Iraq—are being pursued. Moscow does not wish Washington to remain unchallenged, and is aware of the prevalent, similar sentiments in Tripoli, Damascus and Baghdad. The revival of economic and military links are seen as mutually beneficial. Much of the economic and military structures of Libya, Syria and Iraq is rooted in Cold War systems, and post-communist Russia is the natural trading and political partner. It is in contiguous regions, outside Europe, that Russia now sees the opportunity to recover some great power status, and, very importantly for the national psyche, some self-esteem. Russia's re-entry into the region's arms market illustrates this development. A new customer for Moscow is Iran, which throughout the 1990s has spent much valuable foreign currency on advanced Russian weaponry and civil nuclear technology, despite public American objections.

BOX 8.16 US HEGEMONY?

- Saddam Hussein challenge and survival
- so-called 'rogue' states, e.g. Iran
- US Department of State list of states sponsoring terrorism—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria
- Russian attempts to renew interests in region

The arms build-up throughout the Middle East is a striking feature of the years since the Gulf War. Russia, China, France, Britain and the United States are all active selling a variety of weapons to local states. The United States is the clear leader, and the Gulf Arab states are the major customers. Between 1991 and 1994 alone, the United States sold \$34 billion of arms to the Gulf states.

The West may sell large quantities of advanced conventional weaponry to the Middle East, but there are deep Western anxieties about the covert procurement of weapons of mass destruction by Middle East states, particularly the rogue states. Libya has long been suspected of a secret chemical-weapons programme, and Iran of a nuclear-weapons programme. Iran's close links with North Korea and Pakistan and the possible transfer of ballistic-missile technology and nuclear-weapons expertise to Iran create alarm. As well as a common interest in checking American influence in the core Middle East, Russia and Iran have some common interests on international legal issues pertaining to the Caspian Sea, energy exploitation and relations with the newly independent states in that sub-region. The clear evidence of Iraq's efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction prior to the Gulf War has fuelled Western concern. However, it is generally accepted that Israel has produced nuclear weapons, and is an undeclared nuclear-weapons state. That the West, and the United States in particular, should exert pressure against Muslim states which appear intent on procuring weapons of mass destruction while turning a blind eye towards Israel is another source of tension and resentment in American-Arab relations.

That the Middle East is peculiarly prone to political tension and war is manifested by the widespread deployment, historically and presently, of United Nations peace-keeping forces. The proclivity of UN activities in the Middle East and on its periphery demonstrates the fragility and volatility of international, and in some instances internal, stability and peace in the region. The presence of UN forces also demonstrates the importance attached by the international system to controlling conflict in this strategically vital part of the world. The Gulf crisis and war of 1990–1 witnessed the largest deployment of UN forces in history when, at its peak, over 700,000 troops were gathered under its auspices. A snapshot of any time over the past fifty years will show widespread UN activity throughout the region. For instance, at the end of 1988, seven UN units were active in the region and on its periphery.

BOX 8.17 UN FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERIPHERY, 1988

<i>Title</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Date created</i>	<i>Observers</i>
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)	Beirut and Sinai	11 June 1948	295
United Nations Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	India-Pakistan border	24 January 1949	36
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	27 March 1964	2,100
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Syrian Golan Heights	3 June 1974	1,330
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Southern Lebanon	19 March 1978	5,800
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan-Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Afghanistan and Pakistan	14 April 1988	50
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran-Iraq border	9 August 1988	350

In 1990 UNGOMAP ceased operations, and in 1991 UNIIMOG was withdrawn. The other five UN forces detailed in Box 8.17 remain in operation, and have been joined since April 1991 by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). This has over 300 military personnel from over thirty-five countries. Its role is to deter violations of the Iraq-Kuwait border, and observe hostile or potentially hostile actions. There are other UN agencies in the Middle East not considered as peace-keeping forces. The UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to provide care and work for dispossessed Palestinians. By 1980 over 1.8 million Palestinian refugees were registered with UNRWA. Following Iraq's Gulf War defeat, UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 set up the UN Special Commission on Iraq (Unscm) to inspect and verify Iraq's compliance with undertakings not to procure weapons of mass destruction. It had 100 on-site monitors in Iraq. Impediments put in the way of Unscm by Saddam Hussein mean that it ceased being operational in the late 1990s. The longevity of most of the UN operations in the Middle East has resulted in their institutionalisation as part of the strategic culture of the region. Since its foundation in 1945 the United Nations has become mired in Middle East issues more than those of any other region. There is little sign that this condition is going to change.

PROSPECTS

Some strategic conditions have changed with the end of the Cold War. The main fault lines of conflict are no longer East versus West or even Arab versus Israeli. Elements of the latter remain, but are manifest as part of the new fault line which divides the status quo, 'moderate' camp in favour of accommodation with the West and Israel from the anti-status quo, 'extremist' camp, resentful of Western domination and against any compromise with Israel. Such divisions inhibit strong, local multilateral co-operation of the kind experienced in the North Atlantic and Western European region. The Arab League, founded in 1945, has proved highly prone to division and weakness over issues such as Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War of 1990–1 and the PLO-Israeli agreement since 1993. As of 1995 there were twenty-two members, ranging from Mauritania to Djibouti to Syria, but as an international force in the region the League has proved ineffective. Other sub-regional organisations also have a poor record. In 1989 the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) comprising Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen was formed. Its purpose was co-operation in economic and non-military fields; for instance, initiatives to limit Soviet Jewish immigration to occupied Arab land. In late 1990 it fell apart when Egypt joined the US-led coalition against Iraq. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) is a sub-regional organisation which had survived since its foundation in May 1981. Against the background of the Iran-Iraq War and some internal subversive pressures, the six Gulf Arab monarchies—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman—decided to co-ordinate internal security measures, arms procurement and other defence issues, and national economies. Fearful of Saudi dominance and jealous of national independence, meaningful co-ordination and integration has been slight. Throughout the 1980s some joint military exercises were held, and a rapid deployment force organised. However, these efforts proved ineffective in defending Kuwait in August 1990. Since the Gulf War GCC members have shown that defence agreements with the West are preferred over deeper, local military integration.

Within the Middle East fundamental problems of democracy and legitimacy will persist. In the Arab Middle East there is little practice of democracy as the West understands the concept. The legitimacy of many regimes is questioned domestically and internationally. Saudi Arabia is an example of a country experiencing growing strain from many quarters. Its historic borders are the product of deals with Western imperial powers within living memory. The political elite rules by right of conquest and self-claimed religious duties. Saudi Arabia is a wealthy, technologically advanced society with a medieval social structure. Pressures for reform are coming from liberal modernisers, who seek greater social and political freedom, and religious fundamentalists who fear that the Saudi regime is slipping in its duties to protect Islam. Non-Islamic military forces are present on Saudi soil, and terrorism is now a feature of contemporary Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the modus vivendi between Israel and the Arab world remains very brittle and its most difficult objectives have still to be achieved. Egypt, Jordan and the PLO have formal treaties with Israel, and some other Arab countries voice public approval of the process. But there is little élan and there is a grudging spirit to the détente, often evident from the behaviour of both sides. The military and economic

dominance of Israel in the Levant is resented, and it will require many generations to pass before most ordinary Arabs accept Israel as a normal Middle East country.

The path of American power may not run smoothly throughout the region, but Washington's influence is pervasive in a manner unmatched by any other state in the post-colonial period. Competition from Russia, China, the European Union and sometimes France individually is growing and will sometimes collide with American power. But, given American will, the United States will remain clearly dominant. Primary American strategic interests such as oil, the security of Israel and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are very long term and ensure the exercise of Washington's power in the region for a considerable time. The historical perspective of Islam exceeds the existence of the United States by over 1,000 years. The political and economic disappointments and frustrations fuelling active and tacit support for militant Islam across the Middle East continue. These conditions will not be ameliorated in the short to medium term. In some leading Arab societies such as Algeria, Egypt and Syria demographic and economic trends and political inflexibility look set to exacerbate the public mood of discontent. Resentments may manifest themselves not only in Islamic militancy but in low- and middle-level wars, between and within states. If not over territory or access to oil wealth, water could be a major source of interstate friction in the years ahead. Rapid population increase in most Middle East states has put great strain on scarce water resources. If, in any future conflicts, American core strategic interests are at stake, it will intervene militarily. But in local, limited or civil wars the United States will keep its distance.

In historical terms, the present international system in the Middle East is young, and needs time to mature. But while political regimes and state boundaries are relatively new, the pressures upon them have deep historical and cultural roots. The geographical location of the Middle East and its global strategic importance add to the volatile mix, and condemn the region to its high degree of competition and conflict in the foreseeable future.

FURTHER READING

Bernard Lewis's *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) provides a concise yet lucid and panoramic review of the historical, cultural and strategic factors which have moulded the political character of the region over the past two to three hundred years. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new international order is examined in detail, and with verve, by David Fromkin in *A Peace to End all Peace* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991). Both Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1992), and James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), deliver excellent assessments of the roles of nationalism, political parties and state apparatus in the wider politics of the region, as well as within particular countries. In *Inside the Arab World* (London: John Murray, 1994) Michael Field vividly captures the deep sense of discontent and frustration prevalent in much of the Arab Middle East. The debate over militant Islam is demonstrated by L.T. Hadar, 'What Green

Peril?’ and J.Miller, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam’, both in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1993). Avi Schlaim, *War and Peace in the Middle East* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995) is a very readable, succinct and sometimes controversial interpretation of the post-Cold War international security regime in the region. The complex and painful history of Arab-Israeli relations is traced in a clear and efficient manner by T.G.Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London: Macmillan, 1995). Also well balanced, but with more detail on the Palestinian struggle, is Charles D.Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994). Dilip Hiro’s impressive *Dictionary of the Middle East* (London: Macmillan, 1996) has over 1,000 entries and is a valuable asset providing salient details of crises, wars and diplomacy in the region over recent years.

9

Russia and the 'Near Abroad'

Graeme Herd

In reviewing the history of Russian international relations in the twentieth century we are exposed to the unfolding of cataclysmic events, revolutionary upheaval, startling cleavages in strategic orientation: we witness the death throes of the Russian Empire; the birth in 1917 and subsequent consolidation of the Soviet Union under Stalin; the growth of superpower rivalry through the long night of the Cold War, a paradigm that was to dominate the very way in which international relations were interpreted at the global level. The century appeared to draw to a close with the sudden, total and unexpectedly bloodless disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the emergence of a Russian Federation, shorn of imperial possessions and exposed to the democratic impulse released by the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, it was assumed that Russia's future path would lead it towards the 'common European home', democratic market economy and co-operative foreign policy formation. This seemingly conventional assumption is, however, open to question. On the eve of the twenty-first century Russia's place in the contemporary world remains ill-defined, her strategic interests and orientation heavily debated and her relationship with the 'Near Abroad' characterised by ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictability.

BOX 9.1 RUSSIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

- Russian/Tsarist Empire
- 1917 Bolshevik Revolution
- Stalinism, 1929–53
- Cold War, 1944–89
- Disintegration: end of Cold War and of 'empire' in Eastern and Central Europe, 1989–91
- Emergence of Russian Federation, 1991–

How then to explain Russia's relationship with what some analysts have referred to as her 'Near Abroad', those newly independent countries which had formerly been forcibly incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? To what extent does the Soviet legacy play an important role in contemporary post-Soviet international relations? Will Russia emerge in the twenty-first century as a democratic and stable market economy? Could neo-authoritarian tendencies promote the impulse of reintegration of the Slavic peoples into one ethnic homeland, an enlarged, aggressively anti-Western and belligerent

nuclear power ready to exploit the potential of vast natural resources and so uphold its great power status in a turbulent international system? Or, with regional governors flexing their political and economic power against the centre, are we witnessing the gradual fragmentation and disintegration of Russia itself?

What of the 'Near Abroad'? Will the fourteen newly independent states be dominated by their largest neighbour and traditional imperial master, or will each state determine its own national identity and state interest and assume independent foreign and security policies, free of a Russian sphere of influence? That these basic questions can be asked, and that they are never answered the same way twice by any scholar working in the field, underscores the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the international relations of the former Soviet Union. Estonia is poised to open EU accession negotiations along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland and Cyprus, while Tadjikistan is beset with the disruption and horror of civil war. Belarus, in danger of reverting to neo-authoritarian behaviour, proposes a Union Treaty with Russia, a country which has successfully undergone two democratic election campaigns and yet fought itself to a bloody impasse in Chechnya in order to maintain its own territorial integrity.

How are we best to comprehend the complex international relations of this region? Let us begin by briefly analysing the nature of the Soviet system of power and the impact of the Soviet legacy upon contemporary international relations.

THE SOVIET SYSTEM: FROM STALIN TO GORBACHEV

The Soviet Union was created in 1917 and collapsed in 1991. It has been described as a totalitarian state, that is, a state which controlled all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life of its subjects. It was a state legitimised by one sustaining ideology which was subject to differing interpretations during the Soviet period. Vladimir Ilich Lenin turned to the ideas of Karl Marx and translated them into an action programme suited for the Tsarist Empire—a largely agrarian country with a small capitalist sector. In two seminal works, *What Is to Be Done?* (1902) and *State and Revolution* (1917), Lenin developed the idea of a small, highly organised and disciplined politicised vanguard party (the Bolshevik Party) which could lead the mass of urban workers (proletariat) in an armed revolution against the existing social and political tsarist order. This uprising occurred in October 1917, initially in the capital Petrograd (formerly St Petersburg), then spreading throughout the Tsarist Empire. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, socialism would be established within the newly created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), leading, inevitably, to communism. However, internal disorder brought on by Russia's defeat in World War One, famine and civil war (1918–21) intervened. Many of the peripheral parts of the Tsarist Empire, most notably Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, successfully secured their independence and were to remain so throughout the interwar period.

BOX 9.2 TOTALITARIAN SOVIET SYSTEM 1917–91

- state controlled all aspects of life
- one sustaining ideology: Marxist-Leninist
- strong leadership:
 - Lenin, 1917–24
 - Stalin, 1929–53
 - Khrushchev, 1955–64
 - Brezhnev, 1964–82
 - Gorbachev, 1985–91

STALIN AND STALINISATION

Lenin died prematurely in 1924 and by 1929, after a series of internal power struggles, Josef Stalin emerged as the leading political figure within the USSR. He proceeded to consolidate his power base within the Party bureaucracy (*apparatchiki*) and modernise the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible under the slogan ‘socialism in one country’. He introduced the collectivisation of agriculture and the forced industrialisation of industry through a series of five-year economic plans, and utilised terror, a labour-camp system (*gulags*) filled by periodic purges (*chistka*, or cleansing), orchestrated show trials and a ‘cult of personality’ as means of maintaining and expanding Soviet power. Stalin dominated the Soviet Union, creating a state command-control centrally planned economy, state monopolies of politics (a single-party system) and the media, and enforcing CPSU control of the military and police.

Foreign policy was strictly controlled and the key objective was to ensure national defence against the fear of ‘capitalist encirclement’. Stalin and Hitler signed an agreement in 1939 (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) which created a defensive alliance and as a consequence the USSR did not enter the ‘Great Patriotic War’ on the side of the Allies until invaded in June 1941. World War Two ended with victorious Soviet armies and communist parties dominating the devastated political landscape of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The USSR reincorporated all parts of the lost Tsarist Empire (except the Grand Duchy of Finland), as well as newly conquered territories. Interwar democratic regimes in CEE were replaced by Stalinist regimes, Yugoslavia under President Tito proving the only exception. These countries were wedded to the Soviet Union through participation in military and economic alliance structures, for example the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) or Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

BOX 9.3 SOVIET EXPANSION, 1940–8**Countries annexed or under Soviet administration:**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Countries</i>	<i>Population (millions)</i>
1940	Part of Finland	0.5
1940	Estonia	1.1
1940	Latvia	2
1940	Lithuania	3
1945	Part of German East Prussia	1.2
1945	Part of Poland	11.8
1945	Part of Czechoslovakia	0.7
1945	Part of Romania	3.7
	Total	24

Countries controlled by USSR:

1945	Soviet zone of Germany	18.8
1945	Poland	26.5
1946	Bulgaria	7.2
1946	Albania	1.2
1947	Hungary	9.8
1948	Czechoslovakia	12.3
1948	Romania	16.1
	Total	91.9
	Overall total	115.9

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE COLD WAR

In Western Europe and the USA such Soviet dominance and effective conquest of large parts of Europe were perceived to threaten European stability. The proliferation of the Soviet 'sphere of influence' was to be opposed by the establishment of a balance of military and political power within Europe and the 'containment' of Soviet expansionist ambitions throughout the rest of the world. This 'Cold War' paradigm was characterised by a bipolar international system, the growth of two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) who controlled two alliance structures, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, and opposed each other militarily and ideologically and frequently clashed in a series of proxy wars in the Third World.

BOX 9.4 THE WARSAW PACT AND COMECON

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), January 1949:

- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and USSR
- response to OEEC
- attempt to impose Soviet economic control
- economic development of members

Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO/Warsaw Pact), 14 May 1955:

- Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
- officially a response to West Germany (FRG) joining NATO
- mirror to NATO in 'collective defence'
- institutionalisation of Soviet control

The balance of power was essentially designed to stop confrontation slipping into all-out nuclear annihilation. Soviet power was reinforced periodically by Soviet-led military intervention into these satellite states, for example, Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968, to uphold communist regimes. Such intervention was dubbed the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' (see Box 5.8, p. 115).

The Cold War had warmer periods of 'coexistence' and détente, particularly the late 1960s and 1970s, but by 1979 had slipped back to confrontational politics (the 'Second Cold War') characterised by a renewed arms race, and an increase in proxy wars outwith the European theatre.

THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

The 'Great Patriotic War' had an important effect upon Soviet nationalities policy. One striking feature of the USSR was the ethnic diversity, boasting over 100 ethnic groups, with ethnic Russians comprising 51 per cent of the population. Strategies for suppressing and assimilating this ethnic diversity initially appeared to be successful—but by the 1980s the Soviet 'family of nations' was unravelling and the reasons can be located in the strategies themselves. Stalin appealed to Russian national patriotic sentiment throughout the war and at its conclusion implemented forced population shifts of minority ethnic groups, such as the Germans, Tartars and Chechens, who were considered to have collaborated with the invading Nazi forces. Political repression was only one such strategy. In other ways the Soviet system managed to co-opt ethnic elites into working with rather than against the system. Soviet federalism, for example, gave some ethnic groups limited administrative recognition and provided the mechanism through which regional ethnic elites could advance themselves and their regions. However, the federal system also provided the political and administrative structures, especially within the

union republics, through which elites could mobilise popular support, agitate for greater regional autonomy and sovereignty and then, eventually, national independence.

GORBACHEV AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985 the Soviet Union was facing a crisis of effectiveness. The Soviet system suffered myriad social and economic problems compounded by both the new and growing demands of its citizens for rapid improvements in living standards and increased military competition with the West. By 1991 it was facing a crisis of survival. Many scholars have placed the 'blame' for the collapse of the Soviet Union upon the shoulders of Gorbachev and particularly the impact of his 'new thinking' (*novoe myshlenie*) on international relations.

Economic and political reform

Gorbachev attempted to implement economic reform in an effort to modernise the Soviet state, to adapt the political and economic system to meet contemporary demands while still maintaining the stability and integrity of the USSR. The reforms had the opposite effect, pushing the USSR to the brink of collapse, and by 1991 the inter-ethnic demands unleashed by political liberalisation, coupled with a growing economic crisis, had tipped the balance within the fifteen constituent union republics towards the disintegration and break-up of the USSR. Although after 1991 International Relations scholars have provided useful explanatory models of collapse, very few 'Sovietologists' predicted the events which were to unfold. What, then, were the policies Gorbachev introduced which apparently drove the USSR from a crisis of effectiveness to a crisis of survival in the space of six short years?

Gorbachev was attempting to modernise and reform—but not overthrow—the Soviet system. At first it appeared that he would be successful. Initially the economic policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *uskorenie* (economic acceleration) lacked wider support to overcome fundamental opposition within entrenched Soviet interest groups: for example, the military-industrial complex (MIC), agrarian lobby and even the CPSU itself. It became apparent that for economic reform to succeed Gorbachev had to widen the basis of political support for his policies. To this end, he harnessed the twin policies of *glasnost* ('openness' or 'publicity') and *demokratisatsiia* (the move towards liberal democratic norms). *Glasnost* allowed the media unprecedented freedom of speech and received a boost following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, when official misinformation served only to fuel the public's demand for accurate and contemporary information on all aspects of public life.

BOX 9.5 GLOSSARY OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS

- *Perestroika*: Gorbachev first introduced a policy of 'restructuring' in 1985, as head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). *Perestroika* was at first applied to the economy, where decentralisation and autonomy were to make the Soviet economy more productive and efficient. It soon took a political overtone and is closely associated with both *glasnost* and *demokratizatsiia*.
- *Glasnost*: This word means both 'openness' and 'publicity' and was especially applied to the media and arts. *Glasnost* allowed much freer public debates about both the Soviet past, particularly the 'blank spots' in Soviet history (for example, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), and the formalisation and implementation of policy in the present. It was most notably in evidence after the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
- *Uskorenie*: This means 'economic acceleration'. Gorbachev attempted to make workers more disciplined by 'freeing the human spirit' through greater worker autonomy and self-management. This in turn would allow the economy to become more efficient and productive. This policy characterised the earlier 'economic phase' of Gorbachev's regime and was soon overtaken by more overtly political reform and *perestroika*.
- *Demokratizatsiia*: This concept was introduced by Gorbachev in 1987. It represented a subtle move from the 'vanguard party' (representing the 'true interests' of the workers) approach supported by Lenin towards a gradual and grudging acceptance of democratic norms. For example, multi-candidate elections in 1987 gave way to a widening of political competition within the CPSU in 1988, and then multiparty elections in 1989.

The reform programme had to overcome deeply entrenched and systemic problems. The centrally planned Soviet economy was unbalanced, top-heavy and inflexible. It was over-reliant upon heavy industry, producer rather than consumer goods, and the MIC soaked up a disproportionate amount of the USSR's GDP. The poor performance of the economy was exacerbated by East-West competition in arms production, especially pronounced in space research and the Strategic Defence Initiative ('star wars') technology. The move in 1987 from central planning of the economy towards contractual agreements between suppliers and consumers and the creation of a legal non-state economic sector marked the point when the Soviet economy slipped into free fall.

However, as it became apparent that Gorbachev aimed to reform rather than overthrow the system, popular support for the man who was prepared to listen and compromise waned. By mid-1987 a conservative bureaucratic backlash from within the *nomenklatura* (a list of personnel vetted by the Communist Party and appointed to the highest positions), fuelled by local activism and ethnic unrest in the republics, forced Gorbachev

to adopt compromise policies. However, in the ebb and flow of *perestroika* politics, Gorbachev had again seized the initiative by mid-1988, introducing broad political reform, including the establishment of the post of President of the USSR and measures to decentralise political power from the centre (Moscow) to the periphery (regions and republics). Although this process of political decentralisation had been implemented from the top down, it very quickly inherited a dynamic of its own, and so became an unmanageable process. Republics attempted to take control of their economic, social and cultural policies, to highlight and combat environmental deterioration and the exploitation of natural resources. The first sign that republics would take more overt political control of their destinies was marked by the withdrawal of the Lithuanian Communist Party from the CPSU in December 1989, followed by the Estonian and Latvian Communist Parties in March and April 1990.

The rise of national self-determination

This political breach between the centre and periphery of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s was also partially encouraged by the stunning reversal of Soviet control in CEE. Some analysts argue that the Soviet Union collapsed because it was at the 'end of empire' phase in its existence and suffered 'imperial over-stretch'. This phrase suggests that there is a clear connection between a great power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an imperial power. The economic shifts initiated by Gorbachev weakened the Soviet economy and so undermined the position of the USSR in the international system. Gorbachev's foreign policy, particularly the jettisoning of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' for the so-called 'Sinatra Doctrine' ('I Did It My Way') and the rhetoric of a 'common European home', signalled to CEE communist parties that the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily to uphold communist regimes which had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This policy contributed greatly to the strengthening within CEE of opposition umbrella groups calling for a change in the political system, from communist to democratic political legitimisation. In 1989, beginning peacefully in Poland and Czechoslovakia (the 'Velvet Revolution'), moving through Hungary, East Germany (the GDR), Bulgaria and ending with Romania, communist regimes were overthrown in a series of largely bloodless revolutions.

Within the USSR popular movements for national self-determination were boosted by both the startling and highly visible effects of Gorbachev's liberal foreign policy throughout CEE (the 'Revolutions of 1989'), and the results of a series of local elections held from December 1989 to March 1990. The Baltic republics were the first to declare their sovereignty, their indigenous state languages the official languages, residency requirements necessary for voting and restoration of their national flags. These 'Singing Revolutions' were gradually and predominantly peacefully to move the republics closer to independence. By contrast, in the three Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the move to national self-determination proved more volatile, and inter-ethnic violence broke out most notably over the status of a majority ethnic Armenian enclave within an Azerbaijan-controlled region called the Nagorno-Karabakh and among the Abkhaz population within Georgia. Elsewhere in the USSR, particularly

in the five Soviet Central Asian republics, long-standing ethnic rivalries between differing Soviet nationalities which had previously been suppressed by central authority were revived by this process of political and economic decentralisation.

Russia versus the USSR: the August Putsch of 1991

The local elections held in late 1989 and early 1990, as well as bolstering national self-assertiveness in the periphery, revealed the power and popularity of radical reformers within the Russian Republic. In May 1990 Boris Yeltsin was elected head of Russia's Supreme Soviet on a platform of Russian Republican sovereignty and further economic and social decentralisation. With Gorbachev appointed in March 1990 to the newly created post of President of the USSR (in an effort to consolidate a power base outside the CPSU), Yeltsin indirectly posed a challenge to the integrity and democratic legitimacy of the USSR. The two presidents failed to co-operate during 1990, contributing to a highly unstable and chaotic political atmosphere. The radical reformers lined up with those who sought independence for their republics against conservatives in the CPSU apparatus, bureaucracy and military.

By early 1991 Gorbachev responded to conservative pressure to reassert strong central economic and political control over the Union, before it disintegrated. Soviet OMON (special purpose para-military police) troops in Vilnius (Lithuania) and Riga (Latvia), crushed pro-independence demonstrators in January 1991. Would the utility of a Soviet military crackdown during the 'January Events' prefigure a wider application of military coercion throughout the USSR forcibly to 'maintain civil order' and thereby safeguard the integrity of the Union?

On 17 March 1991 the question of support for the preservation of the USSR was put to Soviet citizens in an ambiguously worded all-Union referendum: 'Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which human rights and the freedom of people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?' Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian Republics were strongly in favour, while the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova boycotted the vote; the results (and therefore legitimacy) of the referendum were open to question—were republics voting for sovereignty and territorial integrity or a renewed federation? The nine republics that supported the referendum adopted a draft treaty which left the centre as co-ordinator of largely sovereign republics within a loosely based union.

The resolution of this uneasy political crisis was more apparent than real. The new Union Treaty was due to be signed on 20 August 1990, but only by nine, or possibly ten (Ukraine), of the old republics. Partial compliance would have underscored not only a *de facto* but a *de jure* disintegration of the USSR. Leading politicians within the conservative faction were quick to act. They attempted to persuade Gorbachev of the urgent necessity of declaring an immediate state of emergency, but he refused. On 19 August a *coup d'état* was implemented by a special State Committee on the State of Emergency. However, Yeltsin and the Russian parliament emerged as focal points around which thousands of reformers could unite within Moscow. Sections of the KGB and military defected to Yeltsin and the coup leaders hardly convinced the public that they

offered a coherent alternative vision; indeed, at a hastily called press conference some among their number seemed the worse for drink.

Paradoxically, the coup, in attempting to preserve the integrity of the Union, served only to hasten its disintegration. By 21 August the coup had collapsed; within days the Baltic states had declared their independence and by early December any hopes of reviving the USSR, however loosely, were shattered when Ukraine declared its intention to become a sovereign and independent nation. The dissolution of the USSR was formally set in place by the leaders of the three Slavic republics, Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine, in mid-December, when at a meeting in Minsk they announced the creation of a loosely based Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a coordinating body whose primary task was to ensure a 'velvet divorce'. On 26 December 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the CPSU was outlawed and the Soviet 'inner empire', under Russian control since the seventeenth century, emerged—blinking and faltering into the 'New World Order'—as sovereign and independent states.

BOX 9.6 POST-COLD WAR: THE 'END OF HISTORY' OR THE 'CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS'?

In the wake of the upheaval within the international system between 1989 and 1991, two dominant theses emerged which attempted to provide a conceptual framework by which we could understand international politics after the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama first published his *End of History* thesis on the eve of the revolutions of 1989, while Samuel Huntingdon promoted his *Clash of Civilisations* paradigm in 1993. Startlingly, each thesis bases its argument on an analysis of the same events—the breakdown of Soviet power in CEE and the FSU—and yet provide radically different conclusions. Both of these overarching theses are of interest to the student of International Relations as they have proved to constitute the dominant post-Cold War paradigms.

Francis Fukuyama in his *End of History* thesis argued that the revolutions of 1989 marked the end of an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. With the overthrow of communist regimes throughout CEE, communism as a viable ideology was discredited and liberal democracy and the market economy ('market-democracy') was now in the ascendant. Fukuyama looked to the past and argued that change in history had been generated by a clash of ideologies. In the twentieth century, liberal democracies had defeated the fascist ideologies (Japan, Germany, Italy) during World War Two and, with the collapse of CEE regimes in 1989, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Now, according to Fukuyama, the future of world history would be one of constant repetition—the continued proliferation of a wave of democratisation projects throughout the world, until all states were peaceful, stable market democracies, existing in harmony.

Huntingdon, in examining the causes of the collapse of the Cold War and considering which paradigm would best provide a conceptual framework, a

map through which we can understand future events in International Relations, proposed a *Clash of Civilisations* alternative. He argued wars would be fought in the future and these wars would take place between civilisations. Civilisations were in their essence defined by cultural and religious factors and, as Huntingdon argues, there existed six or seven world civilisations (Western Christian, Slavic Orthodox, Islamic, Buddhist, Shinto, Confucian and 'possibly' African). It is where these civilisations meet, where they brush up against each other, that we discover the cultural fault-lines, the zones of instability where the clash between civilisations would occur. Huntingdon uses a number of examples to illustrate his thesis, notably, post-Soviet Central Asia—a region in which Slavic Orthodoxy clashes with Islam, and an arc of instability stretches from Tadjikistan through to Chechnya—and the former Yugoslavia, where Islam, Western Christianity and Slavic Orthodoxy have all clashed.

Both Huntingdon and Fukuyama issue a challenge to students of International Relations: either accept the general validity of their theses or articulate an alternative paradigm which must account for the same number of phenomena with the same or greater degree of complexity. The fact that no one central paradigm has emerged to replace the Cold War reveals the uncertainty, ambiguity and unpredictability of international relations in the post-Cold War era.

RUSSIAN STATE INTEREST IN THE 'NEAR ABROAD'

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War, of superpower ideological and military rivalry. The international system was in turmoil, old multinational states were disintegrating (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), alliance structures withered on the vine, while new states were forged from the chaos, insistently clamouring for external recognition of the newly acquired sovereignty. Rootlessness, uncertainty and ambiguity marked the passage from Cold War to post-Cold War international relations.

The formation of Russian state interest

The Russian Federation, as largest of the former republics in terms of geography, population, economic development, military might and natural resources, declared itself the successor state of the USSR. Russia inherited the past imperial baggage of a superpower—a pre-existing Soviet foreign policy tradition was now coupled to the new dilemmas of economic implosion, social disorientation, political chaos and a military locked into a Cold War mentality based on superpower strategic rivalry. The loss of empire and the emergence of fourteen new neighbouring states created a policy crisis in Moscow. How was Russia to interact with these nascent, weakly emergent and vulnerable republics? With the jettisoning of the guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy—class

interests and universal interests—what were to be the guidelines or principles through which Russia would seek to determine its foreign policy?

In early 1992 the prevailing view in Moscow held that these countries, although formally independent and sovereign, constituted what Russia referred to as her 'Near Abroad' (*blizhnii zarubezhe*). That is, they were considered part of Russia's sphere of influence. Russian policy-makers reasoned that Russia was the natural and historical dominant regional power (*hegemon*) and that through the deployment of a raft of measures—including the use of military force, economic threats and inducements (such as the manipulation of oil and gas delivery, debt relief and currency management), as well as political and diplomatic pressure—it could remain so.

With the end of the Cold War, the active destruction of past Soviet symbols and Marxist—Leninist ideology, as well as the embrace of democratic ideals and practices, what accounts for such a foreign policy? Why in the 'New World Order' did Russia want to maintain control or influence over her nearest neighbours? How and to what extent was the control to be exercised? The answers to these questions lie in Russia's perception of her state interests in the 'Near Abroad'. Although this perception was never constantly or consistently defined by all parties, movements and political actors within the Russian Federation, there remain, nevertheless, identifiable interests which deserve analysis.

The politics of foreign policy: Soviet nostalgia and nationalist chauvinism

Russia was reeling from a triple blow—the Cold War, the outer empire of CEE and the inner empire of former Soviet republics had been lost within a matter of months. The loss of the 'inner empire' represented a particularly devastating psychological blow to Russian imperial ambitions. Such a loss struck at the heart of Russian self-identity—it led to a loss of self-respect, fuelled feelings of resentment and national humiliation. It was difficult for key elements within the decision-making elite, as well as society at large, to come to terms with the loss of territory which had been conquered during the Tsarist period.

The difficulty in coming to terms with the loss of historic territory was particularly acute in the cases of the Baltic states, eastern Ukraine and Crimea. These territories had been colonised between the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and so were intimately interconnected with Russian self-identity. Their loss provided the means through which politics could be radicalised, and nationalist-patriots and neo-communist forces could mobilise popular support to reverse this 'national humiliation'.

In the post-Soviet period, a complex and wider spectrum of political groupings was represented. In general terms, though, three types of political party and movement emerged. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, initially banned from political participation, reconstituted itself under the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov, as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). It remains the largest single party and dominates other communist or socialist parties on the left that broadly share its programme (such as the Agrarian Party and Russian Communist Workers Party). The CPRF enjoys a strong regional organisation based on the structure of the old CPSU and can contest seats in all regions throughout the Federation. It places emphasis on collectivism (*sobornost'*), patriotism, strong leadership and centralisation—central tenets

of the Tsarist and Soviet political cultures. The CPRF has argued that post-Soviet economic reintegration will inevitably follow as former republics seek to integrate into a highly successful Russian economic model.

**BOX 9.7 MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE DUMA
FOLLOWING THE 1995 ELECTIONS (450 SEATS
CONTESTED)**

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| 1 Orientation | —Communist/Social Democratic |
| • Name of Party | Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) |
| • Leader | Gennady Zyuganov |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 157 |
| • Name of Party | Agrarian Party (AP) |
| • Leader | Mikhail Lapshin |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 20 |
| 2 Orientation | —Liberal/Reform |
| • Name of Party | Russia's Democratic Choice/United Democrats (RDC) |
| • Leader | Yegor Gaidar |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 9 |

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| • Name of Party | Yabloko |
| • Leader | Grigory Yavlinsky |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 45 |
| 3 Orientation | —Centrist |
| • Name of Party | Our Home Is Russia (NDR) |
| • Leader | Victor Chernomyrdin |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 55 |
| • Name of Party | Women of Russia (WR) |
| • Leader | Yekaterina Lakhova |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 3 |
| 4 Orientation | —Nationalist/Patriotic |
| • Name of Party | Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) |
| • Leader | Vladimir Zhirinovskiy |
| • Total Seats in Duma | 51 |
| • Name of Party | Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) |

- Leader Yuri Skokov
- Total Seats in Duma 5

Note: This includes the two main representative parties from each faction—most analysts would say that ‘polarised pluralism’ characterises the system (lots on the left and right of the political spectrum but a weak centre). But we can also see the emergence of an enclosed elite, the so-called ‘people of power’, against the rest.

Nationalist and neo-fascist parties are represented by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s inappropriately named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The LDPR supports the use of military force and advocates the forcible reintegration of Russia’s pre-1917 imperial borders (the Grand Duchy of Finland included). Indeed, Zhirinovskiy’s infamously titled auto-biography—*Last Surge to the South*—suggested that Russian soldiers should bathe their feet in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The West was accused of attempting to colonise Russia for its natural resources and a Eurasian orientation was advocated.

Democratic parties occupy the centre ground between these extremes. The government party—Our Home Is Russia—is the largest of these parties, which tend to have disproportionate urban support (particularly in Moscow, St Petersburg, Nishni-Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don and Ekaterinburg). However, these parties lack regional structures and party organisation and so their support is regionally based, strongest in the cities of European Russia. They support co-operative foreign policies, orientated towards rejoining the Western international community as respected partners.

Although the Russian State Duma (parliament) is a legislative body and enjoys little political power, parties on both the left and the right attained unexpected support in the parliamentary elections of December 1993. In a presidential republic the Duma needs a two-thirds majority to oppose presidential veto—however, the popular swing towards parties representing Soviet nostalgia and national chauvinism has proved to be a key influence upon a hardening of Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ policy. With democratic parties again in a minority after the 1995 Duma elections, this pressure continues to influence Russian governmental rhetoric and policy. For both communist and nationalist-orientated parties (the ‘Red-Brown’ coalition), popular support could be gained by radicalising issues which had both a domestic and international (‘intermestic’) relevance and emotional significance. *Primus inter pares* was the ‘intermestic’ issue of the diaspora.

Russians beyond Russia: the protection of the diaspora

With the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union approximately 25 million Russians were found to live beyond the borders of the newly created Russian Federation. In some newly independent former republics, for example Kazakhstan (37 per cent), Estonia (30 per cent) and Latvia (34 per cent), the proportion of ethnic Russians constituted a high minority. There was a deeply held perception within the Russian Federation that the rights and interests of these Russian minorities were abused through discriminatory legislation. For example, legislation passed in Latvia and Estonia determined that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers only receive citizenship after a naturalisation process—Russia demanded all should receive dual citizenship. In other areas, such as the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, ethnic Russians began to migrate to the Russian Federation, in an effort to flee areas of instability and inter-ethnic violence.

Many of the borders between the Russian Federation and the former republics were artificial Soviet creations—they cut across economic, strategic and ethnic boundaries. In the post-Soviet period these administrative borders acquired a political significance as they formally delineated the territorial integrity of the newly independent republics. The question arose as to who would champion the rights and interests of ethnic Russians living beyond Russia? It was clear from the start of republican independence that the diaspora would play a crucial role in Russia's relations with the 'Near Abroad'.

STRATEGIC MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSETS AND REGIONAL SECURITY

For the Russian armed forces the military and geo-strategic impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union could hardly be exaggerated. Two consequences held overriding priority in the minds of policy-makers in Moscow. First, unitary command and control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal had been broken and strategic nuclear weapons—long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles—were now located in the newly independent republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as the Russian Federation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology would have to be addressed and was set to dominate the agendas of these former Soviet republics. Second, many conventional military assets—such as forward ordnance parks, logistics supplies, airfields and command headquarters—were lost to the newly independent states. Taking the example of Latvia, the Soviet Baltic Fleet headquarters had been based in Riga, Liepāja was the largest military port in the Baltic Sea, radar and communications sites at Skrunda and Ventspils were now, in Russian eyes, compromised. The Russian military had a clear strategic interest in retaining operational control of these 'Near Abroad' military assets. The reassertion of centralised control would minimise the loss of Russia's historic buffer zones, the territories straddling the Russian frontier which, in Russian eyes, constituted a cordon sanitaire between Russia and the West.

The armed forces, conscious of a chronic sense of geographical insecurity, had also suffered a severe loss of prestige and power. They were faced with an apparently contradictory Russian policy of negotiating the withdrawal of Russian troops from the

former republics while defending the rights and interests of the Russian diaspora in a period when regional strife—interethnic conflict and civil unrest—plagued many parts of the former USSR. The proliferation of ethnic and territorial disputes presented a constant danger to the security of Russia itself. Such unrest would be exacerbated by the presence of 'security vacuums' and could spill over into Russia proper and threaten the territorial integrity and stability of the Federation. The danger of fragmentation was ever present in the minds of Russian policymakers. Such violence could also cause a massive remigration of ethnic Russians into the Federation, with the danger that the heavy strain of extra usage could precipitate a collapse in the already overburdened Russian accommodation, energy and transportation infrastructure. This factor was considered especially dangerous should ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan settle en masse in southern Siberia.

The Soviet Union was characterised by intense economic interconnections and integration of a special type. Stalin's command-control centrally planned economy had allowed for economic specialisation within particular republics. This aspect of the Soviet economic legacy had a profound impact on post-Soviet interstate relations. On independence some cotton-producing republics, such as Uzbekistan, or those republics which were traditionally agriculturally abundant, such as Ukraine, had to face the fact that they were also heavily energy dependent on the Siberian oil and gas fields of the Russian Federation. This energy dependence rendered these republics vulnerable to economic pressure in the shape of threats to withdraw gas or oil supplies. At the same time, many of the former republics also housed key strategic economic assets, such as refineries, road, rail and pipeline links, which formerly had been directed by Moscow, and were considered necessary for the uninterrupted expansion of the Russian economy.

Thus Russia had both a strategic economic rationale for maintaining economic control over the former republics and, more importantly, the means to achieve such control. Notably, among a raft of policies directed towards maintaining influence over 'Near Abroad' development, Russia attempted debt-for-equity swaps—Russia forgave energy debts incurred by newly independent states within the 'Near Abroad' in return for control over physical economic assets. Such policies raised the danger that Soviet economic interdependence would provide the rationale for a post-Soviet Russian-led economic reintegration, so setting in place the keystone of a fully fledged reassertion of Russian control over the former republics.

PRO-WESTERN ATLANTICISM VERSUS 'GREAT POWER' EURASIANISM

It quickly became apparent that, just as there was ambiguity and disagreement within political parties and movements as to what constituted Russian interests, so there existed various cleavages which divided opinion within the disorientated Russian foreign policy elite. First came the question of which strategic orientation the Russian Federation ought to adopt—a Eurasianist or Atlantic bias? Second, should the strategic orientation attempt to secure Western co-operation and respect or should it rather seek to promote Russian interests above all else—should the 'Westerns' (*zapadniki*) prevail or rather those

advocating a Russia-first policy, the preservation of Russia's 'great power' status (*derzhavnikii*)?

In 1992 the Russian foreign policy priority was focused almost exclusively upon the establishment of a working relationship with the West. Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' was considered a lesser priority for a number of reasons. Institutionally the Russian Federation was not equipped to articulate and implement a coherent policy towards the 'Near Abroad'. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs most of the specialist personnel had hitherto concentrated upon relations outwith the FSU boundaries; indeed, Russian diplomatic missions to the newly independent states had to be constituted. This problem was not confined to the Russian Federation; many of the former republics were also weakly integrated and lacked formal mechanisms through which to initiate interstate relations with the Russian Federation.

This institutional shortfall was compensated by a psychological or emotional expectation which discounted the necessity of treating the former republics as fully independent. A commonly held assumption in Moscow was that such republics would be unable to overcome the burden of imperial control and would naturally gravitate back into Russia's sphere of influence; albeit the influence would be exercised in a neocolonial manner, subjugation more loosely based, Russian hegemony rendered more acceptable and civilised as befitting a 'New World Order'.

The all-Union institutional framework which was most coherent in the post-Soviet period was the Russian army (constituted in May 1992) and the former KGB (which split into three sections). It was this institution—with its strong command, control, communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities within each of the former republics—which dominated by default Russia's policies towards the 'Near Abroad'. Furthermore, with the creation of the CIS, the Ministry of Defence controlled both military assets and buildings throughout the former Soviet Union. Thus, while initially the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) undertook a liberal policy of rapprochement with the West (an Atlanticist position), characterised by partnership, close co-operation and the pursuit of mutual interests—particularly the acceptance by Western states of Russia's European identity and Western integration—the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) developed a 'Near Abroad' policy predicated in the first instance upon the reintegration of the FSU, and in the second on the controlling influence upon the external policies of FSU republics (the Eurasian perspective).

By late 1992 and early 1993, Russia's broadly pro-Western policy towards its 'Far Abroad' (*dal'nye zarubezhnye*) had undergone a reassessment and was replaced with policies which sought to reassert Russian national interest and provide a more balanced Eurasianist orientation. Russia had become disillusioned, paradoxically, with both the lack of Western aid and her perceived dependence upon that aid. The domestic political landscape reflected this changing perception as both the assertive nationalist and re-emergent communist forces came to the fore at the Duma elections.

BOX 9.8 STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS

- Eurasianist v. Atlanticist?
- secure Western co-operation v. promote Russian interests above all else
- 'Westerns' v. Russia First/Russia to be treated as a true great power

Post-1993: Russian national interest+balanced Eurasianist

Increased stress on:

- importance of former satellite states
- importance of China, Middle East (especially Iran and Turkey)
- importance of former USSR republics and CIS

A Euro-Asiatic orientation stressed the importance of Russian policy towards the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as China, the Middle East (particularly Iran and Turkey) and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, by 1993 the MoD policy towards the 'Near Abroad' had been largely accepted as Russian state policy. Russia, as a great power, began to stress its 'special responsibilities' towards former Soviet space. The raft of measures which Russia adopted in order to attain a reintegration of post-Soviet economic, military and political space was widened to include economic and psychological means, rather than mere military force. The CIS was now perceived as a zone of Russian interest and CIS integration the decisive factor characterising Russian foreign policy in this region.

BOX 9.9 CIS INTEGRATION

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a political and economic international organisation which succeeded the Soviet Union. It was created in 1992 in order to regulate international relations among the states of the former Soviet Union—in effect, to provide a forum within which all outstanding issues left unresolved by the collapse of the Soviet Union could be addressed and peaceably resolved. It should not be confused with the Russian Federation, which, although the legal successor to the USSR, only consisted of territories encompassed by the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR).

All the former Soviet republics, apart from the three Baltic states, are members of this collective security organisation. In 1992 the CIS headquarters was founded in Minsk, Belarus, and by 1993 it had developed an institutional framework, including a CIS Executive Secretariat and a CIS Co-ordinating Consultative Committee.

The CIS has been variously interpreted—some have argued that it represents a mechanism through which Russian imperial ambitions are legitimised, others that it acts as an integrative force within the region, similar to the role played by the European Union in Western

Europe. It remains a largely ineffective organisation, with many agreements signed but only a fraction implemented and then in an ad hoc and confused manner.

Russia has generally utilised the CIS to protect and promote Russian interests within the 'Near Abroad'. Certainly, the CIS has been at the forefront of attempts to reintegrate former Soviet space—particularly the economic space. For example, in 1993 nine CIS member states established an Economic Union, in 1994 the CIS heads of state created an Interstate Economic Commission to co-ordinate and implement the Economic Union, and by 1995 Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia had signed an agreement on the creation of a Customs Union between these countries. However, trade among CIS countries has declined since independence due to trade imbalances, weak economic performance, contradictory monetary policies and divergent strategies for economic development of the member states.

Russia has also utilised the CIS in order to promote both military reintegration and its role as regional peace-keeper, particularly through collective-security agreements. However, co-operation in this sphere of activity has met with less success. The fragmentation and degradation of the operational capability of the Soviet military machine, coupled with widely differing geopolitical interests of former republics, has served to undermine collective-security goals. The deployments of CIS peace-keeping troops to trouble spots around the FSU, for example, Abkhazia in Georgia or Tadjikistan in Central Asia, remain largely Russian affairs.

The CIS has thus experienced mixed success. In the sphere of military co-operation it is perceived to be important by some Russian parties, representing a viable counterweight to NATO enlargement in CEE. However, the inability of the CIS to formulate effective collective environmental security policies—the lack of action over the Aral Sea catastrophe being a particularly notable example—represents the CIS at its weakest and most ineffective. Russia remains hegemonic within the organisation and continues to use it to advance Russian state interest within the 'Near Abroad'.

CASE STUDY: RUSSIA'S BALTIC POLICY

These interrelated economic, military, political and social issues were to form the key components which shaped Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad'. To paraphrase Dean Acheson, Russia had lost an empire and had yet to find its role in the 'Near

Abroad'. How, then, was Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' to be elaborated and implemented? In what way would these issues affect the formation of Russian foreign policy orientation.

The Soviet legacy: Russia and the Baltic states, 1991–4

The Soviet legitimisation crisis of 1990–1 resulted in the emergence and external recognition of the three Baltic states. This period was characterised by an ambivalent and, on occasion, violent Soviet and then Russian reaction to the speed and direction of Baltic strategic reorientation towards European military and political structures. Russo-Baltic relations were complicated both by the need to overcome a Soviet legacy and at the same time negotiate a transition from one-party authoritarian political control to democratic pluralism, and from a centralised economy to some form of free-market economic liberalism. As a consequence, security considerations dominated the political agenda in all three states. For many analysts the Baltic states appeared to face a period of 'crisis'. The 'crisis' most closely associated with the Baltic states arose from the danger of stalled democratisation and consequent reintegration into a neo-imperialist Russia.

In the last days of the Soviet Empire it appeared that the Baltic states were ripe for a full-scale Yugoslav-type crisis—the emergent states had yet to receive external recognition of their sovereignty and it was doubtful whether they could maintain control and stability within their own disputed borders. Would Soviet military forces intervene to protect the integrity of the Union, or Russian troops to uphold the rights of national minorities, or would the Baltic states suffer internal implosion followed by warfare?

The central point of dispute between the newly independent Baltic states and the Russian Federation was the continued presence of Russian troops and Russian-controlled military assets (such as the SSNB training base at Paldiski, Estonia, and the radar station at Skundra in Latvia) on Baltic territory. In Moscow it was the treatment of Russian minorities within Estonia and Latvia (as well as the retired Soviet military pensioners), the 'violation of their rights', which constituted a serious point of contention between Russia and the Baltic states. Border disputes centred upon territory that had been incorporated into the Russian SSR after the Great Patriotic War, in violation of peace treaties signed between the Soviet Union and Estonia and Latvia following World War One (the Treaties of Riga and Tartu, 1920). Indeed, the issue of the Russian diaspora became more prominent within domestic politics and foreign policy formation as Russia gradually embraced the Euro-Asiatic perspective through 1993 and 1994.

However, although the border disputes remain unresolved, progress was reached in other aspects of interstate contention. Former Soviet troops were withdrawn from all three Baltic republics by August 1994 and although the treatment of minorities remains a point of tension at the state level, inter-ethnic relations in the Baltic states are perhaps the most peaceable among the former republics.

NATO enlargement and Baltic strategic reorientation

As the pre-existing points of tension were resolved (or at least ameliorated) by 1994, new disputes arose to replace them. Russian opposition to NATO 'expansion' was dramatically hardened in 1993 with the NATO creation of a Partnership for Peace programme in January 1994. By mid-1994 a number of Central and East European countries, including the Baltic states, had signed partnership agreements ensuring greater co-operation with NATO and raising the possibility of future membership.

In the last years of the Gorbachev regime the Baltic counter-elites conceived of foreign and security policies in terms of a demilitarised and neutral Baltic area. Nascent political groupings and associations looked to integrate into the Nordic security complex once independence had been achieved. However, upon independence, this conception was downgraded and replaced by aspirations of rapid and complete integration into NATO and European Union (EU) structures. NATO membership became the highest foreign policy priority of the Baltic States. The organisation was perceived by the emergent Baltic political elites to be the only existing structure capable of countering threats to Baltic territorial integrity and sovereignty posed by the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States under Russian political hegemony.

The decision to initiate a strategic reorientation away from Russia and to embrace NATO as a security guarantor was also influenced by the transformation of the balance of power within the international system at the end of the Cold War. With the ending of superpower ideological and military confrontation and antagonism, the perceived utility of neutrality was undermined. The realisation by Baltic political elites that the Baltic region did not fall within the US primary sphere of interest, coupled with German preoccupation during the process of reunification, and the refusal of the Council of Baltic Sea States (created through a German and Danish initiative in spring 1992) to extend its limited remit to include collective-security arrangements among its members, all conspired to highlight the relative attractiveness of NATO membership. Bilateral security relationships with the Russian Federation were considered psychologically unacceptable and politically illogical given the experience of occupation since 1940 and the close association in the minds of Baltic decision-makers of Soviet and Russian imperial traditions and ambitions.

RUSSIA'S 'NEAR ABROAD' POLICY ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Russian opposition to NATO 'enlargement' was initially characterised by a twin-track approach. At first Russia adopted a policy of 'conditional enlargement', that is, NATO enlargement could proceed without strenuous Russian opposition providing key conditions were met. These conditions included NATO signing a legally binding treaty to the effect that newly integrated NATO states would remain non-nuclear and only integrate according to an agreed and phased timetable of inclusion. Above all, the Baltic states or any other former Soviet republics were not to be integrated under any circumstances. The negative consequences of unconditional NATO enlargement were

graphically posed at all diplomatic meetings and speeches—strident militarism within the 'Near Abroad', political instability within the Federation, a *derzhavnikii* president at the 2000 elections, and closer Sino-Soviet relations were, it was claimed, just some of the likely negative consequences.

At the same time, Russia proposed alternative 'non-NATO' mechanisms to oversee European security in the New World Order. In the spirit of post-Cold War East-West co-operation, new and more appropriate international organisations, such as the EU, OSCE or UN, should provide the context within which European security was guaranteed. As this line of reasoning received little international support and by the end of 1996 it appeared clear that NATO was preparing to announce in mid-1997 the first echelon of states which would be incorporated into NATO by 1999 (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), Russia adapted its policy towards the Baltic 'Near Abroad'.

BOX 9.10 NATO ENLARGEMENT

- Russians refer to 'enlargement' as 'expansion'
- Baltic states' sense of spheres of influence
- Russia's attempted conditions:
 - legally binding treaty with NATO ensuring new members would remain non-nuclear
 - phased agreed timetable
 - non-inclusion of former USSR territory
- attempt to create overarching pan-European security authority (i.e. stronger OSCE to which existing organisations would be answerable)

Note: See Boxes 3.5, 3.6 and especially 3.7 above.

Conditional opposition to NATO enlargement was transformed into opposition by proxy—a policy designed to oppose NATO enlargement by illustrating that the conditions for enlargement had not been met by the aspirant Baltic states. In February 1997 Yeltsin's Presidential Office published a document which elaborated Russia's long-term policy guidelines towards the Baltic states. The policy document outlined six interlinked issues which were central to Russo-Baltic relations. It began by reiterating Russian opposition to Baltic entry into NATO and stressed that until the protection of 'compatriot rights' were guaranteed, border ratification would be delayed. The document emphasised the necessity of Russia maintaining profitable economic ties to the Kaliningrad *oblast'* (region), while calling for Russo-Baltic co-operation to combat the threats posed by organised crime. Lastly, increased bilateral cultural co-operation between Russia and the Baltic states was encouraged.

BOX 9.11 RUSSIA AND BALTIC STATES

Six policy guidelines (February 1997):

- Russian opposition to Baltic membership of NATO
- need for protection of Russian minorities in Baltic states
- and linkage of this with resolution of border disputes
- need to maintain economic ties with Kaliningrad
- calls for co-operation to combat crime
- call for bilateral cultural co-operation

The insistence that Russian agreement be given for the integration of the Baltic states into NATO, coupled with the linkage of the border question to the condition of the Russian diaspora, represented a concerted attempt to oppose NATO influence within the Baltic region. As the EU insists that the fair treatment of minorities is a condition for EU integration, such a policy could have isolated the Baltic states from all Euro-Atlantic structures. Within the document lies the implicit threat that Russia could redirect its trade destined for the European market away from the costly Baltic ports, towards those of Finland. The possibility of *de facto* economic sanctions would provide another lever of Russian influence upon the formation of Baltic foreign and security policy.

CONCLUSIONS

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' was largely determined by issues generated by the Soviet legacy, the remnants of empire which continued to link the former peripheral republics to their imperial centre. Russia was particularly prone to utilise diplomatic, economic and military pressure to reassert and extend Russian influence. This activist policy was embodied by the deployment of peacekeepers in Moldova and Tadjikistan. Russian military presence advanced Russian strategic interest within the 'Near Abroad', allowing Russia to retain sphere of influence, to dominate a quasi-independent buffer zone, and extend the perimeter for Russian territorial defence.

Through the mid- and late 1990s, other factors have shaped Russian relations with the 'Near Abroad'—and none was so contentious as the process of NATO enlargement. However, just as the very concept of security itself has been broadened and attention has shifted from the narrow traditional political and military conception of security (which characterised Cold War thinking) to include societal, individual and environmental concerns, so too has Russian policy towards the 'Near Abroad' adapted to the new international environment. Russian policy is now characterised by a complex and differentiated interplay of a series of interests with each of the former republics. This shift represents a greater sophistication and appreciation of the differing aspirations of the former republics and is perhaps best represented in Russian policy towards her Baltic

'Near Abroad'.

But in focusing upon the points of dispute between Russia and the 'Near Abroad', we are in danger of overlooking the central role of internal domestic dynamics in the formation of Russian foreign and security policy. The simultaneous downsizing and modernisation of the Russian military establishment, the continued stabilisation of Russia's economic liberalisation programme and consolidation of her democratisation project, the resolution of inherent centre-periphery strains with the elaboration of a workable regional policy will all be crucial to the future evolution of Russian policy to the 'Near Abroad'. Above all, the Russian political elite must reach agreement upon a coherent and consistently proposed set of interests which will act as guiding principles for this 'Near Abroad' policy. Thus, the question of Russian identity remains the key historical and contemporary determinant of Russia's relationship with her former Tsarist empire. The controversy surrounding the reburial of the remains of Tsar Nicholas II and the imperial family in St Petersburg in July 1998, the lack of an agreed official national anthem and weakness and fragility of the emerging party system within the Federation all testify to the difficulties Russia will experience before these questions of identity are settled.

Russia and the 'Near Abroad' will remain of enduring interest to students of International Relations. Through the study of such a subject we witness the creation and collapse of states, explore the meaning of sovereignty in the modern world, the resolution of ethnic conflict, the articulation of state interests and the formation and evolution of a foreign policy. These topics, of great interest in themselves, also remain central to an understanding of the International Relations discipline itself.

FURTHER READING

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Europe and European integration

Trevor C. Salmon

WHAT IS EUROPE?

In the 1960s and 1970s 'Europe' was often referred to as if it was synonymous with the European Economic Community (EEC); but this was never true, and today, with all the changes that have taken place in the last few years, it is even less true. The European Union (EU) consists of only fifteen member states, and even if the proposed enlargement goes ahead early in the twenty-first century, this will initially enlarge it only to twenty-one states. That contrasts with the forty states in 1998's Council of Europe, the fifty-five states (although Yugoslavia is suspended) that are members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the twenty-nine states in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (indeed, Japan and Mexico are members of the OECD). Similarly, both Canada and the United States of America are in the OSCE and OECD, as they are in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), with its nineteen members after the 1999 enlargement.

This, of course, raises questions about European identity and what 'Europe' comprises. Originally a predominantly geographical construct, the Roman legacy of language, culture and values gave the concept of Europe a somewhat wider foundation, as did Charlemagne's empire, the Holy Roman Empire, and Christianity. The divisions within Christianity at the time of the Reformation damaged the notion of a concept of Europe, as did the concomitant emergence of theories of the state and state sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the idea of Europe as a political and cultural entity remained, sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker; indeed, there was a recognition that Europe possessed both diversity and unity: diversity in geography, with rivers and mountains dividing the continent, diversity in language despite the Grecian and Roman inheritance and diversity in political authority as states sought and pursued their own interests, leading to wars, death and destruction; unity in that certain values and the religious, philosophical and cultural inheritance, while often muted, kept re-emerging.

BOX 10.1 EUROPE?

- European Union?
- geographical entity?
- common roots of language, culture and values?
- Roman, Charlemagne and Holy Roman Empire imperial imprint?
- intellectual and philosophical legacy?

Tensions still arise for similar reasons today, as the question is asked which states are eligible for membership of European organisations such as the European Union and what ought the criteria for membership to be? As noted above the United States and Canada are members of the OSCE, while the Commission of the European Community gave a favourable opinion on the application of Cyprus to join the EC in July 1993 and the eligibility of Turkey for membership was first raised in 1964 and reaffirmed in April 1997 when the country was told its application for membership of the European Union would be judged by the same objective standards and criteria as those of other applicants. The question of whether a state is European has been raised not only in the context of enlargements of the EU in the next decade but in that of membership of the OSCE, of which Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are members. This poses the questions of where the boundary of Europe lies and whether it is a geographical or some other type of boundary.

DIVISIONS IN EUROPE

From the end of the war in Europe in May 1945 until 1989 the unity and diversity in Europe was manifested by the division created by the Iron Curtain, a line of ideological, political, economic and military barrier stretching through the former Germany along the fissure line of the inner German border from the Baltic Sea southwards to the Adriatic. Crucially it divided not only Germany itself but Europe. Until the collapse of the Soviet Empire in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989–91, it was problematic to speak of ‘Europe’ since for most practical purposes the division created a Western and an Eastern Europe, broadly along the lines of membership of the Western North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact (with associated socio-economic organisations), though there were also those states that sought to avoid involvement with either, for example, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Ireland or Sweden. Even ‘Western’ Europe came to be divided between the founder-member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (founded in 1951–2) and the EEC (founded in 1957–8), and those that preferred the looser arrangement of the European Free Trade Association (founded in 1960), so that from 1960 to 1973 a clear distinction could be made between the Six and the Seven; in addition, there were two Germanies: the Federal Republic (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

BOX 10.2 DIVISION OF EUROPE

	<i>Western Europe</i>	<i>Eastern Europe</i>
Ideology	liberal democratic, pluralist and market economies	socialist (Marxist-Leninist), central planning and central control
Leadership	US might cajole but democratic and peaceful	USSR terror, subjugation and invasion
Two Germanies	Federal Republic (West)	Democratic Republic (East)
Leading organisations	NATO EEC (6) EFTA (7) Council of Europe OECD	Warsaw Pact Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)

The post-war East/West division in Europe reflected the facts of where military power resided: in Washington and Moscow and in NATO and the Warsaw Pact (although the latter was not formally created until 1955). As noted above, some states tried to avoid being ensnared in this division, so it was not strictly bipolar but was nevertheless a basic feature of the landscape for forty years. It was unusual in that the division lacked flexibility: the alliances were formalised, based on ideology and had permanent structures. The armed forces were prepared and in place. There was a strong emphasis upon maintaining the status quo, it being perceived as too dangerous to challenge it seriously, although there were periodic crises such as those in Berlin in 1948–9, 1958 and 1961. The attempts to challenge the status quo, such as President de Gaulle of France's attempts to become semi-detached from NATO and perhaps the Romanians' efforts to semi-detach from the Warsaw Pact, were ultimately unsuccessful, not least because the Soviets showed when they invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 that there were limits to their tolerance. The style of the two blocs was very different: in the west the United States cajoled, even threatened, but nonetheless ultimately sought peaceful agreed solutions; in the east the Soviets acquired power through Stalinist terror and maintained it through much the same methods, albeit with the iron fist increasingly in a velvet glove. Given the clarity of the division, despite some scares, there was considerable stability in Europe, with implicit recognition of the spheres of influence of the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

Within the context of that division, in Western Europe itself there were further fundamental divisions. These were based on attitudes to the nature of the relations between the democratic, pluralist and industrialised states and centred on the debate over how to achieve a peaceful Europe. On one hand, some argued for supranational institutions with individual states relinquishing all or substantial portions of their sovereignty to new centres of authority. On the other, cases were made for the traditional forms of international organisation, with an emphasis upon consensus agreements and

unanimity.

Part of the argument originally was about how best to control a potentially resurgent Germany, but at root it reflected the different wartime experiences of the states and indeed their political histories and cultures. For some states—France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, and even Germany itself—the war had seen defeat, occupation and humiliation. The state had failed to fulfil its *raison d'être*, that is, to provide the physical security of its citizens and their prosperity. Citizens who had endured this experience were willing to envisage radical solutions for the future political and socioeconomic organisation of Europe, even involving solutions that would do away with the states altogether.

Other states and citizens had enjoyed different experiences. In the United Kingdom, for example, the victory celebrated on VE (Victory in Europe) and VJ (Victory in Japan) days in 1945 appeared to be a confirmation of the strength of the British state and system: undefeated, unoccupied and victorious. Some other states had not emerged quite so triumphantly but nevertheless had not endured the horrors of Germany or France. They too, therefore, were reluctant to accept that the days of the state were numbered. Indeed, in Ireland the political leadership basically argued that they had not striven for 700 years to gain independence to give it up to a European federation. There were divisions then over the nature of any new organisations in Western Europe, especially where the power of decision was to lie, and over whether these organisations were to help the state provide for its citizens in a traditional manner, or were to replace the existing system of states with a kind of United States of Europe along federal or quasi-federal lines. This is not the place to give a detailed history of each separate organisation or to describe its organisational structure, but Box 10.3 provides an overview of them.

BOX 10.3 EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Date of origin/expiry</i>	<i>Membership when created</i>	<i>Objectives</i>
OEEC/OECD	OEEC 1948– 60	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotion of trade of production • Establishment of multilateral payments system • Reduce barriers to trade • Maintain stable currencies • Assist in implementing Marshall Plan
	OECD 1961–	20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forum for discussions and

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> attempt to co-ordinate economic policies • Promotion of trade and currency liberalisation • Economic development • Promotion of productivity • Facilitate greater unity • Promote spiritual and moral values • Facilitate social progress • Uphold principles of parliamentary democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights
Council of Europe	1949–	10	

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To preserve principles of democracy and common heritage • Promote European integration • Economic, cultural and social collaboration
ECSC/EEC	1952/1958–	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To lay foundations for ever closer union among people • To lay foundations for avoidance of war • Economic and social progress • Elimination of barriers and restrictions on trade; creation of a ‘common market’ • Improvement of living and working conditions • Reduction of imbalances between regions
EFTA	1960–	7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited industrial free area • Forum to negotiate with EEC • Fair trade between member states
Warsaw Pact	1955–92	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutionalisation of USSR and satellite relations

COMECON 1949– 6 91	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mirror of NATO • Immediate response to FRG membership of NATO • Response to OEEC
CSCE/OSCE 1975– 35 94	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempt to impose Soviet economic control • Uniting efforts of members • Economic development • Advances in welfare
OSCE 1995– 53 (but Yugoslavia suspended)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indivisibility of security • Inviolable but non-immutable frontiers • Sets norms of behaviour • '3 baskets': • security, arms control and confidence-building measures • economic, scientific and technological co-operation • human rights, rights to self-determination and humanitarian concerns

REVOLUTION

In 1989 the whole European system, which had endured for about forty years, was shaken by the revolution which swept through Eastern and Central Europe and which by the end of 1991 had even claimed the very existence of the Soviet Union and of communism as a political and socio-economic system in Europe. The impact of this was direct in ending the military and ideological division in Europe. Very rapidly the military arm of the Soviet Union's control of its former satellites was dissolved, first with the formal dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact at the end of March 1991 and then political dissolution by March 1992. By 1994 all Russian troops (Russia having become the successor to the Soviet Union's international treaty commitments) had departed from the former Pact territories. The members of the parallel Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/CMEA) accepted that economic disentanglement would be difficult given the degree of economic interdependence and indeed dependence that had been created over the previous forty years, and initially proposed a two-year interim body. Nevertheless, given the very rapid speed of developments in June 1991, it

was resolved to wind up COMECON, and this was formally brought about in September 1991. Much to many people's surprise, by the end of that year the Soviet Union itself had collapsed, leaving the residual Russia as the successor state but with the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union all becoming independent states. Developments had been even speedier in the case of the divided Germany.

BOX 10.4 THE UNITING OF GERMANY

- On 7 October 1989 the East German regime had celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its coming to power;
- by the end of the month their long-term leader (Erich Honecker) had been ousted;
- on 9 November the Berlin Wall, the physical and symbolic monument to the division of Germany and Europe, was dismantled by the people;
- on 31 August 1990 the Treaty of Union was signed by representatives of the two Germanies;
- on 12 September the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany was signed by leaders of the four occupying powers and the two Germanies;
- and on 3 October German unification by the accession of the five Eastern Lander (regions of the former DDR) to the Federal Republic of Germany took place.

It is worth noting that the German developments were not as orderly as the summary in Box 10.4 suggests and few were able to anticipate or foresee what would happen months or even weeks ahead. This is epitomised by the agreement of the Soviets in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany (Article 6) that the new Germany had the right to belong to any alliances it wished, including NATO, something that would not have been countenanced even in the spring of 1990.

The seismic consequences of these developments, which are still reverberating, cannot be overstated, and these developments required both other states in Europe and the existing Western institutions to reappraise their own policies and, in the case of the institutions, to reappraise their functions and *raison d'être*. It is important to note, however, that in this reappraisal neither states nor institutions were starting from a blank sheet of paper: structures, obligations, habits and working practices were often firmly entrenched, making it difficult for radical thinking to take place. One example of this was the continued reservations about 'Germany' and its possible future intentions and power; another was the widely shared view that the United States' presence in Europe and NATO continued to be the basis of European security. Therefore, rather than a swathe of new institutions, the 1990s saw the existing institutions in Europe competing for roles and continued viability, including in this process sometimes radical transformations of their remit and organisation. This rethinking went on against the background of the disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1990 onwards and the Gulf crisis and war of 1990–1.

NATO ADAPTATIONS

NATO's adjustment, which at times became embroiled with discussions about the future of the European Community, took three forms:

- Reform of its strategy and tactics, so that while it remained focused on providing for the territorial defence of its members, it gradually moved to smaller, more mobile, multinational and versatile forces, with scaled-down states of readiness and a reduced nuclear force; and thought of 'risks' rather than 'threats'.
- Extending the hand of consultation and co-operation to its former adversaries from the Warsaw Pact, a development which was to see the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, Partnership for Peace and the move towards admitting three of these states into NATO itself by 1999, with others to follow.
- The move into supporting the crisis-management and peace-keeping aspirations of the United Nations and the (O)CSCE, particularly with respect to the former Yugoslavia.

BOX 10.5 NATO

For boxes with information on NATO see Boxes 3.4 and 3.5, and especially Boxes 3.6 and 3.7 above.

OSCE

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which between 1975 and 1990 had been no more than a peripatetic international conference, also reformed itself, starting with a summit meeting in Paris in November 1990. This led to a modest institutionalisation of the CSCE (it becoming the OSCE in January 1995). More importantly, the CSCE/OSCE built upon its norm/value setting functions which had been established in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and transformed itself into a body able to:

- legitimise actions by others as a regional organisation for Europe under the UN;
- involve itself in conflict prevention and crisis management;
- contribute to a series of 'confidence and security-building' measures in Europe;
- play a more important role in norm and value setting, seeking to establish throughout Europe what was acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour by states in both their international relations and in the treatment of their own citizens in the area of human rights.

BOX 10.6 OSCE*Pluses*

pan-European

consensus or consensus
minus oneUS/Russia both in
crisis prevention and
management

norm setting

confidence and security-
building

measures (CSBMs)

*Minuses*too broad and
unwieldy

too many rivals

difficult to achieve
agreement

different agendas

no forces of own

The negative aspects of the revamped OSCE, however, are:

- it still has a weak institutional structure and its decision-making procedures are largely consensual, although it has evolved a system whereby the parties to a dispute are not allowed a veto. It reflects many of the weaknesses of the League of Nations, in that it can strive for general statements but these have no mandatory effect;
- it lacks its own forces and therefore has to subcontract to other bodies such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU);
- although it is pan-European, it has been challenged by the organisational and other relationships NATO has evolved with Central and Eastern European states.

THE WEU

A third body, the Western European Union (WEU), also had to adjust, but to some extent it has been even less in control of its own destiny than other European institutions, largely because it became caught up in the disputes about the relative roles of NATO and the European Community/Union's attempt to evolve a common foreign and security policy, including a common defence policy. Put another way, the question became that of the primacy of NATO or an EC/EU alternative becoming the basis of an embryonic and relatively independent European security and defence identity that would be relatively independent of the United States. In 1990–1 in the context of NATO's review of its position and the European Community's Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, which concluded in Maastricht in December 1991, these issues were fiercely debated, although it must be said not fully resolved. It was rather ambiguously agreed that the WEU was an integral component of both the new European Union and NATO, although as will be seen below the EU did contract out to the WEU decisions with defence implications.

BOX 10.7 WEU

	NATO ← WEU → EU?
10	committed to Article V guarantee—member states will
Members	'afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'
5	(EU members who choose not to sign up to Article V
Observers	guarantee) may attend meetings and speak

3 Associates	(European NATO states but not EU members) may attend meetings, speak and be associated with WEU planning cell and take part in WEU operations
10	(most of the former Warsaw Pact states)
Associatepartners	may participate in meetings with permission, may participate in working groups, may associate themselves with WEU decisions

The WEU not only had a new relationship with the EU, but offered Observer status to Ireland, Greece and Denmark (and later Austria, Finland and Sweden), that is, those EU member states that did not wish to become fully involved in an automatic defensive commitment, as represented in the founding treaty of the WEU, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (as amended in 1954). European NATO states not in the EU were offered Associate status (Norway, Turkey and Iceland). Neither Observer nor Associate status involved the states in a military guarantee or commitment. More dramatically, in 1992 the members of the WEU at Petersberg (near Bonn) decided to strengthen the WEU's operational role and planning capability and to take responsibility for what became known as the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. They offered former Warsaw Pact adversaries consultation rights and took this further in the Kirchberg Declaration of 1994, which offered these states the position of 'Associate Partners'. The position and role of the WEU became issues again in the second EC/EU Intergovernmental Conference of the 1990s, that of 1996–7, which culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to be discussed below.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

A further body in Europe, the Council of Europe, was not as radically changed by the upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989–91 as one might have expected although its membership substantially increased to forty. The Council of Europe had been created in 1949 as a beacon for liberal, democratic values in a world recovering from the atrocities of the Second World War, where anything seemed to go, and in an era when the great ideological contest was that between two alternative value systems: Western liberal democracy versus Soviet communist totalitarianism. It had also been created at a time when some hoped it would be the foundation for a kind of United States of Europe, an aspiration blighted by those states referred to above as not willing to see radical solutions to the problems facing Europe in the period 1945–9. Instead of being given specific real powers in a limited field, the Council was given a wide remit—almost everything apart from defence—but no real decision-making power, since all its decisions required unanimity on the part of its members. Even if some agreed to proceed on their own in certain areas, that agreement only affected those states that had signed up. Thus in the period 1949–89 the Council of Europe had provided a useful forum for the states of Western Europe to meet and to agree a number of useful if not earth-shattering conventions. Its outstanding contribution was in the field of human rights, particularly the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), originally signed in November 1950. The Convention and subsequent protocols, albeit with a number of exceptions, laid down a number of rights and freedoms for individuals, such as:

- freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery and compulsory labour;
- the right to a fair and public hearing and the presumption of innocence; and
- respect for privacy.

BOX 10.8 COUNCIL OF EUROPE

- limited powers in wide fields—requirement of unanimity or of agreement by states affected by decision
- restoration of and upholding of Western liberal democratic values
- forum for Western states
- series of useful conventions, and especially European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Importantly, the Convention also provided for a machinery and procedures to enable individuals to take action, even against their own governments. It is perhaps not surprising that it is in the area of values that the Council has tried to make its mark in the 1990s, and to some extent membership of the Council has become a symbol of

acceptance by the European community of states that a state meets certain liberal democratic standards. In Vienna in 1993, for example, the Council determined that applications presupposed: the principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, free and fair elections with universal suffrage, guaranteed freedom of expression, the protection of national minorities, observance of international laws and acceptance of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). A year later they added the requirements that the national territory of a member had to lie wholly or partly in Europe and the culture had to be European.

In the 1990s the Council has faced the problem of being squeezed by an enlarging EU and by the OSCE taking an interest in a variety of human rights to do with national minorities and so on. In its desire to establish its importance, the Council gradually extended its membership to forty by 1998, but controversially this includes the Russian Federation despite reservations about a number of aspects of its policy, and especially reservations about the way it had sought to put down the rebellion against its authority in Chechnya in the mid-1990s.

Nevertheless, values have been important, with the suspension of Greece and Turkey at various times because of military rule. Similarly, Portugal and Spain were not allowed membership until the changes in their regimes in 1974 and 1975, respectively.

Apart from NATO the most important European organisation for most of the post-war period and in the 1990s has been the European Community (since November 1993, the European Union (EU)), and the rest of this chapter will focus on it and the nature of, and progress towards, European integration.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

The very structure of the European Union created by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 embodies compromises about the nature, scope and future of European integration. In the EU this is seen, for example, in the pillar structure.

BOX 10.9 EU PILLAR STRUCTURE

European Community	Common Foreign and Security Policy	Justice and Home Affairs
ECSC+EEC+Euratom	CFSP	JHA

The first pillar of the EU is the EC pillar. Officially there were three treaties founding three European communities in the 1950s. The 1951 Paris Treaty founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which began work in 1952. The two separate Treaties of Rome, both signed in March 1957, established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which both began work in 1958. In 1965 the Merger Treaty amalgamated the institutions, but the three Communities were still legally distinct. That remains the position legally, although

the singular ‘European Community’ (EC) is almost always used, unless there is a specific legal reason for not doing so.

The European Community comprises institutionally, most importantly: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. The TEU also elevated the Court of Auditors to equal rank with these four.

BOX 10.10 EC INSTITUTIONS

Commission+Council+European Justice+Court of Auditors	Parliament+European	Court	of
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The Commission

There are twenty Commissioners, one from each of the ten smaller states and two each from France, Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain. Members of the Commission are appointed for five-year terms.

This group of twenty is supposed to have a collegiate nature, reflecting the view that together the Commissioners represent the vanguard of the European idea. The unity of the Commission is reflected in the fact that officially the Commission acts and speaks with one voice. All Commissioners are technically responsible for Commission work; since the Commission is regarded as a college, proposals are made and decisions taken in its collective name. This college of twenty sits on top of a larger organisation, employing another 2,000 individuals as policy-makers and about another 10,000 in secretarial, interpreting and translating functions, and so on. The Commission as a whole is divided into twenty-three Directorates-General (DGs, as they are known) plus technical and legal services. The DGs are the hub of the Commission’s and hence the Community’s administration and the source of most proposals. Some are famous and powerful, such as DG VI—Agriculture, appearing to operate almost as separate fiefdoms. Each Commissioner is responsible for one or more DGs, but is aided in this task by a Director-General, who is the permanent ‘civil servant’ head of the DG. There are a number of ways of describing the Commission’s key roles but perhaps four definitions encapsulate its responsibilities:

- To act as the conscience of the Community and Union; to embody and promote the mystique of the European vocation and to remind member states of their obligations and commitments.
- To act as the guardian of the treaties in the first instance and to ensure similarly in the first instance that the law and decisions of the Community are adhered to, although the European Court of Justice is the final arbiter.
- To act as the executive of the Community with regard to implementing decisions reached by the Council of Ministers. The Commission also has to apply particular rules and funds: for example, with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy.
- To act as the initiator of Community policy and law, since, except in truly exceptional cases, the member states acting in their forum, the Council, cannot make decisions

unless there is a Commission proposal. This is the central power of the Commission and the one which it has fought most tenaciously to preserve. It allows the Commission to set the terms and parameters of debate and the agenda for the Community. However, a real constraint is that the Commission will act with regard to its anticipation of the likely acceptability of its proposals to the member states, since it is they who have the power of decision.

BOX 10.11 COMMISSION

Twenty members:

Conscience+Guardian+Executive+Initiator

The Council

That power is exercised in the Council of Ministers, which is composed of the most appropriate minister from each member state, depending on the topic to be discussed; a representative of the Commission is also present but has no vote. The Council is the central legislative point in the system; it makes Community law and as long as it has acted according to the treaties, its decisions can be binding upon and directly applicable in the member states: that is, they do not require to be ratified by the national parliaments but have direct effect.

This becomes particularly important given that increasingly the Council can take decisions by a majority or qualified-majority vote. While it was always intended that member states would retain the veto for some sensitive issues, in recent years the states have agreed to expand the areas where voting is possible. When this occurs the votes are weighted. However, despite the possibility of voting, in many cases the member states prefer to act on the basis of unanimity or consensus, even where the treaty would allow for a vote.

BOX 10.12 WEIGHTED VOTING IN THE COUNCIL

10—France, Germany, Italy and the UK

8—Spain

5—Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal

4—Austria and Sweden

3—Denmark, Finland and Ireland

2—Luxembourg

A qualified majority is 62 out of the total of 87.

References to ‘the Council’ often go beyond the formal Council of Ministers to embrace the European Council (comprising heads of state or government) and the complex system

of committees and working parties that operate under the Council to prepare its meetings and to seek to establish areas of agreement, the most senior of which is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The European Council was invented as a biannual meeting of the top political leaders in each member state to allow them to provide a sense of momentum, direction and dynamism to the Community. Although on occasion it has provided these inputs, more usually the meetings have become bogged down in detail, such as deciding on the president of the new European Central Bank. Since the formation of the European Union, the European Council also has the function of trying to keep the different pillars and strands of the Union together.

BOX 10.13 'THE COUNCIL SYSTEM'

European Council
 Council (of Ministers)
 Coreper (Committee of Permanent
 Representatives)
 Working groups/parties

The European Parliament

The third major body is the European Parliament. Originally, it had very limited functions and powers but over the past fifty years it has continually sought to exert leverage to extend its power, although that has been an uphill struggle against the member states. A significant development was the introduction of 'direct elections' in 1979: every five years the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are voted for directly by the people of the various member states, although the method of election varies in each state. There are 626 MEPs, the numbers from each state varying according to the states' populations. The MEPs sit by party affiliation in political groups and for the most part they vote along party rather than national lines. The Parliament has acquired the power to reject the budget of the EC, membership of potential new member states, some international agreements the Community may wish to enter and the proposed members of the Commission, as well as possessing the power to sack the Commission on a vote of censure. This power has never been successfully invoked. In the 1998–9 crisis between the European Parliament and the Commission over allegations of fraud and mismanagement it was thought that Parliament would pass a censure motion. In fact, it was defeated by 232 to 292. Nevertheless, this motion, further embarrassment for the Commission in the form of an independent report proving that at least some of the allegations had substance, and threats that another motion would be tabled, this time successfully, led the entire Santer Commission to resign—the biggest institutional crisis for a generation. This whole episode was brought about by the Parliament's unhappiness with the Commission's handling of the 1996 budget, particularly expenditure. Usually these powers have been held in reserve, but the shock waves of the 1998–9 crisis are likely to continue for several years. The Parliament has also on occasion blocked

international agreements. It has also acquired a greater role in the legislative processes of the Community and in some areas now has the ability effectively to veto the decisions and proposed laws of the Council, that is, the power of co-decision; but that power only relates to a range of issues and it is still the case that on most issues it can be overruled by a determined Council.

BOX 10.14 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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MEPs

Powers: *budgetary*

+ *censure and dismissal* of Commission

+ *assent* to enlargement and some international agreements

+ *legislative* role: in some cases merely 'consultation'; in other cases 'co-decision' with Council

The ECJ and Court of Auditors

The European Court of Justice is the final and ultimate guardian of the treaties and the upholder of decisions made by the Community. It has established that in matters covered by the treaties in any clash between the law of a member state and the EC, the EC law prevails and that the EC constitutes a new legal order for the benefit of which member states have limited their sovereignty in certain fields, that is, in matters covered by the treaties. The Court interprets Community law and this has aroused some controversy as on occasion the Court appears to have taken into account the spirit behind the law rather than its actual letter, and it has been accused of abusing its power and being too interested in promoting the integrationist cause rather than the law. Nevertheless, its decisions are final. It consists of a judge, appointed for six-year terms, from each member state.

The Court of Auditors has gradually grown in stature as the Community has become increasingly concerned about fraud and value for money. It draws up an annual report, which is forwarded to the other Community institutions and published, together with the replies of the institutions to its comments and criticisms.

In addition to the above there is, of course, a series of other bodies involved in the decision-making and consultation procedures. Indeed, it has been a deliberate policy to seek to involve as many national officials, national and European pressure groups and political, social and economic elites in the process as possible.

Pillars Two and Three

The EC, the central founding pillar, represents the last vestige of the integrationist, federalist approach to the integration experiment. Increasingly over the years the member states and others have tried to lessen the transfer of power to central institutions such as the Commission and have sought to impose themselves upon the policy-making system. This development was clearly reflected in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) with the decision to create two additional pillars as integral component of the new European Union. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), often referred to as the 'second pillar', represents an attempt to create a single foreign policy for the fifteen member states and gradually to work towards a common defence policy. The Justice and Home Affairs pillar ('Pillar Three') covers areas such as immigration policy and the attempts to combat international drug trafficking and crime, as well as terrorism. The key point about both of these pillars is that their decision-making structure is completely different from that of the EC pillar and so too are the powers and functions of the institutions.

BOX 10.15 CFSP AND JHA DECISION-MAKING

- decisions must be unanimous, all member states must agree and if one does not then nothing is agreed; there is no voting
- the role of the Commission and Parliament becomes marginal and the European Court of Justice plays no (or no significant) role.

The pillar structure was all that could be agreed in the early 1990s and as will be seen below the second examination of the structures and working of the system in 1996–7 produced very little significant change.

INTEGRATION: CONFLICTING PRESSURES

There are a number of different views about—and varying definitions of—'integration'. Most simply, the process of integration is the combination of parts into a whole, with the whole resulting from that combination being an integrated body. In the different definitions a common thread is the formation of political habits and institutions to foster co-operation and to lead to the end of hostilities and war, although many definitions go further. Ernst Haas, for example, sees the study of regional integration as 'explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves' (Haas 1971:6). This raises big issues about the nature of sovereignty, as does the definition by Leon Lindberg: 'process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint

decisions or to delegate the process to new central organs' (Lindberg 1963:6).

It is also necessary to note that this process may well be formally instituted through creating authoritative decision-making common institutions via organisations such as the EC/EU, but that there may be a degree of informal integration created through the intensity of interaction between firms and interests and the changes in their behaviour and expectations.

In the case of European integration, the vanguard for integration has been the EC/EU and it has had a clear goal since the specific ideas leading to the ECSC/EC/EU were formally proposed in May 1950 by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann, when he said that his proposals were: 'the first step in the federation of Europe...[and] will lay a true foundation for their economic unification...will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European Federation indispensable to the preservation of peace' (Salmon and Nicoll 1997:44–5).

BOX 10.16 INTEGRATION DEFINITIONS

'common thread is the formation of political habits and institutions to foster co-operation and to lead to the end of hostilities and war'

If the goal was clear, the implementation and achievement of it have not been straightforward. There has been a tendency, with hindsight, to see the progression from ECSC to EEC to customs union to single internal market to European Union to economic and monetary union as somehow inexorable and progressing in a steady path towards a predetermined goal. It has not been like that:

- The Council of Europe in 1949 had already demonstrated a fatal compromise between Britain and supporters of a strong central decision-making authority.
- The European Defence Community Treaty signed in 1952 was not ratified.
- The negotiations for the Treaty of Rome in 1957 were difficult with no certainty of success.
- Certain problems were only resolved at the very last minute in March 1957.
- President de Gaulle of France twice vetoed enlargement (1963 and 1967, with particular reference to Britain and direct impact upon the other applicants: Denmark, Ireland and Norway) and caused the biggest constitutional crisis in the European Community/Union's history in 1965 when France began its 'empty chair' strategy of absenting itself from key meetings of the premier decision-making body and challenged the whole institutional set-up.
- In June 1992 the Danes put the whole movement towards European Union in jeopardy when they initially rejected the Treaty on European Union by referendum (a decision they reversed a year later).

This suggests that while there are and have been pressures for more integration there have also been pressures in the other direction. In the 1990s there have been and are differences of opinion about:

- The internal arrangements of the European Union; fundamentally about the point of

decision and where should power lie—disputes about the institutional power of the EU's central institutions and about the relationship between those institutions and the member states.

- While 'partners' in the EU, the member states are also economic rivals both on the world stage and in terms of competition within the European market and this causes them on occasion to seek to construct, define and implement policies to their own advantage. A good example is the rivalry and bitter antagonism that have been generated between British and Spanish fishery fleets.
- From the beginning there have been disputes about 'Who pays?' Initially the Federal Republic of Germany was more or less willing to pay more than might have been expected but there have always been arguments about 'winners and losers'. With British entry this became a problem made famous by Mrs Thatcher's handbag as she fought to reclaim 'our money', a battle which took five years to resolve. The issue has come to the fore again with the prospect of enlargement to include six new states who will all be a drain on Union's budget and the German disinclination to pay disproportionately.
- Divergences also arise because of geography, and not just because Britain and Ireland are islands. As the Community/Union enlarges, the divergence of interests and concerns between, say, Austria, Greece and Sweden, given their different geopolitical positions, also becomes an issue as tension increases between, say, a Mediterranean orientation and an orientation towards Central Europe; not to mention particular local issues such as Greece's concerns with Turkey.
- These concerns are exacerbated by differences of historical experience: imperial Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and France compared to the experience of Ireland; the different experiences between 1939 and 1945—France, Belgium and the Netherlands routed in days, Germany and Italy defeated, Britain triumphant and Sweden and Ireland as non-participants. There are also differences with respect to republics/ monarchies and church/state relations depending upon the divergent historical experiences and socio-cultural traditions.
- These issues have profoundly affected attitudes to national identity and perceptions of the nature of sovereignty; not least, for example, in German attitudes to the importance of the stability of their currency, given the ravages inflicted by inflation in the 1920s and early 1930s and the connections between that and the rise of the Nazi Party. It is commonly accepted that there is a link between Britain's wartime experiences and its subsequent attitude to European integration.
- These divergences partly came home to roost in the problematic ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union 1992) in 1992–3 with particular and to some extent divergent difficulties in Denmark, France, Britain and Germany. This trend carried over into the second Intergovernmental Conference of the 1990s in 1996–7 and into the debate about the composition of and nature of economic and monetary union which has occupied so much political time and energy in the late 1990s.

These divergences can be illustrated by two conflicting views as to the nature of the enterprise upon which Europeans were embarked. Mrs Thatcher in 1988 gave as her first guiding principle for the future of Europe:

willing and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community...[instead of concentrating] power at the centre of a European conglomerate... working together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.

(Salmon and Nicoll 1997:208–14)

This contrasted rather starkly with the declarations issued by supporters of federalism in The Hague in 1948, which argued it was:

the urgent duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to secure security and social progress... European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources...[must] bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe.

(Salmon and Nicoll 1997:34–5)

BOX 10.17 CONFLICTING PRESSURES

Hiccups

Council of Europe compromise
de Gaulle's veto and 'empty chair'
policy
Maastricht ratification problems
arguments re where power should lie
economic rivals
who pays?
growing heterogeneity
differences of attitude to identity,
sovereignty and historical experience
collaboration vs. integration tension

Progress

mission/ideal
economies of scale spill-over
desire to wield power and
influence
desire for 'European security
and defence identity'
German question solution
it has worked and developed
habits and structures
magnet effect
common inheritance and
victory of ideology

But, as noted above, the pressures have not all been one-way. There have been and are pressures towards further integration:

- There remains a strong, though perhaps declining, sense of mission or commitment to the 'ideal' of European integration as a vehicle for resolving issues of peace and war, an ideal reinforced by the too-close-to-home experiences of the Yugoslav horrors of war in the 1990s.
- There is continuing, perhaps even growing, awareness of the potential economies of

scale if European enterprises can work together, a sentiment reinforced by the concerns about European competitiveness in the world economy—concerns which prompted the movement towards the single internal market between 1985 and 1992 (and beyond as the single internal market still needs to be completed in some areas) and the European Commission to publish a White Paper in 1994 on ‘Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the Twenty-first Century’.

- Whatever the reservations about inexorability, it can be observed that there has been spill-over in both the economic and political areas since the foundation of the ECSC by the Treaty of Paris in 1951: there has been movement from the original coal and steel foundation to a wide range of Community/Union competencies, ranging from economic concerns with employment, the single market and economic and monetary union and a range of specific policy areas such as agriculture and transport, as well as funding for a series of measures to bring about economic and social cohesion, to educational exchange schemes, to co-operating in foreign and security policy (the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and to co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. This spill-over has occurred partly because it has been discovered that to perform adequately in one area of activity requires involvement in adjacent areas—for example, rationalisation of the coal and steel industries led to concerns about retraining, as do concerns about the EU’s competitive position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. There has also been the feature that some policies that might have been deemed ‘domestic’ have had significant external implications. Most notably this has proved to be true of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since the USA has perceived it to be very protectionist and harmful to American interests and this has spilled over into other aspects of American relations with some European states.
- It must also be remembered that one of the founding motivations for the EEC was a concern that a Western Europe fragmented in political and security terms would be unable to exercise real power in an international environment apparently dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the geopolitical environment has changed, the basis of this concern has remained significant and has been an important motivation behind the initial development of European political co-operation (the attempt to co-ordinate the member states’ foreign policies between 1970 and 1993) and the post-1993 development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
- This too has been reinforced not only by economic tensions between the United States and the members of the EU, but by the growing political distance that has developed in the last twenty years (although this is very much a relative development and the relations through NATO are still close). Following the Vietnam War debacle, the forced resignation of President Nixon in 1974 because of perceived unlawful activities, and the presidency of Jimmy Carter, which was perceived as ineffective, vacillating and weak, Europeans increasingly lost confidence in American leadership and wisdom. In addition, as they have regained their strength since 1945 and more recently as the threat posed by the Soviet Empire and its perceived ambitions has disappeared, there has been increasing questioning of American hegemony. Fundamentally, the question being increasingly asked is what do Europeans and Americans have in common?
- A further pressure for unity is the so-called ‘German question’. Part of the genius of Jean Monnet, to a large extent the ‘brains’ behind the European Community approach

and the originator of the Schumann proposals of 1950, was to recognise that the traditional methods of trying to deal with the relationship between France and Germany had failed—in 1870, 1914 and 1939—and in the aftermath of these events in trying to secure the peace. He therefore proposed that instead of Germany being treated unilaterally or being required to face singular restrictions on its activities, it should only be required to forego what France and other states were willing to forego: that is, Germany would give up as much sovereignty in the same areas as other Western European states, most notably France. With the unification of Germany in 1990 and the emergence of a Germany that had a population of 79 million, compared to those of France, Britain and Italy of 56 million, 57 million, and 58 million respectively, in addition to its unique geopolitical position at the centre of Europe, the problem arose in many minds of how to ensure the emergence of a ‘European Germany’ and not a ‘German Europe’—a concern that Chancellor Kohl of Germany appears to have shared himself. The answer adopted, not least by a majority of mainstream German politicians, was the Monnet solution—Germany would be tied into the European integration movement via moves towards political, economic and monetary union. This was a significant motive behind the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) on these topics in 1991, the second IGC in 1996–7, and the political determination to press ahead with economic and monetary union in 1997–8, despite a number of economic doubts.

- It is also the case that a powerful factor working for integration in the 1990s was the record of achievement of the Six (1951–73), the Nine (1973–81), the Ten (1981–6) the Twelve (1986–95) and the Fifteen (1995–). Despite the internal criticisms, the European integration experiment has shown that such a system can work institutionally and it can be argued that it has played a major role in the economic reconstruction and rejuvenation of the member states.
- Moreover, as the stream of third parties that expressed an interest in joining or having some other relationship with the EC/EU continued to expand, it was clear that in the world at large the EC/EU was and is a pole of attraction and is often seen as an economic giant, if not always so powerful in other areas of activity.
- Finally, there are the residual aspects of the shared inheritance intellectually, culturally and philosophically; that is, the idea of a common heritage, a feature particularly of liberal, pluralist, democratic and industrial Western Europe, all the more so since ‘the West’ appeared to have won the Cold War and many believed the ideological arguments associated with it. The ‘end of ideology’ was actually the victory of one side.

These conflicting pressures, the individual significance of which waxed and waned over the years, continued to have resonance in the debates about the nature and future of European integration in the 1990s. There continued to be a continuum of views and a range of possible decisions from the choices available.

THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

In the early 1990s the European Community member states had tried to resolve many of

the issues confronting them in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The treaty modified the old European Community and added to that core two other distinct but parallel organisational frameworks—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) system and the system of ‘Co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs’ (JHA). Together these three frameworks (in addition to the ECSC and Euratom, which are linked to the EEC/EC through common institutions) were allegedly brought together in a single institutional framework and these three ‘pillars’ together created the European Union.

The other main achievements of the TEU were:

- the delineation of a timetable and set of criteria for the membership of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (of which more below);
- the introduction of a limited form of European citizenship;
- new powers for the European Community: a more active consumer-protection policy; public health; visa policy; the establishment of trans-European transport, telecommunications and energy networks; treaty provision for development co-operation; industrial policy; education; culture; greater importance for environmental protection; an increase in research and development;
- further progress on social policy (with the exception of the United Kingdom); and
- co-operation in the fields of the CFSP and JHA.

BOX 10.18 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

- modified EC and added new powers and fields of competence
- created ‘European Union’ and CFSP and JHA pillars
- outlined timetable and convergence criteria for EMU
- introduced citizenship of the European Union
- introduced ‘Social Chapter’ for eleven states

But, given the depth and range of their disagreements and in some cases the intractable nature of the problems they faced, they were unable to resolve many of the central issues by December 1991 and compromised in many areas by agreeing ambiguous statements which could be interpreted differently by the different states. In other words, they were condemned to return to many of the same issues again later in the decade, and indeed the Treaty on European Union itself made provision for another IGC to examine how the new European Union had performed and the extent to which the policies and structures introduced by the TEU had worked.

THE FOURTH ENLARGEMENT

Also relevant was that in 1991–2 they were aware of the likelihood of an enlargement to bring into the EU some of the EFTA states—Austria, Finland and Sweden (which all finally acceded to the EU in January 1995)—with talks also taking place with Switzerland (which in effect ruled itself out in late 1992) and Norway (which rejected the

terms negotiated in a referendum in the autumn of 1994, just as it had in 1972). By the mid-1990s and the second Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), it was clear that the former members of COMECON and the newly liberated and independent states of the Baltic area and Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) were also seeking membership and the Union would have to prepare itself for that eventuality. Indeed, the Union began to make a clear link between preparations for the membership of other states and its own internal development in the areas of reform of its decision-making systems and policy.

ANOTHER IGC

The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996–7, by its nature as an IGC, was about treaty reform and therefore a number of controversial matters were not covered in that set of negotiations, although they were very much part of the environment in which the negotiations took place. These included: EMU, the ‘Growth, Competitiveness, Employment’ White Paper, completion of the Single Internal Market (SIM), reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a number of details with an impact on enlargement, such as the reform of many of the EU’s funds, for example, the structural funds. The negotiators were particularly mindful of the context of EMU and enlargement; indeed, as the negotiations progressed to some extent senior figures were distracted by the time and effort that had to be paid to the problems of the approaching EMU. The negotiations saw the re-emergence of the differences over the scope, pace, objectives and methods of integration, and the 1996 IGC dragged on to become the 1996–7 IGC, concluding in Amsterdam in June 1997 with the draft treaty being signed at the beginning of October 1997. Even after the negotiations and signing the treaty still faced the test of ratification, which could not be assumed after the rough ride the TEU received in 1992, although most commentators would agree that there was little of substance in the Treaty of Amsterdam and certainly no new initiatives on the scale of EMU, CFSP or JHA. One of the reasons for the modest results of the IGC was that, as with any international treaty, it was the result of a negotiating process and in the case of the EU any treaty reform requires the unanimous consent of all member states, some even requiring that the changes be approved by referendums.

In the negotiations the general issues were:

- Questions remaining about the general direction of the EU and whether it was still about the The Hague or Schumann dream or whether Mrs Thatcher’s practical and limited agendas had acquired more legitimacy, despite her own departure from the political scene. This debate, as with many others, had taken on a slightly different form by 1996–7, but still remained at the heart of many disputes.
- A series of questions about how to organise the EU, especially in terms of the institutional balance between:
 - the EU institutions themselves; and
 - the EU and the member states, in effect the recurring argument about how much independent power an independent European body, the Commission, should have over policy decisions and the way forward for the Union as a whole, and how much

power over what matters should reside with the member states.

- The function and power of individual institutions, especially whether the European Parliament should become co-equal with governments in legislative decision-making and whether the European Court of Justice had become too powerful and too prone to making and interpreting law rather than administering the law as laid down by the member states through the processes of the EU.
- Arguments about striking the right balance between efficiency and democracy and transparency in decision-making, especially given that a gap in democratic accountability had arisen because national parliaments were deemed to have lost power to Brussels, the home of the EU, but there had not been sufficient parliamentary compensation at the European level.
- A fundamental dispute over whether more decisions should be made by the system of voting known as 'qualified majority voting', when some member states on some issues could suffer decisions being taken which became law in their own states although they opposed the measure.
- Continuing arguments about whether the 'pillar' structure agreed in the TEU was appropriate, and whether some functions in the very inter-governmental pillar of JHA, that is, where decisions still required the consent of all member states, might be transferred to the European Community pillar, allowing a greater role for the independent European Commission and on some issues the possibility of some majority voting.

BOX 10.19 1996–7 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE DEBATES

- nature of final destination of European integration
- institutional balance and power of institutions
- efficiency v. democracy
- unanimity v. greater voting in Council
- pillar structure
- inclusion of defence in EU functions?
- development of citizens' or 'social' Europe: what did this mean and involve?

- Within the CFSP and JHA pillars themselves there were also important differences that needed to be resolved, such as the continuing issues of whether the European Union should become directly involved in defence tasks, and if it did, what should they be in the first instance, and what should its relationship to NATO and the WEU be? Indeed, some argued very strongly that the WEU should be incorporated into the European Union itself.
- A further issue, again not new but emerging in a slightly different form, was whether the EC/EU was fundamentally a Europe for business focusing on such issues as the

single internal market and EMU, or whether there should be a more direct connection with the everyday lives and concerns of the people of Europe, in other words a 'citizens' or 'social' Europe. This had become an issue because of the high levels of unemployment the EU was suffering in the mid- to late 1990s and an increasing sense that there appeared to be little connection between what went on in the Union and what mattered to individuals. This issue had taken on a new emphasis with the apparent apathy or even antagonism manifested towards Europe in the TEU ratification saga and in declining turnouts for the direct elections to the European Parliament. In the TEU the issue had been partly addressed by the inclusion of a 'Social Chapter' at the end of the treaty and in an arrangement which applied to all the member states save Britain. The Social Chapter, which touched on working conditions, workers' health and safety, the consultation of workers, and equality between men and women, was regarded as a threat to competitiveness in the world economy by the British. In May 1997, with a new Labour government in Britain, British policy changed and that chapter is now included within the EU's remit. In the 1996–7 IGC the concerns about a social, 'caring' Europe were manifested through proposals for the introduction into the treaties of an 'Employment' Chapter.

AMSTERDAM

What advances were incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty?

- There is the new Title on Employment, which says that the member states will seek to co-ordinate their strategies for employment, particularly the areas of promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce; and that they will seek to achieve a high level of employment throughout the Union. The difficulties in this area are that the issue is to be a matter of seeking rather than compulsion, there is no central decision-making power or real responsibility, and the objective of high employment is left undefined (which contrasts to a commitment to full employment, which some states had wanted to include).
- It incorporates the Social Chapter into the main body of the EC treaty and therefore makes it a subject of Community decision and law, although again it should be noted that the provisions in this area give primacy to consensus: that is, in most areas of the Social Chapter unless all member states agree nothing can be done.
- Reflective of the need to bring Europe closer to the citizens, it lays the foundation for an area of 'freedom, security and justice' by:
 - establishing common rules on immigration, asylum and visa policy;
 - transforming Justice and Home Affairs into 'Provisions on Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters' to put rather more focus on enhancing co-operation between the law and order authorities in the member states to combat international crime, fraud, corruption and drug-trafficking, as well as terrorism—although again it is clear that this co-operation will remain intergovernmental: that is, all decisions have to be agreed unanimously by all member states, otherwise nothing happens;
 - and, with the exceptions of Britain, Ireland and Denmark, removing frontier checks at

the Union's internal borders between member states. (The granting of exceptions is again indicative of an acceptance of flexibility. This is important because it is a recognition that not all member states of the EU need be involved in all of its activities, and instead of all states being committed to the same objectives and final outcomes, some may now permanently exclude themselves.)

- Reflective of the concerns that the EU was not making its voice heard sufficiently on the world stage, particularly in the context of its failure to deal adequately with the Yugoslav crises and wars, Amsterdam introduced procedures to try to improve the ability of the member states to arrive at common assessments of their own and common interests:
 - a new planning, analysis and early warning unit which will present ministers with a common analysis and a common prepared assessment of a variety of situations;
 - it sought to move a little way from the emphasis upon unanimity in decision-making, although in the small print it is clear that if a member state feels really strongly it can still obstruct EU action and decisions in this area;
 - seeking to give a higher profile to the EU's foreign policy positions by introducing a 'High Representative' to speak and where appropriate act on behalf of the member states, although it is clear that this representative will be the servant of the member states; and
 - incorporating into the CFSP the fact that for the time being questions to be covered in the area of military tasks would be those adopted by the WEU at Petersberg in 1992: participation in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making (this last is particularly intriguing because Yugoslavia showed that on occasion an organisation that wishes to help in bringing peace to an area may have to resort to the use of armed force to impose its will).
- It made very modest technical changes to the decision-making systems and the main institutions:
 - extending the power of co-decision of the European Parliament into a few more areas (that is, allowing the Parliament the power to veto decisions made by the member states acting together in certain areas) and allowing the Parliament a co-equal role in the appointment of the Commission President; and
 - extending qualified majority voting to new areas in the Council of Ministers (the forum where member states meet together to make decisions).
- It introduced formally into the treaties the concept of flexibility, or 'Provisions on Closer Co-operation', as it is formally put. These provisions allow certain groups of states (but the membership of those groups will be varied) to deepen their integration and co-operation and at a faster rate than some others in certain policy areas, as long as this does not pose a threat to the integrity of the Union or infringe on the rights of other member states. To offset this latter concern, a member state not willing or able to take part in the proposed closer co-operation in certain areas will be able to veto such a development from taking place.

BOX 10.20 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM*Pluses*

Employment title
all sign up to Social Chapter
'area of freedom, security and
justice'

CFSP improvements

more co-decision for EP and
more QMV in Council

Flexibility to allow progress

Minuses

just rhetoric
but many escape clauses
any more than words?

only the minimum change agreed
but very limited in scope and
insufficient for enlargement

Flexibility could end unity and
cohesion

For all this, Amsterdam produced a very modest result and failed to address a number of issues:

- Its decision-making changes were so limited that the Union remains unprepared for a planned enlargement to twenty-one member states, the existing members having been unable to agree to radical changes: to the composition of the Commission's membership; to the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers when it is a matter subject to qualified majority voting; and to the vexed question of a significant reduction in the areas where member states have a legally and treaty-enshrined right to veto proposed measures and actions of which they disapprove.
- The progress on social and employment issues was very limited, making action still dependent on the consensus of all member states; in other words, much of the progress in the social and citizens' Europe areas is largely rhetoric.
- Flexibility, while it may allow a repeat of the Six experience, where a group of European states decided no longer to allow themselves to be held hostage by Britain and decided that they would be a role model and pathfinder to others, may also be an implicit confirmation that the EU is no longer on a path whereby it is seeking to create a unified, collective, coherent, political and socio-economic identity, even a kind of United States of Europe, but will become increasingly fragmented as states begin to pick and choose those activities that they will or will not become involved in—an à la carte Europe, not a federal or unified Europe. This does not appear to be the current intention, but the opt-outs granted already on the third stage of EMU and the Social Chapter, and the new opt-outs on complete and genuine freedom of movement for citizens, have already put down markers; it would be strange if at a later date and on other issues other member states did not make use of these precedents, especially in the context of the next enlargement significantly increasing the heterogeneity of the member states.

It should just be noted that reform is difficult because an IGC treaty reform requires the

unanimous consent of all the existing member states. In 1997 this was fifteen, and as discussed above they are not in agreement on a number of fundamentals. It should also be noted that the outcome of the IGC was negotiated so not all states achieved all that they wished, individual states had to decide in which areas they were willing to compromise and which not, and where the point of acceptable compromise was, and the final text is inelegant and esoteric precisely because it was not written by one hand but as the evolving outcome of many hands over an eighteen-month period. In addition, all participants were mindful of the 1992 difficulties and had to be aware of what their parliaments, people and, in the German case, their Constitutional Court would accept.

WIDER ISSUES

It was noted earlier that the IGC could only focus on some issues while others were formally outwith its remit. Those issues were ironically in some cases more likely to have far-reaching consequences for the long-term future of the EU than the IGC itself. Three in particular can be identified: EMU, enlargement and the consequent reforms of policies and funds in connection with enlargement.

BOX 10.21 BROADER ENVIRONMENT

EMU+Enlargement+Reform (Agenda 2000)

Economic and Monetary Union had been on the agenda of the EC at least since The Hague summit of December 1969 when it was agreed to work out a plan 'with a view to the creation of an economic and monetary union'. Initial responsibility for that was given to the Luxembourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner, who in October 1970 produced the report. In 1972 a target of 1980 for the completion of EMU was set, although the Werner Report was never officially endorsed in respect of ways and means, and the project failed to get off the ground. Many, however, continued to see EMU as a concomitant to the Common Market which had been successfully created. With increasing turbulence in the world economy and currency markets following problems for the dollar in 1971 and the oil and energy crises of 1973–4, by the end of the decade many were ready to return to the subject because of the pursuit of monetary stability and to give renewed impetus, after the problems of stagnation in the 1970s, to the European enterprise. The result was the European Monetary System of 1979 and within that context the creation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a scheme to limit the value fluctuation of participating currencies against each other. Despite some initial difficulties, EMS/ERM worked relatively well, and this gave cause to revisit the possibilities of going further, especially because in the Single European Act of 1986 it had been agreed to bring into being a single internal market by the end of 1992 and many believed that for that market to be effective and to be truly single a single currency and other aspects of EMU were required. Another motivation was the perceived need to provide the European cause with

momentum towards integration and EMU was seen as being important not just for technical reasons to do with its primary function but equally, if not more so, for its political significance.

In June 1988 at Hanover the European Council (the meeting of the top political leadership of the member states) decided to ask another committee to examine the means of achieving EMU, leading to the Delors Report of 1989 which set out three stages that were required to bring it about. At the meeting which discussed this report the member states agreed to an IGC to amend the European Economic Community treaty to take account of the requirements of creating an EMU. This IGC took place in 1991 and produced the relevant parts of the TEU. Without going into economic and monetary detail, two key points about the TEU arrangement have been particularly important: first, the TEU laid down a timetable by which the three stages were to be completed and by which certain key decisions were to be made; and second, it laid down a number of so-called convergence criteria that the states had to meet to be eligible for participation in the third and final stage of the process. As the timetable deadlines approached, particularly in relation to which states would meet the convergence criteria, there was much speculation that the timetable would be allowed to slip, but 1997 saw enormous political investment in changing perceptions and attitudes, and it came to be regarded as absolutely crucial to the credibility of the EU that EMU was launched on schedule on 1 January 1999. A matter of somewhat greater controversy was that of which states were able to meet the convergence criteria and whether those criteria should be interpreted strictly or with a degree of flexibility, it being believed that that decision would have an enormous bearing on the whole credibility of the new system and its prospects for success, as well as being important in reassuring the German public that their currency, albeit in another guise, was soundly based. The convergence criteria are set out in Box 10.22.

BOX 10.22 CONVERGENCE CRITERIA

- price stability, with inflation being no worse than 1.5 per cent than the average of the best three performing states
- a public deficit of no more than 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or total government debt not exceeding 60 per cent of GDP
- limited fluctuation of exchange rates, only within a 2.25 per cent margin, and no devaluation of a putative member's currency for at least two years
- interest rates for a two-year period not in excess of two percentage points higher than the average of the best three states

Several states experienced great difficulty in reaching these criteria; some appear to have resorted to creative accounting to make their figures match the appropriate targets and others have had to change significantly their public expenditure plans to achieve the targets, a consequence of which has been increased unemployment and unpopularity both for governments and the EU. Nevertheless, in 1998 it was agreed that eleven states met the criteria: Greece did not and three (Britain, Denmark and Sweden) declared their unwillingness to enter the new arrangements at that time.

Another big issue surrounding the IGC, Amsterdam and the whole future of the EU in the period 1997–2007 was that of enlargement. Enlargement is not a new phenomenon for the EC/EU—it was enlarged in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995, but the next enlargements are generally regarded as qualitatively different because of the number of states and the challenge that their entry will pose both to them and the Union.

As the 1995 enlargement was being negotiated, Poland and Hungary both applied for membership, and they were followed by applications from the other Eastern and Central European states (Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Applications had already been received from Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. As early as June 1993 in Copenhagen the EC had declared that it was ready to consider applications if the applicants were able to 'assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required' (*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6–1996). It went further and said that the following conditions had to be met by applicants:

- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

In addition, it has been made clear that the applicants need to be able to meet and fulfil the so-called *acquis communautaire*, namely to accept all the decisions of the EC/EU since their inception. While there could be long periods of transition, the applicants

would have to accept what not all current members agreed to during the 1990s era of flexibility.

BOX 10.23 ENLARGEMENT CRITERIA

- satisfy political and economic conditions
- stable democratic institutions
- functioning market economy
- ability to meet political, economic and monetary aims
- fulfil *acquis communautaire*

Meeting these requirements will not be at all easy for the applicants, and indeed in mid-July 1997 the Commission gave its view (*avis*) on the ability of the various applicants to meet the criteria set out earlier and issued independent opinions on each (Turkey, Cyprus and Malta having already been assessed). The Commission concluded as a result of detailed analysis that accession negotiations should begin with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, the member states having already agreed to open talks with Cyprus six months after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in October 1997. It was made clear that there would have to be extensive negotiations and it cannot be taken for granted that these negotiations will be successful, that all the states offered accession will accept, or that there will not be unexpected developments before 2007. In addition, the Commission issued 'Agenda 2000', which sought to identify the challenges facing the Union in terms of its policies and enlargement. Agenda 2000 gave some indication of the size of the adjustments that will be necessary, and these are outlined in Box 10.24. There is no need to be an expert on the technical questions relating to the nature of the data to be able to understand the message: all of these states are a long way below the European Union average in terms of economic development and wealth. For Poland to catch up with the poorest current EU member, Greece, would require Poland to have an annual growth of over 6 per cent for over ten years.

BOX 10.24 SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS

Successful applicant states of Central and Eastern Europe Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and EU member states basic data (Year 1995).

	<i>GDP at current market prices</i>	<i>GDP at purchasing power standards</i>
	<i>(in ECU per heads as % of EU average)</i>	
Hungary	19	37
Poland	14	31
Estonia	11	23
Czech	20	55

Republic		
Slovenia	42	59
<i>Source: Agenda 2000, p. 138</i>		

The Commission in Agenda 2000, by making generous assumptions about economic growth in the EU (economic growth was forecast to be 2.5 per cent a year for the period 2000 to 2006 for the existing EU states and 4 per cent a year between 1997 and 2006 for the applicant states), managed to argue that by the end of the period the EU would have potential additional resources of over £16 billion available to help in the new members' adjustment. Not surprisingly, most commentators regarded these forecasts with great suspicion, if not incredulity.

The applicants have already started preparing by beginning to adjust to the requirements of the single internal market, and by seeking to converge their laws in a whole swathe of areas to make them compatible with the requirements of the EU *acquis*. But the task is large and there are questions as to the ability of socio-economic and political systems which had to cope with the traumatic changes in and since 1989 to cope with another set of seismic changes.

The agenda is large and difficult since many existing policies reflect the particular vested interests of certain states, and even the parochial and domestic electoral interests of governments and political parties. In addition, reform of these policies is intimately related to arguments about winners and losers: that is, who pays money into the EU budget and who receives money. In the early 1990s it appeared that three states were net contributors: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with Greece, Spain and Ireland being the biggest net beneficiaries. It is interesting to note that while the size of the British contribution has been an issue since Britain became a member of the EC in 1973, in France and Germany the size of the contribution is becoming increasingly relevant: in France because they have switched from receiving to paying and in Germany because they feel they have paid for long enough to assuage guilt and pay their way back into society more than fifty years after World War Two. Also the Germans have been faced with the additional cost of incorporating the five eastern Lander into the new Germany which emerged in 1990. The issues of the nature and distribution of EU budgetary funding lie close to the hearts of states, interest groups and individuals. In addition, many of the funding decisions, indeed even the decision to create funds, have been parts of policy-making bargains agreed over the years in order to conclude agreement on often otherwise unrelated issues or to seek to bring some greater element of balance into the allocation of the EC/EU budget.

CONCLUSION

Although it seems like a cliché, the European Union is at a crossroads. While optimists and supporters can point to its growth in numbers and its apparently relentless, if not effortless, movement into new areas of policy and activity, there is another perspective:

- Twice in the 1990s the member states have failed to make the necessary changes to the EU's decision-making capacity to cope with current difficulties and future enlargements.
- Given the ever-increasing diminution of the war experience, the commitment to radical, even federal, solutions appears to be waning.
- This is exacerbated by the danger that the EC/EU has become a victim of its own success, in that since it has largely achieved many of its original objectives, especially in the economic sphere, a feeling has developed which questions why the state needs to be brought into question when it works, if not perfectly, then at least well enough for most purposes.
- With a return to political stability, and the triumph in the Cold War, has come the renewed arrogance of national political systems and some desire to restore as much autarky as is possible in an interdependent world: a confusion has arisen between the illusion of sovereignty, or the formal constitutional status of sovereignty, and the capacity of states to exercise freedom of action and decision in a meaningful way.
- Whatever the merits and political necessity of enlargement (partly because of a sense of obligation following these states' experience during the Cold War and partly because of a belief that their membership will increase the zone of economic and political stability in Europe), it must be recognised that it involves the EU becoming increasingly heterogeneous compared to the relative homogeneity of the Six, who even in a very basic way shared geographical propinquity, and in some cases coal seams running beneath their shared borders. If a Community of six could come close to being torn apart in the 1965–6 crisis and fail to meet numerous deadlines for decision, and as noted the EC/EU of twelve and fifteen failed in the 1990s, what chance for an EU of twenty-one plus in the years to come?
- In answer to the above queries it sometimes seems to be assumed that the project of European integration will survive because there is an implicit assumption of something inexorable or even economically deterministic about the past and future of integration, at least in the economic sphere. Is there some hidden hand moving integration from coal and steel to customs union to SIM to EMU? Is the progress towards integration so entrenched that there will be no significant repatriation of powers and policy areas—will the *acquis* survive?
- It could be argued that far from inexorability, what has actually been occurring is the increased obduracy of member states, for the reasons given above, and that there is now a lack of sufficient political will to take the necessary hard decisions.
- Is the EU already anachronistic since it has already been left behind by the pressures of globalisation on the one hand and the emergence of subnational political systems on the other?

- Have 'flexibility', subsidiary, à la carte choices and variable geometry destroyed the heart of the enterprise?

BOX 10.25 QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

- Has commitment to radical solutions disappeared?
- Have we witnessed resurgence of nationalism and sovereignty?
- Is the next enlargement one too far?
- Is progress inexorable?
- Is the EU anachronistic?
- Is there any common view of destination?
- Is the EU any longer the model for the future?

Is the European Union the model for the future development of Europe, especially since the revolution in Europe since 1989, or is the model the break-up and crises in the former Yugoslavia?

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- T.Salmon and W.Nicoll (eds), *Building the European Union* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997).

FURTHER READING

- D.Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to the European Community* (Macmillan, London, 1999) covers much of the same ground as Nugent but is particularly strong on the history.
- W.Nicoll and Trevor C.Salmon, *Understanding the European Union* (Prentice-Hall, New York, 2000) is written by an experienced Brussels insider and an experienced lecturer, and is another classic text covering the debates about the different conceptions of how Europe should be organised, the institutions of the EU and its policy and policy processes.
- N.Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (Macmillan, London, 1999) is the classic textbook covering the historical evolution of the EC/EU, its institutions and its policies and policy processes.
- D.Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (Longman, London, 1991) and D.Urwin, *A Political History of Western Europe since 1945* (Longman, London, 1997) are two excellent and accessible introductory accounts

of political developments in Europe. The first focuses more narrowly on the EEC, while the second puts those developments in the broader context.

11

Reflections on the study of International Relations

Vivienne Jabri

THE BOUNDARY PROBLEM

The politics of global interactions are more accessible now in the present age than they ever have been in the past. Whether it is conflict in the Middle East, the break-up of Yugoslavia, human rights violations or poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, we are daily confronted by images of global interactions which in some way cross national boundaries, involve a variety of actors, and impact upon a widespread number of issues which may or may not affect our own lives, values and welfare. What is beyond dispute is that we, as individuals, may no longer claim immunity or distance from events which occur elsewhere, which affect others beyond our shores. Relationships which take place across state boundaries seem, therefore, to include interactions involving not only the diplomatic core or representatives of our individual states, but the business community, the media, charitable organisations, and so on. Furthermore, within a multicultural society such as that of the United Kingdom, it could be said that we are already involved in global interactions on a daily basis from the classroom to the local supermarket. Given the increasing complexity of such processes, the primary question becomes how we limit the remit or boundaries of a discipline named International Relations.

BOX 11.1 NO IMMUNITY FROM GLOBAL INTERACTIONS

Global interactions:

- cross national boundaries
- involve a variety of actors
- impact on a widespread number of issues
- involve business, media, charities, etc.

Question: How to limit IR as a discipline?

International Relations has a number of concerns and equally varied perspectives which seek to make sense of the world around us. From its formal establishment in 1919 to the present day, we see a discipline occupied by debates and contentions relating to the

subject matter that should be within our remit and to the nature and legitimacy of our theories about this subject matter. Conceived in direct response to the devastations witnessed in the First World War, the original aims of those involved in the creation of this discipline were underpinned by the assumption that a greater understanding of the nature of relations between states would lead to the prevention of war in the future. Statesmen, in other words, would be better equipped with the intellectual tools considered necessary to deal with international crisis situations so that these might reach resolution prior to the onset of all-out war. This early *normative* concern, that our theories contain within them the basis for action and change, has its parallels in contemporary thought in International Relations.

BOX 11.2 THEORY

a way of making things more intelligible

+

description

+

set of limited propositions designed to connect, interpret and organise facts

+

explaining

+

in some theories predicting, that is constructing 'if...then...'

hypotheses

BOX 11.3 NORMATIVE THEORY

- deals with how things *ought* to be
- the choices policy-makers *should* make
- contains explanation and/or predictions
- based on *ethical* concerns

We will see as we progress through the discipline's trajectory that we have now returned to these early ethical concerns and, after a long period dominated by the view that the discipline was somehow separate from the realm of practice, those involved in the discipline increasingly recognise the responsibilities which emerge from the intimate relationship between theory and practice.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an introductory overview of the discipline and its theoretical perspectives. The chapter highlights the defining features of these perspectives by concentrating on how they view the subject matter, their core conceptual frameworks and underpinning assumptions. Each perspective comes to constitute a frame or a lens through which global interactions or world politics are viewed. The review will seek to

highlight the relationship between the academic study of international relations and the practice of world politics, arguing that this is both a complex and a mutually formative relationship. In being so intimately related, the discipline and its theoretical perspectives have come under increasing scrutiny by contemporary thinkers in International Relations.

THE 'REALITIES' AND 'THEORIES' OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As a number of writers have indicated, the term 'international relations' is in itself problematic¹ as it immediately points to an ambiguity around the subject matter with which we are concerned. As we saw in the opening paragraph of this chapter, global interactions are highly complex and now involve a number of different actors and issues, and may occur at our doorstep and in distant lands. How we provide a coherent image or set of images which reflects this complexity has been the defining problem in the discipline since its inception.

We could start by stating that the study of international relations may refer to relations between states, between nations or peoples, between cultures, or international institutions such as the European Union or the United Nations. Reminded of business or charitable connections, we may wish to include firms and humanitarian organisations among our growing list of those we see as being involved in global interactions. What we see as the *actors* or *units* of our investigations greatly informs and differentiates the different perspectives that dominate the discipline.

BOX 11.4 ACTORS

- 'What we see as the *actors* or *units*...greatly informs and differentiates the different perspectives that dominate the discipline.'
- Relations between states?
- Diversity: business, international institutions, Amnesty, etc.?

If we were, for example, to confine our investigations to relations between states, we would by definition negate the influence of non-state actors such as Amnesty International and ignore the impact of supranational institutions such as the European Union. We could conclude, as many in the discipline have done, that Amnesty may well be involved in issues relating to human rights, or that the European Commission may well pronounce on matters regarding EU budgets, but what matters ultimately are decisions made by states, for these are the actors with most influence, with the greatest capacity to make a difference.

In this view, the remits of the discipline come to concern the external relations of the state, and the state in itself is seen as a closed box, an entity interacting with other like entities, all bounded territorially, all defined as 'sovereign' units independent ultimately of any external authority. That which occurs within these units becomes a matter of

interest to other related areas such as Political Theory or Comparative Politics.

If we recognise that our lived experience is influenced by global firms or international institutions, or if we have been involved as activists in groups such as Amnesty or Greenpeace, we would seek to expand the remit of our investigations in order to account for the diversity of actors and forms of interactions which take place in global politics. In doing so, however, we come face to face with one of the most vexing and contentious issues in the history of the discipline, namely the question of power, its definition, and how power translates to influence in the global arena. A very common retort to theorists who have attempted to include in their analyses actors other than states is that it is states which have primacy in influencing outcomes and must hence be central to any viable theory of international relations. The reverse situation is equally problematic, with perspectives which seek to undermine or deny the role of the state and to stress the significance of lobby groups and social movements. Here we see a denial of the importance of state boundaries, of affiliations and loyalties prescribed by the state, and of international legal frameworks, the signatories of which can, at least for the present, only be states.

The first question which emerges, therefore, concerns the boundaries of the discipline or the location of what we deem to constitute 'international' politics. As we will see below, how we draw the boundaries of the discipline will have enormous implications for the concepts we use and the theoretical perspectives we advocate. These perspectives are not only differentiated along this particular problematic of the actors, but over the nature of *interactions* which take place globally. We may well place primacy with the state and concentrate on interstate relations, but are such relations determined primarily by distributions of power or are they in some way governed by rule-bound codes of conduct which render some modes of behaviour legitimate or acceptable and others not? Is there a form of international society which might in some way reflect the features of a domestic society; in other words, one which has some features of contract, but which lacks an all-encompassing global government? Furthermore, are relations between states governed by mutual co-operation and interdependence or are they best conceived as conflictual and subject to the imperatives of a self-help system based on survival in an anarchical system?

BOX 11.5 DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Identity of actors

Nature of interactions:

- based on power?
- bound by rules?
- is there a society?

- fundamentally co-operative or conflictual?

The nature of the subject matter

The boundaries of the discipline are therefore influenced by assumptions relating to significant actors in global politics and the nature of interactions between them. The third area which may come under scrutiny when deciding the boundaries of International Relations and which has been pointed to already in this chapter is the *empirical subject matter* with which we are concerned. This in itself is intimately related to the emphasis we place on the type of actor that we consider most significant in global politics and the assumptions we make relating to the nature of interactions taking place at this level. How we view the discipline will have an impact on the types of research question we investigate.

How we view the discipline will in itself reflect a value position which determines the research questions asked. The relationship between the researcher's own value system and the theoretical and empirical interests she/he expresses is one among a number of *philosophical questions* which have occupied the discipline for a number of years and which currently form one of its most controversial areas. One of the controversies relates to how our theories reflect or mirror the world of practice and how near to the 'real' our descriptions of global politics are. Much of the discipline's historical trajectory has been dominated by the assumption that our theories of international relations are separate and independent from the world of practice. This outlook, as we see below, distinguishes between matters of 'fact' and matters of 'value' and aspires towards the replication of methods conventionally associated with the natural sciences. If we are to be as near to the 'real' as we could possibly be then our theories, according to this perspective, must seek to 'mirror' the world rather than change it. The methods by which this could be assured include clarity in conceptual use, precision in generalising statements, and predictive modelling. Above all else, a theory which aspires to the 'real' must preclude any concern with the achievement of change or the incorporation of values in such issues as poverty, war, human rights or environmental protection. The task is set and it has its rules. The discipline's function is to provide descriptions of the world of practice, to explain as far as possible recurring phenomena such as conflict, and to locate particular historical events in wider theoretical explanations.²

We may, however, reject the separation assumed above between theory and practice, between fact and value. The suggestion here is that rather than viewing theory as a reflection of the world, it is recognised as being deeply implicated in its construction. If, for example, we stress the importance of power as a determinant of relations between states, are we not implicated in the perpetuation of coercive relations as the norm of conduct on the international stage? If we prioritise the imperatives of balances of power over and above international law, are we not denying the possibility of there existing norms and rules of conduct which may constitute a 'global civil society'?³ Posing these questions provides an immediate challenge to the view that we may so neatly separate the realm of theory from that of practice, or that we may so unproblematically refer to the

'real', as if 'the world' may be conceived separately from the words we use and the concepts we habitually draw upon in order to make sense of all that which goes on around us. What of those aspects of international relations which remain hidden from view? If our theories of the international take the state as given, for example, and state sovereignty as the mainstay of relations between states in an anarchic system, then we must preclude from our investigations any considerations which might challenge the primacy of the state, such as identity politics, race relations, gender and the place of women in the realm of the international. That which remains silent and hidden from view provides, as will be seen below, an invaluable insight into the relationship between power and knowledge and, therefore, between the world and the word.

BOX 11.6 PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS

- a)
 - is theory separate from practice?
 - 'value-free' mirror of world?
 - clear concepts+precision+prediction
 - descriptive orientation
- or b)
 - value and fact linked?
 - theory has a relationship with world?

International Relations has, since its inception after the Great War, been structured around the issues highlighted above. Contentions relating to subject matter centre on the actors and issues most significant in global politics, but touch on fundamental questions relating to what constitutes politics, whether we may legitimately assume a separation of the domestic from the international, and whether we may indeed rely on concepts such as power and sovereignty to delimit the boundaries of our enterprise. The debate is often framed by dualisms which oppose the public realm to the private, the domestic to the international. These are dualisms which have foundations deep in Western political thought and it is not altogether surprising that their impact is strongly felt in a discipline such as International Relations. Contentions about subject matter must be juxtaposed with underpinning assumptions about what constitutes the international and what types of relations constitute global politics. Such assumptions powerfully inform empirical concerns in the discipline and these have spanned a wide range since the establishment of the discipline, from the study of war to global environmental politics. Contentions about subject matter must in turn be juxtaposed against those philosophical issues which place theory itself under scrutiny, the criteria used for its justification, and its place in the construction of the world. These are questions which any student of International Relations must be aware of and we will see them highlighted as we move through the trajectory of the discipline's history and its so-called 'great debates'.

THEORETICAL CONTENTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Relations as a formal discipline is relatively young compared to the social sciences and humanities to which it is closely related. It has, therefore, sought to establish clear boundaries which confer on it a distinct identity. While boundaries change and identities shift with time, what is clear is that the discipline is by and large constituted by the discourses or theoretical frameworks which dominate it at any stage during its evolution. It is these frameworks which provide the terms of reference for the discipline and it is these which function as gatekeepers for what is considered as its legitimate subject matter. Boundaries can by no means be taken for granted, however, and are always subject to contention and dispute within the discipline itself. How we construct such boundaries will, as stated earlier, have an impact on the delimitations of our subject matter and the theories we build to develop our understanding of such salient issues as peace and war, order and justice, the effectiveness or otherwise of international law and institutions and so on.

BOX 11.7 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

‘deals with and seeks to develop understandings of international social, political and economic life, where each of these terms in turn, the international, the social, the political and the economic, are in themselves subject to contention and contestation’

Whether we agree that International Relations is a distinct discipline or prefer to see it as emerging from a long tradition of reflections on these issues, we may confer an all-encompassing identity to the discipline by stating that it deals with and seeks to develop understandings of international social, political and economic life, where each of these terms in turn, the international, the social, the political and the economic, are in themselves subject to contention and contestation. While some may view such debate with dismay, seeking a uniform approach to the subject, others celebrate such diversity as promoting a rich tapestry for how we may not only understand the complexities of the realm we label the international but seek to transform the practices which enable the continuation of violence and inequality in the global sphere.

The concerns which have preoccupied International Relations have been the subject of speculation and reflection in writings that take us back to ancient Greece and the Romans, to Renaissance Italy and well into the birth of the Enlightenment and the eighteenth century. Whether we can consider International Relations as a separate realm of knowledge is itself highly problematic and requires justification. What is beyond dispute is that the discipline has a classical tradition which, in its various forms and interpretations, has contributed, as we will see below, to providing foundations for the perspectives associated with the field today.⁴ Foundations are often drawn upon in the setting of boundaries and the settling of identities. They are used as a method of

justification, as if to state that today's theories are built upon and derive from discourses which preceded our time, our context. It must, however, be recognised that foundations in the social sciences are set in turbulent terrain and are thus often shaky and questionable, strong in parts and weaker in others. The classical tradition is, therefore, open to a number of different usages and interpretations, and how we use the tradition, how we read the texts, will say more about our contemporary thought processes, our present modes of disciplinary legitimisation, than the assumptions held by the authors of those distant texts.

What we may state with certainty before this chapter moves to the contemporary debates is that much of the subject matter that delimits the discipline was already the focus of reflection among historians, philosophers and legal scholars much before the creation of a formal discipline we variously label International Relations, International Politics or International Studies. Writers within the contemporary field have looked to this 'classical tradition' not only as an exercise in the history of thought, but, more crucially, as a means of justifying the theories put forward. Using the classical tradition as a method of justification suggests that assumptions contained within this tradition may be thought of as 'foundational' and therefore taken as the givens upon which all other premises may be built. The crucial idea in foundationalism as a method of justification is that beliefs are built upon and require the support of other beliefs which are in themselves secure and beyond question.⁵ Such beliefs may, for example, point to a view of human nature as the basis upon which we may build theories relating to human organisation, the state and interstate relations. Clearly, a scrutiny of foundations, their subjection to different, often conflicting interpretations, endangers the edifice itself, the discipline's conceptual schema, and its intellectual content. It therefore becomes necessary to look to the foundations, not so much to uncover the detail of the classical tradition, but to illustrate that thought on matters 'international' existed prior to the establishment of the discipline of International Relations and that such thought has had a formative influence on the discipline's trajectory.

Theories of International Relations have always been concerned with questions relating to the regulation of interstate relations and the maintenance of order in the international system. How we regulate such relations and what form of order we seek to establish are, however, matters for contention and debate. In the early years, from 1919 to the 1930s, the discipline was dominated by what is conventionally referred to as *liberal internationalism*. The primary concern of this approach was that conditions which had led to the outbreak of the First World War and the devastation which followed should not be allowed to predominate in the future. The driving force was therefore normative in orientation and the underlying assumption was that the academic study of International Relations had the potential to contribute to the prevention of war and the establishment of peace. With foundations in the Enlightenment and the eighteenth century, liberal internationalism, as Scott Burchill points out, suggested that 'the prospects for the elimination of war lay with a preference for democracy over aristocracy, free trade over autarky, and collective security over the balance of power system'.⁶

The first of these, the view that democracy within states contributes to the establishment of peace between states, is a powerful idea whose primary exponent is Immanuel Kant in his pamphlet 'Perpetual Peace'.⁷ Here in this eighteenth-century text

on international relations, and one which some would view as having resonances in our own age, we see expressed the view that the internal governmental structures of a state have profound effects on how it conducts its relations with other states. The establishment of a 'perpetual peace' is dependent on a number of prerequisites which must be met if the conditions which have given rise to perpetual war are to be eliminated. Kant suggests that while war may benefit rulers, it cannot be in the interest of free citizens living within a republic for they would have 'great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise'.⁸ Just as reason is the basis of a 'perfect civil constitution' which ensures freedom, so too reason, 'as the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate duty'.⁹ A democratic order within a state provides a free citizenry with the capacity to condemn war conducted in the interest of rulers and establishes public opinion as a primary constraint on the conduct of relations with other states. For peace to be secure, however, a 'pacific federation' would have to be created which would secure the rights and duties of the contracting parties and which would govern peaceful relations between states.

The two interrelated ideas that emerge from Kant's reflections on a perpetual peace and which formed the basic foundations for the liberal internationalism that dominated the discipline of International Relations in its early days centred on democratic governance and institutionalised law-governed relations of co-operation between states. These were in themselves underpinned by the twin formative ideas of the Enlightenment, namely human rationality and a cosmopolitan moral order (that is, free from national limitation or interpretation) which saw humanity as a whole as the realm of a system of rights and obligations.¹⁰

BOX 11.8 LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

- normative: idealism
- democracy+free trade+collective security
- Kant
- democratic governance+co-operation based on law
- human rationality+cosmopolitan moral order
- international institutions

The two formative pillars of liberal internationalism, democracy and free trade, required the establishment of international institutions which would promote collectivist aspirations in place of the conflictual relations which formed the basis of balance-of-power thinking. For it was just such thinking, based as it was on the premise that relations between states are determined solely by the pursuit of power, which led to violations of international law and ultimately to the outbreak of war in 1914. A system of 'collective security' was advocated to replace antagonistic alliance systems with an international order based on the rule of law and collective responsibility. The domestic analogy of a social contract was deemed to be transferrable to the international level. The creation of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War was the culmination of the

liberal ideal for international relations. The League would function as the guarantor of international order and would be the organ through which states could settle their differences through arbitration. Any deviance from international law would be dealt with collectively in the name of a commonly held interest in the maintenance of peace and security.

Though liberal internationalist ideals are now recognised for their significant contribution in the development of normative approaches to the subject, they seemed, at the outset of the 1930s and ultimately the outbreak of the Second World War, futile and utopian. Thus it was that the subject matter of International Relations, dominated as it had been by international law and diplomatic history, was transformed to an intellectual agenda which placed power and self-interest at the forefront of concern.¹¹ The 'idealism' of the interwar period was henceforth to be replaced by *realism*, and it is this school of thought which, in its various articulations, remains dominant in the discipline. E.H.Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis*, published in 1939, was the text which positioned what he called utopianism in opposition to realism.¹²

Carr called for a 'science' of international relations, one which would move away from what he saw as the wishful thinking of liberal internationalism. By presenting the fact-value distinction, that which separates the 'what is' from the 'what ought to be', in dichotomous or oppositional terms, Carr's text called for a move away from utopian doctrine which, he suggested, was based on an unrealistic negation of power and its impact on international politics. In a statement which has manifest resonance for contemporary concerns in International Relations, Carr states:

The outstanding achievement of modern realism has been to reveal, not merely the determinist aspects of the historical process, but the relative and pragmatic character of thought itself. In the last fifty years, thanks mainly though not wholly to the influence of Marx, the principles of the historical school have been applied to the analysis of thought; and the foundations of a new science have been laid, principally by German thinkers, under the name of the 'sociology of knowledge'. The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and *a priori* principles, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed by the furtherance of interests.¹³

This statement points to the view that values are context-bound, that morality is determined by interest, and that the conditions of the present are determined by historical processes. Where idealism sought a universally applicable doctrine, Carr's call is for a historical analysis of the contingent frameworks which determine politics. Though Carr himself recognised the ambiguities involved in the 'antitheses' that frame his text, others writing subsequently have, by and large, neglected the nuances surrounding Carr's critique of utopianism, preferring instead to concentrate on an unmuddied borderline between realism and idealism. This oppositional representation had a lasting impact on the discipline and indeed has been seen as its first stage of theoretical contention.¹⁴

The formative assumptions of realism as a school of thought centre on the view that the

international system is 'anarchic', in the sense that it is devoid of an all-encompassing authority. Where domestic society is ruled by a single system of government, the international system of states lacks such a basis and renders international law non-binding and ultimately ineffectual in the regulation of relations between states. Conflict is hence an inevitable and continual feature of international relations. Just as liberal internationalism sought foundations in the Enlightenment and the birth of reason, so realism locates its roots further back, citing Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes as its founding voices.¹⁵ Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War is read as the formative paradigmatic text in that it covers themes such as power, intrigue, conquest, alliance-building and the intricacies of bargaining. Here we see portrayed a system of city states, the units or members of which are self-reliant and independent, with war breaking out in 431 BC. This text, selected from an age which produced Herodotus, Sophocles and Euripides, not to mention Socrates and Plato, is deemed foundational and is used by more contemporary realists as a basis of justification for claims made. Classically, we see in this narrative a powerful state, Athens, expanding in influence and threatening the political and economic well-being of the Peloponnesian states, led by Sparta. What is of interest is not so much how the themes covered by Thucydides reflect those of the dominant paradigm in the discipline, but more what is left out of this selective reading, namely the race and class struggles that were apparent at the time and which interest Thucydides himself, or the effects of war on the lived experience of those involved.¹⁶

Hans Morgenthau, whose *Politics among Nations* (1948) leads the realist perspective, points to a clear line of descent from Thucydides when he asserts that 'realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all'.¹⁷ Morgenthau's text starts with the assumption that there are objective laws which have universal applicability:

Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature... Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.¹⁸

BOX 11.9 REALISM

- what is
- values are context-bound
- morality and state behaviour determined by interest
- no all-encompassing authority
- conflict inevitable
- Morgenthau: 'interest defined as power':
 - objective laws rooted in human nature
 - distinction 'between truth and opinion'; separation of fact and value
 - 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power'
 - scientific and explanatory
 - state+power+Cold War concern

Ultimately, for Morgenthau and other realists, 'international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power'.¹⁹ Where liberal internationalism had been openly normative and prescriptive in orientation, the realism expressed by Morgenthau purports to be scientific and explanatory. Theories of international relations must, according to Morgenthau, be consistent with the facts and it is these which must be the ultimate test of the validity of theoretical statements. Morgenthau, like other realists, hence assumes a clear separation of fact and value, of theory and practice. What we see on closer inspection, however, is a theory that is replete with politics and prescriptive content, one that is steeped in the Cold War international politics of its day, and one, finally, which seeks the legitimation of its claims and its status by recourse, first, to foundational ideas on human nature derived from Hobbes, and, second, to science as the ultimate guarantor of the truth of theory. This text, above any other in the discipline, has had profound influence, not only in setting the substantive agenda, but in placing positivism²⁰ at the heart of the methodological and epistemological approaches to the subject.

By the late 1950s and into the 1960s we see a discipline dominated by realist conceptions of international relations, based as these were on the state as the primary unit of analysis, on interactions between states governed by the relentless pursuit of power, and on a substantive empirical agenda defined by Cold War concerns. Morgenthau's call for a 'science' of international relations was actualized in the so-called *behavioural revolution*, a methodological turn in International Relations and the rest of the social sciences which sought to apply the rigorous testing methods of the natural sciences to social science research. The emphasis was on quantitative research and any theory which could not be so subjected to 'operationalisation' was deemed to be based on impression and ideology. Far from challenging realism presuppositions, behaviourism merely reinforced the realist orthodoxy. It was, however, its claims to methodological supremacy which invited the most vigorous criticism from those opposed to the idea that the methods of the natural sciences could easily be transposed to International Relations. Prominent among such critics was Hedley Bull, who argued, along with other

traditionalists that the greatest insights in International Relations derived from classical thought, from philosophy and history.²¹

BOX 11.10 THE BEHAVIOURAL REVOLUTION

- new methodological approach: methods of natural science
- rigorous testing
- quantitative emphasis+operationalisation
- reinforced realist orthodoxy
- challenged by Hedley Bull: English School

Bull's concern was to argue that relations between states could not be reduced to measurable attributes of power or models of decision-making. If features of 'society' characterised relations between states and if, indeed, we could locate codes of conduct which formed such a society, we could legitimately look to history and philosophy to conceptualise the complexity of international politics. Bull's *The Anarchical Society*, first published in 1977, came to represent what subsequently has been referred to as the 'English School', demarcated from the United States-dominated realist and scientific perspective mainly through its normative approach to the subject.

It was during the 1960s, however, that other perspectives came to constitute alternative modes of conceptualising international politics. With decolonisation, the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the rise of a Third World alliance which made itself felt primarily at the United Nations, global relations came to encompass matters which seemed far removed from the Cold War rhetoric which underpinned relations between East and West. Economic and financial relations, development, social issues and regional integration seemed to challenge the primacy of the state as sole unit of analysis and power as the ultimate determinant of relations between states. One of the foremost challengers to the orthodoxy was John Burton, whose work came to be pivotal in the *pluralist* attempt to rewrite the discipline.²² Central to Burton's corpus was the view that global relations were multiform in content and involved a number of different types of actor, from individuals to states, to non-state organisations. Others within this wide-ranging challenge to realism included Keohane and Nye's work on 'transnational relations' and on 'complex interdependence'. Where the former was an empirical description of Burton's position that states were not the sole actors in the international system, the latter, articulated in *Power and Interdependence*, saw global politics as multiple channelled, as being based on a variety of relationships rather than on force, and as ultimately centring on issues which were not hierarchically organised around the strategic interests of the most powerful.²³ Taking these assumptions as baseline, the main research problematic came to focus on agenda-setting in global politics and it was this which led to the more recent emergence of 'regime theory', which acknowledges the place of power in the politics surrounding an issue area but which recognises other dynamics, including legitimacy and rules of conduct, that may not so easily be reduced.

BOX 11.11 PLURALIST

- global relations multiform in content
- number of different actors
- Burton
- Keohane and Nye: 'transnational relations'+ 'complex interdependence'
- complex interdependence: multi-channels+force not only basis of relations+no single hierarchy
- regime theory+issue areas+international organisations
⇒ neo-liberal institutionalism

Pluralism did not so much challenge the realist orthodoxy as provide a wider perspective on global interactions. While Burton's trajectory came to focus on conflict, its resolution and the place of the individual therein,²⁴ those involved in the interdependence school concentrated on the workings of international organisations, issue areas and the establishment of regimes. Despite such variation in outlook and research agenda, descriptions of the discipline have often far too easily placed these within one perspective. If pluralism's identity was based on its opposition to the realist orthodoxy, then it must be acknowledged that the theoretical underpinnings of realism, its derivation from classical thought and its foundational dependence on the essential rationality and sovereignty of the state as actor were not challenged. The contemporary derivation of pluralism, neo-liberal institutionalism,²⁵ based primarily in the United States, shares with realism a number of its founding assumptions.

A third perspective or paradigm which emerged as a critique of both realism and pluralism concentrated on the inequalities that exist within the international system, inequalities of wealth between the rich 'North', or the 'First World', and the poor 'South', or the 'Third World'. Inspired by the writings of Marx and Lenin, scholars within what came to be known as the *structuralist* paradigm focused on dependency, exploitation and the international division of labour which relegated the vast majority of the global population to the extremes of poverty, often with the complicities of elite groups within these societies. As Banks points out, exponents of this approach, 'argued that most states were not free. Instead they were subjugated by the political, ideological and social consequences of economic forces. Imperialism generated by the vigour of free enterprise capitalism in the West and by state capitalism in the socialist bloc imposed unequal exchange of every kind upon the Third World.'²⁶ The basis of such manifest inequality was the capitalist structure of the international system which accrued benefits to some while causing, through unequal exchange relations, the impoverishment of the vast majority of others. The class system that predominated internally within capitalist societies had its parallel globally, producing centreperiphery relations that permeated every aspect of international social, economic and political life. Thus, where pluralism and its liberal associations had viewed networks of economic interdependence as a basis of increasing international co-operation founded on trade and financial interactions, neo-Marxist structuralism viewed these very processes as the basis of inequality, the debt

burden, violence and instability.

BOX 11.12 STRUCTURALISTS

- focus on inequalities
- Marx and Lenin inspiration
- dependency+exploitation+division of labour
- subjugation of states by consequences of economic forces
- capitalism+class
- Frank, Amin and Wallerstein

Major writers in the structuralist perspective emerged from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, primary among which were Andre Gunter Frank and Samir Amin, both of whom concentrated on dependency theory. Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems analysis provided a historicist account of the spread of capitalism from the sixteenth century to the present, providing a definitive statement on the impact of this structure on interstate, class and other social relations.²⁷

Despite pluralist and structuralist attempts to move the discipline beyond the realist perspective, Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State and War* and his later *Theory of International Politics* define a neo-realist agenda and absolutely dominate the discipline to the present day. The substantive agenda which had already been set in place by theorists such as Morgenthau informed strategic studies and the Cold War struggle for power between East and West. It was this struggle which provided a reinforcing context which came to legitimate realism as a dominant approach in International Relations and which located its institutional and intellectual base firmly in the United States. It was, therefore, within this context that Kenneth Waltz came to establish his dominance in the discipline. Where Morgenthau's realism concentrates on the attributes and behaviour of states within the international system, Waltz focuses on the international system itself and seeks to provide a structuralist account of its dynamics and the constraints it imposes on state behaviour. The international system is, for Waltz, anarchical and hence perpetually threatening and conflictual.

BOX 11.13 NEO-REALISM

- Waltz
- focus on international system and its constraints on state behaviour
- structural
- importance of distribution of capabilities

What is of interest to Waltz is not the set of motives which may determine state behaviour, but the imperatives of the international system and the distribution of

capabilities within it. This is hence a structural account, but it is an account that markedly differs in approach and substantive content from the neo-Marxist structuralism outlined above. It has much akin to realism and must therefore be placed within that perspective.

The three schools of thought highlighted, namely realism, pluralism and structuralism, came to be described by Banks and others as constituting the 'inter-paradigm debate' in International Relations, a debate based on different images of the international system, its constitutive parts and relations between them.

BOX 11.14 INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE

- Banks
- paradigm: a general pattern or world view providing the parameters of actors, events and facts for theory
- realism/pluralism/structuralism=distinct agendas+concepts+ language
- no real 'debate'

Each 'paradigm' formed a perspective on global politics which was seen as distinct in its research agenda, concepts and language as to be incommensurable in relation to its counterparts. Each was, in turn, represented as a general theory of international relations.

As the above survey indicates, the discipline has moved through a number of so-called debates, starting with the idealist-realist debate, moving through the methodological controversies which pitched the behaviouralists against the so-called traditionalists, and culminating by the early 1980s in the interparadigm debate. This phased development of the discipline has structured the teaching of Theories of International Relations and has formed the basic framework for the vast majority of textbooks on the subject. However, as Steve Smith has pointed out,

the notion of an inter-paradigm debate is really misleading, since it implies that the three paradigms can confront one another over how to explain international relations. The problem is that there has been very little at all in the way of a debate between the rival positions. Rather, each has had its supporters, and these have referenced one another, been on one another's conference panels, and built incrementally on one another's work.²⁸

Despite the construction of the discipline in terms of the inter-paradigm debate, there is agreement that realism and its neo-realist close cousin dominate the field, that other perspectives merely answer to realism and perpetuate its dominance in establishing the intellectual agenda, and that such dominance has negated the place of marginal voices, those critical of the orthodoxies which underpin International Relations and discipline its discourses.

CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF ETHICS

International Relations has, as indicated in the previous section, sought to establish a distinct identity as a discipline with a remit that is distinguishable from political theory. Martin Wight's much-quoted question, 'Why is there no international theory?',²⁹ pointed to a widely held assumption that domestic political life was essentially different from international life and it was precisely this difference which called for a new language to reflect the realm of the international. The mainstay of theory in International Relations, and in particular realism as a dominant school of thought, came to be framed by a Westphalian legacy which placed sovereignty, the state and the anarchical interstate system at the core of the discipline. While the pluralist challenge succeeded in widening the scope of research concerns and contributed to the development of specialised areas such as International Political Economy, Conflict Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis, it manifestly failed in questioning the theoretical underpinnings of realism and specifically its unquestioning reliance on constructs such as sovereignty, the state and even anarchy. The Marxist influence in the structuralist school did raise questions relating to the state and its relationship to the global capitalist system, analysed class relations which transcended state boundaries and determined relations of exchange at the global level, and brought into International Relations a historicist, sociologically informed account of the global spread of capitalism, militarism and the state as predominant forms of human organisation. The state as unit of analysis could no longer be taken for granted, nor could relations between states. These were recognised to be historically contingent practices, situated in specific time and space relations, and steeped in relations of power.

Structuralism's Marxist underpinnings clearly impeded its development as a major school of thought in a US-dominated discipline. The questions it raised were, however, of central importance to the development of *critical perspectives* in International Relations, perspectives which concentrated on the relationship between knowledge and power, theory and practice, as well as language and the subject of our investigations. Theories of international relations and their role in the constitution of the world came under increasing scrutiny and the discipline could no longer assume an unproblematic distinction between the world and the word, between facts and the narratives we construct as 'expert' accounts of global politics. What was excluded from hegemonic accounts came to be as crucial as that which was included. Themes which were manifestly excluded, and which are to this day marginalised, included the inequalities which beset global relations, the vast riches accruing to the Western countries while the rest and their populations remain trapped within a system which has historically enabled some while constraining the vast majority of others. Another theme, and one related to the above, is culture and the diversity of lifeworlds which constitute the global population. International Relations is predominantly a Western discourse which draws upon Western political thought, and largely assumes Western institutions as legitimate and beyond question. There is here, as Stephen Chan has pointed out, an effective exclusion of other voices, other philosophies and a multiform series of other rationalities and ways of knowing the world we inhabit.³⁰

BOX 11.15 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (i)

- relationship between knowledge and power
- relationship between theory and practice
- use of language
- the subject of investigation
- taking account of previously excluded discourses=development of feminist account and re-examination of violence and war, international political economy and human rights, etc.
- rejection of 'positivism' with its focus on:
 - testing hypotheses, especially quantitatively
 - measuring and quantifying
 - recognising only positive facts and observable phenomenon

Just as cultural difference constitutes a crucial exclusion in hegemonic discourses in International Relations, so too gender and sexual difference are deemed to belong to a private realm separate from the public sphere of global politics, diplomacy and war. As Jill Steans points out:

Gender has been denied salience as an issue in International Relations because the discipline has been seen as constituted by a system of states which relate to one another in a context of anarchy... With respect to gender, International Relations theory grounded in realist assumptions has either been seen as neutral or assumptions about the position and status of women have not been made explicit.³¹

Revealing such exclusion, Steans, as well as a number of other feminist scholars, has not only succeeded in deconstructing major discipline-defining texts, but has contributed to the development of a specifically feminist account of global politics, one which is rewriting subjects such as violence and war, the international political economy and the international division of labour, nationalism and identity, human rights and international law.

What distinguishes the 'critical turn' in International Relations is a rejection of the positivist tenets which have dominated the discipline, as well as the assumption that international theory is somehow distinct from political and social thought.

A number of perspectives constitute this turn, and these have conventionally been labelled, if only for simplicities in representation, as critical theory, poststructuralism or postmodernism and feminism. Each of these in turn represents a number of different perspectives primarily on issues relating to epistemology or the nature of justified belief, and ontology or modes of being in the world and the basis of subjectivity. Where critical theory owes a debt to modernity and the Enlightenment, and specifically the writings of Immanuel Kant, it also looks to Marxist social theory as well as to the Frankfurt School

of the 1920s and 1930s, not only to provide a critique of positivism, but to develop a social theory based on emancipatory politics and human freedom.³² Poststructuralism, on the other hand, looks to philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger and more recent French philosophers such as Foucault and Derrida to provide a critique of Enlightenment thought and its reifications of instrumental reason and universalist accounts of truth.³³ Both critical theory and poststructuralism have variously influenced feminist thought. Above providing a post-positivist critique of International Relations and its dominant discourses, these three approaches scrutinise the discipline itself, the relations of power which determine its exclusions, and the ways in which theories are deeply implicated in the construction of naturalised concepts such as sovereignty, anarchy or security. Rather than considering these as given and beyond question, critical and poststructuralist approaches view all three as discursively constructed socio-political practices which have their own contingency in time and place. Where neo-realist orthodoxy views anarchy, for example, as a given condition of the international system, a critical account views anarchy as constructed and situated within specific historical conditions.³⁴

BOX 11.16 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (ii)

- Critical theory
- Poststructuralism or postmodernism
- Feminism

Issues as to:

- nature of the discipline
- relations of power
- role of theory in formulation of concepts

The postpositivist critique of the discipline has, paradoxically, brought the agenda of International Relations back to reflections on ethics, on questions of rights, and on the nature of political community and the international public sphere. Normative international relations is conventionally framed by the ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian’ divide which, respectively, argues for a conception of rights and obligations situated in our common humanity as opposed to being constituted by the individual’s membership of a specific cultural community. Where the first perspective, cosmopolitanism, argues for a single moral order linking humanity across the boundaries of culture and state, the second, communitarianism, confers moral standing to the state and the cultural community of which the individual is part.³⁵

BOX 11.17 COSMOPOLITAN-COMMUNITARIAN DIVIDE

- Cosmopolitan—conception of rights and obligations situated in common

humanity

- Communitarian—conception of rights and obligations constituted by membership of a *specific* community

There are significant substantive differences between contemporary interests in ethics and International Relations and the original concerns which established the discipline. What links them is a recognition that International Relations cannot be considered as separate and distinct from its subject matter, that the world and the words we construct of the world are intimately related, and this mutual constitution must, ultimately, confer a certain responsibility and demand a certain reflexivity on how we use the word and concept 'international'.

CONCLUSION

The discipline of International Relations has, as has been discussed above, moved through a number of defining theoretical perspectives as successive scholars have sought to make sense of the apparently simple word 'international'. The diversity of approaches has been not so much a reflection of changes in the substance of global politics, as a series of contentions relating to more philosophical questions on how we know what we know, whether ethical issues have a role in theories of international relations, and how theory relates to the realm of practice. Such questions, concerned as they are with knowledge and being, challenge the orthodoxy in International Relations and the dominance of the positivistic underpinning of neo-realism and its adjuncts.

Such questions did not emerge with the discipline, but are the concern of a deeply rooted classical tradition which has informed our ideas on the nature of politics, democratic practice, the ethics of interstate relations and the spatial and temporal domain of what constitutes international politics. The realm of knowledge is deeply implicated in the construction of the political subject and the subject of politics. It is precisely this recognition which renders the discipline of International Relations itself a contested site, only certain with its own categorising practices, its own reductions of the complexity of human interactions and the societies which contain them.

NOTES

- 1 As Brown points out, “‘International Relations’ (upper case) is the study of ‘international relations’ (lower case)’ (Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 3).
- 2 See Scott Burchill, ‘Introduction’, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater *et al.*, *Theories of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1996), for a similar categorisation of approaches in International Relations.
- 3 See Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- 4 See Torbjorn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) for a discussion of the heritage that theories in International Relations draw upon.
- 5 For a discussion of ‘foundationalism’ as a method of justification, see A.C. Grayling, ‘Epistemology’, in N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 41–2.
- 6 See Scott Burchill, ‘Liberal Internationalism’, in S. Burchill, A. Linklater *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
- 7 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93–130.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 100.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 104.
- 10 See Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) for an elaboration of these ideas and their application to contemporary global politics.
- 11 See William C. Olson and John Groom, *International Relations Then and Now* (London: Routledge, 1992) for a definitive history of the discipline covering the period under discussion.
- 12 Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939 and 1981; New York: Harper and Row, 1964). Subsequent quotations from this text derive from the 1964 edition.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp. 67–8.
- 14 See the special issue of *Review of International Studies*, ‘The Eighty Years Crisis 1919–1999’, Vol. 24 (December 1998), that is devoted to Carr’s legacy and subsequent developments on the themes covered by Carr.
- 15 N. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (London: Penguin Classics, [1532], 1981); T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, [1651], 1985); and Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1651], 1980).
- 16 This point is expressed by Sir R.W. Livingstone in his introduction to Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943).
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FURTHER READING

K.Booth and S.Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) stretches students but has an excellent introductory chapter and a comprehensive review of the main theories.

Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997) provides a clear and accessible overview, and relates theory to events.

James E.Dougherty and Robert L.Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990) is something of a classic.

A.J.R.Groom and Margot Light (eds), *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (London and New York: Pinter, 1994). A useful, neutral collection of descriptive essays.

Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds), *Perspective on World Politics: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 1991) provides an excellent overview of realism, pluralism and structuralism based on extracts from relevant examples, plus an introductory commentary.

Paul R.Viotti and Mark V.Kauppi (eds), *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1993) is an excellent combination of commentary and selected readings. NN

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